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Preface
On 26 January 2018, Randolf van Lambalgen was awarded a PhD by the
Erasmus University Rotterdam for his thesis ‘State aid to banks – an analysis of
the Commission’s decisional practice’. His supervisors were professor Hélène
Vletter-van Dort and professor Kleis Broekhuizen.
Van Lambalgen has written an inspiring dissertation about State aid to banks.
As the subtitle of the dissertation indicates, Van Lambalgen has focused on
the decisional practice of the Commission. This is not without reason: the
European Commission plays a central role in State aid cases. Indeed, every
State aid measure has to be authorised by the Commission before it can be
implemented by the Member State. In the case of State aid to banks, the authori-
sation by the Commission is usually conditional upon the submission of a
restructuring plan. This restructuring plan has to include restructuring measures
(such as divestments, pricing restrictions and an acquisition ban). These
restructuring measures are “tailor-made” and thus different per case. Indeed,
banks are different and State aid measures are different; consequently, the
restructuring measures are also different in each case. This explains why in
certain cases far-reaching restructuring measures are imposed, whilst in other
cases a much more lenient approach is taken. However, as Van Lambalgen
correctly argues, a tailor-made approach should not result in an arbitrary
approach.
As Van Lambalgen sets out in chapter 6, it is not easy to establish whether the
differences in restructuring measures are justified by the differences between
the various bank State aid cases. In that regard, Van Lambalgen observes that
there is a lack of clarity as to whether the bank State aid decisions of the Com-
mission are in line with the principle of equal treatment. This observation has
led to the following research question: How to assess whether a bank State aid
decision complies with the principle of equal treatment?
In his dissertation, Van Lambalgen provides an answer to this question. He
does so by introducing the ‘relevant characteristics-approach’. This is a novel
approach and it constitutes the most innovative aspect of his dissertation. In
essence, the ‘relevant-characteristics approach’ entails that the Commission
should consistently take into account the “relevant characteristics” (i.e. the
characteristics that are relevant to the Commission’s assessment). In order to
find these relevant characteristics, Van Lambalgen has analysed the hundreds
of bank State aid decisions that were taken since the start of the financial crisis
V
in 2007. The resulting list of relevant characteristics has led to a framework of
analysis. Analysing a bank State aid case through the application of this frame-
work of analysis ensures a consistent approach which takes all relevant aspects
into account. The framework can be used by every actor in a bank State aid case,
such as governments that consider granting State aid to banks, beneficiary
banks, or the Commission itself. The ‘relevant characteristics-approach’ enables
them to assess the consistency of the Commission’s decisional practice.
It is with great pleasure that we introduce this dissertation in the Series of the
Institute for Corporate Law of the University of Groningen and the Erasmus
University Rotterdam (Serie vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht
van de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen en de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam).
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background and illustration of the subject-matter
“The Dutch lobby in Brussels should have been better.”1
“The restructuring measures imposed on ING are punishments.”2
“ING accuses the Commission that it has treated the banks unequally.”3
These newspaper headlines all relate to the decision of the European Commis-
sion regarding the State aid that was granted by the Dutch state to the Dutch
bank ING. During the financial crisis, ING (like many other banks and finan-
cial institutions) experienced financial difficulties, and it had to be ‘rescued’
by the Dutch state. The Dutch state undertook several measures to help ING
survive the crisis. These measures constituted State aid.
In principle, EU law prohibits State aid, because State aid may give rise to com-
petition concerns. Distortions of competition can occur in three ways. Firstly,
State aid may give the beneficiary banks an unfair competitive advantage
over other banks which did not get State aid. Secondly, State aid may lead to
subsidy races between member states. If one member state is granting exces-
sive aid to its banks, then other member states may follow and also give
excessive aid to their banks. Thirdly, if a Member State recapitalises banks
which do otherwise not have access to capital (and would subsequently have to
leave the market), then State aid can frustrate the normal market functioning.
Besides these competition concerns, there is also the concern of moral hazard.
If banks know or expect that they will be rescued, then they are more inclined
to take (excessive) risks. They enjoy the upside, but do not bear the downside
risk of their actions. Thus, moral hazard may lead to excessive risk-taking.
So it comes as no surprise that State aid is prohibited in EU law. This prohibi-
tion is laid down in Article 107, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU). However, there are a few exceptions to this
1. “Nederland zou in Europa wat meer handjes moeten schudden”, NRC Handelsblad, 26 May
2012.
2. “Halvering ING is strafmaatregel”, NRC Handelsblad, 25 January 2010.
3. “ING verwijt Kroes banken ongelijk te behandelen”, Het Financieele Dagblad, 9 January
2010.
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prohibition (Article 107, paragraphs 2 and 3, TFEU). For instance, State aid
may be justified when it is intended to remedy market failure. In the case of
State aid to the banks, the aid was deemed necessary to prevent a meltdown
of the financial system. Therefore, a balance must be struck between preserv-
ing competition on the one hand and preserving financial stability on the other
hand. This is the task of the European Commission, who is the only competent
authority to judge the aid measures. The Commission has sought to achieve this
balance by approving the aid measures (to preserve financial stability), and by
imposing restructuring measures on the beneficiary banks at the same time (to
compensate for the competition distortions).4 Those restructuring measures can
be very severe, and are sometimes perceived (by the banks) as punishment.5
In the case of ING, the Commission approved the aid measures, but it imposed
certain conditions on ING: ING had to divest 45% of its assets (i.e. its insurance
branch, its subsidiary ING Direct USA, and other entities). Furthermore, ING
was prohibited from acting as price leader. And finally, ING had to adhere to
an acquisition ban for 3 years.
It is clear that those restructuring measures are very severe. ING has con-
ducted legal proceedings against the European Commission arguing that it was
not treated fairly. Other banks have also been granted State aid, but they were
not imposed such strict conditions. Also in the literature, it is argued that ING
was treated harshly, especially when compared to other banks. This raises the
question of equal treatment.6
At this point, an important clarification should be made. The ING-case just
serves as an illustration of a more general issue: can it be established whether
the Commission has applied the principle of equal treatment in its State
aid control policy. Since the ING-case is a well-known example in the
Netherlands, it was a logical choice to illustrate my point using the ING-case.
However, I could have easily used another bank. ING was not the only bank
that felt treated unjustly. Some other banks also faced restructuring measures
that they felt were too severe.
4. In one of its decisions (ING, 16 November 2012, para. 170), the Commission underlined
that “when it approves a measure, it does so on the basis of any accompanying commit-
ments which form an integral part of the measure in question”.
5. Also in the literature, the term ‘punish(ment)’ has been used. For instance, Soltész & Von
Köckritz (2010, p. 302) remark that the Commission “punishes banks which received ‘too
much’ or ‘too cheap’ aid”.
6. In its 2009 Annual Report (p. 7), ING argued the following: “We accepted these far-
reaching terms on the assumption that the EC would treat all state-supported financial
institutions equally and safeguard the level playing field in the EU internal market.
However, following the announcements of restructuring agreements the EC has entered
into with other state-supported financial institutions, we have strong concerns that the level
playing field in the EU internal market is at risk.”
CHAPTER 1
2
Thus, on a more general level, the following observation can be made: some
banks appear to have ‘escaped’ easily, while ING and other banks faced severe
restructuring measures. This raises the question of equal treatment. Similar
concerns were raised in a task force report of the Centre for European Policy
Studies:
“It should thus come as no surprise that some states felt unjustly treated,
leading to criticism of arbitrariness and inflexibility in the decisions.”7
In the literature, the following observation was made:
“Thus a tension surfaced over time between, on the one hand, the need for
a case-by-case assessment of the viability of credit institutions and of the
requirement of equal treatment. Put otherwise, the principle of proporti-
onality sometimes required derogations to (or a differentiated implementa-
tion of) stated principles but the lack of clarity as to the circumstances
justifying these derogations raised concerns of discrimination.”8
This observation touches upon a crucial problem: there is a lack of clarity as
to whether bank State aid decisions comply with the principle of equal treat-
ment. In my opinion, this lack of clarity is problematic, as will be discussed in
the following section.
1.2 Description of the problem
The previous section illustrated that there is some doubt whether the principle
of equal treatment is respected by the Commission in its bank State aid deci-
sions. This doubt is caused by a lack of clarity as to whether bank State aid
decisions comply with the principle of equal treatment.
This lack of clarity is due to the fact that it cannot easily be established whether
a bank State aid decision complies with the principle of equal treatment. This
principle essentially requires that comparable situations must not be treated
differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless
such treatment is objectively justified.9 It goes without saying that bank State
aid cases are not identical; the outcomes of the State aid procedure are there-
fore also not identical. In fact, State aid cases are often not comparable. This
is because the Commission follows a “tailor-made approach”: the Commission
7. Sutton, Lannoo & Napoli 2010, p. 20.
8. Gerard 2013, p. 18.
9. Case T-319/11, para. 110.
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takes into account the specific circumstances of each case.10 Taking into account
all the specific circumstances of the cases inevitably means that there will be
many aspects on which State aid cases can differ from each other. This, in turn,
means that it cannot easily be established whether a bank State aid decision is
in line with the principle of equal treatment. This is what results in a lack of
clarity.
Because of the lack of clarity, banks that are confronted with severe restructur-
ing measures may easily have the feeling that the imposition of those restruc-
turing measures is unfair, (especially) when compared with other banks that
were confronted with less severe restructuring measures. Those less severe
restructuring measures are due to differences between the bank State aid cases,
but if it is not clear which differences are relevant, then this lack of clarity may
easily lead to a feeling of unfair or unequal treatment.
The lack of clarity may thus lead to doubts whether the principle of equal treat-
ment is respected by the Commission in its bank State aid decisions. Since the
principle of equal treatment is a general principle of European Union law, the
Commission is bound to respect the principle of equal treatment. Doubts about
the application of the principle of equal treatment may undermine the public
support for the Commission’s State aid control policy. The lack of clarity is
therefore problematic for the Commission.
The lack of clarity is also problematic for the banks and Member States. In the
first place, this lack of clarity may lead to uncertainty for Member States that
are about to grant State aid to banks. Because of the “tailor-made approach” of
the Commission and the resulting lack of clarity, Member States and benefi-
ciary banks do not always know what to expect from the Commission in terms
of the required restructuring measures. Furthermore, the restructuring measures
that the Commission demands may be hard to challenge because of this lack of
clarity. Beneficiary banks and Member States may have the feeling that they are
unfairly treated in comparison with other bank State aid cases, but because of
the lack of clarity, they are not able to assess if this feeling is correct. This is
problematic, because if they are not able to assess if the restructuring measures
(that the Commission demands from them) are in line with the principle of
equal treatment, then they cannot successfully argue (during the negotiations
with the Commission) that these measures should be less severe. In addition,
they cannot make a well-considered decision whether to challenge the Com-
mission decision before the Court of Justice.
10. For instance, in the 2013 Banking Communication (point 9), the Commission stresses that
in its assessment of banks’ restructuring plans, it will take account of the specificities of
each institution and Member State.
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The main problem that this PhD-study aims to tackle, can thus be formulated
as follows:
There is a lack of clarity as to whether bank State aid decisions comply
with the principle of equal treatment. This lack of clarity may result in a
feeling of being treated unfairly in comparison with other banks that
have received State aid.
1.3 The aim of the study
1.3.1 Research question
The aim of this PhD-study is to address the central problem that was identi-
fied in the previous section. How to clarify the applicability and application of
the principle of equal treatment to bank State aid cases? The purpose of this
PhD-study is to find a way in which it can be assessed whether a bank State aid
decision complies with the principle of equal treatment. The corresponding cen-
tral research question is thus as follows:
How to assess whether a bank State aid decision complies with the prin-
ciple of equal treatment?
1.3.2 Relevance of the research
It has to be stressed that the main purpose of this PhD-study is not to reach any
conclusions on whether or not the Commission has respected the principle of
equal treatment in the past. In section 1.1, it was mentioned that there were
some suspicions that the Commission had violated the principle of equal
treatment. Although it might be tempting to find out whether these suspicions
were correct, that is not the ultimate aim of this PhD-study. The aim of this
PhD-study is not backward-looking; rather, it is forward-looking. It is about
providing a framework which can be used to establish whether a bank State
aid decision complies with the principle of equal treatment. This framework can
be put to use by the Commission, the Member States as well as by beneficiary
banks.
Relevance to Member States and banks
First and foremost, this PhD-study is relevant for the Member States that con-
sider granting State aid and for the beneficiary banks. Every Member State that
grants State aid and every bank that receives State aid, is ultimately confronted
with a decision of the Commission. If a Member State or a beneficiary bank has
the feeling that it was unjustly treated by the Commission in comparison with
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the way other banks were treated, then it probably wants to be able to substan-
tiate this feeling. This PhD-study enables Member States and beneficiary banks
to assess whether this feeling is correct. This PhD-study provides a framework
which can be used to establish whether a bank State aid decision complies with
the principle of equal treatment. This framework is not only useful for challen-
ging the restructuring measures. Indeed, it can be used to anticipate the “treat-
ment”, to negotiate the “treatment” and to challenge the “treatment”.11
These three possible uses correspond to three different stages. The first stage is
when a Member State designs the aid measure. The second stage is when the
Member State and the beneficiary bank conduct negotiations with the Com-
mission on the aid measure and the restructuring plan. The third stage is when
the Commission has adopted a decision and when the Member State and ben-
eficiary bank have to decide whether or not to challenge that decision before
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).12
With respect to this third stage, Member States and beneficiary banks could
use the framework of this PhD-study to estimate whether they can successfully
challenge the decision before the CJEU by pleading a violation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment. Since the case-law from the CJEU usually receives
more attention than decisions from the Commission, one could think that the
third phase (the litigation-phase) is the phase in which the framework of this
PhD-study can be best put to use. However, in my opinion, this is not the case.
There are 90 bank State aid cases, and only in 15 cases, the Commission deci-
sion was challenged before the CJEU.13 There are thus relatively few Member
States and banks who challenged the Commission decision before the CJEU
by bringing an action for annulment.
An important hurdle is the burden of proof: the applicant has to prove that
the Commission did not respect the principle of equal treatment. Another
– even more serious – obstacle is that the principle of equal treatment is inter-
preted very narrowly by the CJEU.14 In my opinion, the narrow CJEU-def-
inition15 of the principle of equal treatment can be unsatisfactory, because the
feeling that one is treated unfairly in comparison with others might be broader
than the principle of equal treatment as defined by the CJEU. In other words:
while the CJEU might conclude that the principle of equal treatment was not
violated, the bank concerned may still have the feeling that it was treated
11. The “treatment” being the total package of restructuring measures that the Commission
requires from the beneficiary bank.
12. In this PhD-study, I will mainly use the term ‘CJEU’. However, for the sake of readability,
I will sometimes speak of ‘the Court of Justice’ or simply ‘the Court’.
13. As will be explained in section 5.19.
14. This will be explained in-depth in chapter 5 of this PhD-study.
15. In this PhD-study, I use the term ‘CJEU-definition’ to refer to the way how the principle of
equal treatment is defined, interpreted and applied by the CJEU.
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unfairly in comparison with other banks. Since this PhD-study aims to address
that feeling – or more precisely: to address the lack of clarity that has caused that
feeling – this PhD-study will not focus solely on the CJEU-definition of the
principle of equal treatment. Instead, other interpretations of the principle of
equal treatment will also be explored. As will be explained in chapter 6, it is
possible that while there is no violation of the principle of equal treatment
according to the CJEU-definition, there is a violation according to another defi-
nition/interpretation. While that other interpretation cannot be used to raise a
plea regarding a violation of the principle of equal treatment, it might be able to
be used to substantiate other pleas of law. Furthermore, the other interpretation
is very useful in the negotiations with the Commission. As was explained in the
previous section, doubts about the application of the principle of equal treatment
by the Commission might undermine the public support for its State aid control.
Since these doubts are not limited to the CJEU-definition of the principle of
equal treatment, the Commission’s concern for the public support is probably
also not limited to the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treatment.
Indeed, it is during the negotiation stage that the framework is most relevant.
The framework can be used to assess whether the restructuring measures that
the Commission demands from the beneficiary bank, are in line with the prin-
ciple of equal treatment. If this assessment reveals that the required restructur-
ing measures are too severe in comparison with other bank State aid cases, then
this assessment can provide the Member State and bank concerned with argu-
ments to negotiate less severe restructuring measures.
With respect to the first stage (i.e. setting-up the aid measure), the framework
developed in this PhD-study will provide an insight into the Commission’s
approach to bank State aid. This insight can be useful to Member States when
designing aid measures, because the insight resulting from this PhD-study
allows them to better anticipate the “treatment” by the Commission.
One question remains: should a distinction be made between the relevance of
this PhD-study to banks on the one hand and Member States on the other hand?
They are two distinct parties and they have clearly different positions: the one is
granting the aid, while the other one is receiving the aid. It should also be noted
that the Commission decision is addressed to the Member State, not to the
bank. However, the bank is directly and individually concerned by the deci-
sion16, so it can challenge the Commission decision.17
16. “Directly and individually concerned” refers to the so-called “Plaumann-criteria” of case
25/62.
17. The ING-case is a good illustration of the fact that the Member State as well as the bank can
initiate legal proceedings. The fact that they each lodged their own application illustrates
that their position is not completely the same.
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The bank’s primary concern is its own interests, whereas the Member State
needs to take into account the stability of the entire banking sector. This means
that their interests may not always converge. However, this does not mean that
this PhD-study is less relevant to them.
Relevance to the Commission
In addition to being relevant to Member States and banks, this PhD-study is
relevant for the Commission. Just like Member States and banks can use the
framework to assess whether a bank State aid decision complies with the prin-
ciple of equal treatment, the Commission can use it in the same way to establish
whether its decision is in line with the principle of equal treatment. In the first
place, the aim of the Commission would be to evaluate its own decisional prac-
tice in terms of compliance with the principle of equal treatment. In the second
place, it seems likely that the Commission would like to be able to demonstrate
that its decisional practice does not violate the principle of equal treatment.
1.4 Scope of the study
This PhD-study focusses on State aid to banks. This focus on banks is due to the
fact that State aid to banks is somewhat special. As will be explained in chapter
3, banks are different from non-financial firms. The Commission has recognised
that State aid to banks is special: during the financial crisis, the Commission
adopted the Crisis Framework (mainly consisting of the 2008 Banking Com-
munication, the Recapitalisation Communication, the Impaired Assets Commu-
nication and the Restructuring Communication). In these Communications, the
Commission gave guidance specifically aimed at State aid to banks. It should
be noted that the Crisis Communications do not only apply to banks, but also
to other firms in the financial sector (such as insurance companies18, building
societies19 and credit unions20).
In that regard, it is worth stressing that the scope of application of the Crisis
Communications is not sharply defined. The 2008 Banking Communication
merely speaks of ‘financial institutions’, without providing a definition of
18. See, for instance: Ethias, 20 May 2010.
19. See, for instance: Dunfermline Building Society, 25 January 2010.
20. See, for instance: SA.41371 (1st prolongation of the Credit Union restructuring and
stabilisation Scheme), 5 May 2015, footnote 5.
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‘financial institutions’. The Recapitalisation Communication and the Prolonga-
tion Communications specify that in these documents, for the convenience of
the reader, financial institutions are referred to simply as ‘banks’.21
The 2013 Banking Communication (which replaced the 2008 Banking
Communication) is more precise about the scope of application of the Crisis
Communications. In particular, point 25 of the 2013 Banking Communication
provides that the Crisis Communications apply to ‘credit institutions’ (also
referred to as ‘banks’), as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC. The
scope of application is not limited to banks, since point 26 of the 2013 Banking
Communication provides that the Crisis Communications, where appropriate,
also apply, mutatis mutandis, to insurance companies.22
The approach of the Commission in its Crisis Communications can be con-
trasted with the CRD IV-approach. Indeed, the CRR and CRD IV contain spe-
cific and detailed definitions of ‘credit institutions’ and ‘financial institutions’.
By contrast, the Crisis Communications are quite vague about the scope of their
application. The Crisis Communications even seem to contradict the CRR-
definitions. The terms ‘banks’, ‘credit institutions’ and ‘financial institutions’ are
more or less used as synonyms in the various Crisis Communications, whereas
CRR/CRD IV makes a sharp distinction between credit institutions and finan-
cial institutions.23 However, it should be noted that CRR/CRD IV has a different
purpose than the Crisis Communications. From a financial regulation perspec-
tive, it is important to clearly distinguish between the different types of finan-
cial firms. By contrast, from a State aid control perspective, this distinction is not
that important. From a State aid perspective, the essential difference is between
financial firms and non-financial firms. In that regard, the scope of application
of the Crisis Framework is specific enough.24
21. This was specified in footnote 1 of these Communications. In the same vein, footnote 3 of
the Restructuring Communication indicates that although the Restructuring Communica-
tion refers to banks for ease of reference, “it applies, mutatis mutandis, to other financial
institutions where appropriate”.
22. Within the meaning of Article 6 of Directive 73/239/EEC, Article 4 of Directive 2002/83/
EC or Article 1(b) of Directive 98/78/EC.
23. ‘Financial institution’ is defined in CRR as an undertaking other than a credit institution
or investment firm, the principal activity of which is to […]. Thus, according to this defi-
nition, a credit institution cannot be a financial institution.
24. The question whether the Crisis Framework is applicable to a case, is rarely raised. Only in
the case of ARCO, a financial cooperative company, the Commission assessed whether the
beneficiary of State aid fell under the scope of application of the Crisis Framework. In its
decision on ARCO (SA.33927, 3 July 2014, para. 120), the Commission concluded that
financial cooperatives are not financial institutions for the purposes of the 2008 Banking
Communication. The case of ARCO will be discussed in more detail in section 5.10.
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In this PhD-study, I will analyse the bank State aid decisions of the Commis-
sion.25 In this PhD-study, ‘bank State aid decisions’ are understood as every
decision in which the Commission assessed the aid on the basis of the Crisis
Framework.26 An overview of the bank State aid decisions can be found in the
table in Annex III.27
As regards the temporal scope of the study, all bank State aid decisions that are
taken since the adoption of the Crisis Framework will be analysed. However,
there are a few cases in which the public version of the decision is not (yet)
available.28 These decisions are not included in the analysis of the decisional
practice, because the contents of the decisions is vital to that analysis. A final
remark: this research was concluded on 1 August 2017. Developments after that
date are not taken into account in this PhD-study.
1.5 Structure of the study
The aim of this PhD-study is to provide a framework which can be used to
establish whether a bank State aid decision complies with the principle of
equal treatment. This aim guides the structure of this PhD-study. Firstly, the
foundations of the framework are laid down in chapters 2 to 5. These chapters
provide a background to the topic of bank State aid. Secondly, chapter 6 delves
25. In this PhD-study, the decisional practice of the Commission will be analysed. It should be
noted that the Commission is not the only institution that applies State aid rules: the EFTA
Surveillance Authority also assesses State aid cases. The EFTA Surveillance Authority
assesses State aid measures granted by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (i.e. the EFTA
States that are part of the EEA Agreement). NB: the EFTA (European Free Trade Asso-
ciation) consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, while the EEA
(European Economic Area) is an agreement between the EU and three of the EFTA
States; Switzerland is not part of the EEA. The EEA Agreement extends the single market
(i.e. the four freedoms) to the EEA and it mirrors the competition and State aid rules of the EU
Treaties. Accordingly, the EFTA Surveillance Authority applies State aid rules that are
broadly equivalent to the EU State aid rules. Nevertheless, this PhD-study focusses only
on the Commission decisions. Decisions from the EFTA Surveillance Authority fall outside
the scope of this PhD-study.
26. In this PhD-study, I will also use the term ‘Commission decisions’ to refer to the bank
State aid decisions.
27. In this PhD-study, when referring to a Commission decision, I will usually provide the
following information in a footnote: the name of the bank concerned, the case number, the
date of the decision and the relevant paragraph. The case number can be used to find the bank
State aid decision on the website of the Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
state_aid/register/.
28. In these cases, the only information can be found in the press release. The table in Annex
III (which gives an overview of all bank State aid decisions) also indicates the decisions of
which the public version is not available.
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into the question how the principle of equal treatment can be applied to bank
State aid cases. Chapter 6 is thus a pivotal chapter, in the sense that it introduces
my framework of analysis. Thirdly, the actual analysis of the bank State aid
decisions takes places in the chapters 7 to 13. The conclusions can be found in
chapter 14, the final chapter of this PhD-study.
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Chapter 2. State aid
2.1 Introduction
Since the topic of this PhD-study is the Commission’s assessment of State aid
to banks, it might be worthwhile to provide a basic background of the concept
“State aid control”. This will be done in the present chapter.
The concept of “State aid control” can be captured in a single statement: in prin-
ciple, State aid is prohibited, but it can – in certain instances – be authorised
(“declared compatible”) by the Commission. This statement touches upon the
following questions. Firstly, why is State aid prohibited? Secondly, why is the
Commission charged with assessing whether State aid is compatible? Thirdly,
when does a measure fall under the scope of the prohibition? Fourthly, in which
instances is State aid considered to be compatible with the internal market?
The first two questions concern the economics of State aid; these questions
will be addressed in section 2.2 of the present chapter. The third question con-
cerns the existence of State aid, while the fourth one concerns the compatibility
of State aid; these questions will be addressed in sections 2.3 and 2.4 of the
present chapter. Finally, the procedural aspects of State aid control will be set out
in section 2.5.
2.2 The economics of State aid
2.2.1 The adverse effects of State aid
State aid is a remarkable phenomenon. It can be both harmful and beneficial.
On the one hand, Member States may have valid reasons to grant State aid. On
the other hand, State aid can have adverse effects.
13
The damaging effect of State aid is that it may create distortions of competition.
This is harmful, because competition is generally considered to be desirable.
According to economic theory, competition increases welfare, because competi-
tion leads to efficiency. There are three types of efficiency: productive efficiency,
allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency.1
Productive efficiency means that goods and services are produced at the
lowest possible cost. Productive efficiency is achieved when a certain input is
used in such a way that results in a maximum output, or alternatively, when a
certain output is produced with a minimum input.2
Allocative efficiency is based on the economic notion that resources are
scarce and can be used in alternative ways. Allocative efficiency is achieved
when the scarce resources are used in such a way that will optimally benefit
society at large. This is the case when the marginal willingness to pay equals
the marginal production costs.
Productive and allocative efficiency are static concepts, in the sense that
they focus on maximising welfare at a specific point in time. By contrast, the
third type of efficiency is dynamic: this focuses on maximising welfare over a
period of time.3 Dynamic efficiency is achieved by investments and innova-
tion. The link with competition is clear: competition may induce undertakings
to innovate.
Thus, competition increases efficiency, which – in turn – increases welfare.
From this viewpoint, State aid is harmful, because it creates distortions of com-
petition. These distortions can occur in several ways.
In the first place, State aid gives the beneficiary undertaking an unfair com-
petitive advantage over other undertakings which did not receive State aid.
This results directly from the characteristic of selectivity of State aid. State aid
is a selective advantage; an advantage that is only granted to certain under-
takings. It is an artificial competitive advantage. It is contrary to the ideal of
“competition on the merits”.
In the second place, if a Member State recapitalises undertakings which do
otherwise not have access to capital (and would subsequently have to leave
the market), then State aid can frustrate the normal market functioning. The
normal market functioning is based on the principle of “survival of the fittest”.4
As the AG noted in the case C-526/14, “it is in the nature of any economic
1. Haucap & Schwalbe 2011, p. 6; Nitsche & Heidhues 2006, p. 52.
2. Schwalbe & Zimmer 2009, p. 8.
3. Haucap & Schwalbe 2011, p. 6.
4. See: Adriaanse, Kuijl & Verdoes 2009. Rescuing inefficient banks that are too-big-to-fail
goes against the principle of survival of the fittest. Barneveld (2012) aptly called this:
“survival of the fattest”.
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activity that some undertakings – generally the most poorly performing – will
fail and leave the market, and their investors, consequently, lose all or part of
their investments”.5 Keeping inefficient undertakings artificially alive negati-
vely affects productive efficiency.6
In the third place, State aid influences expectations and incentives. Under
normal market conditions, undertakings have an incentive to invest in R&D
and innovation, because this will increase their market share. The market share
of the competitors will decrease and they may even have to leave the market.
However, if undertakings expect that the State will support undertakings in
difficulty, then this will reduce their incentives to invest in innovation.7 State
aid not only affects the incentives of the potential beneficiaries of State aid, it
also affects the incentives of undertakings that are very successful. If those
undertakings expect that their inefficient competitors will be rescued by the
State, then this reduces their effort to succeed. Since the State aid allows their
inefficient competitors to remain on the market, the reward for success is
reduced.8 This, in turn, reduces the effort to be successful on the market. This
might result in a decrease of dynamic efficiency.9
In the fourth place, State aid may lead to subsidy races between Member
States.10 If one Member State is granting excessive aid to its undertakings, then
other Member States may follow and also give excessive aid to their underta-
kings. So granting aid may provoke a reaction from other Member States (the
so-called “tit-for-tat-strategy”11).
In the fifth place, State aid may create moral hazard.12 If undertakings know
or expect that they will be rescued when they are about to fall, then they are
more inclined to take (excessive) risks. They enjoy the upside, but do not bear
5. Opinion in Case C-526/14 (Kotnik), para. 58. This case will be discussed in chapter 5 of
this PhD-study.
6. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 653.
7. Ahlborn & Piccinin 2010a, p. 54.
8. Ahlborn & Piccinin, 2010b, p. 136.
9. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 653.
10. The risk that State aid might lead to subsidy races was recognised by the Commission in
the IAC (point 13b and 16) and in the Recapitalisation Communication (point 8).
11. Nicolaides & Bilal 1999, p. 32.
12. A definition of the term ‘moral hazard’ can be found in The New Oxford Companion to
Law (2008, by Michel Tison): “This term generally refers to a situation where a person
who is exposed to a risk of whatever nature has no incentive to avoid the materialization of
the risk because its effects have been transferred to or taken over by someone else. […]
Moral hazard will induce a person who is immunized from the (financial) effects of the
occurrence of a risk to behave in a less careful way then if he or she were more exposed to
it.”
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the downside of their actions.13 This is especially the case for undertakings
that are considered to be “too-big-to-fail”. Thus, moral hazard may lead to
excessive risk-taking.14
At this point, it might be useful to elucidate one other aspect: moral hazard
and distortions of competition are sometimes bracketed together.15 This raises
the question to what extent they are different distortions: is moral hazard a
distortion of competition? In the sense that moral hazard creates perverse
incentives and leads to excessive risk-taking, moral hazard is different from
competition distortions. Nevertheless, the too-big-to-fail status which creates the
moral hazard problem, also creates a distortion of competition: the prospect that
the bank will be rescued by the State may make it easier for the bank to raise
funding on the market (at a lower cost). In other words: the prospect of State aid
may artificially reduce the funding costs of the bank. This gives the bank an
undue competitive advantage.16 This is clearly a distortion of competition.
2.2.2 Motives for granting State aid
As explained in the previous subsection, State aid may give rise to competition
distortions. This raises the question why governments grant State aid. There may
be several motives for governments to grant State aid; motives which can be of
an economic or non-economic nature. The economic motives are reflected in the
efficiency objective of aid, whereas the non-economic motives are reflected in
the equity objective of State aid.
The efficiency objective
Market failures may provide a justification for government intervention. Mar-
ket failuremeans that the market fails to deliver the optimal outcome.17 Amarket
failure occurs when the market does not provide a good or service even though
the economic benefits are greater than the economic costs.18 There are several
types of market failure. In this section, the two most prominent ones will be dis-
cussed: i) externalities, and ii) information asymmetry.19
13. Ahlborn & Piccinin 2010a, p 54.
14. This also explains why financial regulation is so important.
15. For instance, point 29 of the Restructuring Communication – which will be discussed in
chapter 3 – indicates three types of distortions created by State aid. The first two types of
distortion clearly concern competition, whilst the third type of distortion concerns the
moral hazard problem.
16. This concern is mentioned in point 9 of the 2014 R&R-guidelines.
17. Buelens et al. 2007, p. 10.
18. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 633.
19. The State aid Action Plan (SAAP) also includes coordination problems and market power
as examples of market failure.
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Externalities
The existence of externalities may provide a justification for granting State aid.
“Externalities” is an economic concept and essentially means that economic
actors (such as undertakings) cannot fully internalise the costs or benefits of
their actions. There are positive externalities and negative externalities. Negative
externalities (or external costs) are costs that result from a certain activity, but
those costs are incurred by society and not by the undertaking conducting the
activity. The classic example of a negative externality is pollution.Assume that an
undertaking produces certain products and that the production process causes
air pollution. The undertaking itself is not affected by it, but the activity obvi-
ously has negative effects on society. In such a situation, the social costs are
higher than the private costs.
Positive externalities (or external benefits) occur when a certain activity
entails benefits for society which are not appropriated by the undertaking itself.
A classic example is R&D. Some R&D-projects are not invested in by under-
takings; this occurs when the rate of return on these projects is not attractive
from the perspective of the undertaking. This is the case when the undertaking
cannot fully appropriate the benefits of the R&D-project; for instance when
patents do not provide full protection.20 However, these projects may still be
beneficial for society as a whole, since R&D may create knowledge spillovers
or opportunities for other undertakings to develop complementary products and
services.21 In such a situation, the social benefits are higher than the private
benefits.
Externalities are a form of market failure, in the sense that the market fails
to deliver an efficient outcome.22 This is because undertakings only take into
account the private costs or benefits (and not the social costs or benefits). As a
result, in the case of a negative externality, more products are produced than is
desirable from a social welfare perspective. In the case of positive externalities,
the activity is performed at a smaller scale than would be optimal for society.
Giving subsidies (i.e. State aid) to the undertakings concerned may remedy this
market failure, because these subsidies induce the undertaking to produce at
the optimal scale.
20. As explained by Meiklejohn (1999, p. 28), it can be costly to obtain or enforce patents and
the period of validity of the patent may in some cases be shorter than the payback period.
21. As the Commission noted in its R&D&I-Communication.
22. Public goods can be considered as a very specific form of externalities. The defining char-
acteristic of public goods is that they are non-rival and non-excludable. Non-rivalry of con-
sumption means that a good can be consumed by one person without reducing the availability
to others. Non-excludability means that people who are not willing to pay for the good,
cannot be excluded from using it. Street lighting is a good example of a public good. As a
result of the non-excludability of public goods, it is not attractive for undertakings to produce
public goods, because they cannot appropriate the benefits: they cannot force people to pay
for the consumption of the good, since no one can be excluded from using the good. This
means that there is no market for public goods.
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Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry means that one side of the market has more information
than the other side. A good example is the capital market/credit market. On the
demand side, there are undertakings that want to obtain funding for their activ-
ities. On the supply side there are banks and investors. The undertakings know
more about the prospects and profitability of their activities than banks and
investors. Also, the default risk is often unknown to potential suppliers of credit.
In other words: there is information asymmetry. As a result, it is difficult for
potential investors to distinguish between good and bad investments.23 Risk-
averse investors may be reluctant to provide capital to such undertakings. In
economic terms: there is an imperfect matching of supply and demand. This
means that some projects will not be financed, even though they are worth
financing.
Especially young undertakings and SME’s find it difficult to obtain fun-
ding.24 This is because there is less information about them. Information asym-
metries may provide a justification for State aid that provides incentives to the
financial sector to increase (SME) investments.
The equity objective
The equity objective concerns redistribution of wealth and resources. As
Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden put it: the efficiency objective is about “mak-
ing the cake bigger”, the equity objective is about “dividing the cake better”.25
State aid is one of the instruments governments can use to redistribute income.
In the absence of market failures, the market will deliver efficient results. This
does not mean, however, that the market outcome is equitable/socially desirable.
This might provide a reason for the government to intervene. This is the case for
regional aid, social aid and aid to promote culture.
Regional aid is a typical example of a redistribution of income. Public funds
are used to support the poorer regions of a Member State. Regional aid has an
equity objective, because “it is morally, socially and therefore politically unac-
ceptable for a country to allow great differences in the standard of living of its
regions”.26
An example of social aid is aid for the employment of disadvantaged and
disabled workers. Employers might be reluctant to hire disadvantaged and dis-
abled workers. As a result, these workers might have difficulties entering (or
staying in) the labour market. This is an outcome that is not socially desirable.
23. Neven & Verouden 2008, para. 1.42; Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 633.
24. Neven & Verouden 2008, para. 1.43.
25. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 632.
26. Schina 1987, p. 63.
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In order to encourage undertakings to hire more disadvantaged and disabled
workers, Member States may choose to subsidise the wage costs of these work-
ers.27
Aid to promote culture is another example of the equity objective. If too few
cultural goods are produced, then State aid may be justified in order to increase
(or sustain) the production of cultural goods. In that regard, it should be noted that
the TFEU explicitly recognises the utmost importance of promoting culture.28
2.2.3 The effectiveness of State aid
State aid that is intended to correct market failure may seem like a sound
policy instrument. However, there are a number of drawbacks which limit the
effectiveness of State aid.
Alternatives
The existence of a market failure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for granting aid. State aid is only an appropriate instrument to address market
failure if there are no better options available. This is why State aid has been
called a “second-best option”.29 The first-best solution would be to address
market failure directly. The most typical alternatives are regulation and taxation.
In the case of externalities, there are two approaches: internalisation or sub-
sidisation. For instance, in the case of a negative externality such as air pollution,
the government may impose a tax on emissions. The tax would internalise the
externality, because the tax entails that the undertaking has to bear the cost of
pollution.30 However, this may put undertakings at a disadvantage compared to
undertakings in other countries with a less strict environmental policy.31
The Commission has recognised that there are alternatives to State aid. In
many of its Communications, the Commission stresses that aid should be an
‘appropriate policy instrument’.32
Difficult to measure
It is difficult to measure the exact size of the market failure. As a result, it is dif-
ficult to determine the right amount of State aid. For instance, in the case of posi-
tive externalities, the social benefits are greater than the private benefits. As a
27. This type of State aid is dealt with in “Communication from the Commission – Criteria for
the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and
disabled workers subject to individual notification”.
28. Article 167(2) and 167(4) TFEU. Communication from the Commission on State aid for
films and other audiovisual works, para. 9-10.
29. Nicolaides 2008, p. 92.
30. It has been argued that a tax on pollution is a “first-best policy”. See: Crocioni 2006, p. 92.
31. Meiklejohn 1999, p. 29.
32. See for example: Communication from the Commission – Criteria for the analysis of the
compatibility of State aid for the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers
subject to individual notification, para. 8.
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result, the undertaking produces less than is optimal from a social welfare per-
spective. The government may induce the undertaking to produce at the optimal
scale by granting subsidies. Optimally, the amount of the subsidy should equal
the difference between the social and private benefits. This, however, may be
difficult to determine.
The costs of State aid
Government intervention may have benefits. But there is also a cost-side. State
aid should only be granted if the benefits outweigh the costs. State aid is costly
and has to be financed. In the end, taxpayers bear the cost.33 Furthermore, state
resources are limited. Funds that are used to finance State aid cannot be used to
finance other domains of government. This is called the opportunity cost of State
aid.34
Government failures
It is perhaps ironic that a government intervention which is intended to correct
a market failure, may be subject to a “government failure”. This is the case when
the intervention is misdesigned or misimplemented. Politicians do not always
take the “right” decisions. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there may be
information asymmetry. Governments do not have perfect information. Secon-
dly, politicians may be susceptible to lobbying. State aid policy may have been
captured by special interest groups. Thirdly, politicians wish to be re-elected and
sometimes, they pursue their private goals.35 State aid may make politicians
popular, especially when the benefits are more easily perceived than the costs.
These three reasons (information asymmetry, lobbying and self-interest) may be
interrelated. If politicians do not possess enough information, then they may be
more susceptible to lobbying.36 Also, politicians may decide to grant State aid
according to the wishes of certain interest groups, because this may have favour-
able electoral consequences.
2.2.4 State aid control
All State aid measures have to be notified to the Commission. State aid measures
are in principle prohibited and can only be implemented when they are author-
ised by the Commission. By assessing State aid measures, the Commission
exercises State aid control. A key feature of State aid control is that it is exercised
by a supranational institution (i.e. the Commission). Why should State aid con-
trol be performed by a supranational institution? This is due to the following two
reasons.
33. This is also recognised in the State aid Action Plan (para. 8).
34. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 637; Haucap & Schwalbe 2011, p. 30.
35. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 637.
36. Buelens et al. 2007, p. 8.
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Preventing subsidy wars
One of the purposes of State aid control is to prevent subsidy wars. State aid
may have negative spill overs: it may benefit undertakings in one Member
State at the expense of other Member States.37 This might result in a “beggar-
thy-neighbour policy”.38 As was described in section 2.1, granting aid may
provoke retaliatory measures by other Member States. This is the so-called “tit-
for-tat strategy”.39 The subsidy competition is individually rational, but collec-
tively wasteful.40 Granting aid to domestic undertakings is individually rational,
because it is the dominant strategy. This can be illustrated by the following
example: If Member State A is the only Member State that grants aid, then the
undertakings of Member State Awill have a competitive advantage. In this case
it would be rational for Member State A to grant aid. In the case that other
Member States also support their own industries, it would still be rational for
Member State A to grant aid to its undertakings: not to gain a competitive
advantage, but to level the playing field. So in both cases, it would be rational to
grant aid. The collective outcome is that each Member State will grant aid.
However, all Member States would be better off if none of them would grant
aid. The only result of the subsidies is “reciprocal neutralisation”: the subsidies
cancel each other out.41 As a consequence, government funds are used to sub-
sidise undertakings, but no Member State has gained a competitive advantage.
The only ones who benefit are the undertakings that are subsidised. The gov-
ernments (in the end: the taxpayers) have to bear the cost. In economic terms:
funds are transferred from the rest of society to undertakings. To conclude, while
each Member State has an incentive to grant State aid, it would be in the col-
lective interest not to grant State aid. To solve this prisoner’s dilemma, a supra-
national institution is needed.42
Providing a shield against domestic lobbying
State aid is not always effective. Especially in the case of government fail-
ures, State aid may be a waste of government funds. Governments may be sus-
ceptible to domestic lobbying. State aid control may provide a shield against
domestic lobbying, because it entails that the ultimate decision is not taken by
the national government, but by the European Commission. A supranational
37. Positive cross-border spillovers are also possible. This is the case when subsidised
undertakings use imported goods as input.
38. Nicolaides & Bilal 1999, p. 4.
39. Nicolaides & Bilal 1999, p. 5.
40. Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 638.
41. European Commission’s First Report on Competition Policy, 1972, p. 116.
42. For this reason, State aid control can be viewed as “an act of rational self-commitment”
(Haucap & Schwalbe 2011, p. 5) or as a “disciplining device” (Heimler & Jenny 2012,
p. 351).
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institution would be less vulnerable to domestic lobbying.43 Thus, State aid con-
trol reduces government failures. It is a way to limit excessive aid and wasteful
spending. This is often cited as a rationale for supranational State aid control.
It is however doubtful whether the Commission is really invulnerable to lob-
bying.44
2.2.5 Concluding remarks
As explained in the present section, there may be valid reasons to grant State
aid, but State aid can also be harmful. A “good” State aid policy enhances social
welfare, while a “wrong” State aid policy reduces social welfare. In essence,
State aid control tries to ensure a good State aid policy, by authorising the “good”
State aid measures while prohibiting the “wrong” measures.
2.3 The (legal) notion of State aid
In the previous section, the economics of State aid have been explained. In the
present and following sections, the legal aspects of State aid will be discussed.
The State aid rules can be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). The State aid rules date from the very beginning of the
European treaties. There have been several treaty changes and the provisions on
State aid have been renumbered several times, but their contents have (largely)
remained the same.45 The substantive State aid rules are laid down in Article
107 TFEU. Article 107, paragraph 1, TFEU states that:
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Mem-
ber States, be incompatible with the internal market.”
43. See also: Crocioni 2006, p. 93.
44. See also: Friederiszick, Röller & Verouden 2006, p. 644; Buelens et al. 2007, p. 8.
45. The original provisions were Article 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC Treaty). Following the Treaty of Maastricht (which entered
into force on 1 November 1993), the EEC Treaty was renamed as the Treaty establishing
the European Community (EC Treaty) and renumbered: the State aid rules were laid down
in Article 87 and 88 EC. The State aid provisions were renumbered again on 1 December
2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Following this treaty, the EC treaty
was renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and renum-
bered. The State aid rules are now laid down in Article 107 and 108 TFEU.
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For a measure to fall under the definition of “State aid”, six criteria have to be
fulfilled:
1) The aid must be granted by the state or through state resources
2) The recipient of aid must be an undertaking
3) The aid must confer an advantage to the recipients
4) The advantage must favour certain undertakings or economic activities
5) The aid must affect trade between Member States
6) The aid must distort competition in the common market
These criteria are cumulative. This means that a measure only constitutes State
aid if all these criteria are met. It should also be noted that although I have
distilled six criteria from Art. 107(1) TFEU, some authors only distil five cri-
teria.46 Furthermore, the Court usually identifies four criteria.47
It is important that the notion of “State aid” is clearly defined. An overly broad
interpretation of “State aid” would mean that many measures fall under the
scrutiny of the Commission.48 This would result in an enormous administrative
burden for both the Member States and the Commission. As a consequence,
the effectiveness of State aid control will be reduced.
In that regard, it is worth stressing that the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU
have been interpreted and clarified in the case-law of the Court. In the context
of the State aid Modernisation (SAM), the Commission announced its inten-
tion to provide clarification and better explanation of the notion of State aid.49
This led to the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid.50 Notwithstan-
ding this Commission Notice, the Court has the final say on the interpretation
of the notion of “State aid”. As the following subsections clearly illustrate, the
Court has had an important role in clarifying the notion of “State aid”.
46. For instance, Adriaanse (2006, p. 19) identifies five criteria. He treats the criterion that the
aid must favour “certain undertakings” as a single criterion, while I have separated it into
two distinct criteria: “certain” (i.e. criterion 4) and “undertaking” (i.e. criterion 2).
47. See, for instance: Case C-677/11, para. 25: “Article 107(1) TFEU makes that incompa-
tibility subject to the confirmation that four conditions have been met. First, there must
be an intervention by the State or through State resources. Second, the intervention must
be liable to affect trade between Member States. Third, it must confer an advantage on the
recipient. Fourth, it must distort or threaten to distort competition.”
48. Prek & Lefevre 2012, p. 335. See also: Lopez 2010, p. 807-819. Hancher 2003, p. 365-373.
49. SAM, para 23a.
50. Communication from the Commission – Commission Notice on the notion of State aid
pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU. NB: the Commission first published a Draft Notice.
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2.3.1 Criterion 1: The aid must be granted by the state or through state
resources
Unsurprisingly, an aid measure can only be categorised as “State aid” when it is
granted by the State. However, the notion “Member State” does not only include
the central government, but also the regional and local governments.51 In that
regard, it has been argued in the literature that the term “government aid” would
actually better capture the essence of this criterion than the term “State aid”.52
Alternatives?
The phrase “granted by the state or through state resources” may be confusing.
It can be understood as one criterion, but it can also be interpreted as two alter-
native criteria. According to the latter interpretation, only one of the two crite-
ria has to be met. If, for instance, it is established that a Member State grants
aid, then it does not have to be proven that State resources are involved. In the
past, the case-law of the Court was not always clear on this matter, but in 1993,
the Court decided in case C-189/91 that the terms “granted by the state” and
“through state resources” are no alternatives.53 Thus, for a measure to satisfy
the criterion “granted by the state or through state resources”, it must be, first,
granted directly or indirectly through State resources, and second, be imputable
to the State. This means that two cumulative requirements have to be met.54
State resources
For a measure to be capable of being categorised as State aid, it should be
granted, directly or indirectly, through State resources. This criterion is not
fulfilled when the measures have no budgetary effect for the State. This means
that regulatory measures which have no impact on the budget of the State are
not caught by Article 107 TFEU. For instance, when a State relaxes the anti-
pollution regulation, this may confer an advantage to certain undertakings. How-
ever, since the relaxation of the anti-pollution regulation has no impact on the
budget of the State, no state resources are involved, so this regulatory measure
does not fall under the scope of Article 107 TFEU.55
51. Nicolaides, Kekelekis & Kleis 2008, p. 11.
52. Hessel et al. 2005, p. 83.
53. Case C-189/91, para. 16.
54. See also: Clayton & Segura Catalan 2015, p. 260-270.
55. I borrowed the example of a relaxation of anti-pollution regulation from Nicolaides,
Kekelekis & Kleis 2008, p. 14. Another example to illustrate that regulatory measures do
not meet the criterion of “granted by the state or through state resources” is given by Dekker
& Van der Wal (2008, p. 23). The example that they give, is a change of the zoning plan.
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The case-law from the Court has clarified the notion of “State resources”.
The Court has held that a measure can be capable of being regarded as State
aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU, even if there is no transfer of
state resources.56 For instance, a tax exemption does not involve a transfer of
state resources, but it nonetheless has a budgetary impact and is therefore
capable of being regarded as State aid.
Imputable to the State
If the aid is directly granted by the State, then it is obvious that the criterion
“granted by the state or through state resources” is met. However, some situa-
tions are less clear-cut. For instance, if aid is granted through an intermediate
body.
There is an entire body of case-law about the question whether aid is imput-
able to the State. The imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a
public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the
circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken.57
The Court has held that no distinction is to be drawn between cases where
the aid is granted directly by the State and those where it is granted by public
or private bodies which the State establishes or designates with a view to admin-
istering the aid. EU law cannot permit the rules on State aid to be circum-
vented merely through the creation of autonomous institutions charged with
allocating aid.58
Even if the State is in a position to control a public undertaking and to exer-
cise a dominant influence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in
a particular case cannot be automatically presumed. A public undertaking may
act with more or less independence, according to the degree of autonomy left
to it by the State. Therefore, the mere fact that a public undertaking is under
State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertaking to be
imputed to the State. The public authorities must be regarded as having been
involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures.59
If the body cannot take the measure without taking account of the require-
ments of the public authorities, then it can be concluded that the measure is
the result of the actions of the State.60 As a result, it is capable of being cat-
egorised as State aid.
56. Case C-387/92 (Banco Exterior de España v Ayuntamiento de Valencia), para. 14; Case
C-6/97 (Italy v Commission), para. 16; Case C-482/99 (Stardust Marine), para. 36.
57. Case C-482/99 (Stardust Marine), para. 55.
58. Case C-482/99 (Stardust Marine), para. 23.
59. Case C-482/99 (Stardust Marine), para. 52.
60. Joined Cases 67, 68, 70/85 (Van de Kooy), para. 37-38.
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2.3.2 Criterion 2: The recipient of aid: “undertaking”
The recipient of the aid must be an undertaking. Article 107 TFEU covers both
private and public undertakings.61 The notion of “undertaking” under Article
107 TFEU is the same as under Article 101 TFEU. It should be noted that the
term “undertaking” is not defined in the Treaty. However, as with many other
concepts in the Treaty, the Court has interpreted the concept of undertaking. In
C-41/90, the Court has given the following definition: undertakings are natural
or legal persons engaging in economic activities.62
This definition raises another question: what is an “economic activity”? Also
this concept is interpreted in the case-law: an economic activity is any activity
consisting in offering goods and services on a given market.63 In that regard, it
should be noted that some activities belong to the exclusive competence of
the State, such as issuing passports. The State has reserved these activities for
itself. They relate to the exercise of state prerogatives. As a result, there is no
market for such activities, and they therefore cannot be regarded as economic
activities.
The decisive issue is thus whether the entity is engaging in an economic
activity. The size of the entity, its legal status or the way in which it is financed
are not relevant when determining if an entity can be classified as undertaking.
Also a profit motive is not required, so also non-profit organisations are capable
of being categorised as undertaking.64
The Court has given a broad interpretation of the notion of “undertaking”.
Consequently, several organisations which at first sight might not appear to
be undertakings, fall under the scope of the State aid rules. Hospitals, museums,
theatres and professional football clubs are examples of organisations that have
been categorised as undertakings. It is important to note that an entity is only
an undertaking with respect to its economic activities.65 If an entity engages in
both economic activities and other activities, then it is only an undertaking
with respect to its economic activities. As a result, the State aid rules only apply
to those activities. This may be the case for museums and theatres who engage in
both purely cultural activities and more commercial activities.66
61. Case 78/76 (Steinike & Weinlig), para. 18.
62. Case C-41/90 (Hofner and Elser).
63. Joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 (Pavlov and Others), para. 75.
64. Adriaanse, p. 25; Dekker & Van der Wal 2008, p. 31.
65. Dekker & Van der Wal 2008, p. 32-33.
66. Dekker & Van der Wal (2008, p. 33) give the example of Aviodrome Lelystad.
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2.3.3 Criterion 3: The aid must confer an advantage to the recipients
Naturally, State aid implies that the aid measure confers an advantage to the
recipient. However, the real question is: what exactly is an “advantage”?
General principles
First of all, the notion of State aid covers much more than only subsidies. This
clarification came when the Court rendered its judgment in the case 30/59. The
Court held that the concept of aid is wider than that of a subsidy.67 The reason
is that the notion of aid embraces not only positive benefits, but also interven-
tions which mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of
an undertaking. These interventions are not subsidies in the strict meaning of
the word, but they are similar in character and have the same effect.
The form of the aid measure is irrelevant.68 Also the aim, objectives or inten-
tions of the aid measure are irrelevant. The only issue that matters is whether
the aid measure has the effect of favouring certain undertakings. This is the case
when the undertaking enjoys an advantage that it would not have obtained in
normal market conditions.
For instance, if a public authority purchases goods from an undertaking at a
price that is above the market price, then the difference between the market price
and the actual price may constitute an advantage to the undertaking. Similarly,
if a public authority sells goods to an undertaking at a price that is below the
market price, then the difference between the market price and the actual price
may constitute an advantage. By the same token, a loan granted to an undertak-
ing at an interest rate below the market rate of interest may confer an advantage
to the undertaking.
To conclude, an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU does not
refer to any advantage; it only refers to a gratuitous advantage.69 In other words:
it refers to an advantage that an undertaking would not have obtained in nor-
mal market conditions. Undertakings are allowed to make profit, so a transac-
tion with a public authority that is advantageous to an undertaking does not
necessarily confer an ‘advantage’, since a lucrative transaction may be in line
with normal market conditions. However, any transaction that deviates from
normal market conditions may constitute an advantage.
67. Case 30/59 (De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority), Case
C-387/92 (Banco Exterior de España), para. 13.
68. According to established case-law, “measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly
or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage
which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained in normal market conditions are
regarded as aid”. See Case C-34/01 (Enirisorse), para. 30.
69. Winter 2004, p. 487.
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Market economy investor principle
In order to be able to assess whether a transaction deviates from normal market
conditions, the Commission applies the Market Economy Investor Principle.70
Originally, this test was applied to public undertakings that were recapitalised
by the Member states.71 But it has become a general criterion that is applied to
all kinds of transactions between a member state and its undertakings. Depen-
ding on the type of transaction, one could speak of a “private investor test”72,
“private creditor test”, “private purchaser test” or “private vendor test”.73 In the
Notice, the Commission introduced the term “Market Economy Operator” to
capture the different types of transaction.74
The essence of the private investor test is that the behaviour of the public
authority is compared to that of a hypothetical private investor. If the public
authority acts like a private investor would do (under similar circumstances),
then the transaction contains no aid-element. Comparing the behaviour of the
public authority and that of a hypothetical private investor makes it necessary to
determine the behaviour of the hypothetical private investor. In the case-law
from the Court, several factors and indicators were developed.
The most essential characteristic of a private investor is that he is solely moti-
vated in making a profit. In T-228/99, the Court specified that the private
investor would, when calculating the appropriate return to be expected for his
investment, in principle require a minimum return equivalent to the average
return for the sector concerned.75
The private investor does not pursue other objectives than making a profit.
All social, regional-policy and sector considerations should be left aside; they
cannot be taken into account when applying the private investor test.76
However, the fact that a private investor is motivated in making a profit
does not mean that he is only interested in short-term profits. There are situa-
tions in which a private investor would tolerate short-term losses. The Court has
given the following clarification:
70. The history of the Private Investor Principle dates back to 1984, when the Commission
adopted the Communication on Government Capital injections. See: Nicolaides & Rusu
2011, p. 238; Saanen 2014.
71. Kohler 2011, p. 22.
72. In this PhD-study, the terms “market economy investor” and “private investor” are used
interchangeably.
73. Hessel et al. 2005, p. 95.
74. Draft Notice, para. 78.
75. Case T-228/99 (WestLB), para. 255.
76. Case 234/84, para. 14.
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“It should be added that although the conduct of a private investor with
which the intervention of the public investor pursuing economic policy aims
must be compared need not be the conduct of an ordinary investor laying
out capital with a view to realizing a profit in the relatively short term, it
must at least be the conduct of a private holding company or a private group
of undertakings pursuing a structural policy – whether general or sectorial –
and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term.”77
The Court has also recognised that a parent company may be willing to tempo-
rarily bear the losses of one of its subsidiaries, in order to protect the group’s
image.78
The Court has stressed repeatedly that assessment by the Commission of the
question whether an investment satisfies the private investor test involves a com-
plex economic appraisal.79
The burden of proof is on the Member State. It has to prove that its behav-
iour is comparable to that of a private investor. This can be a difficult task. How-
ever, with respect to some transactions, it is easier to establish that the public
authority is acting in line with market conditions. This is the case when private
investors invest in the undertaking concerned at the same time and under the
same conditions as the public authority. Such a transaction is called a “pari passu
transaction”.80 The capital that the State has injected in that undertaking is then
presumed not to constitute State aid. There is a “pari passu transaction” when:
• the private investment is significant,81
• the private investment is simultaneous (concomitance),
• the private investment is done under comparable terms and conditions,
• their starting position should be comparable.
It is for the Member State to prove that these pari passu conditions are fulfilled.
The private investor test is not always easy to apply in practice, since it can
be a difficult task to determine how a private investor would behave. Besides
this practical concern, there are also some conceptual concerns raised in the
literature.82 The most prominent concern is that the State can never be fully
77. Case C-305/89 (Italy v Commission), para. 20. See also Case C-303/88 (Italy v Commis-
sion), para. 21 and 22.
78. Case C-303/88 (Italy v Commission), para. 21.
79. Case T-296/97 (Alitalia – Linee aeree italiane SpA v Commission), para. 105; Case C-56/
93 (Belgium v Commission), para. 10 and 11; Case T-358/94 (Air France), para. 71; Joined
Cases T-126/96 and T-127/96 (BFM and EFIM v Commission), para. 81. See also Case
T-19/37 (ARR).
80. Draft Notice, para. 88.
81. See for an example where the private investment was not significant: T-358/94 (Air
France), para. 148-149.
82. See: Parish 2003; Saanen 2014.
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comparable to a private investor. Notwithstanding these concerns, the private
investor test has become a general criterion that is applied to all kinds of trans-
actions between a Member State and its undertakings.
2.3.4 Criterion 4: The advantage must favour certain undertakings or
economic activities
A State measure which benefits all undertakings in national territory, without
distinction, cannot constitute State aid.83 Only measures that favour certain
undertakings or economic activities can be considered State aid. This is known
as the “selectivity-criterion” or “specificity-criterion”. This criterion is very
understandable from the rationale of State aid control. Aid measures that favour
only certain undertakings distort the level playing field. They affect the balance
between the beneficiary and its competitors.
The Court formulated the ‘selectivity-criterion’ as follows:
“It should be observed that the specific nature of a State measure, namely
its selective application, constitutes one of the characteristics of State aid
within the meaning of [Article 107(1) TFEU]. In that regard, it is necessary
to determine whether or not the measure in question entails advantages
accruing exclusively to certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity.”84
Measures that meet the selectivity-criterion are capable of being categorised
as State aid. There are several ways in which the selectivity-criterion is met.
Firstly, individual aid is selective. Secondly, aid that is granted to certain clas-
ses of undertakings meets the selectivity-criterion. Thirdly, aid that is granted to
certain sectors of the economy is selective. Sectoral aid has always been con-
sidered by the Court as selective.85 Fourthly, aid that is granted to certain regions
is selective.
Selective measures are thus capable of being categorised as State aid. General
measures, on the other hand, fall outside the scope of the State aid rules. A
general measure means that the measure is open to all undertakings. It can be
difficult to draw a line between selective measures and general measures. In the
case-law of the Court, some clarifications can be found.86 First of all, discretion
83. Case C-143/99 (Adria-Wien), para. 35.
84. Case T-55/99, para. 39; Case C-241/94 (France v Commission), para. 24; Case C-200/97
(Ecotrade), para. 40 and 41; Case C-75/97 (Belgium v Commission), para. 26.
85. Gebski 2009, p. 92.
86. Notwithstanding these clarifications, it has been argued in the literature that the concept of
selectivity is still far from clear. See, for instance: Bartosch 2010, p. 729-752.
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is an important factor when assessing the selectivity of an aid measure. When a
public authority has discretion in granting aid, then the measure – even though
it is of a general nature – may fall under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Furthermore, the fact that there is no prior identification of the aid beneficiar-
ies does not preclude the selective nature of the measure.87 In addition, the fact
that a large number of undertakings are eligible for the aid measure does not
mean that the aid measure is not selective.88
The question whether a measure is general or selective often occurs with
respect to tax measures. Taxation is usually a general measure, but a preferential
tax treatment could be selective.
2.3.5 Criterion 5: The aid must distort competition in the common market
Some handbooks on State aid discuss criteria 5 and 6 together. Much could be
said for this approach, because the conditions that trade between Member
States must be affected and competition distorted, are as a general rule inex-
tricably linked.89
The condition that aid must distort competition is easily met. This is because
an actual effect on competition is not required; a potential effect is sufficient.90
However, a mere reference to the selective nature of the aid measure is insuf-
ficient to prove that the aid distorts competition.91 Even if in certain cases the
very circumstances in which the aid is granted are sufficient to show that the
87. See Case T-55/99, para. 40: “The fact that the aid is not aimed at one or more specific
recipients defined in advance, but that it is subject to a series of objective criteria pursuant
to which it may be granted, within the framework of a predetermined overall budget allo-
cation, to an indefinite number of beneficiaries who are not initially individually identified,
cannot suffice to call in question the selective nature of the measure and, accordingly, its
classification as State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty. At the very most,
that circumstance means that the measure in question is not an individual aid. It does not,
however, preclude that public measure from having to be regarded as a system of aid con-
stituting a selective, and therefore specific, measure if, owing to the criteria governing its
application, it procures an advantage for certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods, to the exclusion of others.”
88. See C-143/99 (Adria-Wien), para. 48: “Neither the large number of eligible undertakings
nor the diversity and size of the sectors to which those undertakings belong provide any
grounds for concluding that a State initiative constitutes a general measure of economic
policy.”
89. This follows from settled case-law. See for instance: Case T-288/97, para. 41. See also:
Alzetta v Commission, para. 81; Case 730/79 (Philip Morris v Commission), paragraph 11;
Case C-278/92, para. 40.
90. Dekker & Van der Wal 2008, p. 36.
91. Joined cases C-15/98 and C-105/99 (Italy v Commission), para. 67.
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aid is capable of affecting trade between Member States and of distorting or
threatening to distort competition, the Commission must at least set out those
circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision.92
With respect to the criterion that the aid must distort competition in the common
market, the De minimis regulation93 is of great importance. This Regulation
states that aid of no more than EUR 200.000 granted over a period of three
years is not regarded as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.94
2.3.6 Criterion 6: The aid must affect trade between Member States
As was explained in the previous subsection, the conditions that trade between
Member States must be affected and competition distorted, are as a general
rule inextricably linked. This means that trade is regarded as affected by the
aid, when the aid strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared with
other undertakings competing in intra-Union trade.
The background of this criterion is that EU-law does in principle not apply
to purely domestic situations. In that regard, it should be pointed out that the
fact that an undertaking is not engaged in cross-border trade or only operates
locally or regionally, does not preclude the existence of an effect on intra-Union
trade.95 This is because the aid makes it more difficult for undertakings from
other Member States to enter the market on which the beneficiary undertaking
is operating.
The criterion of effect on trade between Member States was elucidated by
the Court in one of the bank State aid cases. In its judgment in the case C-667/
13 (Banco Privado Portugues) – which will be discussed further in chapter 5
of this PhD-study – the Court held that, when aid granted by a Member State
strengthens the position of an undertaking in comparison with other compe-
ting undertakings in trade between Member States, that trade must be regarded
as being affected by that aid. In this regard, the fact that an economic sector,
such as that of financial services, has been involved in a significant liberalisa-
tion process at EU level, enhancing the competition that may already have
92. Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 (Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek), para.
24; Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 (Germany and Others v Commission),
para. 52; Joined Cases C-15/98 and C-105/99, para. 66.
93. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to de minimis
aid.
94. Article 3 of the De Minimis Regulation.
95. Draft Notice, para. 192-193.
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resulted from the free movement of capital provided for in the Treaty, may serve
to determine that the aid has a real or potential effect on competition and affects
trade between Member States.96
2.3.7 Concluding remarks
The present section discussed six (cumulative) criteria. When a measure meets
all these criteria, it is a “State aid measure” within in the meaning of Article
107(1) TFEU. Consequently, the measure falls under the prohibition. None-
theless, the aid measure may still be authorised when the Commission considers
it to be compatible with the internal market. This compatibility-assessment will
be set out in the following section.
2.4 The compatibility of State aid
In principle, State aid is prohibited. This follows from Article 107(1) TFEU.
However, it is a prohibition with several exemptions. Those exemptions are
listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 107 TFEU. Paragraph 2 lists the situations
in which the aid is compatible with the internal market. Paragraph 3 lists the
situations in which the aid may be compatible with the internal market. In other
words: the situations of paragraph 2 are automatically compatible with the inter-
nal market; with respect to the situations under paragraph 3, the Commission
has discretion.97
Besides the exemptions under Article 107(2) and (3), there are also two other
provisions which are relevant: Article 93 TFEU and Article 106(2) TFEU.98
Article 93 TFEU applies to State aid to transport, but this provision will not
be discussed in this PhD-study. Article 106(2) TFEU concerns services of gen-
eral economic interest (SGEI). SGEI are services that are not provided by
market forces alone. However, they are in the interest of society as a whole.
Certain services are so essential that they must be guaranteed to all citizens on
affordable conditions.99The postal services are a classic example of SGEI.100
96. Case C-667/13, para. 51.
97. The fact that Article 107(3) TFEU gives the Commission discretion was confirmed by the
Court in Case 730/73 (Philip Morris), para. 17.
98. Nicolaides, Kekelekis & Kleis 2008, p. 66.
99. Sutton 2008, p. 191.
100. Dekker & Van der Wal 2008, p. 41.
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According to Article 106(2) TFEU, services of general economic interest fall
under the scope of the competition rules, but they can be exempted.101
2.4.1 Article 107 (2) TFEU
Art. 107(2) TFEU provides for three situations in which aid is automatically
authorised.102 The first situation relates to price subsidies that enable the pro-
vision of services at lower rates to disadvantages users (such as low income
groups, handicapped people or elderly people).103 The second situation relates
to compensation for damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occur-
rences. The third situation relates to compensation for the disadvantages that
were caused by the division of Germany. However, since the reunification of
Germany, aid has not been authorised on the basis of this provision.104
The exemption of Article 107(2)(b) has received the most attention in the liter-
ature. On the basis of this provision, compensation for damage caused by natural
disasters or exceptional occurrences is automatically authorised. This raises
the question what constitutes a ‘natural disaster’ or ‘exceptional occurrence’. In
the decisional practice of the Commission, these notions have been clarified.
In the context of the Netherlands, the following cases can serve as a good exam-
ple of aid that falls under the scope of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU: the firework
disaster in Enschede105, and the flooding of the Maas in 2003106.
101. Article 106 (2) TFEU provides that: “Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services
of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly
shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on com-
petition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law
or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be
affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.”
102. Art. 107(2) TFEU reads as follows: “The following shall be compatible with the internal
market: (a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that
such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected
by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the
economic disadvantages caused by that division. Five years after the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a
decision repealing this point.”
103. Alberto Santa Maria, p. 51.
104. Nicolaides, Kekelekis & Kleis 2008, p. 45.
105. N217/2002.
106. N42b/2003.
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2.4.2 Article 107 (3) TFEU
Art. 107(3) TFEU provides for five situations in which aid may be authori-
sed.107 Not all of these five provisions are equally important. Article 107(3)(a)
and (c) are usually considered to be the most important exemptions.108 The
other provisions are less frequently used.
The Commission can authorise regional aid on the basis of (a) and (c). Article
107(3)(c) TFEU is wider in scope than (a), because Article 107(3)(a) only
applies to regions where the standard of living is abnormally low or where
there is serious underemployment. This requirement does not apply to aid that is
based on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. Article 107(3)(c) TFEU is not only used in
relation to regional aid; it also provides an exemption for other types of aid. In
fact, most horizontal rules are based on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.
Until the financial crisis of 2008, the exemption of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU
was rarely used.109 The financial crisis of 2008 changed this: the Commission
created the so-called Crisis Framework, which was based on Article 107(3)(b)
TFEU. This Crisis Framework will be discussed in detail in section 3.4.1.
2.4.3 The Communications, Guidelines and Notices
The Commission has adopted numerous Communications. They go by differ-
ent names (i.e. Communications, Guidelines or Notices), but there is no sig-
nificant difference between these types of documents.110 The purpose of the
Communications is to provide guidance. This guidance is intended to make the
Commission’s reasoning transparent and to create predictability and legal
certainty.111 The legal status of the Communications can be characterised as
107. Art. 107(3) TFEU reads as follows: “The following may be considered to be compatible
with the internal market: (a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and of
the regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social
situation; (b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; (c) aid to
facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas,
where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the
common interest; (d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid
does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that is
contrary to the common interest; (e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by
decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.”
108. Nicolaides, Kekelekis & Kleis 2008, p. 48.
109. Only in the “Greek industry case” the Commission authorised the aid. See: Commission
decision 88/167/EEC of 7 October 1987.
110. Dekker & Van der Wal 2008, p. 56.
111. This purpose is explicitly stated in many communications. See for instance: Communica-
tion from the Commission – Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for
the employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification,
para. 2.
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‘soft law’. In other words: they are not binding instruments. However, it is
important to point out that by issuing Communications, the Commission is self-
limiting its discretion.112 The legal status of the Communications will be dis-
cussed in more detail in section 3.4.3.
The Communications, Guidelines and Notices are published in the Official
Journal. Furthermore, they can easily be found at the Commission website.113
On that website, the following categories can be found:
– Sector-specific rules: agriculture, audio-visual production, broadband, broad-
casting, coal industry, electricity, fisheries, postal services, shipbuilding, steel,
synthetic fibres (motor vehicles industry), transport.
– Horizontal rules: aid to disadvantaged and disabled workers, training aid,
regional aid, research and development and innovation, environmental aid,
risk capital, rescue and restructuring aid.
– Specific aid instruments: state guarantees, public land sales, export credit
insurance, fiscal aid (direct business taxation).
– Block exemption regulations
– Temporary rules in response to the crisis
– Services of general economic interest (SGEI)
As the name indicates, sector-specific rules apply to a specific sector. Horizon-
tal rules, on the other hand, apply (in principle) to all sectors. The specific aid
instruments could be considered as a category on its own, or it could be con-
sidered as belonging to the category of horizontal rules.114
This PhD-study will not discuss all these Communications, Guidelines and
Notices in detail.115 The only Communications that deserve an in-depth discus-
sion are the Crisis Communications, which will be discussed in chapter 3.
However, in the current section, some remarks can be made regarding the
compatibility assessment. In that regard, two Commission initiatives are worth
mentioning: in 2005, theCommission adopted the StateAidAction Plan (SAAP),
followed by the State aid Modernisation (SAM) in 2012.116 In the context of
first the SAAP and later the SAM, several Guidelines were revised.
112. Santa Maria 2007, p. 56.
113. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/legislation.html
114. Dekker & Van der Wal 2008, p. 89.
115. The added value of a detailed discussion would be limited in this PhD-study which is
concentrated mostly on aid to banks. Furthermore, the Guidelines and Communications are
amended and updated over time, so a detailed discussion would not have a lasting value.
116. The SAAP was aimed at “less and better targeted aid” and “a refined economic approach”.
For more information, see: Hildebrand & Schweinsberg 2007, p. 454.
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Common Assessment Principles
In the context of the SAAP and SAM, the Commission set out a methodology
for the compatibility-assessment. The SAAP formally introduced the balan-
cing test. The balancing test entailed that the Commission would balance the
positive impact of the aid measure against the potentially negative effects.117 In
the SAM, the Commission called for identification of the common assess-
ment principles.118 The common assessment principles are largely based on the
balancing test. The guidelines that were adopted in the context of the SAM
explicitly refer to the common assessment principles. A State aid measure will
be considered compatible when the following criteria are met:
Contribution to well-defined objective of common interest
A State aid measure must aim at an objective of common interest in accord-
ance with Article 107(3) TFEU. The exact objective depends on the type of
aid. For instance, in the Guidelines on R&D&I-aid, the Commission recog-
nised that “R&D&I aid should contribute to the achievement of the Europe
2020 strategy of delivering smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”.119 State
aid to the agriculture sector should be aimed at ensuring viable food produc-
tion and at promoting the efficient and sustainable use of resources in order to
achieve intelligent and sustainable growth.120
Need for state intervention
A State aid measure must be targeted towards a situation where aid can bring
about a material improvement that the market cannot deliver itself. This refers
to market failures.
Appropriateness of the aid measure
The aid measure must be an appropriate policy instrument to address the
policy objective concerned. In that regard, it should be noted, firstly, that State
aid is not the only policy instrument and, secondly, that there are various types
of aid instruments.
If other less distortive policy instruments make it possible to achieve the
same goal, then the aid measure is not the most appropriate instrument. In the
same vein, if there are other less distortive types of aid measures, then the aid
measure is not the most appropriate instrument.
117. SAAP, para. 19.
118. SAM, para. 18a.
119. R&D&I-guidelines 2014, point 42.
120. European Union Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural
areas 2014 to 2020, point 43.
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Incentive effect
The aid measure must change the behaviour of the undertaking concerned. In
other words: the aid measure must induce the undertaking to engage in addi-
tional activity which it would not carry out without the aid.
Proportionality of the aid
The proportionality of aid concerns the following question: could the same
change in behaviour be obtained with less aid? For an aid measure to be con-
sidered proportional, its amount must be limited to the minimum needed for
carrying out the aided activity.
Avoidance of undue negative effects
For State aid to be compatible with the internal market, the negative effects of
the aid measure in terms of distortions of competition and impact on trade
between Member States must be limited and outweighed by the positive effects
in terms of contribution to the objective of common interest.
Transparency of aid
Member States, the Commission, economic operators, and the public, must
have easy access to all relevant acts and to pertinent information about the aid
awarded thereunder.
The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)
In 1998, the Council adopted the Enabling Regulation.121 This Regulation
enables the Commission to adopt block exemption regulations. In those regula-
tions, the Commission can declare certain types of aid compatible with the
common market. Those aid measures are exempted from the notification
requirement of Article 108(3) TFEU.
The purpose of block exemptions is to relieve the Commission from an
administrative burden.122 There are many State aid cases in which it is almost
obvious that the compatibility conditions are satisfied. If the Commission would
have to spend time on all those cases, then it would have less time to concentrate
on the more distortive State aid cases. By providing that certain cases (that are
clearly compatible) do not have to be notified to the Commission, block exemp-
tion regulations allow the Commission to concentrate on the more distortive
State aid cases.123 Block exemptions also benefit the Member States, since they
121. Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and
93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal
State aid.
122. Sinnaeve 1999, p. 212.
123. As is mentioned in the SAAP (para. 35), block exemptions are based on the principle that
State aid control should set clear ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ priorities.
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reduce the administrative costs.124 And since there is no standstill-obligation
with respect to aid that falls under the block exemption, recipient undertakings
will receive their aid more speedily.
The Commission has adopted several block exemption regulations on the basis
of the Enabling Regulation.125 Those regulations concern areas126 in which the
Commission has gained sufficient experience to define general compatibility
criteria. In 2008, the Commission adopted the General Block Exemption Reg-
ulation (GBER). This is one single regulation that replaced the previous block
exemption regulations.127 The range of exemptions was also broadened by
this Regulation. The GBER should be seen against the background of the State
aid Action Plan (SAAP), in which the Commission aimed at a better prioritisa-
tion through simplification and consolidation of the block exemptions.128 In
2014, as part of the State aid Modernisation (SAM), the Commission adopted
a revised GBER.129 This revised GBER greatly extended the possibilities for
Member States to grant “good aid” without prior Commission scrutiny.
The GBER should not be confused with the De minimis Regulation.130 Aid that
falls under the scope of the De minimis Regulation is deemed not to meet all
the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU, whereas aid that falls under the scope of
the GBER is considered compatible with the common market (in the sense of
Article 107(3) TFEU). So in the first case, there is no aid, while in the second
case, there is aid, but it is compatible (and therefore authorised). The effect of
both regulations, however, is the same: namely the measure does not have to be
notified.
2.4.4 Concluding remarks
The present section has shown that there are exceptions to the prohibition of
State aid. Indeed, State aid can be implemented when it is declared compatible
by the Commission. As will be explained in the following chapters, in almost
all bank State aid cases, the Commission declared the aid measures to be com-
patible with the internal market.
124. Deiberova & Nyssens 2009, p. 27.
125. Regulations (EC) Nos 68/2001, 70/2001, 2204/2002 and 1628/2006.
126. Such as aid in favour of SME’s, training aid and aid for R&D.
127. General Block Exemption Regulation, para. 4.
128. SAAP, para. 35-38.
129. Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories
of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the
Treaty.
130. Both Regulations are aimed at achieving a better targeted enforcement and monitoring (see
SAAP, para. 52). Both Regulations have the same legal base (i.e. the Enabling Regulation).
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2.5 State aid procedure
In the previous sections, the substantive rules on State aid have been discussed.
The present section discusses the procedural rules. Article 107 TFEU contains
the substantive State aid rules, whereas Article 108 TFEU deals with the pro-
cedural issues. The procedural rules are not only laid down in Treaty provisions.
Several regulations have been adopted that contain detailed procedural rules.
The most important of these regulations is Council Regulation No 659/1999
of 22 March 1999, also known as the Procedural Regulation.131 Before the
adoption of the Procedural Regulation, the only procedural rules were the ones
laid down in the predecessors of Article 108 TFEU.132 The procedural rules
were clarified in the decisional practice of the Commission and the case-law
from the Court. The purpose of the Procedural Regulation was to codify this
practice.133 In 2015, the Council adopted Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/
1589 of 13 July 2015, which replaced the Procedural Regulation from 1999. For
this reason, I will speak of the 1999 Procedural Regulation and the 2015 Pro-
cedural Regulation.
The 2015 Procedural Regulation sets out four types of State aid procedures: i)
new aid, ii) unlawful aid, iii) misuse of aid, and iv) existing aid. These pro-
cedures will be discussed in the following subsections.
2.5.1 New aid
In case of new aid134, the Member State has two obligations. Firstly, it has to
notify the aid measure to the Commission.135 Secondly, the Member State is
subject to a standstill clause: it may not put the aid measure into effect until the
Commission has authorised the aid measure.136
131. Amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006, Council
Regulation (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013 and Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013
of 22 July 2013. In addition, in 2009, the Commission adopted the Enforcement Notice,
the Notice on a Simplified Procedure, and the Code of Best Practices.
132. It has therefore been argued that the Procedural Regulation was “long overdue”. See:
Sinnaeve & Slot 1999, p. 1153.
133. Preamble 2.
134. In Article 1(c), ‘new aid’ is defined as “all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual
aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid”. This is a residual
definition. ‘Existing aid’ has been defined in Article 1(b) of the Procedural Regulation.
135. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Procedural Regulation.
136. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Procedural Regulation.
CHAPTER 2
40
The State aid procedure with respect to new aid consists of two phases: a pre-
liminary investigation procedure and a formal investigation procedure. The pro-
cedure always starts with the preliminary investigation. The formal investigation
is only initiated when there are doubts as to the compatibility of the notified
aid measure with the common market.
The preliminary investigation procedure
When new aid has been notified, the Commission will launch the preliminary
investigation procedure. According to settled case-law, the preliminary stage
of the procedure for reviewing aid under Article 108(3) is intended merely to
allow the Commission to form a prima facie opinion of the partial or complete
conformity with the Treaty of the aid schemes notified to it.137 On the basis of
Article 4 of the Procedural Regulation, the Commission can take the following
decisions:
– Article 4(2): The Commission finds that the notified measure does not con-
stitute aid. In this case, it shall record that finding by way of a decision.
– Article 4(3): The Commission finds that no doubts are raised as to the com-
patibility of the notified measure with the common market. In this case, it
shall decide that the aid measure is compatible with the common market.
This decision is referred to as a ‘decision not to raise objections’.
– Article 4(4): The Commission finds that doubts are raised as to the com-
patibility of the notified measure with the common market. In this case, the
Commission shall initiate the formal investigation procedure. This decision
is referred to as an ‘opening decision’.
– Article 4(6): The Commission does not take a decision within two months.
In this case, the aid shall be deemed to have been authorised by the Com-
mission.
The formal investigation procedure
The formal investigation procedure is laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU and
Article 6 of the Procedural Regulation. The formal investigation procedure
is only initiated if the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the
notified aid measure with the common market.
The Court has held that the formal investigation procedure is “essential
whenever the Commission has serious difficulties in determining whether an
aid is compatible with the common market. The Commission may thus restrict
itself to the preliminary examination under Article 108(3) when taking a deci-
sion in favour of an aid only if it is able to satisfy itself after an initial exam-
ination that the aid is compatible with the Treaty. If, on the other hand, an initial
examination leads the Commission to the opposite conclusion, or does not
137. Case C-99/98, para. 32; Case 84/82, para. 12-12; Case 120/73, para. 3.
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enable it to overcome all the difficulties involved in determining whether the
aid is compatible with the common market, the Commission is under a duty to
carry out all the requisite consultations and for that purpose to initiate the
procedure under Article 108(2).”138
On the basis of Article 9 of the Procedural Regulation139 , the Commission can
take the following decisions:
– Article 9(2): The Commission finds that, where appropriate following
modification by the Member State concerned, the notified measure does
not constitute aid.
– Article 9(3): The Commission finds that the doubts as to the compatibility
of the notified measure have been removed. This decision is referred to as
a ‘positive decision’.
– Article 9(4): The Commission attaches conditions to a positive decision.
This decision is referred to as a ‘conditional decision’.
– Article 9(5): The Commission finds that the notified aid is not compatible
with the common market. This decision is referred to as a ‘negative deci-
sion’.
A key feature of the formal investigation procedure is the possibility to attach
conditions to the authorisation of the aid measure. The Commission can only
take a conditional decision in the formal investigation stage.
2.5.2 Unlawful aid
In the previous subsection, it was established that Member States are required
to notify new aid. However, it is conceivable that a Member State grants aid
without notifying the Commission. This can be case when a Member State
wants to avoid Commission control. However, there does not necessarily
have to be bad intent. For instance, the Member State can be of the opinion
that the measure does not constitute aid and that it therefore does not have to
be notified.
If a Member State grants aid without notifying the Commission, then there is
unlawful aid. Article 1(f) of the Procedural Regulation gives the following defi-
nition of ‘unlawful aid’: ‘unlawful aid’ is new aid put into effect in contraven-
tion of Article 108(3) TFEU.140 Unlawful aid should not be confused with
incompatible aid. Incompatible aid is aid that falls under the prohibition of
138. Case C-225/91 (Matra v Commission), para. 33.
139. Article 9 of Regulation No 2015/1589 corresponds to Article 7 of Regulation No 659/
1999.
140. Article 1(f) of Regulation No 659/1999.
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Article 107(1) and that is not declared compatible in the sense of Article 107(2)
or 107(3). Incompatible aid concerns substantive rules, whereas unlawful aid
concerns procedural rules.
The Commission is obliged to examine whether unlawful aid is compatible
with the common market. Before taking a decision on the compatibility of
the aid, the Commission can adopt an injunction. Three types of injunctions
are possible: i) an information injunction141 , ii) a suspension injunction142 and
iii) a recovery injunction143 .
The procedure regarding unlawful aid is similar to that of new aid. This means
that this procedure also can consist of two stages: a preliminary investigation
procedure and a formal investigation procedure (which is only initiated if the
Commission chooses to).144 In contrast to the procedure regarding new aid,
the Commission is with respect to unlawful aid not bound by the time-limit
set out in Articles 4(5), 7(6) and 7(7).145 Another difference is that the above-
mentioned injunctions are not possible in the procedure regarding new aid.
On the basis of Article 16 of the Procedural Regulation146, the Commission
can take a recovery decision when it considers the unlawful aid to be incom-
patible. The Commission is however bound by general principles of EU law:
Article 16 provides that the Commission shall not require recovery if this would
be contrary to a general principle of EU law.147
2.5.3 Misuse of aid
In Article 1(g) of the Procedural Regulation, ‘misuse of aid’ is defined as aid
used by the beneficiary in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to Article 4
(3) or Article 9(3) or 9(4) of the Procedural Regulation. These provisions refer
to: i) the decision not to raise objections, ii) the positive decision and iii) the
conditional decision. The result of these decisions is that the aid measure is
declared compatible with the common market. The aid measure is authorised
for a certain purpose. If, after the aid measure has been authorised, the Member
State decides to use the aid for a different purpose, then there is misuse of aid
within the meaning of Article 1(g).
141. Article 10(3) of the 1999 Procedural Regulation.
142. Article 11(1) of the 1999 Procedural Regulation.
143. Article 11(2) of the 1999 Procedural Regulation.
144. For a detailed discussion of the enforcement possibilities in case of unlawful aid, see:
Adriaanse 2006.
145. Article 13(2) of the 1999 Procedural Regulation.
146. Article 16 of Regulation No 2015/1589 corresponds to Article 14 of Regulation No 659/
1999.
147. See: Rzotkiewicz 2013.
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The procedure regarding misuse of aid is laid down in Article 20 of the Pro-
cedural Regulation. This Article provides that the Commission may, in cases of
misuse of aid, initiate the formal investigation procedure. 148
2.5.4 Existing aid
All existing aid149 is kept under constant review by the Commission.150
According to Article 21 of the Procedural Regulation, Member States have to
submit information on all existing aid schemes to the Commission.
2.5.5 Interested parties
Strictly speaking, the State aid procedure is a procedure between the Commis-
sion and the Member State concerned.151 However, State aid may affect many
other economic actors; such as the beneficiary undertaking, competing under-
takings and other Member States. Some of these actors fall under the definition
of “interested party”.152 And as a consequence, they have certain rights in the
State aid procedure: they can submit comments and complaints.
The rights of interested parties are laid down in Article 24 of the Procedural
Regulation. Article 24(1) provides that, once the Commission has taken the
decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, an interested party may
submit comments. It is worth stressing that this “right to be heard” only applies
to the formal investigation procedure. Only then is the Commission obliged to
allow the undertakings concerned to submit their comments. As the Court has
pointed out in its case-law, there is no such obligation in the preliminary inves-
tigation procedure.153
148. In the case of Caixa Geral de Depositos (SA.35062, 18 December 2012), the Commission
considered that the breach of a dividend ban constituted misuse of aid. Another example is
the case of the Latvia bank ‘Parex banka’. Latvia had committed that the bank would
divest the Wealth Management Business within a certain deadline. However, the divest-
ment did not take place within the agreed deadline. This constituted a breach of the terms
of the Parex Final Decision and hence a misuse of the aid granted. The Commission
therefore opened the formal investigation procedure (Parex banka, SA.36612, 16 April
2014, para. 60).
149. ‘Existing aid’ is defined in Article 1(b) of the Procedural Regulation.
150. Article 108(1) TFEU.
151. Niejahr and Scharf (2008, p. 365) call it a “bilateral procedure”. This means that the
beneficiary of the aid is considered to be a third party. In practice, however, the beneficiary
and the Member State concerned can team up.
152. Interested party is defined in Article 1(h) of the Procedural Regulation as “any Member
State and any person, undertaking or association of undertakings whose interests might be
affected by the granting of aid, in particular the beneficiary of the aid, competing
undertakings and trade associations”.
153. Case C-225/91 (Matra), para. 52-53.
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Pursuant to Article 24(2) of the Procedural Regulation, any interested party
may submit a complaint to inform the Commission of any alleged unlawful
aid or any alleged misuse of aid. This involvement of interested parties is
important to the effectiveness of State aid control. The Commission has inves-
tigatory powers; it can conduct inquiries on its own initiative. This is one way
to detect unlawful aid or misuse of aid. Another way to detect unlawful aid is
when interested parties, such as competitors, inform the Commission about
unlawful aid. The fact that complaints are ‘an essential source of information
for detecting infringements of the EU rules on State aid’ has been recognised
by preamble 13 of Regulation 734/2013 (i.e. the Regulation that amended the
1999 Procedural Regulation).
2.5.6 Concluding remarks
While the present section set out the procedural rules relating to the different
types of aid (new aid, unlawful aid, misuse of aid and existing aid), the pro-
cedure relating to new aid is the most important in this PhD-study. Indeed, all
beneficiary banks were concerned by this procedure, while there are only a
few cases of misuse of aid and unlawful aid.
Moreover, the present section explained the relevant distinction between
the preliminary investigation procedure and the formal investigation proce-
dure. The relevance of this distinction will become apparent in section 3.7.3,
which discusses the distinction between commitment decisions (taken in the
context of the preliminary investigation procedure) and conditional decisions
(taken in the context of the formal investigation procedure).
2.6 Conclusion
The present chapter provided a basic background of State aid. It has shown
that State aid exists in various forms and ways. The present chapter focussed
on State aid in general, whereas the next chapter focusses specifically on State
aid to banks.
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Chapter 3. State aid to banks
3.1 Introduction
While the previous chapter focussed on State aid in general, this chapter spe-
cifically focusses on State aid to banks. Why this special focus on banks? In
essence, the special focus on banks is due to two specific features of the banking
sector: banks are essential to the economy and banks are special. These two
specific features of the banking sector explain why State aid to banks might be
justified. These two features will be explored in section 3.2, while section 3.3
and 3.4 discuss how the two specific features of the banking sector are taken
into account by theMember States respectively the Commission. In other words:
sections 3.3 and 3.4 set out how the Member States and the Commission
responded to the financial crisis.
Roughly speaking: the topic of this PhD-study is State aid to banks. More
specifically, the topic of this PhD-study is the Commission’s assessment of State
aid to banks. The last three sections of the present chapter introduce some key
features of this assessment.1 Firstly, section 3.5 provides an overview of the
various steps in the Commission’s assessment of bank State aid measures.2
Secondly, the Commission’s assessment of bank State aid measures is laid down
in its decisions. In order to analyse the Commission decisions, it is essential to
understand how the decisions are built up and what types of decisions there are.
To that end, section 3.6 provides a basic overview of the decisions. Finally, since
the restructuring measures play a key role in the Commission’s assessment of
bank State aid measures, section 3.7 provides a basic overview of these struc-
tural and behavioural measures.
1. In that regard, these three sections are essential building blocks for chapter 6 (in which the
framework of analysis is set out) and chapters 7 to 13 (in which the actual analysis of the
Commission decisions takes place).
2. The relevance of this overview will become apparent in chapter 6, which sets out the structure
of the chapters 7 to 13.
47
3.2 The economics of State aid to banks
3.2.1 Why banks are essential
Banks play an essential role in the economy. In the language of the Bank Recov-
ery and Resolution Directive (which will be discussed in the next chapter), banks
perform “critical functions”, such as safeguarding deposits, managing payments
systems, providing loans and channelling capital for investment and innovation.
The banking sector can be described as the “lubricating oil”3 of the real econ-
omy: if the real economy were a machine, then the banking sector is a way to
ensure that the economy operates smoothly. This illustrates the importance of
the banking sector to the overall economy. By lending credit, banks are the facil-
itators of the real economy.4
This can be explained as follows. In economic terms: there are surplus units
(households and firms with spare funds) and deficit units (households and
firms in need of funds). There are essentially two ways to raise funds: direct
financing and indirect financing.5 In case of direct financing, there is a direct
relation between the lender and borrower: the lender has a claim on the borrower.
One could think of securities such as shares or bonds. Financial markets play
an important role here, because securities are traded on the financial markets. In
case of indirect financing, the lender does not have a claim on the borrower, but
on an intermediary, while the intermediary has a claim on the borrower.
Banks are financial intermediaries: by granting loans to deficit units (borro-
wers) and by taking deposits from surplus units (lenders), they bring together the
demand and supply of capital. Borrowers and lenders usually have different
preferences. As a result, the desired characteristics of the loans will be different
from the desired characteristics of the deposits. Banks therefore have to fulfil
a transformation function.6 The preferences of borrowers and lenders differ with
respect to maturity, size and risk. As a consequence, three types of transforma-
tion can be distinguished: maturity transformation, size transformation7 and risk
3. See, for instance: Lyons 2009, p. 29.
4. In that regard, Schillig (2013, p. 754) argued that banks perform a quasi-utility function.
About the crucial role of the banking sector, see also: Broekhuizen 2016, p. 50-51; Savvides
& Antoniou 2009, p. 355-358; Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 151.
5. Direct financing and indirect financing are both forms of external financing. A firm can
also use its own profits to finance new activities. This is called internal financing. See: Van
Ewijk & Scholtens 1999, p. 38.
6. Van Ewijk & Scholtens 1999, p. 68-69.
7. Usually, the size of the deposits is smaller than the size of the loans. The reason is that most
surplus units only have a limited amount of money to deposit, while deficit units often need a
large amount of money. Think of an individual who wants to buy a house or a firm which
wants to finance its business activities. Banks intermediate by ‘transforming’ several of those
small deposits into one large loan.
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transformation.8 Of these three, maturity transformation is the most important.
The importance of maturity transformation follows from the fact that deficit
units (borrowers) usually want a loan for a longer period, while surplus units
(lenders) want to be able to immediately withdraw money from their accounts.
In other words: lenders and borrowers have different preferences with respect to
the maturity. Banks intermediate between surplus units and deficit units by
lending long and borrowing short. Loans can have a maturity of many years,
while deposits are often withdrawable on demand.
The core function of banks is financial intermediation.9 Banks bring together
supply and demand for capital. However, besides this indirect financing, firms
can rely on direct financing, which takes place at the capital market. For
instance, firms can issues shares or bonds. From this perspective, banks and
the capital market compete.10 However, it should be pointed out that banks also
have a role in direct financing, since they often assists firms that opt for direct
financing. Banks are ‘facilitators of capital market transactions’.11 Banks per-
form functions such as underwriting and market making. In that regard, instead
of making a profit from receiving interest on loans, banks make a profit from the
fees that they charge for their services.12
To conclude, banks are the facilitators – the “lubricating oil” – of the real econ-
omy. This explains why the banking sector is so essential. Another specific
feature of the banking sector is that banks are ‘special’; this will be explained in
the following subsection.
8. Borrowers need capital to finance activities that may be risky, while lenders deposit their
money because they do not want to take risk. Borrowing is risky, because deficit units have
a risk of defaulting in their repayment. Because of intermediation, lenders no longer have a
claim on the borrowers; instead, they have a claim on the bank that operates as intermediary.
Claims on the bank (i.e. deposits) are usually less risky than claims on borrowers. Because of
diversification, the default risk of banks is lower than the default risk of individual companies.
9. It should be noted that not all banking activities are performed by banks. Sometimes, other
entities – such as money market funds, investment funds or securitisation vehicles – conduct
banking activities. These entities are part of the so-called ‘shadow banking sector’. While
there is no uniform definition, ‘shadow banking’ is usually defined as credit intermediation
that takes place outside the regular banking system.
10. This raises the question why there is a need for financial intermediaries such as banks. The
traditional answer to this question lies in the existence of market imperfections. In the
economic literature, several arguments have been proposed in order to explain the need
for financial intermediaries. Those arguments mainly rely on the following two market
imperfections: transaction costs and information asymmetries. Banks – as intermediaries –
can reduce the transaction costs, because they can exploit economies of scale and economies
of scope.
11. Scholtens & Van Wensveen 2003, p. 28.
12. Van Ewijk & Scholtens 1999, p. 115.
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3.2.2 Why banks are special
Banks are ‘special’ in the sense that they are different from non-financial firms.
In the first place, banks are characterised by a high leverage. A high leverage
means that the amount of equity is very low compared to the amount of debt.
It has been observed that the banking sector is the sector with the highest
leverage.13 In this respect, banks are different from other firms. In the second
place, banks have a large balance sheet compared to non-financial firms. It has
been remarked that “the size of the largest banks dwarfs that of the largest non-
bank business”.14
But most importantly, banks are more interlinked and more interconnected
than non-financial firms. This interconnectedness may create systemic risk. Sys-
temic risk is sometimes related to banks that are too-big-to-fail, too-complex-
to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail. It can be argued that in a crisis situation,
every bank has systemic relevance.15 The failure of one bank may have dramatic
repercussion for other banks. In other words: bank failure is contagious. This
goes by many names: contagion effect16, domino-effect17, spill-over effect or
systemic risk. Thus, the failure of a bank can have a negative effect on finan-
cial stability. Why is bank failure so contagious? This is due to the following rea-
sons.18
Interbank lending
There are direct linkages between banks. This is because banks lend to each
other. In other words: banks hold claims on each other.19 If a bank fails and goes
into insolvency, then it is no longer able to honour its claims. Consequently, the
banks that have claims on the failing bank have to write down their claims.20
This is a form of direct contagion.
13. Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 25; Vickers Interim Report 2011, p. 64.
14. Quigley 2012, p. 2.
15. This will be discussed in more detail in section 7.6.
16. See, for instance: Beck et al. 2010, p. 11.
17. See, for instance: Savvides & Antoniou 2009, p. 348; Hellwig 2009, p. 182.
18. These reasons are not only discussed in the literature on (bank) State aid, but can also be
found in the literature on financial regulation (as the rationale for financial regulation is
related to the fact that bank failure is contagious). See, for instance: Brunnermeier et al. 2009,
p. 3-5.
19. Beck et al. 2010, p. 11; Amelio & Siotis 2009, p. 4.
20. Hellwig 2009, p. 182.
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Fire-sales
Another connection between banks is related to the fact that banks usually hold
similar assets.
If a troubled bank needs funding – and is unable to get enough wholesale
funds – it has to sell assets quickly. This may lead to a fall in asset prices. This
might depress the value of similar assets held by other banks. This could turn
into a negative spiral.21
Confidence
The failure of one bank may trigger a loss of confidence in other banks. Indeed,
as a result of the failure of a bank, investors might become worried about the
viability of other banks, either because they perceive the other banks as similar
to the failed bank or because they expect that the other banks will be affected
through the direct linkages with the failed bank.22 Thus, the failure of one bank
may trigger a loss of confidence in other banks.23
Such a loss of confidence can have dramatic repercussions. This is because
confidence is crucial to the banking sector. Banks are dependent on confidence;
this is their ‘Achilles heel’.24 Because of their business model (lending long and
borrowing short), access to short-term funding is crucial to banks. This makes it
highly important for a bank to retain the confidence of its creditors.25
The most extreme form of a loss of confidence in a bank is a bank run by
its depositors. However, because of deposit guarantee schemes, bank runs by
depositors are not very likely to happen.26 Nonetheless, deposit guarantee
schemes do not mitigate the risk of a ‘modern’ bank run. In that regard, it should
be noted that banks are sometimes dependent on the money market and inter-
bank market.27 The funds obtained on these markets are not insured by deposit
guarantee schemes. Accordingly, when investors on these markets lose con-
fidence in a bank, then they are likely to withdraw their funds.
21. Beck et al. 2010, p. 12; Heremans & Pacces 2012, p. 573; Lyons & Zhu 2011, p. 3; Maes
& Kiljanski 2009, p. 13; Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 42-45.
22. With respect to the first situation, it has been remarked that the public does not differentiate
adequately among individual banks. See: Psaroudakis 2012, p. 198.
23. This form of contagion is sometimes referred to as “information(al) contagion”. See, for
instance: Beck et al. 2010, p. 11; Brunnermeier et al. 2009, p. 3; Commission Staff Working
Paper 2011, p. 25; Hellwig 2009, p. 182.
24. Bovenzi, Guynn & Jackson 2013, p. 38.
25. As Hüpkes (2005) points out, under normal circumstances, the maturity mismatch does not
pose a problem, but it makes banks particularly vulnerable to a loss of public confidence.
26. Heremans & Pacces 2012, p. 572; Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 27.
27. In the interbank market, banks borrow and lend funds among each other on a short-term,
often unsecured, basis (Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 28).
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Because of the essential role of confidence, the fall of one bank can result
in the fall of other banks. And even if the failure of one bank does not lead to a
complete downfall of other banks, it may still create problems for those other
banks. A bank may face higher funding costs: if investors lose confidence in
a bank, then they perceive an investment in that bank to be more risky. Sub-
sequently, they would demand a higher return. In other words: the bank faces
higher funding costs.28
To conclude, because of the interconnectedness of the banking sector, bank
failure may be contagious. This particular feature of the banking sector makes
banks ‘special’ (as compared to non-financial firms).
3.2.3 The justification for State aid to banks
In Chapter 2, the motives for granting State aid were discussed. A distinction
was made between the efficiency objective of State aid and the equity objective
of State aid. In the case of State aid to banks, the efficiency objective provides
the main justification for granting State aid. During the financial crisis, grant-
ing State aid to banks was necessary; not just to rescue one bank, but to rescue
the entire financial system. This follows from the fact that bank failure is con-
tagious – as was explained in subsection 3.2.2. In addition, as explained in sub-
section 3.2.1, banks are essential to the economy. For these two reasons,
granting State aid to banks may be justified. In that regard, it has been remarked
that “the overall public interest is at stake, not just a private one”.29 In other
words: the social costs of a bank failure exceed the private costs.30 In economic
terms: a bank failure constitutes a negative externality.31 This provides a jus-
tification for granting State aid.
3.3 State aid measures in support of banks
For the reasons set out in the previous section, Member States decided that they
could not allow ‘their’ banks to fall and therefore rescued the ailing banks by
means of State aid. These rescue operation were conducted in various ways,
which illustrates that there are several types of State aid measures. The various
measures to support (ailing) banks are described in the following subsections.
28. Doleys (2012, p. 558) remarks that “investor sensitivities led to a dramatic increase in the
cost of capital”.
29. Sutton, Lannoo and Napoli 2010, p. 2.
30. Beck et al. 2010, p. 10; Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 25.
31. Beck et al. 2010, p. 10; Brunnermeier et al. 2009, p. 3; Commission Staff Working Paper
2011, p. 25; Gerard 2013, p. 2.
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3.3.1 Guarantees
Banks need funding. For an ailing bank, it may be difficult to attract new fund-
ing, because an ailing bank is not an attractive investment for many investors.
During the financial crisis, even healthy banks faced difficulties in attracting
new funding. A guarantee (scheme32) can help overcome this problem, because
a guarantee (scheme) provides a safety net to investors. In this way, a guarantee
(scheme) can contribute to the revival of the interbank lending market and of
the financial markets in general. A guarantee (scheme) thus allows the bene-
ficiary banks to refinance themselves.
3.3.2 Bond loan scheme
Another liquidity enhancing measure is a bond loan scheme.33 Such a scheme
ensures that banks have sufficient access to liquidity. The functioning of this
scheme can be explained as follows. Banks obtain funds on the money market.
Important participants on the money market are other banks and the ECB.34 A
distinction can be made between uncollateralised/unsecured lending and
collateralised/secured lending.35 Collateralised lending often takes the form
of a repurchase agreement.36 Collateralised lending can also take the form of
a loan that is granted against assets that are pledged as collateral.37 Not all
assets can be used as collateral. The ECB has certain eligibility criteria with
respect to the collateral. Banks not having assets that can be used as collateral
may have problems of obtaining funds on the money market. This may create
liquidity problems for those banks. These liquidity problems are solved by the
32. A guarantee can be given ad hoc or in the context of a scheme. Under a guarantee scheme,
(eligible) banks usually have the option to enter into an agreement with the State, which in
turn would guarantee the banks’ new issuance of debt instruments in exchange for a fee.
33. Greece introduced a ‘Bond Loan Scheme’ and Cyprus introduced a ‘Special government
bonds scheme’. The Polish scheme comprised State Treasury bonds related support
measures.
34. The ECB monetary policy operations can be divided into open market operations and
standing facilities. Open market operations can be divided into i) main refinancing operations
(MRO), ii) longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO), iii) fine-tuning operations (FTO), and
iv) structural operations. Standing facilities can be divided into the marginal lending facility
and the deposit facility. Either the ECB conducts a repurchase agreement or it grants a loan
against assets pledged as collateral.
35. As a general rule, unsecured lending will be more expensive than secured lending.
36. ECB, The monetary policy of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main 2011, p. 42.
37. Other forms of secured lending are Covered Bonds and Asset Backed Securities (ABS).
See: Alink & Aarts 2013.
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bond loan scheme, in which the State lends government bonds to the benefi-
ciary banks.38 These government bonds can be used as collateral in interbank
transactions and as collateral in refinancing transactions or marginal lending
facilities of the ECB. The temporary acquisition of the bonds allow the bene-
ficiary banks to obtain liquidity from the money market. As the Commission
explained in its decisions on these bond loan schemes, the economic effect of a
bond loan scheme is similar to that of a guarantee.39
3.3.3 Recapitalisation
Capital is important, because it is a ‘cushion’ or ‘buffer’ that can be used to
absorb losses. Capital requirements ensure that banks have enough loss-absorb-
ing capacity. A higher capital buffer would increase the “distance to default”.
Regulatory capital not only includes equity, but also hybrid securities. A
distinction can be made between Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital.40 Tier 1
capital is “going concern” capital, while Tier 2 capital is “gone concern” capital.
These terms refer to the fact that Tier 1 capital is used to absorb losses in a going
concern situation, whereas Tier 2 capital is intended to be used in a situation in
which the bank is liquidated.41
A recapitalisation means that the State injects capital into the bank.42 This
capital injection can be in the form of ordinary shares, preference shares or some
hybrid capital instruments. A capital injection ensures that the beneficiary bank
is in compliance with regulatory capital requirements.
3.3.4 Nationalisation
In several cases, ailing banks were nationalised by the Member States con-
cerned. The nationalisation itself does not constitute State aid. Nevertheless,
nationalisation is usually achieved by means of a recapitalisation – which does
constitute State aid.
38. In exchange for the temporary acquisition of the bonds, the beneficiary banks have to pay a
fee to the government. In addition, they have to provide collateral. The assets that are
provided as collateral will probably be of such a quality that they will not be accepted by other
banks (or other money market participants) as collateral.
39. Greece – N560/2008, para. 81. The fee is therefore calculated in the same way as the
guarantee fee.
40. Before the introduction of CRD IV, there was also a category know as Tier 3 capital. This
category was repealed by CRD IV. Tier 1 capital consists of Common Equity Tier 1 capital
(CET) and Additional Tier 1 capital (AT). The CRR sets out in detail the criteria that
capital instruments have to meet in order to qualify as CET, as AT and as Tier 2. These
criteria are laid down in Art. 26 to 50, 51 to 61 and 62 to 71 CRR respectively.
41. Joosen 2010a, p. 186, footnote 27.
42. A capital injection can be performed ad hoc or in the context of a scheme.
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3.3.5 Underwriting
An underwriting commitment can also constitute a State aid measure. This is
illustrated by the case of the four large Greek banks (Alpha Bank, NBG,
Piraeus Bank and Eurobank). In 2015, these banks planned to conduct a capital
raising exercise. The Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) would act as a
backstop: it committed to provide the amount of capital needed in case it was not
provided by private investors in the framework of the capital increase.43
3.3.6 Asset relief measures
During the financial crisis, the market value of many assets fell dramatically.
As a result, many banks had ‘impaired assets’ on their balance sheets. In order
to remove market uncertainty and to revive market confidence, Member States
have undertaken measures to relieve banks from their impaired assets. A dis-
tinction can be made between an asset guarantee and an asset purchase. An asset
purchase means that the State effectively purchases the impaired assets from
the bank. An asset guarantee is a form of insurance: the State commits to bear
some of the losses on the impaired assets. An important feature of an asset guar-
antee is that the insured assets remain on the balance sheet of the beneficiary
bank, while an asset purchase means that the impaired assets are hived off
the balance sheet. However, in both cases, the downside risk is removed from
the bank’s balance sheet.44
3.3.7 Facilitating a transfer of (part of) the beneficiary bank
When a beneficiary bank cannot continue as a viable standalone entity, the
Member State may choose to facilitate the transfer of (parts of) the beneficiary
bank to another larger bank. In such a case, the value of the transferred assets
usually exceeds the value of the transferred liabilities – the difference is the
so-called ‘funding gap’. By covering this funding gap, the Member State facil-
itates the transfer and thus the rescue of (parts of) the beneficiary bank.
3.3.8 Controlled winding-up
The objective of a controlled winding-up is to support value preservation in
failing banks.45 Value is preserved by means of a controlled winding-up on a
going concern basis instead of the bank being subjected to regular bankruptcy
43. Alpha Bank, 26 November 2015, para. 18-19.
44. Consequently, both types of impaired assets measure lead to a decrease of the bank’s RWA.
45. See, for instance, Danish winding-up scheme, N 407/2010, 30 September 2010, para. 3.
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proceedings.46 In the context of a financial crisis, the market conditions are not
very favourable for assets disposals: a swift sale of assets would thus be at an
excessive discount and would not reflect the real value of the assets.47 State aid
may be needed to keep the bank afloat whilst it is wound-down. This usually
amounts to liquidity support. For instance, the Slovenian State granted Probanka
a liquidity facility. In that context, the Slovenian State granted a State guarantee
on newly issued debt. This guarantee was issued to allow Probanka to draw a
direct emergency loan (emergency liquidity assistance) from the Bank of Slo-
venia.48
3.3.9 Liquidity assistance by central banks
Central banks may act as a lender of last resort (LOLR)49 by providing
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA).50 Within the Eurozone, the decision to
grant ELA is at the discretion of the national central bank51, but the ECB can
veto a decision to grant ELA.52 This raises the question whether ELA can be
considered as a national measure.53 Another question is whether ELA consti-
tutes State aid. This question was answered by the Commission in its decision on
Northern Rock.54 The Commission held that liquidity assistance does not
constitute State aid, if the following cumulative conditions are met:
i) the financial institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision
and the latter is not part of a larger aid package,
ii) the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in
function of its quality and market value,
iii) the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary,
iv) the measure is taken at the central bank’s own initiative, and in particular
is not backed by any counter-guarantee of the State.
46. This description was used to describe the objective of the Danish winding-up scheme
(SA.33001, 28 June 2011, para. 6). See also Roskilde Bank, 5 November 2008, para. 23.
47. N407/2010, Danish winding-up scheme, 30 September 2010, para. 36.
48. Probanka, 18 December 2013, para. 13.
49. The LOLR-function of central banks is discussed by, inter alia: Campbell & Lastra 2009;
Schooner & Taylor 2010, p. 53-56; Tucker 2014.
50. In one of its decisions (Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 39), the Commission described
ELA as follows: “ELA is an exceptional measure enabling a solvent financial institution,
facing temporary liquidity problems, to receive Eurosystem funding without such an oper-
ation being part of the single monetary policy.”
51. ELA is provided by the national central bank at its own risk.
52. By a (two thirds) qualified majority of its Governing Council according to art. 14.4 of the
ECB Statute.
53. This question is discussed by Psaroudakis (2012, p. 215-217).
54. Northern Rock, 5 December 2007, para. 31-34.
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These four cumulative conditions were codified in point 51 of the 2008 Banking
Communication and reprised in point 62 of the 2013 Banking Communi-
cation.55
As a final remark, it should be noted that the ordinary activities of central
banks relating to monetary policy, such as open market operations and standing
facilities, fall outside the scope of the State aid rules.56
3.4 State aid control since the financial crisis
All State aid measures have to be approved by the Commission before they can
be implemented. With respect to State aid to banks, there are two competing
interests: preserving competition on the one hand and preserving financial sta-
bility on the other hand. A balance must be struck between these two competing
interests. The current section describes how the Commission has sought to
achieve this balance.
3.4.1 The Crisis Framework
State aid to firms in difficulty is normally assessed under the Rescue and
Restructuring-guidelines (the “R&R-guidelines”). Accordingly, the first few
State aid banking cases were assessed under these R&R-guidelines.57 However,
the R&R-guidelines were not appropriate in a crisis situation, because they
did not take into account the systemic effects of a bank failure. Therefore, on
13 October 2008, the Commission adopted the Banking Communication. This
was the first of several Communications in which the Commission provided
guidance. The other Communications were the Recapitalisation Communica-
tion, the Impaired Assets Communication and the Restructuring Communica-
tion. Together, these Communications constitute the Crisis Framework.58 In
addition, the Commission adopted the First Prolongation Communication,
followed by the Second Prolongation. As the name of these Communications
indicate, these Communication prolonged the Crisis Framework. In 2013, the
55. Point 62 of the 2013 Banking Communication changes the first cumulative condition: it is
now required that the bank is temporarily illiquid but solvent at the moment of the liquidity
provision.
56. Point 51 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
57. The Commission applied the R&R-guidelines that were in force at that time. In 2014, the
Commission adopted new guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid; these are referred to
as the “2014 R&R-guidelines”.
58. In a few decisions, the Commission used the term “Crisis Communications”. See, for
instance, Alpha Bank, 26 November 2015, para. 74. Also the 2013 Banking Communication
speaks of “Crisis Communications”.
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Commission adopted a new Banking Communication (the “2013 Banking
Communication”) which replaced the original Banking Communication (now
referred to as the “2008 Banking Communication”).
3.4.1.1 The 2008 Banking Communication
On 13 October 2008, the Commission adopted the Banking Communication.59
The purpose of this Communication was to provide guidance on compatibility of
recapitalisation and guarantee schemes. The Banking Communication set out
the general principles. First of all, the Commission justified why it had cho-
sen Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as the appropriate legal basis.60 The Commission
stressed that the exceptional nature of the crisis – in which the entire functioning
of financial markets was jeopardised – might require exceptional measures.
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU was therefore an appropriate legal basis.
Secondly, the Banking Communication introduced a distinction between fun-
damentally sound banks and distressed banks.61 The Commission recognised
that – due to the exceptional nature of the crisis – even fundamentally sound
banks experienced problems. Fundamentally sound (efficient) banks and dis-
tressed (inefficient) banks were both affected by the crisis. Therefore, a
distinction should be made between banks whose problems have an exoge-
nous cause and banks whose problems have an endogenous cause. An exoge-
nous cause means that the bank – although it has an efficient business model and
strategy – has gotten into difficulty because of the exceptional nature of the
crisis. An endogenous cause means that the bank has got into difficulty because
of its own inefficient business model or risky strategy. In this case, a far-reaching
restructuring is required.62
Thirdly, the Banking Communication reiterated the general principle that
aid should be well-targeted, proportionate and limited to the strict minimum.63
In other words: any aid measure should be appropriate, necessary and pro-
portionate.64
59. Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures
taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis,
OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8-14.
60. Points 6 to 13 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
61. Point 14 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
62. In another Communication, the Commission introduced a threshold of 2% to differentiate
between fundamentally sound and distressed banks.
63. Point of the 2008 Banking Communication.
64. The terms “appropriate, necessary and proportionate” cannot be found explicitly in (point 15
of) the 2008 Banking Communication, but since these terms are used in every bank State aid
decision, I will use these terms rather than the terminology of (point 15 of) the 2008 Banking
Communication.
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After introducing these general principles, the Banking Communication pro-
vided specific guidance relating to guarantees, recapitalisation measures, con-
trolled winding-up and liquidity assistance. These specific principles concerned,
for instance, the eligibility criteria to the scheme, the material and temporal
scope of the aid measure, and the need for behavioural safeguards (such as
restrictions on commercial conduct). These specific principles determined
whether a State aid measure could be considered appropriate, necessary and
proportionate. For that reason, these specific principles will be discussed in
chapter 8 of this PhD-study, since that chapter covers the Commission’s assess-
ment of the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of State aid measures.
3.4.1.2 The Recapitalisation Communication
Although the Banking Communication provided some guidance regarding
recapitalisation measures, there was a need for further guidance. Therefore, on
5 December 2008, the Commission adopted the Recapitalisation Communica-
tion.65 The purpose of the Recapitalisation Communication is to provide
detailed guidance as to whether specific forms of recapitalisation are compati-
ble with the common market.66 First, the Recapitalisation Communication sets
out the common objectives of recapitalisation measures, the possible competi-
tion concerns and the recommendations of the Governing Council of the ECB.
The second part of the Recapitalisation Communication discusses the specific
principles that govern the different types of recapitalisation. In essence, the
Recapitalisation Communication is mainly about the pricing of capital injec-
tions. In that regard, the Recapitalisation Communication mentions several
elements that should be taken into account by Member States when determin-
ing the remuneration for State recapitalisations. The remuneration is of key
importance to the assessment of the proportionality of recapitalisation measures.
Therefore, the guidance provided in the Recapitalisation Communication on the
remuneration will be discussed in chapter 8 of this PhD-study.
At this place, it is worth noting that the Recapitalisation Communication
distinguishes between fundamentally sound banks and other banks. Banks that
are not fundamentally sound are subject to stricter requirements: for these banks,
a restructuring plan is required.67
65. Communication from the Commission – The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the
current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against
undue distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2-10.
66. Point 3 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
67. Points 43 and 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
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3.4.1.3 The Impaired Assets Communication
On 26 March 2009, the Commission adopted a Communication that deals with
asset relief measures: the “Impaired Assets Communication” (often referred
to as “IAC”).68 In the IAC, the Commission clarifies the rationale of asset
relief as a measure to safeguard financial stability and underpin bank lending.
The Commission recognises that uncertainty about the valuation and location
of assets lead may lead to a credit crunch.69 The main purpose of asset relief
measures is therefore to boost market confidence. The IAC contains guidelines
on the application of State aid rules to asset relief measures. The IAC will be
discussed extensively in chapter 9 of this PhD-study.
3.4.1.4 The Restructuring Communication
The fourth Communication of the Crisis Framework was the Restructuring
Communication70, adopted on 22 July 2009. Member States have to submit a
restructuring plan or a viability plan. The Restructuring Communication con-
tains detailed provisions regarding the restructuring plan.71 The Restructuring
Communication is based on three pillars: restoration of long-term viability of the
bank, burden sharing, and minimisation of competition distortion.
Return to long-term viability
Long-term viability implies that State aid is redeemed over time, or is remu-
nerated according to normal market conditions.72 Long-term viability requires
that the bank is able to survive without any State support.73 Pursuant to the
Restructuring Communication, the relevant Member State should demonstrate
how the bank will restore long-term viability. The Restructuring Communica-
tion contains detailed provisions on the information that a restructuring plan
should contain. First of all, the restructuring plan should include a comparison
with alternative options. Secondly, the restructuring plan should contain a
diagnosis of the causes of the bank’s difficulties. Thirdly, it should contain
68. Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the
Community banking sector, OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1-22.
69. Points 6 and 7 of the Impaired Assets Communication.
70. Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring
measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules, OJ C 195,
19.8.2009, p. 9-20.
71. Only section 2 of the Restructuring Communication applies to cases in which Member
States should submit a viability plan. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Restructuring Communica-
tion are not applicable to viability plans; they only apply to restructuring plans.
72. Point 14 of the Restructuring Communication.
73. Point 53 of the Impaired Assets Communication.
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information about the business model. This includes information on the organ-
isational structure, funding, corporate governance, risk management, asset-
liability management, cash-flow generation, off-balance sheet commitments,
leveraging, current and prospective capital adequacy and the remuneration
incentive structure.74 The business model should be feasible. The feasibility
is analysed by the Commission with a stress test. The expected results of the
planned restructuring are to be tested under different scenarios (base case
scenario and stress case scenario). The annex of the Restructuring Communica-
tion provides a model restructuring plan. The Restructuring Communication
further provides that the restructuring period should be as short as possible: the
maximum duration of a restructuring plan is five years.75
NB: The principle of restoring long-term viability will be discussed in depth
in chapter 11 of this PhD-study.
Burden-sharing (own contribution)
The bank and its capital holders should contribute to the restructuring costs
as much as possible.76 This is necessary in order to limit distortions of com-
petition and moral hazard. The R&R-guidelines already stipulated that ‘the
amount and intensity of aid must be limited to the strict minimum of the restruc-
turing costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of
the existing financial resources of the company, its shareholders or the business
group to which it belongs’.77 Unlike the R&R-guidelines, the Restructuring
Communication does not require a specific threshold for the own contribution.78
NB: The principle of burden-sharing will be discussed in depth in chapter
12 of this PhD-study.
Limiting competition distortions
Since State aid creates competition distortions, measures are needed to limit
these competition distortions. These measures are usually referred to as “com-
pensatory measures”. Section 3.7.1 gives a general overview of these compen-
satory measures. The Restructuring Communication stresses that compensatory
measures should be tailor-made.79 The Communication identifies two main
criteria that determine the nature and form of the compensatory measures: 1) the
amount of aid and the conditions and circumstances under which the aid was
granted, and 2) the characteristics of the market on which the beneficiary bank
will operate.80
74. Point 11 of the Restructuring Communication.
75. Point 15 of the Restructuring Communication.
76. Point 22 of the Restructuring Communication.
77. R&R-guidelines, para. 43.
78. Point 24 of the Restructuring Communication.
79. Point 30 of the Restructuring Communication.
80. Point 30 of the Restructuring Communication.
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NB: The principle of limiting competition distortions will be discussed in
depth in chapter 13 of this PhD-study.
3.4.1.5 The First Prolongation Communication
The four Communications described in the previous subsections constitute
the Crisis Framework. One of the most essential characteristics of the Crisis
Framework is that – due to the exceptional nature of the crisis – Article 107(3)
(b) TFEU was chosen as a legal basis. This provision allows State aid ‘to rem-
edy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’. The Banking
Communication stresses that recourse to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU is only
possible as long as the crisis situation justifies its application.81 This highlights
the temporary nature of the crisis framework. The Restructuring Communication
even had a specified expiry date. It was due to expire on 31 December 2010.82
On 7 December 2010, the Commission adopted the (First) Prolongation
Communication. This Prolongation Communication recognised that there were
still tensions in the financial markets and that the economic outlook was uncer-
tain. In addition, the Prolongation Communication recognised the high level
of interconnectedness and interdependence within the financial sector.83 This
justified the maintaining of the possibility for Member States to have recourse to
crisis-related support measures on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Thus,
the Prolongation Communication provided that the Banking Communication,
the Recapitalisation Communication and the Impaired Assets Communication
would remain in place.84 Furthermore, the Prolongation Communication
provides that the temporal scope of the Restructuring Communication should
be extended to 31 December 2011.85
Apart from extending the temporal scope of the Crisis Framework, the Prolonga-
tion Communication also introduced some changes to the Crisis Framework.
Thus far, the Crisis Communications made a distinction between fundamen-
tally sound and distressed banks.86 The Prolongation Communication removed
this distinction.87 The financial situation had improved slightly, so the Commis-
sion held that banks should face fewer difficulties in raising capital on the
market.88 The distinction was mainly important for the question whether the
81. Point 12 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
82. Point 49 of the Restructuring Communication.
83. Point 6 of the First Prolongation Communication.
84. Point 7 of the First Prolongation Communication.
85. Point 7 of the First Prolongation Communication.
86. Point 14 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
87. Points 12 to 16 of the First Prolongation Communication.
88. Point 13 of the First Prolongation Communication.
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bank had to submit a restructuring plan. The removal of the distinction means
that as of 1 January 2011, every bank (both fundamentally sound and distressed
banks) which benefit from a new recapitalisation or an impaired asset measure
should submit a restructuring plan.89 The requirement to submit a restructuring
plan still only applies to structural measures (i.e. recapitalisation and asset relief)
and not to aid in the form of guarantees.90
3.4.1.6 The Second Prolongation Communication
One year after the First Prolongation Communication, the Commission issued
a Second Prolongation Communication. Pursuant to this Prolongation Com-
munication, the Banking, Recapitalisation and Impaired Assets Communica-
tions will remain in place beyond 31 December 2011 and the Restructuring
Communication is extended beyond 31 December 2011.91 Unlike the previous
Communications, the Second Prolongation Communication did not set a spe-
cific expiry date.
In addition to extending the temporal scope of the Crisis Framework, the Second
Prolongation Communication refined the pricing principles regarding capital
injections and guarantees – as will be discussed in section 8.6. The Second
Prolongation Communication also introduced the “proportionate assessment” –
which will be discussed in section 10.5.
3.4.1.7 The 2013 Banking Communication
In July 2013, the Commission updated the Crisis Framework by adopting the
2013 Banking Communication. This Communication replaces the 2008 Bank-
ing Communication and supplements the other Crisis Communications.92
Recapitalisation and impaired asset measures
One of the most important changes introduced in the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication concerns the restructuring procedure. Under the 2008 Banking Com-
munication, recapitalisation measures and asset relief measures were
temporarily approved as rescue aid, while the in-depth analysis of the aid
measures was postponed to the restructuring stage. The final authorisation of the
aid measures depended on the restructuring plan. In the 2013 Banking Com-
munication, the Commission departed from this approach. Following the 2013
89. Point 14 of the First Prolongation Communication.
90. Point 16 of the First Prolongation Communication.
91. Point 4 of the Second Prolongation Communication.
92. For a general overview of the 2013 Banking Communication, see: Flynn 2014.
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Banking Communication, the Commission will authorise recapitalisation mea-
sures as restructuring aid only after agreement on the restructuring plan has been
reached.93 In other words: the “clear-first-ask-questions-later approach”
has been abandoned with the 2013 Banking Communication. The reason for
this change in approach is that the market conditions had changed and that there
was less need for an immediate approval of aid measures.94
Temporary approval of recapitalisation measures and asset relief measures as
rescue aid is still possible under the 2013 Banking Communication.95 However,
this is only possible in exceptional circumstances: the emergency recapitalisa-
tions or impaired assets measures must be absolutely necessary to preserve
financial stability. The Communication further requires that the competent
supervisory authority should confirm that there is an exceptional risk to financial
stability that cannot be averted by any other less distorting measures. So only in
those exceptional circumstances is the “clear-first-ask-questions-later approach”
maintained. Once the emergency measures are authorised as rescue aid, the
Member State has two months to submit a restructuring plan.
Member States should submit a capital raising plan before or as part of the
restructuring plan. The capital raising plan should contain 1) capital raising
measures, 2) burden-sharing measures and 3) safeguards preventing the outflow
of funds from the bank.96
Capital raising measures
The beneficiary bank should identify capital raising measures, such as rights
issues, voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments into equity,
capital-generating sales of assets, or earnings retention.97
Burden-sharing
The 2013 Banking Communication introduced stricter burden-sharing require-
ments.98 Shareholders, hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders
should contribute to reducing the capital shortfall. There are two main ways in
93. Point 34 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
94. This new procedure is welcomed by Lienemeyer, Kerle & Malikova (2014, p. 284). They
argue that “banks announce their restructuring plan (sale of Robeco, major cost cutting in
the case of Rabobank) at the same time of their private capital raising, and not after it. The
purpose is to give long term visibility to the investors before they commit to investing in
the bank. The Member State should not accept to have less information when committing
State resources.”
95. Points 50 to 53 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
96. Point 32 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
97. Point 35 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
98. Lienemeyer, Kerle & Malikova (2014) also highlight the enhanced burden-sharing under
the 2013 Banking Communication.
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which hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders can contribute:
either by converting their debt into Common Equity Tier 1 or by writing down
the principal of their instruments.99 State aid may not be granted before
equity, hybrid capital and subordinated debt have fully contributed to offset
any losses.100 In essence, the Banking Communication introduces some form
of a “bail-in”. However, it is not a general bail-in by all bank creditors, because
the Commission does not require contributions from senior debt holders.
The reason to introduce this bail-in was to make an end to the diverging
approaches to burden-sharing across Member States.101 In the early stages of
the financial crisis, Member States did not require creditors to contribute to
rescuing banks. However, as the crisis developed, some Member States intro-
duced stricter ex ante burden-sharing requirements. Diverging approaches to
burden-sharing can lead to differences in funding costs. As a consequence, the
level playing field may be undermined.
Points 45 and 46 are also of importance. Point 45 provides for an exception
to the burden-sharing requirements. In point 46, the ‘no creditor worse off prin-
ciple’ is enshrined.
Preventing outflow of funds
The outflow of funds prior to the restructuring decision must be prevented.102
A bank that knows that it has a capital shortfall is not allowed to pay dividend,
repurchase its shares or buy back hybrid capital instruments.103 If a bank
nonetheless pays dividend or repurchases shares, then the Commission will,
for the purpose of establishing the required measures to limit distortion of com-
petition, add an amount equivalent to the outflow to the aid amount.104 As a
result, the Commission may impose stricter remedies.
Covering the residual capital shortfall with restructuring aid
The 2013 Banking Communication is based on the idea that all capital genera-
ting measures should be exhausted before restructuring aid can be granted in
the form of recapitalisation or impaired asset measures.105 Only the residual
capital shortfall may be covered with restructuring aid.106 The residual capital
shortfall is the capital shortfall that remains after the capital raising measures and
burden-sharing measures have been implemented.
99. Point 41 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
100. Point 44 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
101. Points 17 and 18 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
102. Point 47 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
103. Point 47 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
104. Point 48 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
105. Point 19 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
106. Point 49 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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Guarantees and liquidity support
The 2013 Banking Communication also contains rules regarding guarantees
and liquidity support. These aid measures can still be temporarily approved as
rescue aid. This means that those aid measures can be granted before the Com-
mission has approved the restructuring plan. However, this is only possible for
banks that have no capital shortfall.107 If a bank with a capital shortfall needs
liquidity support, the Commission will apply the procedure concerning recapi-
talisation, which means that the Member State has to submit a restructuring plan.
3.4.2 What is special about the Crisis Framework?
The Crisis Framework is special in the sense that it takes into account the
specificities of the banking sector. By contrast, the Rescue and Restructuring-
guidelines (R&R-guidelines) – that the Commission originally applied – do not
take into account the systemic effects of a bank failure. As was explained in
section 3.2, bank failure can be contagious. During the crisis, Member States
supported banks not just to rescue one bank, but to rescue the entire bank-
ing sector. This makes the State aid to banks different from ‘normal’ rescue and
restructuring aid.108 For this reason, the Commission adopted the Crisis
Framework.
The adoption of the Crisis Framework is special in two ways. On the one
hand, the introduction of the Crisis Framework underlined that the Commis-
sion continued to apply State aid rules to the banking sector. It had been
argued by some that State aid control should be suspended altogether for the
duration of the crisis.109 However, instead of completely suspending the State
aid rules, the Commission adapted the State aid rules for the banking sector.
It has been remarked that “the pragmatism and flexibility shown by the Com-
mission in adjusting its approach to fit the circumstances may well have
avoided a more serious undermining of State aid antitrust law through wide-
spread non-compliance”.110
107. Point 58 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
108. Not all authors agree with the specificity of the banking sector. For instance, D’sa (2009,
p. 144) questions the specificity of the banking sector (and thus the need to create a special
framework).
109. Mamdani 2012, p. 242; Botta (2016, p. 269) describes how in 2008 the French president
Sarkozy put forward a proposal to exempt crisis aids form the scope of State aid control.
Since unanimity was required and not all Member States agreed, this proposal was not
accepted.
110. Da Silva & Sansom 2009, p. 31. See also: Gebski 2009, p. 95; Reynolds, Macrory &
Chowdhury 2011, p. 1679.
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On the other hand, the adoption of the Crisis Framework constitutes a relaxation
of the State aid rules. Although the Crisis Framework is largely based on the
principles of the 2004 R&R-guidelines111, there are several differences between
them.112 In that regard, the Crisis Communications have been described as
“quite permissive”113, “more flexible”114, “accommodating”115 and a “marked
liberalization”.116 The Crisis Communications are more flexible than the 2004
R&R-guidelines on the following aspects:
The “one time, last time principle”
Point 72 of the R&R-guidelines provides that rescue aid should only be granted
once. This is known as the “one time, last time-principle”. In the crisis
framework, the Commission departed from this “one time, last time-principle”.
Point 7 of the Restructuring Communication stipulates that provision of addi-
tional aid during the restructuring period should remain a possibility if justified
by reasons of financial stability.117 As a consequence, a bank can be aided sev-
eral times.
The own contribution
The Commission requires a significant own contribution from the beneficiary
bank. The R&R-guidelines contain several thresholds: for small enterprises,
the contribution should be at least 25%; for SME, the contribution should be
111. On 31 July 2014, the Commission adopted the “Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and
restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty”. As the name suggests, these R&R-
Guidelines do not apply to financial institutions. This is because financial institutions
are covered by specific rules, i.e. the 2013 Banking Communication and the other Crisis
Communications.
112. In some decisions, the Commission has made an effort to explain why a deviation of the
R&R-Guidelines was needed. See for instance the decision in case WestLB, C43/2008,
12 May 2009, para 63: “However, the nature and the scale of the present crisis call for
further specific elements related to the current market conditions to be taken into account.
Therefore the principles of the R&R Guidelines have to be modulated when applied to the
restructuring of WestLB in the present crisis.”
113. Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 767.
114. Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 142.
115. Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 768.
116. Flynn 2014, p. 670.
117. This principle is reiterated in points 16 and 27 of the Restructuring Communication. Point
16 reads as follows: “Should further aid not initially foreseen in the notified restructuring
plan be necessary during the restructuring period for the restoration of viability, this will
be subject to individual ex ante notification and any such further aid will be taken into
account in the Commission’s final decision.” However, this does not rule out the
possibility to grant emergency aid prior to the notification of an amended restructuring
plan. This is the case when urgent remedial action is needed to keep the ailing bank afloat.
See for instance: WestLB, 7 October 2009. The Commission considered that in such cases
a commitment to provide an amended restructuring plan within six months or less should
be sufficient.
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at least 40%; and for large firms, the contribution should be at least 50%. As
banks are large firms, the R&R-guidelines would require an own contribution
of at least 50%. Unlike the R&R-guidelines, the Crisis Framework does not
stipulate a specific threshold for the own contribution.
The restructuring period
Another relaxation concerns the timeframe. In the Crisis Framework, the
restructuring period (i.e. the period in which a bank has to return to viability)
is extended to five years.118 This is a relaxation, because the normal time frame
is two to three years.119
State aid procedure
The Crisis Framework not only amounted to substantive changes, it also
changed the procedure.120 Under the R&R-guidelines, the Member States could
not implement the aid measures until the Commission had approved the aid
measures. The aid measures were subject to a full ex ante review. This process
could take some time (usually several months). The R&R-guidelines pro-
vided for a simplified procedure121, but even this procedure could take 1 month.
In a financial crisis, it is of the utmost importance that Member State can act
quickly.122 The need for immediate approval of State aid measures was rec-
ognised by the Commission. Indeed, the 2008 Banking Communication stressed
that “the Commission has taken appropriate steps to ensure the swift adoption
of decisions upon complete notification, if necessary within 24 hours and over a
weekend”.123 As set out in the previous subsection, the procedure (under the
2008 Banking Communication) was as follows: recapitalisation measures
and asset relief measures were temporarily approved as rescue aid, while the
in-depth analysis of the aid measures was postponed to the restructuring stage.
This approach has been described as “clear first, ask questions later”.124
118. Point 15 of the Restructuring Communication.
119. See footnote 2 of point 15 of the Restructuring Communication.
120. Doleys 2012, p. 556.
121. See point 30 of the 2004 R&R-guidelines.
122. In essence, there are three moments: i) the moment of notification of the aid measures to the
Commission, ii) the moment of authorization of the aid measures by the Commission, and iii)
the moment of implementation of the aid measures. Ideally, the moment of implementation
should be after the moment of authorization. However, in several cases, Member States have
implemented the aid measures before gaining authorization by the Commission. This
constitutes a breach of article 108(3) TFEU.
123. Point 53 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
124. Ahlborn & Piccinin 2010b, p. 140.
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3.4.3 The legal status of the Communications
The Communications can be characterised as “soft law”: they are not binding
on Member States. They are, however, binding on the Commission. In that
regard, the CJEU has held the following:
“Where the Commission adopts guidelines intended to specify, consisten-
tly with the Treaty, criteria which it intends to apply in the exercise of its
discretion, there is a self-imposed limitation of that discretion in that it is
obliged to comply with the guiding rules which it imposed on itself. It may
not depart from those guidelines in an individual case without giving reasons
that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment, which requires that
comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different
situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is
objectively justified”.125
In another case, the CJEU clarified that the Communications are not binding
on the Courts of the European Union.126 This once more underlines that the
Communications are “soft law”.
It is worth stressing that despite their soft law character, the Communications are
nonetheless authoritative. Indeed, although the Communications are not bind-
ing on Member States, they do influence the behaviour of Member States.127
It has even been remarked that the Communications de facto have the same
binding power as formal laws or regulations.128
The legal status of the 2013 Banking Communication was one of the issues in
case C-526/14. The “Ustavno sodišče” (i.e. the Constitutional Court of Slovenia)
asked for a preliminary ruling. Advocate-General Wahl held that the referring
court asked in essence whether the Banking Communication should be con-
sidered as de facto binding on the Member States.129 The Advocate-General
recalled that in the field of State aid control, the Commission has no general
125. T-104/13, para. 184.
126. “Although the Commission must observe the principle of the protection of legitimate
expectations when it applies its self-imposed guidelines, that principle cannot bind the
Courts of the European Union in the same way, in so far as they do not propose to apply a
specific method of setting the amount of fines in the exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction,
but consider case by case the situations before them, taking account of all the matters of fact
and of law relating to those situations.” T-82/13, para. 168.
127. As noted by Doleys (2012, p. 553), the use of soft law provides a “politically-palatable
way to address government behaviour”. See also: Sutton, Lannoo & Napoli 2010, p. 31.
128. Soltész & Von Köckritz 2010, p. 289.
129. Opinion in case C-526/14 (Kotnik), para. 32.
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legislative power: “This means that the Commission is not empowered to lay
down general and abstract binding rules governing, for example, the situations in
which aid may be considered compatible because it is aimed at remedying a
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State under Article 107(3)(b)
TFEU. Any such body of binding rules would be null and void”.130
3.4.4 Temporary Framework for the real economy
As a response to the financial crisis, the Commission not only created the Crisis
Framework, it also adopted the Temporary Framework for the real economy.
While the Crisis Framework deals specifically with financial institutions,
the Temporary Framework was targeted at the real economy. The purpose of
the Temporary Framework was to unblock bank lending and to ensure contin-
ued access to finance. The financial crisis not only had an impact on the financial
sector; the real economy was also heavily affected. Due to the credit crisis, banks
became risk-averse. This created problems for the real economy. Not only weak
companies, but also creditworthy companies faced sudden problems in gaining
access to finance. Especially SME’s faced such difficulties. Besides short-term
effects, the Commission also identified long-term effects: if companies expe-
rience problems in their access to finance, then they may postpone or abandon
investment projects. This is especially harmful if it concerns investments in
sustainable growth or environmental friendly projects.
The Commission identified the need for temporary State aid measures. At the
same time, the Commission identified the need for a coordinated action to
ensure a level playing field. The Commission therefore adopted the Tempo-
rary Framework for the real economy. Just like the Crisis Framework, the
Temporary Framework was based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. As the name
‘Temporary Framework’ indicates, it is a temporary framework. The original
Temporary Framework expired in December 2010. However, it was prolonged
until 31 December 2011. This New Temporary Framework expired in December
2011.
Since this PhD-study is about State aid to banks, the Temporary Framework is of
no relevance to this PhD-study. Accordingly, the Temporary Framework will not
be discussed further.
130. Opinion in case C-526/14, para. 37.
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3.5 The Commission’s assessment of bank State aid
3.5.1 The steps in the Commission’s assessment
It is worthwhile to unravel the various steps in the Commission’s assessment of
State aid measures. Although the Commission does not label the steps, as I see it,
there are five steps:
• In the first place, it has to be assessed whether a certain aid measure con-
stitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
• In the second place – when the measure constitutes State aid – it has to be
assessed whether the compatibility of the State aid measure should be
assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (and thus on the basis of
the Crisis Framework).
• In the third place – when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the
compatibility-assessment – it has to be assessed whether the State aid meets
the cumulative criteria of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality. NB:
in the specific case of an asset relief measure, the measure has to comply with
the criteria of the Impaired Assets Communication.
• In the fourth place – when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and pro-
portionate – it has to be assessed whether a restructuring plan is required for
the beneficiary bank.
• In the fifth place –when a restructuring plan is required – it has to be assessed
whether the restructuring plan achieves long-term viability, burden-sharing
and the limitation of competition distortions.
3.5.2 The outcome of the Commission’s assessment
In most cases, the aid measures were authorised as compatible State aid. Thus,
the conclusion at the first step of the assessment is often that the aid measures
constitute State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU. The conclusion
at the third step of the assessment is often that the aid measures are appropriate,
necessary and proportionate. The conclusion at the fifth step of the assessment
is often that the restructuring plan is appropriate to enable the bank to restore its
long-term viability, sufficient in respect to burden-sharing and appropriate to
limit the competition distortions.
Thus, in most cases, the outcome of the Commission’s assessment is that – in
light of the restructuring plan – the aid measures constitute compatible State aid.
In a few cases, however, the outcome is different. Since the assessment com-
prises five stages, the outcome of the assessment can be different in five ways.
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In the first place, the outcome of the assessment could be that the aid measures
do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU. Indeed,
there are a few cases in which the Commission concluded that the aid measures
did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU. This was
the case in: Dexia BIL, the Italian securitisation scheme (10 February 2016) and
the Hungarian Asset Management Company “MARK” (10 February 2016).
In the second place, the outcome of the assessment could be that the com-
patibility of the State aid measures should not be assessed on the basis of Article
107(3)(b) TFEU. This outcome would mean that in those cases, the Crisis
Framework is not used as the assessment framework. However, as will be
explained in section 7.6, in all bank State aid cases, the Commission concluded
that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU – and thus the Crisis Framework – formed the basis
of the compatibility-assessment.
In the third place, the outcome of the assessment could be that the cumulative
criteria of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality are not met. How-
ever, it can be observed that the Commission never concluded that the aid was
not appropriate, necessary or proportionate. Although there are a few cases in
which the Commission concluded that the aid was incompatible, the incom-
patibility was due to the restructuring plan (i.e. the fifth step of the assessment),
rather than due to the nature of the aid (i.e. the third step of the assessment).
Indeed, as will be explained in section 8.1.4, the Commission was quite lenient
at the third step, while being quite strict at the fifth step of the assessment. For
this reason, I am of the opinion that the fifth step of the assessment is more
important than the third step.131
In the fourth place, the outcome of the assessment could be that no restructuring
plan is required. As will be explained in chapter 10, there are a few instances
in which no restructuring plan is required (for instance, when the bank only
benefits from a guarantee scheme). However, in most other instances, the Mem-
ber State has to submit to the Commission a restructuring plan for the benefi-
ciary bank.
In the fifth place, the outcome of the assessment could be that, in light of the
restructuring plan, the aid is not compatible. In the cases of Banco Privado
Portugues, Banco Tercas and ARCO, the Commission came to the conclusion
that the aid was not compatible. In these cases, the Commission adopted a
131. This has some implications for the focus and structure of this PhD-study. As will be explained
in section 6.9, there are three chapters (i.e. chapters 11, 12 and 13) that address the second
stage, while only one chapter (i.e. chapter 8) addresses the first stage.
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Recovery Decision. Interestingly, these three cases arrived at the Court of
Justice. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 5, the beneficiary banks and Member
States in these three cases decided to challenge the Recovery Decision.
3.6 The Commission decisions
An important part of this PhD-study is the analysis of the Commission decisions
in State aid cases. This makes it worthwhile to explain how the decisions are
built-up.
3.6.1 Type of decisions
There are several types of decisions in a State aid procedure. In chronological
order, the following types of decisions can be distinguished:
Rescue Decision
As was explained in section 3.4.1, the Commission used to follow a two-step
approach: first the aid was temporarily approved as rescue aid; later followed
by an assessment of the restructuring plan. With the introduction of the 2013
Banking Communication, this two-step approach was abandoned for recapi-
talisation and impaired asset measures. However, most bank State aid deci-
sions were taken before the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication.
Consequently, most bank State aid cases started with a Rescue Decision. In the
Rescue Decision, the Commission would assess whether the aid was appro-
priate, necessary and proportionate. If these three criteria were met, the aid
measure was temporarily approved for a period of six months.132
In section 2.5, the State aid procedure was explained. A Rescue Decision
corresponds to a ‘decision not to raise objections’ within the meaning of Art. 4
(3) of the Procedural Regulation.
Opening Decision
In some cases, an Opening Decision is adopted. By this type of decision, the
Commission opens the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 108
(2) TFEU. This procedure is initiated when the Commission has doubts as to
the compatibility of the aid. This type of decision is taken on the basis of Art. 4
(4) of the Procedural Regulation.
132. Within those six months, the Member State had to submit a restructuring plan.
STATE AID TO BANKS
73
Prolongation Decision
Sometimes, the formal investigation procedure is prolonged; in these cases, a
Prolongation Decision is adopted.
Restructuring Decision
In a Restructuring Decision, the Commission assesses the compatibility of the
aid measure in light of the restructuring plan. In particular, the Commission
assesses whether the three restructuring objectives are met: in the first place,
the restructuring plan should ensure the restoration of long-term viability of
the bank; in the second place, the restructuring plan should ensure burden-
sharing; in the third place, the restructuring plan should mitigate the competi-
tion distortions.
It should be noted that sometimes, a restructuring plan provides for the liq-
uidation of the bank.133 In such a case, the restructuring plan is usually called
a ‘liquidation plan’. Accordingly, the restructuring decision is referred to as a
liquidation decision. The compatibility-assessment of liquidation aid is not
really different from the assessment of restructuring aid. Admittedly, the 2013
Banking Communication contains a section that specifically addresses liquida-
tion aid. Nevertheless, point 70 of the 2013 Banking Communication stipulates
that the principles for the assessment of restructuring aid apply mutatis mutan-
dis to the assessment of liquidation aid.134 Since a liquidation plan is essentially
a restructuringplan, thisPhD-studyuses the term ‘restructuringplan’ and ‘restruc-
turing decision’.
Depending on whether the Commission has initiated the formal investigation
procedure, the Restructuring Decision is taken on the basis of Art. 4 or on the
basis of Art. 9 of the Procedural Regulation.135 If the Restructuring Decision
directly follows the Rescue Decision, then it corresponds to a ‘decision not to
raise objections’ within the meaning of Art. 4(3) of the Procedural Regulation.
If, on the other hand, the Restructuring Decision follows an Opening Deci-
sion, then it is taken on the basis of Art. 9 of the Procedural Regulation. In this
case, the Restructuring Decision is either a ‘positive decision’, a ‘conditional
decision’ or a ‘negative decision’.136
133. See, for instance: HGAA, 3 September 2013, para. 13.
134. In addition, point 78 of the 2013 Banking Communication requires that sections 3.1.2 and
3.1.3 must be complied with mutatis mutandis.
135. NB: Article 4 and Article 9 of Regulation No 2015/1589 correspond to Article 4 and
Article 7 of Regulation No 659/1999.
136. See section 2.5.
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Amendment Decision
In principle, the Restructuring Decision is the final decision. However, in several
bank State aid cases, the Commission was requested by the Member State to
amend the Restructuring Decision. In the Amendment Decision, the Commis-
sion assesses whether the requested amendments are acceptable.
It should be recalled that in the Restructuring Decision, the State aid is declared
compatible in light of the commitments (or conditions – in case of a conditional
decision). A very common commitment is the commitment to divest certain
subsidiaries. Sometimes, the beneficiary bank experiences difficulties when
implementing the commitments. For instance, due to deteriorating market
circumstances, the bank may find it difficult to divest the subsidiary within
the stipulated timeframe. In such a situation, the Member State may request the
Commission to amend the Restructuring Decision. An amendment is only pos-
sible on the basis of a sufficiently reasoned request from the Member State.
Furthermore, the failure to implement the commitment within the stipulated
timeframe should be due to external factors. In other words: there should be no
fault of the bank.137
Several amendments are possible. In the first place, the Member State can
request an extension of the (divestment) deadline. In that regard, the Commis-
sion has held that, although it is not explicitly provided for in the Procedural
Regulation, the Commission has discretion to allow an extension as long as it
does not impede the enforcement of the Restructuring Decision.138
In the second place, the Member State can request a modification of the com-
mitment. To give an example: in case of a divestment commitment, the Member
State may propose to change the divestment commitment into a commitment to
run-down the subsidiary.139 An important precondition is that the modification
does not entail any additional aid. Furthermore, the modification should be
based on new commitments which are equivalent to those originally pro-
vided.140
137. For instance, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) had committed to divest its Rainbow Business.
The Amendment Decision describes how RBS genuinely tried to divest Rainbow within the
timeline. RBS started marketing Rainbow immediately after the Restructuring Decision and
subsequently signed a sale agreement with Santander UK. However, Santander UK pulled
out from the agreed purchase. For this reason, RBS missed the divestment deadline. The
Commission considered that RBS could not be blamed for missing the divestment deadline.
138. Sparkasse KolnBonn, 30 March 2011, para. 12. Some Restructuring Decisions expressly
provide for the possibility to extend the divestment deadline. See, for instance: KBC,
18 November 2009, para. 89.
139. This occurred in the cases of Commerzbank, KBC and Ethias.
140. Ethias, 12 June 2014, para. 67.
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3.6.2 Structure of the decisions
The decisions are usually built up in the same way. A Restructuring Decision
often contains the following sections:
1. Procedure
2. Description
a. The beneficiary bank
b. The events triggering the aid measure
c. The aid measure
d. The restructuring plan
3. Position of the Member State
4. Assessment by the Commission
a. Existence of State aid
b. Compatibility of the aid
5. Compliance of the aid measure with the intrinsically linked provisions of
the BRRD
6. Conclusion
Annex
3.6.3 Language of the decisions
As to the language of the decisions, most decisions are in English.141 The
normal rule is that the decisions are drafted in the language of the Member State.
However, because of the exceptional nature of the financial crisis and the need
for a quick response, in many cases the Member States have agreed that the
Commission can draft its decisions in English. Most decisions contain a phrase
like “Denmark has exceptionally agreed that the authentic language for this
decision should be English” or “For reasons of urgency, the Greek authorities
exceptionally accept that the Commission decision be adopted in the English
language”. So with respect to decisions in bank State aid cases, the exception has
become the rule.
3.6.4 Confidential information in the decisions
Some information is regarded as confidential. This information is therefore
omitted in the published versions of the decision.142 Sometimes, the information
is completely deleted (and replaced by a few dots between square brackets) and
141. A few decisions are not available in English. For instance, the Restructuring Decision of
12 May 2010 in the case of Carnegie Investment Bank (NN18/2010) is only available in the
Swedish language.
142. Pursuant to Art. 24 and 25 of the 1999 Procedural Regulation/Art. 30 and 31 of the 2015
Procedural Regulation.
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sometimes (between square brackets) a range is given in order to allow a non-
confidential approximation of the figure. Normally, the removal of confidential
information means the removal of one word. However, in some cases, entire
paragraphs are treated as confidential.143
Which information is usually considered as confidential? If an ailing bank is
sold through a tender procedure, the identity of the acquiring bank is of course
mentioned in the State aid decision. However, the identity of other banks that
have expressed an interest in acquiring (parts of) the ailing bank, is not always
revealed in the State aid decision.144
3.7 The structural measures and behavioural constraints
One of the key features of bank State aid cases is that the Commission requires
structural measures and behavioural constraints. These measures are aimed at
ensuring that the State aid is proportionate (first stage of the compatibility-
assessment) and at restoring long-term viability, ensuring burden-sharing and
limiting competition distortions (second stage of the compatibility-assessment).
3.7.1 Overview of the structural measures and behavioural constraints
In the literature, the Commission’s approach towards bank State aid has been
applauded and criticised. Most authors agree that the Commission was success-
ful in the sense that it avoided a financial meltdown. Nevertheless, there was
some criticism. In particular, the structural measures and behavioural constraints
have attracted a lot of criticism. With respect to certain behavioural restraints,
it has been argued in the literature that “the medicine may be more harmful
than the illness”.145 All structural measures and behavioural constraints will be
touched upon in this PhD-study, but the most prominent ones will be introduced
below:
Price leadership ban
One of the most prominent behavioural restrictions is the price leadership ban.
A price leadership ban (sometimes referred to as a non-price leadership com-
mitment) means that the beneficiary bank is not allowed to offer the best price on
the market. The rationale of this behavioural restriction is that State aid may not
be used to finance aggressive pricing strategies.
143. See, for instance, Bradford&Bingley, 25 January 2010, para. 57.
144. See, for instance: AB Ukio Bankas, 14 August 2013, para. 14-20.
145. Da Silva & Sansom 2009, p. 30.
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A criticism is that by imposing price leadership bans in a concentrated
market, the Commission makes the non-recipient bank de facto price leader.146
It has been argued that price leadership bans undermine the competitive pro-
cess.147 It limits limiting the beneficiary bank’s ability to compete and thus
softens its rivals’ incentives to compete.148
Acquisition ban
Another prominent behavioural restriction is the acquisition ban. An acquisi-
tion ban means that the beneficiary bank is not allowed to acquire stakes in
other banks. This is in line with point 23 of the Restructuring Communication
(according to which the restructuring aid should be limited to covering costs
which are necessary for the restoration of viability) and points 39 and 40 of the
Restructuring Communication (according to which State aid must not be used
to the detriment of competitors which do not enjoy similar public support).
Remuneration restrictions
Many bank State aid cases are characterised by remuneration restrictions.
Remuneration restrictions usually entail that the remuneration of the bank’s
senior management will be restricted. This make State aid less attractive. This
– in turn – weakens the incentive to apply for State aid; and it strengthens the
incentive to repay State aid as soon as possible. In the literature, it has been
argued that remuneration restrictions can be counterproductive, because it could
induce good and capable managers to leave the beneficiary bank.149 This would
harm the return to viability of the bank.
Divestments
While price leadership bans, acquisition bans and remuneration restrictions
are examples of behavioural restrictions, divestments are a structural remedy.
Divestments are a form of burden-sharing by the beneficiary bank. They are also
a form of downsizing of the beneficiary bank.
A criticism raised in the literature is that many divestments concern foreign
markets rather than the domestic market, which might undermine the cohesion
of the internal market.150
146. See: Schinkel 2012; De Kok 2015.
147. Lyons & Zhu 2012, p. 64.
148. Ahlborn & Piccinin 2010, p. 55.
149. Heimler & Jenny 2012, p. 364; see also: Beck et al. 2010, p. 53.
150. Drijber & Burmester 2009, p. 582. See, however, also: Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 780-781.
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Monitoring Trustee and Divestiture Trustee
How to ensure that the restructuring measures are implemented correctly? To
that end, a monitoring trustee is appointed in most bank State aid cases. The
monitoring trustee monitors the implementation of the restructuring measures
and submits a report to the Commission. These regular reports allow the Com-
mission to verify that the restructuring plan is implemented properly.
3.7.2 Terminology
There exist several terms for these structural measures and behavioural con-
straints: ‘restructuring measures’, ‘compensatory measures’, ‘remedies’ or
‘commitments’. It may therefore be useful to elaborate on the terminology.
In the Commission decisions, the term ‘commitments’ is used most frequently.
However, as will be explained in the following subsection, this term does not
cover all structural measures and behavioural constraints, since they sometimes
take the form of conditions.
To the extent that the structural measures and behavioural constraints are
included in the restructuring plan, they can be described as ‘restructuring
measures’. Sometimes, the term ‘compensatory measures’ is used. Although
this term is sometimes used as a synonym for restructuring measures151, it
is more often used to describe a specific type of restructuring measure: i.e. the
measures that are aimed at limiting competition distortions. For instance, the
2008 Banking Communication requires “compensatory measures to limit distor-
tions of competition”.152
In the literature, the term ‘remedies’ is often used. By contrast, the Commission
decisions rarely use this term.153 It should be noted that the term ‘remedies’ is
more common in the other fields of EU competition law: antitrust and merger
control. The term ‘remedies’ can be found in the Restructuring Communication;
mostly in the context of competition distortions.154 Therefore, the terms ‘rem-
edies’ and ‘compensatory measures’ are often used interchangeably.155 How-
ever, remedies are sometimes considered to also include burden-sharing
151. For instance, Drijber & Burmester (2009, p. 580) argue that “compensatory measures are
essentially synonymous for restructuring measures”.
152. Point 14 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
153. The term ‘remedies’ can only be found in: Fortis, 3 December 2008, para. 96;
154. See points 19, 36, 38 of the Restructuring Communication.
155. See for instance: Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 154.
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measures.156 Whether remedies also include viability-measures is less clear. For
that reason, the term ‘remedies’ might not be completely suitable to describe all
the three types of measures in the restructuring plan.
Therefore, in this PhD-study, the term ‘restructuring measures’ is used as a
catchall term for the structural and behavioural measures that are included in the
restructuring plan. When referring to one of the three types of restructuring
measure, the term ‘viability measure’, ‘burden-sharing measure’ respectively
‘compensatory measure’ is used.
It should, however, be noted that not all behavioural constraints originate from
the restructuring plan. Indeed, some behavioural constraints originate from a
bank support scheme. As will be explained in section 8.8, all bank support
schemes provide for some behavioural constraints. Are the behavioural con-
straints that originate from the scheme ‘restructuring measures’? To the extent
that the restructuring plan includes information about the behavioural constraints
originating from the scheme, these behavioural constraints can still be conside-
red as ‘restructuring measures’. However, there are a few instances in which
a restructuring plan is not required. For instance, banks that only participate in
a guarantee scheme do not have to draw up a restructuring plan. In such a cases,
the behavioural constraints cannot be considered as ‘restructuring measures’.
Thus, the term ‘restructuring measures’ is not a perfect catchall term for all struc-
tural measures and behavioural constraints. Nevertheless, as will be explained
in section 6.9, this PhD-study focusses on the assessment of whether the aid
is compatible in light of the restructuring plan. Because of this special focus, this
PhD-study will mainly speak of ‘restructuring measures’.
3.7.3 Imposed by the Commission or proposed by the Member State?
Restructuring measures can take the form of either commitments or conditions.
Substantively, there is no difference between commitments and conditions; but
there is an important procedural difference between them. In section 2.5, it was
explained that a State aid procedure has two phases: a preliminary investigation
procedure and a formal investigation procedure. At the end of the preliminary
investigation procedure, the Commission can accept commitments by the Mem-
ber State and adopt a decision not to raise objections.157 If, however, there are
serious doubts as to the compatibility of the notified aid measure with the
156. For instance, Laprévote (2012, p. 99) distinguishes three categories of remedies: own
contribution measures, structural measures and behavioural measures.
157. On the basis of Article 4(3) of the 2015 Procedural Regulation/Art. 4(3) of the 1999
Procedural Regulation.
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common market, then the Commission can initiate the formal investigation
procedure. At the end of the formal investigation procedure, the Commission
can adopt a conditional decision, thereby imposing conditions on the bank con-
cerned.158
Most decisions concerning State aid to banks are ‘commitment decisions’.159
The advantages of commitment decisions over conditional decisions are obvi-
ous: the formal investigation procedure is avoided, which saves time. Further-
more, the avoidance of the formal investigation procedure means that extra
administrative efforts are avoided. In addition, the opening of the formal inves-
tigation procedure is seen as a ‘clash’ between the Commission and the Member
State concerned – which they might wish to avoid.160
The key difference between a conditional decision and a commitment decision
is that in a conditional decision, the Commission imposes restructuring measu-
res, while a commitment decision is based on the restructuring measures pro-
posed by the Member State concerned.
Formally speaking, the Member State proposes commitments. However, in
reality, the commitments result from negotiations between the Commission
and the Member State (and the beneficiary bank). When proposing restructuring
measures, the Member State anticipates the commitments that the Commission
would require.161 If the commitments are deemed insufficient by the Commis-
sion, the Commission would not adopt a decision not to raise objections. In
the end, all State aid measures have to be authorised by the Commission before
they can be implemented. The Commission thus has the decisive say in the
negotiations about the restructuring measures. Therefore, the Commission is in
a position to require certain commitments from the Member State. It has been
remarked that commitment decisions can sometimes be better characterised as
a Commission’s unilateral decision rather than a truly ‘negotiated’ solution.162
In some cases, the Commission even explicitly indicated that it expected certain
commitments. This can be illustrated by the following recital from the Opening
Decision on HSH Nordbank:
“Moreover, the Commission appreciates the commitment not to advertise
with the fact that the bank received State aid. However, this is insufficient
to mitigate the distortion of competition and the Commission would expect
further measures of a behavioural or structural nature, especially in Northern
158. On the basis of Article 9(4) of the 2015 Procedural Regulation/Art. 7(4) of the 1999
Procedural Regulation.
159. Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 165.
160. Botta 2016, p. 274.
161. Lyons & Zhu 2012, p. 64; Rivas 2014, p. 723.
162. Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 166.
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Germany, such as a commitment that the capital effects of relief will be used
for providing credit to real economy and not for financing of a growth
strategy (in particular for acquisitions), a commitment for no price leadership
in the market or a commitment for restrictions on dividend policy or caps on
executive remuneration”.163
If the commitments proposed by the Member State are not accepted by the
Commission, the Member State is effectively forced to propose more far-reach-
ing restructuring measures. Otherwise, the Commission will not adopt a com-
mitment decision. In such a case, the Commission will impose restructuring
measures by adopting a conditional decision. This is also illustrated by the case
of HSH Nordbank:
“As Germany refuses to propose additional own contribution measures, the
aid measure cannot be approved as compatible under Article 7(3) of Reg-
ulation (EC) No 659/1999. Such measures can, however, be imposed by
attaching conditions to the Decision”.164
What is the position of the beneficiary bank vis-à-vis the Member State? The
beneficiary bank has some say in the negotiations about the restructuring
plan. In that regard, the Court has held that “in principle, there is nothing to
prevent the content of all the measures provided for by the restructuring plan
from being the subject-matter of negotiations between the Commission and
the Member State concerned, in which the beneficiary of the aid may, where
appropriate, participate”.165 Laprévote argues that it is likely that most cost
reduction measures result from the banks’ own decisions.166 Nicolaides & Rusu
argue that compensatory measures included in restructuring plans are defined
first by the beneficiary banks themselves and then proposed by the correspon-
ding Member States.167 However, while the beneficiary bank might have some
say on the restructuring measures, the Commission has the decisive say. In the
end, the beneficiary bank is subject to the restructuring plan and the restructuring
measures that are included in it.
163. HSH Nordbank, 22 October 2009, para. 80. A similar consideration can be found in
BayernLB, 12 May 2009, para. 96.
164. HSH Nordbank, 20 September 2011, para. 242.
165. Case T-457/09, para. 284.
166. Laprévote 2012, p. 99.
167. Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 781.
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3.8 Conclusion
While the previous chapter focussed on State aid in general, this chapter
specifically focussed on State aid to banks. The reason for this special focus
on banks was explained in section 3.2. This section explored the two specific
features of the banking sector: banks are essential to the economy and banks are
special. These two specific features of the banking sector explain why State
aid to banks might be justified. This was recognised by the Commission. As set
out in section 3.4, the Commission adopted the so-called Crisis Framework, in
which the Commission deviated from the strict and rigid approach of the R&R-
guidelines. Notwithstanding this flexible approach towards banks, the restruc-
turing measures that the Commission required from beneficiary banks attracted
a lot of criticism, as explained in section 3.7.
State aid is one way of dealing with ailing banks. When the financial crisis broke
out in 2008, Member States had no alternative for granting State aid (other than
allowing banks to fail). However, in 2014, a bank recovery and resolution
framework was adopted. This framework provides for an alternative way of
dealing with ailing banks (i.e. by putting them into resolution). How this frame-
work affects State aid (and State aid control) will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 4. Bank State aid under the BRRD
and the SRM
4.1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis, the supervisory and regulatory landscape has changed
dramatically. In particular, a bank recovery and resolution framework has been
created, consisting of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)1
and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)-Regulation.2
Before the adoption of the bank recovery and resolution framework,
Member States were forced to choose between “two evils”, when dealing
with an ailing bank: either allowing the bank to fail (under normal insolvency
procedures) or bailing out the bank (i.e. rescuing the bank by granting State
aid).3 The latter option was the “lesser evil”: although State aid leads to com-
petition distortions and moral hazard, it preserves financial stability. Allowing
banks to fail and to go into insolvency would be much more damaging. In that
regard, the Commission remarked:
“Put bluntly, there was no simple way for a bank to continue to provide
essential banking functions whilst in insolvency, and in the case of a failure
of a large bank, those functions could not be shut down without significant
systemic damage”.4
1. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment
firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/
EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of
the Council.
2. Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July
2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism
and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
3. Kastelein 2014, p. 42.
4. Commission Communication of 20 October 2010, ‘An EU Framework for Crisis Manage-
ment in the Financial Sector’, p. 2.
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The inadequacy of normal insolvency procedures underlined the need for a
special insolvency regime for banks. The recovery and resolution framework
constitutes an alternative to normal insolvency procedures.5 At the same time, it
also provides an alternative to the bail-out of a bank. It effectively adds another
option to the “two evils”: instead of allowing the bank to fail (and go into insol-
vency) or bailing out the bank, the bank can be put into resolution.
The introduction of the recovery and resolution framework raises the follo-
wing question: (how) does the recovery and resolution framework affect the way
in which State aid is granted? Does State aid to banks still have a future now that
the BRRD and SRM entered into force?
A similar question arises in the context of the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). As will be explained in section 4.5, it is now possible for the ESM to
directly recapitalise banks: the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument (DRI).
The question could arise whether State aid rules also apply to the ESM direct
recapitalisation instrument. After all, if the ESM recapitalises banks directly, is
the recapitalisation imputable to the Member State?
These questions will be answered in the present chapter. In the context of this
PhD-study, these questions are of the utmost importance. If banks can be
allowed to fail by putting them into resolution, then this reduces the need for
State aid measures. Accordingly, a study of the Commission’s assessment of
State aid measures to banks would lose some of its relevance. However, as will
be explained in this chapter, State aid to banks remains relevant.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the background and context of the
BRRD/SRM will be provided (in section 4.2). Section 4.3 sets out the main
elements of the BRRD/SRM. Section 4.4 delves into the fundamental question
regarding the impact of the BRRD/SRM on the State aid control framework. The
impact of the ESM will be discussed in section 4.5. The conclusion of this
chapter – that State aid (control) remains relevant – can be found in section 4.6.
5. One of the main differences between resolution and normal insolvency concerns the objec-
tives: the main aim of normal insolvency procedures is the maximisation of assets available to
satisfy creditors’ claims, while resolution is primarily aimed at public policy objectives such
as financial stability and the continuity of critical functions. See: Commission Communica-
tion of 20 October 2009, ‘An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the
Banking Sector’, p. 9.
CHAPTER 4
86
4.2 The background and context of the BRRD and the SRM
The recovery and resolution framework consists of the BRRD and the SRM-
Regulation. These two legal instruments have a different background. The
BRRD is part of the Single Rule Book and applies to all banks in the EU,
whereas the SRM is part of the Banking Union and only applies to banks in the
euro area.6
4.2.1 The background of the BRRD
One of the first steps towards a recovery and resolution framework was the
adoption of the Commission Communication of 20 October 2010 “An EU
Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector”.7 In this Commu-
nication, the Commission set out plans for an EU framework for crisis man-
agement in the financial sector. On 6 June 2012, the Commission adopted a
legislative proposal for bank recovery and resolution. This eventually led to the
BRRD, which was adopted on 15 May 2014.
The adoption of the BRRD should be seen in the context of steps taken at
the international level: at the G20 Toronto Summit of June 2010, the FSB was
called to develop “concrete policy recommendations to effectively address
problems associated with, and resolve, systemically important financial institu-
tions”.8 Accordingly, in October 2011, the FSB issued Key Attributes of
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.9 The BRRD is in line
with these Key Attributes.10
The BRRD is part of the Single Rule Book, which is a single set of har-
monized prudential rules which all banks in the EU should respect.11 Another
main element of the Single Rule Book is the CRD IV-package.12 While the
6. Another difference between the BRRD and the SRM is the subject matter and scope: the
BRRD applies to banks (‘credit institutions’) and investment firms, whereas the SRM only
concerns banks and banking groups.
7. On 20 October 2009 and on 26 May 2010, the Commission had already adopted a Com-
munication “An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector”
respectively a Communication “Bank Resolution Funds”.
8. Point 21 of the G20 Toronto Summit Declaration of June 2010.
9. NB: in October 2014, the Key Attributes were updated.
10. This has been observed by many authors. See for instance: Huertas et al. 2016, p. 1-2. It is
also noteworthy that in the Proposal for a BRRD, the Commission already referred to the
FSB Key Attributes.
11. The Single Rule Book is sometimes considered to be the foundation of the Banking Union.
However, it should be kept in mind that the Banking Union only concerns banks in the
Eurozone, while the Single Rule Book applies to all banks in the EU.
12. The CRD IV-package consists of a Regulation and a Directive. The CRD IV-package is an
implementation of Basel III. In addition, it includes some new elements. Basel III/CRD IV
is intended to make banks stronger and more resilient. Basel III/CRD IV changes the
capital requirements: it requires higher capital buffers, and capital buffers of better quality.
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BRRD is part of the Single Rule Book, the SRM is part of the Banking Union
– which will be discussed in the following subsection.
4.2.2 The background of the SRM
The SRM is one of the pillars of the Banking Union – the other pillar being the
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The Banking Union was created in
response to the Eurozone crisis.13 The Eurozone crisis demonstrated that there
was a “vicious circle”14 between the finances of banks and the finances of
Member States: an ailing bank was usually rescued by the Member State in
which the bank in question was established. As a result of these aid measures,
the financial position of that Member State deteriorated. This, in turn, affected
the banks in that Member State, since banks often hold government bonds of
‘their’ government. Providing support to these banks imposes a further burden
on the finances of the State. Hence: there is a vicious circle between banks and
governments.15 The Commission noted that this situation “poses specific risks
within the euro area, where the single currency increases the likelihood that
developments in one Member State can create risks for economic development
and the stability of the Euro area as a whole”.16
The Banking Union is aimed at breaking the vicious circle between banks and
governments. The Banking Union allows for a rescue of banks at EU-level:
the Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012 held that the ESM should
get the possibility to recapitalise banks directly. As a corollary, if banks are
rescued/supported at EU-level, then banking supervision should also be trans-
ferred to EU-level.17 In order words: the SSM was a precondition for the direct
recapitalisation by the ESM.
Another rationale of the Banking Union is that nowadays, banks often operate
across national borders. Cross-border banks can operate through branches or
through subsidiaries. Before the entry into force of the SSM, the supervision
of cross-border banks was divided by home- and host-supervisors.18 Home
and host supervisors worked together in colleges of supervisors. National
financial supervisors are inclined to take only national interests into account.
13. Véron (2013, p. 4) aptly called the Eurozone crisis a “trigger” for the banking union.
14. Sometimes referred to as “negative feedback loop”, “doom loop” or “deadly embrace”.
15. As Franchoo, Baeten & Salem (2014, p. 568) rightly point out, the fact that almost the
entire banking sector in the programme countries (i.e. Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, and
Cyprus) had to be restructured provides a clearly demonstration of the link between the
financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.
16. SSM Proposal, p. 2.
17. Bovenschen et al. 2013, p. 364; Hadjiemmanuil 2015a, p. 20; Kastelein 2014, p. 35; Ter
Kuile 2015, p. 10 (and in particular footnote 139).
18. For more information, see: Joosen 2010b.
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The Turner Review (2009) summarised the essence of the problem by quoting
Mervyn King (former governor of the Bank of England) who said that “banks
are global in life, but national in death”.19 The introduction of the Banking
Union was meant to remedy this situation.
The first pillar of the Banking Union is the SSM.20 The SSM is composed of
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national competent authorities
(NCA’s) of the participating Member States. Within the SSM, the ECB is
responsible for direct supervision of significant21 banks, while the NCA’s are
responsible for direct supervision of less significant institutions (though this
supervision is subject to the oversight of the ECB).22 On 4 November 2014,
the ECB formally assumed its responsibility as supervisor of the banks in the
euro area.
While the importance of the SSM cannot be overstated, its relevance to this
PhD-study is limited, since it does not have any impact on State aid control.
By contrast, the SRM (the other pillar of the Banking Union) is much more
relevant to this PhD-study: the SRM concerns the resolution of failing banks
and therefore touches upon the issue of State aid to failing banks.
19. Turner Review, p. 36.
20. Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions (“SSM-Regulation”). Further rules are laid down in the SSM Framework
Regulation, which the ECB adopted pursuant to Art. 6(7) SSM-Regulation: Regulation
(EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the
framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the
European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated
authorities.
21. Art. 6(4) SSM-Regulation clarifies when a bank is ‘significant’. A bank is significant in the
following situations:
– The total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion.
– The ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating Member State of
establishment exceeds 20%, unless the total value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion.
– The ECB may consider a bank to be of significant relevance. The ECB can make this
assessment on its own initiative or following a notification from a national competent
authority.
– The bank has received public financial assistance from the EFSF or the ESM.
– The bank is one of the three most significant credit institutions in the participating
Member State.
22. Art. 4(1) SSM-Regulation confers prudential tasks on the ECB. As set out in Art. 3-6 of
the SSM Framework Regulation, the day-to-day supervision of significant banks is carried
out by Joint Supervisory Teams (JST), which are composed of staff members from the
ECB and from the NCA’s.
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4.2.3 The added value of the SRM
To a large extent, the SRM-Regulation is based on the BRRD. In that regard,
recital 18 of the SRM-Regulation even provides that in order to ensure a level
playing field within the internal market as a whole, the SRM-Regulation is
consistent with the BRRD.23 But where the BRRD introduces national resolu-
tion authorities and national resolution financing arrangements, the SRM-
Regulation introduces a Single Resolution Board (SRB) and a Single Resolution
Fund (SRF). The creation of the SRB and the establishment of the SRF con-
stitute the added value of the SRM.
Firstly, because of the creation of the SRB, the SRM provides for a centralisa-
tion of decision-making. In its Proposal for a SRM-Regulation, the Commission
already explained the need for the SRM in addition to the BRRD by pointing out
that in the Banking Union, bank supervision and resolution need to be exercised
by the same level of authority.24
Within the SRM, the SRB and the national resolution authorities cooperate.
The division of tasks within the SRM is set out in Art. 7 SRM-Regulation.
Pursuant to Art. 7(2), the SRB is responsible for significant banks and for other
cross-border banks. Other banks fall under the responsibility of the national res-
olution authorities.25
Secondly, because of the establishment of the SRF, the SRM breaks the negative
feedback loop between bank and governments. In recital 10 of the SRM-
Regulation, it is indicated that since the BRRD provides for national financing
arrangements, it does not sufficiently reduce the dependence of banks on the
support from national budgets.26 By contrast, the SRF breaks the link between
sovereigns and the banking sector.
23. See also Art. 5 SRM-Regulation which provides that where, pursuant to the SRM-Regula-
tion, the SRB performs tasks and exercises powers, which, pursuant to the BRRD are to be
performed or exercised by the national resolution authority, the SRB shall, for the application
of the SRM-Regulation and of the BRRD, be considered to be the relevant national resolution
authority.
24. This viewpoint was expressed by the European Council and reiterated by the Commission
in recital 12 of the SSM-Regulation.
25. However, also with regard to these bank, the SRB may, pursuant to Art. 7(4)(b) SRM-
Regulation, exercise directly all of the relevant powers under the SRM-Regulation. Pursuant
to Art. 7(5) SRM-Regulation, participating Member States may decide that the SRB exercise
all of the relevant powers and responsibilities conferred on it by the SRM-Regulation in
relation to the ‘non-significant banks’.
26. Recital 10 SRM-Regulation.
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4.3 The main elements of the BRRD and SRM
The BRRD distinguishes between three main stages: preparation (see subsec-
tion 4.3.1), early intervention (see subsection 4.3.2) and resolution (see subsec-
tion 4.3.3). The most prominent feature of the bank recovery and resolution
framework is the bail-in (see subsection 4.3.4). Other important elements are the
resolution strategies for cross-border banking groups (see subsection 4.3.5) and
the resolution fund (see subsection 4.3.6).
4.3.1 Preparation
In the preparation-stage, the bank makes a recovery plan, while the resolution
authority makes a resolution plan and assesses the resolvability of the bank.
Recovery plans
Pursuant to Art. 5(1) BRRD, banks27 have to draw up a recovery plan.28 A
recovery plan has to include measures to be taken by the bank to restore its
financial position following a significant deterioration of its financial situ-
ation.29 Recovery plans have to be updated regularly.30 Pursuant to Art. 6
BRRD, recovery plans have to be submitted to the competent authority31 for
review. The competent authorities thus assess the appropriateness of the recov-
ery plans.32
Resolution plans
Where the recovery plan is drawn up by the bank, the resolution plan is drawn
up by the resolution authority. This follows from Art. 10 BRRD. Pursuant to
Art. 8 SRM-Regulation, the SRB shall draw up and adopt resolution plans for
the significant banks. The national resolution authorities shall draw up resolution
plans for the other banks.33
27. Although I speak of “banks”, it should not be forgotten that the BRRD applies to credit
institutions (i.e. banks) and investment firms (together referred to as “institutions”).
28. Art. 74(4) CRD IV already provided for the obligation to prepare recovery plans and
resolution plans. On this aspect, CRD IVanticipated the BRRD. With the entry into force of
the BRRD, art. 74(4) CRD IV was deleted (pursuant to Art. 124 BRRD).
In the Netherlands, DNB required systemically important banks already in 2011/2012 to
draw up recovery plans (Kamerstukken 31980, nr. 59, p. 6).
29. Pursuant to Art. 5(5) BRRD, recovery plans should include the information listed in
Section A of the Annex of the BRRD.
30. At least annually, pursuant to Art. 5(2) BRRD.
31. The competent authority is the relevant supervisor. See point 21 of Article 2(1) BRRD
which refers to the definition given in point 40 of Article 4(1) CRR.
32. Art. 6(4) BRRD provides for a role for the resolution authority as regards the assessment of
the recovery plan.
33. Art. 9 SRM-Regulation.
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What is a resolution plan? The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution
actions which the resolution authority may take where the institution meets the
conditions for resolution. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution
authority shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where
necessary and proportionate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments
could be addressed.34
The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the SRB
may take where a bank meets the conditions for resolution.35 In that regard,
Art. 23 SRM-Regulation provides that when adopting a resolution scheme, the
SRB, the Council and the Commission shall take into account and follow the
resolution plan as referred to in Article 8 unless the SRB assesses, taking into
account the circumstances of the case, that the resolution objectives will be
achieved more effectively by taking actions which are not provided for in the
resolution plan.
Resolvability
Pursuant to Art. 15 BRRD and Art. 10 SRM-Regulation, the resolution authority
will assess the resolvability of the bank.36 Section C of the Annex to the BRRD
gives a list of matters that the resolution authority is to consider when assessing
the resolvability of the bank. When there are impediments to the resolvability of
a bank, the resolution authority can require the bank to take measures that reduce
or remove the impediments in question.37 For instance, it can require the bank to
divest specific assets or require changes to legal or operational structures of the
bank.38 Thus, resolution authorities have far-reaching powers, not only in the
resolution-stage, but also in the preparation-stage.
As has been remarked in the literature, the drawing up of “living wills” – a term
sometimes used to refer to recovery and resolution plans – could act as a catalyst
for thinking and taking action.39 The structure of a bank or banking group can be
very complex. The different legal entities within a banking group are often
34. Art. 10(2) BRRD.
35. Art. 8(6) SRM-Regulation.
36. Art. 15(1) BRRD provides that an institution shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible
and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency
proceedings or to resolve it by applying the different resolution tools and powers to the
institution while avoiding to the maximum extent possible any significant adverse effect on
the financial system, including in circumstances of broader financial instability or system-
wide events, of the Member State in which the institution is established, or other Member
States or the Union and with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out
by the institution. See also Art. 10(3) SRM-Regulation.
37. Art. 17 BRRD.
38. Art. 17(5)(d) and (g) BRRD.
39. Avgouleas, Goodhart & Schoenmaker 2013, p. 211.
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interrelated, because key functions (such as risk management, IT, treasury and
cash management) are often centralised; resulting in a “mismatch between the
legal and operational structure”.40 This might constitute an impediment to the
resolvability of the bank.41 Since the measures enshrined in the resolution plan
can only be implemented if the bank is organised and structured in line with the
resolution plan, the resolution plan dictates the current structure of the bank.
Thus, recovery and resolution planning can contribute to reducing the com-
plexity of the bank’s legal and operational structure.42
4.3.2 Early intervention
The second stage that the BRRD provides for is the stage of early intervention.
In this stage, the financial and economic situation of the bank is deteriorating,
but an economic recovery is still possible. When – because of a deteriorating
situation – a bank infringes or is likely to infringe requirements from CRD IV/
CRR, the competent authority can take the early intervention measures that are
listed in Art. 27 BRRD. For instance, the competent authority can require the
management body of the bank to implement one or more of the arrangements
or measures set out in the recovery plan.43 The competent authority can also
require one or more members of the management body or senior management of
the bank to be removed or replaced if those persons are found unfit to perform
their duties.44
It is worth stressing that these measures can be taken by the competent
authority rather than by the resolution authority. In the early intervention-stage,
the competent authority plays a central role; in the resolution-stage, the central
role is played by the resolution authority – as will be discussed in the following
subsection.
4.3.3 Resolution
The third stage provided for by the BRRD is the stage of resolution. The formal
definition of ‘resolution’ can be found in Article 2(1) BRRD; but simply said,
resolution is the restructuring of an ailing bank by a resolution authority through
40. Van der Zwet 2011, p. 21. See also: Gleeson 2012, p. 25-26. In that regard, Hüpkes (2009,
p. 380-381) speaks of ‘aligning the legal form and economic function’.
41. Schillig 2014, p. 80.
42. Bierens (2017) argues that the drawing up of resolution plans will also influence the
governance of the bank.
43. Art. 27(1)(a) BRRD. In that regard, Art. 5(5) BRRD stipulates that recovery plans shall
include possible measures which could be taken by the bank where the conditions for early
intervention under Article 27 are met.
44. Art. 27(1)(d) BRRD.
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the use of resolution tools. In essence, when the resolution conditions (see sub-
section 4.3.3.2) are met, the resolution authority applies the resolution tools (see
subsection 4.3.3.3) in order to achieve the resolution objectives (see subsection
4.3.3.1).
4.3.3.1 Resolution objectives
Resolution constitutes an alternative to normal insolvency procedures. The
objectives of resolution45 are to ensure the continuity of critical functions and to
avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system (in particular by pre-
venting contagion). Another objective is to protect public funds by minimising
reliance on extraordinary public financial support. In other words: the costs for
the taxpayer should be minimised.
4.3.3.2 Resolution conditions
What triggers resolution? For a resolution action to take place, three resolution
conditions have to be met: (i) the bank is failing or likely to fail46; (ii) there is no
reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector measures would prevent
the failure of the bank within a reasonable timeframe; and (iii) a resolution action
is necessary in the public interest. These resolution conditions are listed in Art.
32(1) BRRD and elaborated in Art. 32(4) and (5) BRRD.47
With respect to the first resolution condition, the following aspect is worth
noting: one of the instances in which a bank is considered to be ‘failing or likely
to fail’ is when it needs “extraordinary public financial support” 48 – in other
words: when it needs State aid. Thus, the granting of State aid to a bank triggers
resolution (provided that the other resolution conditions are also met). There are,
however, three exceptions. These will be discussed in more detail in section
4.4.1.
Since putting a bank under resolution has far-reaching implications, the assess-
ment whether the resolution conditions are met, is very important. Equally
important is the question by whom the resolution conditions are assessed.
45. The resolution objectives are listed in Art. 31 BRRD and Art. 14(2) SRM-Regulation.
46. When a bank is insolvent, the criterion ‘failing or likely to fail’ is met. But this criterion
can also be met in some other instances, also in instances in which the bank is still solvent.
For this reason, Hadjiemmanuil (2015b, p. 243) is quite critical.
47. The corresponding provisions from the SRM-Regulation are Art. 18(1) and Art. 18(4) and
(5).
48. Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD.
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In that regard, a distinction should be made between banks outside the
Eurozone (to which the SRM-Regulation does not apply) and banks inside the
Eurozone (to which the SRM-Regulation applies). As regards the latter, a further
distinction can be made between banks that fall under the responsibility of
the SRB and banks that fall under the responsibility of the national resolution
authorities. Roughly speaking, significant banks and cross-border banks fall
under the responsibility of the SRB, whilst the ‘small banks’ fall under the
responsibility of the national resolution authorities.49
The following table provides an overview of the authorities that decide whether
the resolution conditions are met. This can be the NCA (national competent
authority), NRA (national resolution authority), SRB (Single Resolution Board)
or ECB (European Central Bank).
Who decides whether the resolution conditions are met?
With regard to banks
outside the Eurozone
(and thus outside the
scope of the SRM)
With regard to banks inside the Eurozone
Banks falling under the
responsibility of the SRB
Banks falling under
the responsibility of the
NRA
First resolution
condition:
NCA, after consulting
the NRA
ECB, after consulting
the SRB
NCA, after consulting
the NRA
‘Failing or likely
to fail’
or: or: or:
NRA, after consulting
the NCA (pursuant to
Art. 32(2) BRRD)
SRB, but only when the
ECB is informed and
does not make
an assessment
NRA, after consulting
the NCA
NRA informs and coor-
dinates with the SRB
Second resolution
condition:
NRA SRB NRA
‘No alternatives’ ECB may inform the
SRB that it considers
this condition to be met.
NRA informs and coor-
dinates with the SRB
Third resolution
condition:
NRA SRB NRA
‘In the
public interest’
NRA informs and coor-
dinates with the SRB
49. As explained in section 4.2.3.
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Situation before 1 January 2016
The SRMbecame fully operational on 1 January 2016, whereas the BRRD (with
the exception of the provisions on the bail-in) already had to be implemented
in national legislation by 31 December 2014.50 So there was a ‘transition period’
from 1 January 2015 until 31 December 2015. The situation for banks inside the
Eurozone in this transition period reflects the situation for banks outside the
Eurozone nowadays: only the BRRD applies. In such a situation, the resolution
authority determines whether the conditions of ‘no alternatives’ and ‘in the
public interest’ are met, while the competent authority determines whether the
condition of ‘failing or likely to fail’ is met.
The allocation of tasks can be illustrated by the case of the Cooperative Bank of
Peloponnese. The Commission decision on the Cooperative Bank of Pelopon-
nese indicates that the Bank of Greece determined that the bank was ‘failing or
likely to fail’.51 The Bank of Greece is the competent authority as well as the
resolution authority. In that regard, the Credit and Insurance Committee (CIC) of
the Bank of Greece has been entrusted with prudential supervision, whilst the
Resolution Measures Committee (RMC) has been entrusted with issuing all the
decisions and recommendations of the Bank of Greece as resolution authority.
With respect to the resolution of the Cooperative Bank of Peloponnese, it was
the Credit and Insurance Committee (CIC), in consultation with the Resolu-
tion Measures Committee (RMC), that determined (by decision no. 170/4 of
13 December 2015) that the condition of ‘failing or likely to fail’ was met.
4.3.3.3 Resolution tools
The resolution tools enable resolution authorities to assume control of the failing
bank.52 There are four resolution tools: i) sale of business, ii) bridge institution,
iii) asset separation, and iv) bail-in.53
50. Art. 130 BRRD and Art. 99 SRM-Regulation.
51. Cooperative Bank of Peloponnese, 17 December 2015, para. 17.
52. The situation under the SRM is as follows. The resolution procedure is laid down in Art. 18
SRM-Regulation. Pursuant to Art. 18(6) SRM-Regulation, the SRB shall, when the three
resolution criteria have been met, adopt a resolution scheme. The resolution scheme shall:
(i) place the bank under resolution; (ii) determine the application of the resolution tools to the
bank under resolution; (iii) determine the use of the Single Resolution Fund to support the
resolution action. This resolution scheme is addressed to the national resolution authorities.
The SRB shall – pursuant to Art. 28 SRM-Regulation – closely monitor the execution of the
resolution scheme by the national resolution authorities.
53. Art. 37(3) BRRD.
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Sale of business tool
The sale of business tool54 makes it possible to rescue the sound parts of the
bank and to maintain the critical functions by selling (parts of) the bank to a
private sector purchaser. If only part of the bank is transferred, the residual entity
shall be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.55 A key feature of the
sale of business tool is that the resolution authority can sell (part of) the bank
without the consent of shareholders. To that end, Art. 63 BRRD provides that
resolution authorities should have the power to take control of a bank under
resolution and exercise all the rights and powers conferred upon the sharehol-
ders, other owners and the management body of the bank.
Bridge institution tool
The bridge institution tool56 is similar to the sale of business tool. The differ-
ence between these two tools concerns the purchaser of the bank: in case of the
sale of business tool, the purchaser is a private party, while in case of the bridge
institution tool, the purchaser (i.e. the bridge bank) is wholly or partially owned
by one or more public authorities (which may include the resolution authority)
and is controlled by the resolution authority. The bridge institution tool can be
used when there is no private sector purchaser willing to take over the bank
under resolution.
Asset separation tool
The asset separation tool57 can be used to transfer assets, rights or liabilities of
a bank under resolution to a separate vehicle.58 This tool can be used to create
a ‘bad bank’. Since the asset separation tool effectively amounts to an asset relief
measure, the BRRD provides that this tool should be used only in conjunction
with other tools in order to prevent an undue competitive advantage for the fail-
ing bank.59
54. Defined in point 58 of Art. 2(1) BRRD as “the mechanism for effecting a transfer by a
resolution authority of shares or other instruments of ownership issued by an institution under
resolution, or assets, rights or liabilities, of an institution under resolution to a purchaser that is
not a bridge institution, in accordance with Article 38”.
55. Art. 37(6) BRRD.
56. Defined in point 60 of Art. 2(1) BRRD as “the mechanism for transferring shares or other
instruments of ownership issued by an institution under resolution or assets, rights or
liabilities of an institution under resolution to a bridge institution, in accordance with
Article 40”.
57. Defined in point 55 of Art. 2(1) BRRD as “the mechanism for effecting a transfer by a
resolution authority of assets, rights or liabilities of an institution under resolution to an asset
management vehicle in accordance with Article 42”.
58. For an illustration of the asset separation tool, see the case of Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank
(MKB), SA.40441, 16 December 2015.
59. With the exception of the asset separation tool (which must always be applied in combination
with another resolution tool), the resolution tools may be applied individually or in any
combination; this follows from Art. 37(4) BRRD.
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Bail-in tool
The bail-in tool60 is undoubtedly one of the most prominent features of the
BRRD.61 The bail-in tool is the power of a resolution authority to cancel the
bank’s shares and to write down the bank’s liabilities or to convert them into
equity.62 The bail-in tool will be discussed in more detail in the following
subsection.
4.3.4 Bail-in
4.3.4.1 Reasons for introducing the bail-in tool
The bail-in can best be explained by contrasting it with the bailout. With a bank
bailout, the State – and thus the taxpayer – bears most of the burden of rescuing
and restructuring the bank, while with a bail-in, the costs of the rescue and
restructuring of the bank are primarily born by the shareholders and creditors of
the bank (through a write down or conversion of their capital instruments). The
bail-in tool thus minimises the costs of the resolution of a failing bank borne by
the taxpayers.63
In addition to minimising the costs borne by the taxpayers, the bail-in removes
the implicit guarantee. The implicit guarantee followed from the expectation
that a Member State would bail out a failing bank.64 Usually banks that were
considered to be “too big to fail” enjoyed such an implicit guarantee. The guar-
antee was implicit, because there was no explicit ex ante commitment by
the State to bail out the bank in case of financial difficulties. Rather, it was the
expectation that the bank would be bailed out. This expectation could create
moral hazard. By removing the implicit guarantee, the bail-in reduces moral
hazard and strengthens market discipline.
Bank bailout led to creditor inertia.65 Because of the implicit guarantee, inves-
tors in banks knew that their investments were relatively safe. As a con-
sequence, they had little incentive to monitor the bank. The bail-in tool will
60. Defined in point 57 of Art. 2(1) BRRD as “the mechanism for effecting the exercise by a
resolution authority of the write-down and conversion powers in relation to liabilities of an
institution under resolution in accordance with Article 43”.
61. The bail-in was also one of the FSB Key Attributes (Key Attribute 3.5).
62. Bail-in should not be confused with contingent convertible debt (CoCo’s). See: Gleeson
2012, p. 14-15.
63. A complicating factor is that bank debt instruments are sometimes issued under foreign
law. When debt instruments are not governed by EU law, there is a risk that the bail-in of
these liabilities is not recognised (by the court of the third country). This reduces the
effectiveness of the bail-in tool.
64. Schich & Kim 2012, p. 2.
65. Avgouleas & Goodhart 2015, p. 4.
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give these investors a stronger incentive to monitor the health of a bank during
normal circumstances.66 It has, however, been questioned whether investors
really are in a position to influence the course of affairs of the bank.67
Another reason to introduce the bail-in tool in the BRRD is harmonisation.
Some Member States had already introduced some form of bail-in. Diverging
approaches across Member States could lead to different funding costs for banks
with the same creditworthiness. This would undermine the internal market and
the level playing field.
4.3.4.2 Write-down and conversion power
Noteworthy in the context of the bail-in is the write-down and conversion
power. 68 This power – provided for in Art. 59 BRRD69 – can be exercised
independently of any resolution action; but it can also be exercised in combina-
tion with a resolution tool.70 Although the write down and conversion instru-
ment is not a resolution tool, it is part of the resolution authority’s toolbox. If
a bank can become viable again if the write down and conversion power is
applied, then the resolution authority is required to exercise the write down and
conversion power. In the resolution-stage, the resolution authority is required to
exercise the write down and conversion power if the resolution action would
result in losses being borne by creditors.71
The term ‘bail-in’ is sometimes used as an umbrella term for the resolution
tool (Art. 43 BRRD) and the write down and conversion power (Art. 59
BRRD).72 However, the write down and conversion instrument is more limited
in scope than the bail-in tool, since it only covers AT1 and Tier 2 capital instru-
ments.73
4.3.4.3 Hierarchy of claims
Art. 48 BRRD provides the sequence of write down and conversion (sometimes
referred to as “waterfall” or “pecking order”). The hierarchy also follows from
the general resolution principles listed in Art. 34 BRRD and Art. 15 SRM-
Regulation. The shareholders will bear the first losses. After the shareholders,
66. Recital 67 BRRD and recital 73 of the SRM-Regulation.
67. See, for instance: Joosen 2015, p. 44.
68. In Dutch, this is known as “AFOMKI” (which stands for “afschrijven of omzetten van
kapitaalinstrumenten”).
69. Art. 21 SRM-Regulation.
70. Art. 59(1) BRRD.
71. This follows from Art. 37(2) BRRD.
72. Wojcik 2016, p. 106.
73. Wojcik 2016, p. 112.
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the creditors of the bank will bear losses in accordance with the order of priority
claims under normal insolvency proceedings. The treatment of shareholders
and creditors under normal insolvency proceedings is thus used as a “bench-
mark”.74 Another resolution principle is the ‘no creditor worse off-principle’.
This principle means that no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have
been incurred if the bank had been wound up under normal insolvency pro-
ceedings.75 While the ‘no creditor worse off-principle’ may sound simple, there
are two complicating factors. Firstly, this principle requires a comparison with a
hypothetical situation: it is not completely certain what creditors would have
received in insolvency.76 Secondly, the ranking of creditors in insolvency is not
harmonised at the EU level.77
4.3.4.4 Scope of the bail-in
The bail-in applies to all liabilities of the bank, except the liabilities that are
excluded pursuant to Art. 44(2) and (3) BRRD. The liabilities mentioned in
Art. 44(2) BRRD are always excluded, while pursuant to Art. 44(3) BRRD, the
resolution authority may exclude certain liabilities from the application of the
bail-in. Covered deposits, secured/collateralized liabilities, short-term liabilities
are some of the liabilities that are always excluded from the scope of the bail-in
tool.
In the literature, a distinction is made between ‘capital liabilities’ and ‘opera-
tional liabilities’.78 Ideally, only the capital liabilities should be bailed in.
Indeed, a bail-in of the operational liabilities could endanger the continuity of
the critical functions of the bank. The operational liabilities should therefore be
excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool.
It has been pointed out that as a result of the discretion to exclude certain lia-
bilities in “exceptional circumstances”, the bail-in might proceed differently in
each Member State, if there is no EU-definition of “exceptional circumstan-
ces”.79 This risk is, however, addressed by the Commission Delegated Regula-
tion 2016/860.80
74. Wojcik 2015, p. 254.
75. This principle is enshrined in Art. 34(1)(g) BRRD and Art. 15(1)(g) SRM-Regulation.
76. Avgouleas & Goodhart 2016, p. 83; Wojcik 2015, p. 257; Wojcik 2016, p. 124.
77. Gardella 2015, p. 217; Wojcik 2015, p. 257-258; Wojcik 2016, p. 124-125.
78. See, for instance: Bierens 2017, p. 243; Tucker 2013.
79. Huertas et al. 2016, p. 16-18.
80. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/860 of 4 February 2016 specifying further the
circumstances where exclusion from the application of write-down or conversion powers is
necessary under Article 44(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the
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The bail-in tool has a wider scope than the burden-sharing required by the
2013 Banking Communication. As was explained briefly in chapter 3 and will
be discussed extensively in chapter 12, the 2013 Banking Communication
requires burden-sharing by shareholders and subordinated debt holders; burden-
sharing by senior debt holders is not required.81
4.3.4.5 MREL
Banks have to meet a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible lia-
bilities (MREL).82 The MREL ensures that banks cannot structure their lia-
bilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail-in.83 In other
words: the MREL ensures that there are sufficient liabilities that can be bailed in.
Another objective of the MREL is to increase the predictability of the bail-in
operation for the bank’s investors. MREL is thus “a necessary corollary to make
bail-in work”.84
The determination of the MREL is made in parallel with the development and
maintenance of the resolution plans.85 The SRB shall address its determina-
tion to the national resolution authorities. The national resolution authorities
shall implement the instructions of the SRB in accordance with Article 29.
The SRB shall require that the national resolution authorities verify and ensure
that banks maintain the MREL.86
On 9 November 2015, the FSB introduced the Total Loss-absorbing Capacity
(TLAC) Term Sheet. This TLAC standard is a standard for G-SIB’s.87 The
MREL was similar, but not identical to the TLAC standard. On 23 November
2016, the Commission adopted a proposal (for a regulation) to integrate the
TLAC standard in the MREL.
Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and
investment firms. Art. 44(11) BRRD empowers the Commission to adopt delegated acts in
accordance with Art. 115 BRRD in order to specify further the circumstances when exclusion
is necessary.
81. Point 42 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
82. Art. 45 BRRD and Art. 12 SRM.
83. Recital 79 BRRD and recital 83 SRM.
84. Wojcik 2016, p. 113.
85. Art. 12(13) SRM-Regulation.
86. Art. 12(14) SRM-Regulation.
87. In the EU legislation, G-SIB’s are referred to as global systemically important institutions
(G-SIIs).
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4.3.4.6 Criticisms of the bail-in tool
In order to fully understand the bail-in tool and its implications, it is useful to
briefly discuss the criticisms that the introduction of the bail-in tool has received.
These criticisms concern the implications on the funding costs of banks and the
risk of contagion.
The possibility of a bail-in might make it more difficult for banks to obtain
funding. The consequence of a bail-in is that bank debt entails more risk for
the debt-holders, so bank debt instruments become a less attractive investment.
The implicit State guarantee was removed because of the bail-in tool.88 As a
consequence, investors are only willing to invest in bank debt instruments if
the bank compensates them for the higher risk; in other words, they will demand
a higher rate of return. To conclude, the bail-in could lead to higher funding costs
for banks.
The bail-in tool might create contagion.89 Banks are interrelated and intercon-
nected. Debt instruments (that could be bailed in) are often held by other
banks.90 A bail-in could thus be harmful to other banks and could thus have
negative repercussions on financial stability.
The application of the bail-in tool could create social unrest. The rationale of
the bail-in tool is presented as shifting the burden from taxpayers to investors.
It should, however, be pointed out that ‘the taxpayer’ and ‘the investor’ can be
the same person. Some households have invested in banks. Italy is a well-known
example: Italian households hold about one-third of senior bank debt and
almost half of total subordinated bank debt.91 Furthermore, households are
sometimes indirect investors in banks, because pension funds and insurance
companies invest in banks.92 Since households are the ultimate beneficiaries of
pensions and insurance pay-outs, a bail-in of the claims of pension funds and
insurance companies might indirectly harm these households.
In my opinion, while it is certainly true that a bail-in could be painful for
investors, it should not be forgotten that a bailout is not completely painless for
them either. Indeed, under the State aid control framework, burden-sharing by
shareholders and by subordinated creditors is required.
88. Wojcik 2016, p. 127.
89. Wojcik 2016, p. 129; Avgouleas & Goodhart 2015, p. 3-29; Schillig 2014, p. 94.
90. Merler pointed out that in Italy – and to a lesser extent in Spain – banks usually hold
participations in each other: they are “strongly tied together in a network of cross-holdings”.
See: S. Merler, ‘Vicious circle(s) 2.0’, Bruegel blog post, 20 November 2014.
91. IMF 2016 Article IV Report, p. 25.
92. This is also remarked by R. Theissen in his blog ‘Bail-in or bail-instability’.
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For some creditors, the bail-in might be more burdensome than a bailout.93
A bailout may have been more favourable to them. However, it should be
recalled that a bailout (i.e. State aid) is not a right; Member States are not obliged
to grant aid.94 The counterfactual scenario is an insolvency of the bank. And the
‘no creditor worse off principle’ provides that the application of the bail-in tool
might not result in a worse position of creditors than in case of an insolvency.
4.3.5 Resolution of a (cross-border) banking group
Banks are often organised as a banking group rather than as a single entity.
This might complicate the resolution of the bank. Especially the resolution of
a cross-border banking group can be complicated.95 There are essentially two
approaches to the resolution of a (cross-border) banking group: Single Point
of Entry (SPE) and Multiple Point of Entry (MPE).96 SPE means that the
resolution tools are applied at the level of the top parent or holding com-
pany, and by a single resolution authority.97 MPE means that the resolution
tools are applied to different parts of the group, and by two or more resolution
authorities.98 Whether several resolution authorities are involved thus depends
on whether the resolution follows a SPE approach or MPE approach. In that
regard, the SPE approach has been called a ‘universal approach’, and the MPE
approach a ‘territorial approach’.99
The BRRD does not prescribe a specific resolution strategy. Rather, it allows
for a SPE resolution, a MPE resolution or a combination of both.100 Which
resolution strategy is most effective depends on how the banking group is
structured.
93. This is especially the case for senior creditors.
94. This was also stressed by AG Wahl in his Opinion in case C-526/14, para. 79: “At this
juncture, it may be useful to stress that, under EU State aid rules, no undertaking can claim
a right to receive State aid; or, to put it differently, no Member State can be considered
obliged, as a matter of EU law, to grant State aid to a company.”
95. Cross-border bank resolution has received a lot of attention in the literature. See, inter alia:
Babis 2014, Lehmann 2017; Lupo-Pasini & Buckle 2015.
96. FSB 2013, p. 12-13. See also: Gardella 2015, p. 220; Lupo-Pasini & Buckle 2015,
p. 218-220; Lehmann 2017, p. 116-117; Schoenmaker 2016, p. 6.
97. A formal definition of SPE can be found in Art. 2 of the Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 of 23 March 2016.
98. A formal definition of MPE can be found in Art. 2 of the Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2016/1075.
99. Lupo-Pasini & Buckle 2015, p. 218. See also: Gardella 2015, p. 220.
100. This follows from recital 80 BRRD and recital 23 of Commission Delegated Regulation
(EU) 2016/1075.
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In a MPE resolution, the resolution tools are applied to different parts of the
banking group. A MPE approach is effective when the banking group’s opera-
tions are divided into several clearly identifiable subgroups.101 By contrast,
when the banking group operates in a very integrated manner, a SPE approach
might be more appropriate.
In a SPE resolution, the losses in the group entities should be absorbed by
the top parent: an “upstream of the losses” from the subsidiaries to the parent
level.102 The SPE approach is thus only effective when there is sufficient loss-
absorbing capacity at the parent level.103 Another element that makes the SPE
approach effective is when the top parent is a non-operating holding company.
In such a case, the SPE resolution entails that the ‘operating liabilities’ (i.e. the
liabilities of the operating group entities) are protected relative to the ‘capital
liabilities’ (i.e. the liabilities of the top company).104
4.3.6 Resolution fund
A key element of the BRRD is the requirement to establish national resolution
funds (in the official terminology: “resolution financing arrangements”).105
The main purpose of a resolution fund is to provide liquidity to the bank or
bridge institution.106 However, the fund can also be used for recapitalisations:
pursuant to Art. 44(4) BRRD the resolution financing arrangement may make a
contribution to the bank under resolution. In that regard, Art. 44(5) BRRD sets
out a very important restriction: the resolution fund may only make a contribu-
tion if the following two conditions are met: i) there is a bail-in of at least 8% (of
total liabilities including own funds)107, and ii) the contribution does not exceed
5% (of total liabilities including own funds).
National resolution funds are publicly managed, but they are financed through
contributions paid by banks. Pursuant to Art. 103 BRRD (and Art. 70 SRM-
Regulation), banks are required to make ex ante contributions to the resolution
101. See Art. 25(3)(d) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 of 23 March
2016. See FSB (2013, p. 17-20) for an overview of the preconditions for a successful
implementation of a MPE strategy. See also FSB 2012, p. 16-19.
102. Gardella 2015, p. 220.
103. See Art. 25(3)(b) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1075 of 23 March
2016. See FSB (2013, p. 14-17) for an overview of the preconditions for a successful
implementation of a SPE strategy. See also FSB 2012, p. 16-19.
104. Tucker 2013. See also: Bierens 2017, p. 243-244.
105. This requirement is laid down in Art. 100 BRRD. The rationale of these resolution financing
arrangements is clearly explained in recital 103 of the BRRD.
106. Art. 101(1) BRRD indicates all the purposes for which resolution financing arrangements
may be used. See also Art. 76(1) SRM-Regulation.
107. Art. 44(8) BRRD provides for an exception to this precondition.
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fund.108 Extraordinary ex post contributions are made possible by Art. 104
BRRD (and Art. 71 SRM-Regulation). The fact that banks have to contribute to
the resolution fund contributes to the BRRD’s objective of minimising the cost
of taxpayers.
Whereas the BRRD provides for national resolution funds, the SRM provides
for the creation of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). The SRF is financed by
bank contributions which are raised at national level and which are transferred
to the SRF. The obligation to transfer the bank contributions to the SRF does not
follow directly from the SRM-Regulation, but is established in the intergover-
nmental agreement (IGA109).110 The SRF will be built up over a period of
8 years (starting at 1 January 2016). The SRF will initially consist of national
compartments; the bank contributions are allocated to these national compart-
ments.111 These national compartments will gradually be merged (“mutualised”)
over the 8-year transition period.112 The SRF is key to breaking the link between
governments and banks. In that regard, the SRF has been called “an essential
element without which the SRM could not work properly”.113
4.4 BRRD/SRM and State aid
What is the impact of the BRRD/SRM on the State aid control framework? In
this regard, there are three crucial questions. Firstly, can Member States grant
State aid to banks without triggering resolution under the BRRD or the SRM?
Secondly, can Member States still grant State aid to a bank under resolution?
And thirdly, is the State aid control framework still relevant when a bank is
restructured under the recovery and resolution framework? The following three
subsections provide an answer to these three questions.
108. Pursuant to Art. 103(2) BRRD, each bank contributes pro rata to the amount of its liabilities
(excluding own funds) less covered deposits, with respect to the aggregate liabilities
(excluding own funds) less covered deposits of all the institutions authorised in the territory
of the Member State.
109. Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution
fund, 21 May 2014. For the institutional aspects of the IGA, see: Drijber 2015, p. 224-225.
110. Art. 1(a) and Art. 3 of the IGA.
111. Art. 4 of the IGA.
112. The modalities of the mutualisation are laid down in Art. 5 of the IGA.
113. Recital 19 of the SRM-Regulation.
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4.4.1 State aid as a trigger of resolution
Can Member States grant aid to banks without triggering resolution under
BRRD or the SRM?
It should be recalled that one of the conditions for resolution is that the bank
is ‘failing or likely to fail’. This condition is further specified in Art. 32(4)
BRRD.114 Pursuant to Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD115, a bank will be deemed to be
‘failing or likely to fail’116 when extraordinary public financial support is
required. ‘Extraordinary public financial support’ is defined in point 28 of
Article 2(1) BRRD as State aid. Thus, as general rule, the need for extraordinary
public financial support to a bank triggers the resolution of the bank.
There are, however, three exceptions (listed in Art. 32(4)(d)(i)-(iii) BRRD).
According to this provision, State aid does not trigger resolution when the State
support takes the form of:
– (i) a State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks
according to the central banks’ conditions;
– (ii) a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities; or
– (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices
and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution. NB: Art.
32(4)(d) further specifies that the third exception is limited to injections
necessary to address capital shortfall established in the national, Union or
SSM-wide stress tests, asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises.117 The
third exception thus refers to a so-called “precautionary recapitalisation”.
The three exceptions only apply to solvent banks. Furthermore, the measures
must be of a precautionary and temporary nature and must be proportionate to
remedy the consequences of the serious disturbance.118 Art. 32(4) BRRD also
stresses that the measures must be conditional on final approval under the Union
State aid framework.
Illustration of the second exception
The decision of 27 January 2015 in the case SA.40480 (eleventh prolongation
of the Polish guarantee scheme) illustrates the second exception. The Commis-
sion noted that the Polish guarantee scheme was limited to solvent institut-
ions. The guarantees granted under the scheme were of a temporary nature since
114. Art. 18(4) SRM.
115. Art. 18(4)(d) SRM.
116. ‘Failing or likely to fail’ is one of the conditions for resolution.
117. On 22 September 2014, EBA has published guidelines on the types of tests, reviews or
exercises that may lead to support measures under Article 32(4)(d)(iii) of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive.
118. Art. 32(4) BRRD.
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the window of their issuance was limited to six months and their maturity was
limited to five years (or seven years in case of covered bonds) and were of a
precautionary nature since they only covered newly issued liabilities. The
guarantees granted under the scheme were also proportionate to remedy the
consequences of the serious disturbance. Therefore the Commission concluded
that the aid measure does not violate the intrinsically linked provisions of the
BRRD.119
Illustration of the third exception
An illustration of the third exception can be found in the decisions that the
Commission adopted in 2015 in the cases of Alpha Bank, Eurobank, NBG and
Pireaus Bank.120 Since the aid measures in these cases met the conditions
of Art. 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD, the aid measures did not trigger the ‘failing or
likely to fail’-criterion and could thus be implemented outside resolution. In
the decisions, the Commission listed the following nine conditions that would
have to be met in order for the State aid to fall under the exception of Art. 32
(4)(d)(iii) BRRD.
i. The aid is required in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy
of a Member State and preserve financial stability.
The Commission noted that the compatibility-assessment had already shown
that the measures were granted to remedy a serious disturbance in the Greek
economy and to preserve financial stability in the Greek banking sector.
ii. The aid is granted at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage
upon the institution.
The Commission noted that the aid measures did not confer an undue advantage
to the bank in question. An ‘undue advantage’ was specified as an ‘advantage
incompatible with the internal market under State aid rules’. This was ensured
by the compliance with the compatibility conditions for restructuring aid, in
particular the level of remuneration and the depth of the restructuring.
iii. The aid shall be confined to solvent institutions.
The Commission noted that the banks complied with the capital requirements
when the aid measures were granted, following in particular the private capital
increase and the 2015 LMEs, and as assessed by the competent supervisory
authority.
119. SA.40480, 27 January 2015, para. 27-30. See also the decision on the fifth prolongation of
the Cypriot guarantee scheme, SA.40027, 14 January 2015, para. 28-31.
120. Alpha Bank, 26 November 2015, para. 125-139; Piraeus Bank, para. 160-173; NBG,
para. 167-182; Eurobank, para. 125-137.
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iv. The aid shall be conditional on final approval under State aid framework.
The Commission noted that that the compatibility-assessment had already
shown that the measures were compatible.
v. The aid shall be of a precautionary and temporary nature.
In the case of NBG, the Commission noted that this was ensured by the fact
that a high proportion of the aid (75%) was granted in the form of a repayable
capital instrument, i.e. CoCo’s.121 In the case of Alpha Bank, the aid measure
was of a precautionary and temporary nature, because it expired automatically as
Alpha Bank successfully covered the capital shortfall and did not lead to any
pay-out of capital by the HFSF.122
vi. The aid shall be proportionate to remedy a serious disturbance in the
economy of the Member State.
In each of the four decisions, the Commission noted that it had already con-
cluded in the decision that the aid was proportionate to remedy the consequences
of the serious disturbance in the Greek economy.
vii. The aid shall not be used to offset losses that the institution has incurred
or is likely to incur in the near future.
The Commission noted that the aid was not used to offset losses that the bank
had incurred or was likely to incur in the near future.
viii. The aid is limited to injections necessary to address capital shortfall
established in the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset quality reviews
or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or
national authorities.
The Commission noted that the aid measures were limited to the injections
necessary to cover the capital shortfall arising under the adverse scenario of
the stress test, as identified by the ECB and disclosed on 31 October 2015, after
the capital shortfall arising under the AQR and the baseline scenario of the
stress test had been covered by private means (i.e. capital raising from private
investors, the 2015 LME and the conversion into common equity of instruments
not included in the 2015 LME).
ix. The circumstances referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of Article 32(4)(d)
BRRD and the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) BRRD are not met.
The Commission noted that the supervisory authority, the ECB, approved the
capital raising of the bank and that the bank managed to raise an important part
of the capital shortfall from private investors. Furthermore, the aid measures
121. NBG, para. 177.
122. Alpha Bank, para. 134.
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for the bank were limited to the injections necessary to cover the capital shortfall
arising under the adverse scenario of the stress test, after the capital shortfall
arising under the AQR and the baseline scenario of the stress test has been
covered by private means. The ECB noted in the report of the 2015 CA that
covering the shortfalls by raising capital would then result in the creation of
prudential buffers in the four Greek banks, keeping thus an adequate level of
solvency. Therefore, the Commission concluded that there were no objective
elements to indicate that any of the circumstances referred to in point (a), (b) or
(c) of Article 32(4)(d) BRRD were met. As regards the circumstances referred to
in Article 59(3) BRRD, the Commission noted that all additional Tier 1 and Tier
2 instruments held by the bank were subject to conversion into ordinary shares
and would fully contribute to covering capital needs of the bank before State aid
was injected.
Concluding remarks
These cases demonstrate that it is possible to grant State aid without trigge-
ring the resolution of the bank. However, as has also been remarked in the
literature, the three exceptions are quite limited in scope.123 Thus in most cases,
granting State aid would trigger resolution.124
A related question is the following: can Member States still grant aid to banks
without triggering the write-down and conversion tool? It should be recalled
that this tool can be used in combination with the resolution tools or outside a
resolution action.125 The write-down or conversion of capital instruments
is required in the situations listed in Art. 59(3) BRRD and Art. 21(1) SRM-
Regulation. One of these situations is the situation that extraordinary public
financial support is needed, except in any of the circumstances set out in point
(d)(iii) of Article 32(4) BRRD and point (d)(iii) of Article 18(4) SRM-Regula-
tion.126 Thus only a so-called “precautionary recapitalisation” does not trigger
the write-down and conversion tool.
4.4.2 State aid to a bank under resolution
Can Member States grant aid to a bank under resolution? Art. 37(10) BRRD
provides for the possibility for Member States to grant State aid to banks under
resolution. It must be granted through ‘government stabilisation tools’ and it is
123. Lo Schiavo 2014, p. 449. See also: Lannoo 2014, p. 630-635.
124. For instance, in the decision on CCB (18 December 2015, para. 126), the Commission noted
that the capital support for CCB was not of a precautionary nature, because it was aimed at
covering a capital shortfall stemming from additional loan loss provisioning.
125. Art. 59(1) BRRD.
126. Micossi, Bruzzone & Cassella 2016.
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only possible when there is a bail-in of at least 8%. This means that the share-
holders and creditors of the bank have to contribute to loss absorption and
recapitalisation (through write down, conversion or otherwise). This contribu-
tion should be equal to an amount of at least 8% of total liabilities including own
funds.
In addition, Art. 37(10)(b) BRRD stresses that this extraordinary public
support is conditional on prior and final approval under the Union State aid
framework.127
The rules on government stabilisation tools are laid down in article 56-58
BRRD. In art. 56(1) BRRD, it is again underlined that extraordinary public
support – through government financial stabilisation tools – must be granted in
accordance with art. 37(10) BRRD and the Union State aid framework. Art. 56
(3) BRRD stresses that government financial stabilisation tools may only be
used as a last resort.128
4.4.3 Relevance of the State aid control framework
Is the State aid control framework still relevant when a bank is rescued under
the recovery and resolution-framework? This question should be answered in
the affirmative. In the BRRD as well as in the SRM-Regulation, references to the
State aid rules can be found. The relevance of the State aid framework is already
highlighted in the recitals of the BRRD and SRM-Regulation.
– Recital 47 BRRD underlines that when the use of the resolution tools invol-
ves the granting of State aid, interventions have to be assessed in accordance
with the Union State aid framework. Recital 47 BRRD further stipulates that
State aid may be involved where resolution funds or deposit guarantee funds
intervene to assist in the resolution of an ailing bank.
– Recital 55 BRRD stresses that the resolution tools should be applied before
any extraordinary public financial support to the bank. Recital 55 BRRD
further provides that the use of extraordinary public support, resolution funds
or deposit guarantee schemes to assist in the resolution of failing institutions
should comply with the rules on State aid.
– Recital 30 SRM-Regulation provides that “where resolution action would
involve the granting of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU or as Fund
aid, a resolution decision can be adopted after the Commission has adopted a
positive or conditional decision concerning the compatibility of the use of
such aid with the internal market”.
127. The Union State aid framework is defined (in point 53 of Article 2(1) BRRD) as: “the
framework established by Articles 107, 108 and 109 TFEU and regulations and all Union
acts, including guidelines, communications and notices, made or adopted pursuant to
Article 108(4) or Article 109 TFEU”.
128. As already underlined by recital 55 BRRD.
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Already in its Proposal for a SRM-Regulation, the Commission stressed that
“within the SRM, the State aid control of the Commission would be preserved
in all circumstances”.129
The procedure concerning State aid and Fund aid is laid down in article 19
SRM-Regulation. Pursuant to Art. 19(3) SRM-Regulation, the SRB shall, to
the extent that the resolution action involves the use of the Fund, notify the
Commission of the proposed use of the Fund. This notification shall trigger
a preliminary investigation by the Commission during the course of which the
Commission may request further information from the SRB. Art. 19(3) SRM-
Regulation further provides that the Commission shall assess whether the use
of the Fund would distort, or threaten to distort, competition by favouring
the beneficiary or any other undertaking so as, insofar as it would affect
trade between Member States, to be incompatible with the internal market. The
Commission shall apply to the use of the Fund the criteria established for the
application of State aid rules as enshrined in Article 107 TFEU.
The Commission shall adopt a decision on the compatibility of the use of
the Fund with the internal market, which shall be addressed to the SRB and to
the national resolution authorities of the Member State or Member States
concerned. That decision may be contingent on conditions, commitments or
undertakings in respect of the beneficiary.
Art. 44 SRM-Regulation provides that the SRB shall act in compliance
with Union law, in particular with the Council and the Commission decisions
pursuant to the SRM-Regulation.
Drijber remarked that the State aid rules apply by analogy to Fund aid. If Fund
aid would directly qualify as State aid, then there would be no need for laying
down the procedure in Art. 19 of the SRM-Regulation.130 Though the terms “by
analogy” cannot be found in the SRM-Regulation, the Commission made use of
these terms in its Proposal for a SRM-Regulation:
“Where no State aid is present in the use of the Fund, the criteria estab-
lished for the application of Article 107 of the TFEU should be applied, by
way of analogy, as a precondition for the adoption of a decision to place a
bank under resolution, in order to preserve the integrity of the internal market
between participating and nonparticipatingMember States.”131 [Italics mine,
REvL]
129. SRM proposal, p. 8.
130. Drijber 2015, p. 229.
131. SRM proposal, p. 9.
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Consistency between the recovery and resolution framework and the State aid
control framework is also ensured as regards the business reorganisation plan.
Where the bail-in tool is used to recapitalise the bank, a business reorganisation
plan should be drawn up and implemented.132 Art. 52(1) BRRD provides that
this business reorganisation plan should be compatible with the restructuring
plan that is required under the State aid framework.133 Noteworthy is also that
in the Delegated Regulation of 10 May 2016, the Commission explicitly
indicated that the Crisis Communications “may provide useful reference for
the elaboration of the business reorganisation plan even where no State aid has
been granted, since they share with the business reorganisation plan the
objective of restoring the institution or entity’s longterm viability”.134
4.4.4 Compliance of the aid measure with the intrinsically linked provision
of the BRRD
In the Commission decisions that were taken after the adoption of the BRRD,
the Commission assessed whether the aid measures violated intrinsically linked
provision of the BRRD. Even if the Member State had not yet transposed the
BRRD into national law and the respective provisions on bail-in, the Commis-
sion needed to assess whether the aid measures violated indissolubly linked
provisions of the BRRD.135 This obligation follows from the case-law from the
Court of Justice EU.136 In that regard, the Court has held the following: “While
the Commission has a wide discretion when it determines the compatibility of
a system of aid with the common market, it is none the less required to ensure, in
the context of that assessment, that the procedure does not produce a result
which is contrary to specific provisions of the Treaty other than those of Articles
87 EC and 88 EC, in particular where those aspects of aid which contravene
those provisions are so indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is
impossible to evaluate them separately.”
132. Art. 51 BRRD.
133. See also Art. 27(16) SRM-Regulation which refers to Art. 52 BRRD.
134. See recital 2 of the Delegated Regulation of 10 May 2016.
135. CCB, SA.43367, 18 December 2015, para. 122.
136. MKB Bank, 16 December 2015, para. 132; CCB, 18 December 2015, para. 123; Banif,
21 December 2015, para. 193. These decisions refer to the judgments in the cases 74/76
(para. 14), C-134/91 (para. 20), T-184/97 (para. 55), T-289/03 (para. 313-314).
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Thus, an aid measure cannot be deemed compatible when it violates intrinsi-
cally linked provisions of the BRRD. In the bank State aid decisions that were
adopted since 2015, the following provisions of the BRRD were identified as
intrinsically linked to the specific aid measure under examination:
– Article 32(4)(d) BRRD.137 This provision concerns one of the conditions for
resolution; i.e. the condition that the bank is ‘failing or likely to fail’.
– Article 34(1)(a) BRRD.138 This provision concerns burden-sharing by
shareholders.
– Article 36 BRRD.139 This provision concerns the valuation.
– Article 37(5) BRRD.140
– Article 38 and 39 BRRD.141 This provision concerns one of the resolution
tools.
– Article 42 BRRD.142 This provision concerns one of the resolution tools.
– Article 44(5) BRRD.143 This provision concerns the contribution by the
resolution financing arrangement.
– Article 59(3) BRRD.144 This provision concerns the write-down and
conversion tool.
– Article 100(5) BRRD.145 This provision concerns the requirement to
establish resolution financing arrangements.
– Article 101(1) BRRD.146 This provision concerns the use of the resolution
financing arrangements.
– Article 109 BRRD.147 This provision concerns the use of deposit guarantee
schemes in the context of resolution.
137. Alpha Bank, 26 November 2015, para. 125.
138. Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 111; MKB Bank, 16 December 2015, para. 135;
CCB, 18 December 2015, para. 124.
139. CCB, 18 December 2015, para. 128.
140. Banif, 21 December 2015, para. 197.
141. Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 112; Banif, 21 December 2015, para. 197.
142. MKB Bank, 16 December 2015, para. 137; Banif, 21 December 2015, para. 197.
143. Reintroduction of the winding-up scheme, compensation scheme, Model I and Model II,
SA.40029, 13 February 2015, para. 25.
144. Reintroduction of the winding-up scheme, compensation scheme, Model I and Model II,
SA.40029, 13 February 2015, para. 25.
145. Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 111.
146. MKB Bank, 16 December 2015, para. 138.
147. Prolongation of the winding-up scheme, compensation scheme, Model I and Model II,
SA.42405, 18 September 2015, para. 37.
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In the bank State aid decisions that were adopted since 2015, the Commission
concluded that the aid measures in question did not seem to violate the
intrinsically linked provisions of the BRRD.148
4.4.5 Interaction between State aid and resolution
How to deal with an ailing bank? In essence, there are three possibilities: i) a
bank can be put in resolution and receive State aid, ii) a bank can be put in
resolution without receiving State aid, or iii) a bank can receive State aid without
being put in resolution.
State aid and resolution
The case of the Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank (MKB Bank) can serve as an
illustration of a case that is characterised by both State aid and resolution. In
December 2014, the Hungarian resolution authority, Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
decided to put MKB Bank in resolution. As part of the resolution, Hungary
decided to apply the asset separation tool, according to which the problem-
atic assets of MKB Bank would be transferred to the Resolution Asset
Management Vehicle (RAMV). The Commission considered that the transfer
of impaired assets to the RAMV constituted State aid. In its decision of
16 December 2015, the Commission authorised the State aid to MKB Bank.
Resolution without (granting) State aid
Heta Asset Resolution (“Heta”)149 has the dubious honour of being the first
bank to undergo resolution under the BRRD. In 2015, a capital shortfall of 7,6
billion EUR was revealed by an AQR. The Austrian State decided not to rescue
Heta.150 Consequently, in March 2015, the FinanzMarktAufsicht (FMA) – in its
capacity as resolution authority – decided to put Heta in resolution.151 NB: since
no State aid was involved, there is no Commission decision on the resolution
of Heta.
An illustration of a resolution ‘by-the-book’ can be found in the case of Banco
Popular Español. The SRB concluded that the resolution conditions were
met.152 On 7 June 2017, Banco Popular Español was put in resolution. Under
148. The conclusion that the aid does not violate intrinsically linked provisions of the BRRD is
without prejudice to the prerogative of the Commission to initiate infringement procedures
against a Member State for breach of Union law, including breach of the provisions of the
BRRD. This was explicitly indicated by the Commission in its decision on MKB Bank
(16 December 2015, para. 140) and in its decision on CCB (18 December 2015, para. 131).
149. Heta was the ‘bad bank’ that resulted from the rescue and restructuring of Hypo Alpe
Adria.
150. See the blog by Gandrud & Hallerberg, ‘Not SIFIs but PIFIs’, Bruegel 6 March 2015.
151. The German version of this ruling is available on the website of the FMA, while an
English translation of this ruling is available on the website of Heta.
152. On 6 June 2017, the ECB had concluded that Banco Popular was ‘failing or likely to fail’.
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the resolution scheme, Banco Popular Español was sold to Banco Santander. All
the existing shares were written down, while the Tier 2 instruments were
converted into new shares, which were transferred to Banco Santander for the
price of EUR 1. The case of Banco Popular Español did not involve State aid,
so there is no State aid decision on Banco Popular Español. Nevertheless, there
is a Commission decision: pursuant to Art. 18(7) SRM-Regulation, the Commis-
sion has approved the resolution of Banco Popular Español.153
State aid without (triggering) resolution
In principle, State aid triggers resolution. As a result, some Member States
have become reluctant to grant State aid, since this would trigger resolution
and the application of the bail-in tool. This is illustrated by the case of Italy in
2016 when Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) experienced serious difficulties.
A resolution would likely entail bail-in of junior and senior creditors.154 Since
many creditors of Italian banks were families and small investors rather than
professional investors, Italy wanted to avoid a bail-in of these investors. In 2016,
a solution was found which did not involve State aid to MPS.155 However, in
December 2016, this solution proved to be unfeasible: the private capital raise
failed. Italy then decided to grant State aid in the form of a “precautionary recap-
italisation”. As explained in section 4.4.1, a precautionary recapitalisation within
the meaning of Art. 18(4)(d)(iii) SRM-Regulation does not trigger the resolution
of the bank. Following negotiations between Italy, the Commission and the
ECB, an agreement in principle was reached on 1 June 2017 between Italy and
the Commission.156 On 4 July 2017, the Commission authorised the State aid to
MPS.157
Another noteworthy case is the case of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto
Banca. Italy decided to grant State aid to wind-down Banca Popolare di Vicenza
and Veneto Banca. On 25 June 2017, the Commission authorised the State
aid.158 An interesting aspect of this case is that the State aid did not trigger the
153. See press release IP/17/1556 (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1556_en.htm).
154. IMF 2016 Article IV Report, p. 25.
155. It was decided that MPS would raise EUR 5.000 million of capital. In addition, Atlas/
Atlante would free MPS of its non-performing loans.
156. See Commission STATEMENT/17/1502 (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release
_STATEMENT-17-1502_en.htm).
157. Unfortunately, the public version of this decision is not yet available. Consequently, the
only information can be found in the press release. See IP/17/1905 (available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1905_en.htm).
158. Unfortunately, the public version of this decision is not yet available. Consequently, the
only information can be found in the press release. See IP/17/1791 (available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1791_en.htm).
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resolution of these banks. Although the criterion of ‘failing or likely to fail’ was
met, the SRB decided not to take resolution action with respect to these two
banks. The SRB considered that the resolution was not necessary in the public
interest.159 As a result, the third resolution criterion was not met. Banca
Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca would be liquidated under Italian
insolvency law.
While the Italian banks thus ‘escaped’ resolution (and the subsequent applica-
tion of the bail-in tool), it should be recalled that a bailout does not necessarily
mean that investors are spared. Indeed, the State aid rules require burden-
sharing by shareholders and subordinated creditors. For these investors, there
is no real difference between a resolution and bail-in on the one hand and a
bailout with full burden-sharing on the other hand. Only with respect to senior
creditors, there is a difference between a bailout and a resolution of a bank.
4.5 ESM
4.5.1 Background of the ESM
The purpose of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is to grant stability
support to Euro-area Member States. The ESM is the successor of the EFSF
(European Financial Stability Facility). Whereas the EFSF was temporary, the
ESM is a permanent mechanism.
When was the ESM created? There is not one single date; rather, the ESM was
the result of several successive steps.160 On 17 December 2010, the European
Council agreed on the need for Euro-area Member States to establish a per-
manent stability mechanism.161 Subsequently, on 25 March 2011, the European
Council adopted Decision 2011/199/EU amending Article 136 TFEU.162 On
2 February 2012 the Euro-area Member States signed the ESM Treaty. The ESM
become operational on 8 October 2012.163
159. See the SRB press release of 23 June 2017 (available at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/341).
160. Another milestone for the ESM was 27 November 2012. On that date, the legality of the
ESM was confirmed by the CJEU in its judgment in the case C-370/12 (Pringle).
161. On 28 November 2010, the Ministers of Finance of the Euro area Member States already
agreed on the establishment of the ESM.
162. The following paragraph was added to Article 136 TFEU: “3. The Member States whose
currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.”
163. The EFSF and the ESM functioned concurrently from 8 October 2012 until 30 June 2013.
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4.5.2 ESM direct recapitalisation instrument
The ESM provides financial assistance to Member States in the Eurozone. In
some cases, the ESM indirectly recapitalised banks. For instance, in 2012, the
ESM granted a loan to Spain, which in turn used these funds to recapitalise its
banks. Art. 15(1) of the ESM Treaty provides that the ESM may grant finan-
cial assistance through loans to an ESM Member for the specific purpose of
re-capitalising the financial institutions of that ESM Member. Art. 15(3) of the
ESM Treaty is also of relevance, since this provision refers to Articles 107 and
108 TFEU.
The Banking Union allows for a rescue of banks at EU-level: the Euro Area
Summit Statement of 29 June 2012 held that the ESM should get the possibility
to recapitalise banks directly. However, if banks are rescued/supported at
EU-level, then banking supervision should also be transferred to EU-level.164
In order words: the SSMwas a precondition for the direct recapitalisation by the
ESM.
The direct recapitalisation instrument (DRI) was intended to break the vicious
circle between banks and governments. However, because of the introduction
of the bail-in tool and the national resolution financing arrangements/the Single
Resolution Fund, the DRI is less likely to be used.165 It has even been remarked
that “the prospects for ESM direct recapitalisation were later shrunk to the point
of near-meaninglessness”.166
DRI and the recovery and resolution framework
As regards the relation between the DRI and the recovery and resolution
framework, the provisions of Art. 8 of the ESM Guideline on Financial
Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions (hereinafter: “ESM
Guideline”) are of importance.
In the first place, Art. 8(1) of the ESM Guideline stipulates that the DRI cannot
be used as a “precautionary recapitalisation” in the sense of Art. 32(4)(d)(iii)
BRRD or Article 18(4)(d)(iii) SRM-Regulation. Consequently, the DRI would
most likely trigger resolution.
In the second place, a precondition for the use of the DRI is that a bail-in of at
least 8% has to be applied. In addition, there must be a contribution from the
resolution financing arrangement of at least 5%. Moreover, all unsecured, non-
preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, must be written down or be
164. Bovenschen et al. 2013, p. 364.
165. See question 3 of the FAQ on the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument. See also:
Lo Schiavo 2014, p. 451-456.
166. Schoenmaker & Véron 2016, p. 2.
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converted in full. These three preconditions follow from Art. 8(3) of the ESM
Guideline.167 Similar conditions can be found in the BRRD and the SRM-
Regulation. Art. 44(7) BRRD and Art. 27(9) SRM-Regulation provide that in
extraordinary circumstances, further funding may be sought from alternative
financing sources.168 There are, however, two preconditions: firstly, the 5%
limit of the contribution of the SRF should be reached; and secondly, all unse-
cured, non-preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, should be written
down or converted in full.
DRI and the State aid control framework
As regards the relation between the DRI and the State aid control framework,
the question could arise whether State aid rules also apply to the ESM direct
recapitalisation instrument. After all, if the ESM recapitalises banks directly,
is the recapitalisation imputable to the Member State? The Euro Area Summit
Statement of 29 June 2012 leaves little room for doubt as to the applicability
of the State aid rules:
“When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving
the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular
decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly. This would rely
on appropriate conditionality, including compliance with state aid rules,
which should be institution-specific, sector-specific or economy-wide and
would be formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding.”169 [Italics mine,
REvL]
The relevance of the State aid rules to the DRI was reiterated in the following
statement:
“The decision of the Commission approving the assistance and setting out
the State aid conditionality is a prerequisite for the disbursement of finan-
cial assistance in the form of direct recapitalisation.”170 [Italics mine,
REvL]
167. See also question 11 of the FAQ on the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument.
168. In that regard, Art. 30(6) SRM-Regulation provides that the SRB shall endeavour to
cooperate closely with any public financial assistance facility including the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in
particular in the extraordinary circumstances referred to in Article 27(9) and where such a
facility has granted, or is likely to grant, direct or indirect financial assistance to entities
established in a participating Member State.
169. Euro Area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012.
170. ESM, ‘ESM direct bank recapitalisation instrument; main features of the operational
framework and way forward’, 20 June 2013.
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Art. 1(3) of the ESM Guideline provides that the DRI shall be provided in
accordance with the State aid provisions under Art. 107 and 108 TFEU.
Consequently, the intention to grant aid under the DRI has to be notified to the
Commission.171 Since the State aid rules apply to the DRI, a restructuring
plan is required for banks that benefit from the DRI.172 Pursuant to Art. 4(5)
of the ESMGuideline, the ESM shall, jointly with the institution(s) and the ESM
Member concerned, draw up a restructuring plan. This, once again, underlines
the significance of the State aid rules in case of a direct recapitalisation by the
ESM.
4.6 Conclusion
The main message of the present chapter is that – notwithstanding the introduc-
tion of the BRRD, SRM and DRI – State aid to banks remains relevant, the State
aid control framework remains relevant and this PhD-study remains relevant.
State aid to banks remains relevant
Does State aid to banks have a future? It can be argued that Member States
have become reluctant to grant State aid, since State aid would trigger resolu-
tion and the application of the bail-in tool. However, it should be recalled that the
BRRD allows for some flexibility for Member States that wish to rescue banks
without bailing-in creditors. As explained in section 4.4.1, there are three sit-
uations in which it is possible to grant State aid without triggering resolution.
The most notable exception is the “precautionary recapitalisation” within the
meaning of Art. 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD or Art. 18(4)(d)(iii) SRM-Regulation.
In that regard, the cases of Alpha Bank, Eurobank, Piraeus Bank and NBG
(discussed in subsection 4.4.1) and MPS (discussed in subsection 4.4.5) have
demonstrated that a “precautionary recapitalisation” is not only a hypothetical
possibility, but a real possibility that has been applied in practice.
The State aid control framework remains relevant
The present chapter has shown that all forms of assistance have to comply
with the State aid control framework.
– In case a Member State grants an aid measure that does not trigger resolution,
it shall be conditional on final approval under the Union State aid framework.
This follows from Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD.
171. Art. 4(4) of the ESM Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of
Institutions.
172. See question 8 of the FAQ on the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument.
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– In case a Member State grants extraordinary public financial support through
government stabilisation tools, it shall be conditional on prior and final
approval under the Union State aid framework. This follows from Art. 38(10)
and Art. 56(1) BRRD.
– In case resolution funds are used, it should comply with the relevant State
aid provisions. This follows from recital 55 BRRD.
– In case the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is used, the Commission shall
apply to the use of the Fund the criteria established for the application of
State aid rules as enshrined in Article 107 TFEU. This follows from Art. 19
SRM-Regulation.
– In case the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument (DRI) is used, it shall be
in accordance with the State aid provisions under Art. 107 and 108 TFEU.
This follows from Art. 1(3) of the ESM Guideline on Financial Assistance
for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions.
This PhD-study remains relevant
As set out in chapter 1, the aim of this PhD-study is forward-looking. It is
about providing a framework which can be used to establish whether a bank
State aid decision complies with the principle of equal treatment. If there were
no bank State aid decisions in the future, then this PhD-study would lose most
of its relevance. However, as set out above, State aid to banks remains relevant
and the State aid control framework remains relevant. As a consequence, this
PhD-study remains relevant.
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Chapter 5. Case-law of the Court of Justice
EU on bank State aid
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 The role of the Court of Justice EU
While this PhD-study focusses on the State aid control of the European Com-
mission, the present chapter highlights the role of another important European
institution: the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In fact, there
are two Courts, for the Court of Justice of the European Union is one institution
consisting of two judicial bodies: the Court of Justice and the General Court.
What is the role of the CJEU in bank State aid cases? In essence, there are two
ways in which the CJEU can be involved in these cases. In the first place, the
CJEU can be asked to review the legality of the Commission decisions. In the
second place, the CJEU can be asked to give a preliminary ruling. Both pro-
cedures are set out below.
Action for annulment
The Commission decisions are subject to judicial review by the Court of
Justice of the European Union. Article 263 TFEU provides for an action for
annulment.1 Under this procedure, the General Court can be asked to review
the legality of a Commission decision. If the General Court considers that the
Commission decision violates higher-ranking rules of EU law2, then it declares
the Commission decision to be void (pursuant to Art. 264 TFEU).
It is, however, worth stressing that judicial review of the Commission’s State
aid decisions is limited. The Court has held that “for the purposes of apply-
ing Article 87(3) EC the Commission enjoys a wide discretion, the exercise of
which involves assessments of an economic and social nature which must be
made within a Community context. The Court, in reviewing whether that free-
dom was lawfully exercised, cannot substitute its own assessment in the matter
1. For a detailed discussion of the action for annulment, see: Lenaerts, Maselis & Gutman
2014, p. 253-418.
2. Art. 263 TFEU provides for the following four grounds on which the validity of the
decision can be contested: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application,
or misuse of powers.
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for that of the competent authority but must confine itself to examining
whether the authority’s assessment is vitiated by a manifest error or by misuse
of powers”.3
Another question is: who can challenge Commission decisions before the
General Court? This question concerns the admissibility and – as will be dis-
cussed in this chapter – it has been an important issue in several bank State
aid cases.
Reference for a preliminary ruling
It should be pointed out that State aid measures may be challenged before
a national court. For instance, when the Dutch State nationalised SNS
REAAL, it did so by expropriating the shareholders and subordinated debt
holders of the bank. Some of these investors brought an action before the Raad
van State (the Dutch Council of State) – in order to challenge the lawfulness
of the expropriation – and before the Ondernemingskamer (the Enterprise
Division) – in order to challenge the fact that the expropriated investors received
no compensation. This illustrates that State aid may give rise to proceedings
before national courts.
When in proceedings before a national court questions arise about the inter-
pretation of the EU Treaties or on the validity and interpretation of a Commis-
sion decision, then the national court may – pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU – request
the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling. In the preliminary ruling, the
Court of Justice answers the questions and thus provides clarity on the inter-
pretation of EU law. The preliminary ruling procedure is aimed at avoiding
divergent interpretations of EU law in each Member State.4 Since the Court of
Justice can be requested by a national court to review the validity of a Com-
mission decision, the preliminary ruling procedure provides for an indirect
route to challenging a bank State aid decision.5
5.1.2 The purpose(s) of this chapter
This chapter has a twofold purpose. In the first place, the purpose of this chapter
is to give an overview of the case-law on bank State aid.6 How many cases are
there? Who brought proceedings and why? And what were the main issues in
3. See Case C-148/04, para. 71. See also: Sutton, Lannoo & Napoli 2010, p. 29-30;
Psaroudakis 2012, p. 205 (footnote 56).
4. For a detailed discussion of the preliminary ruling procedure, see: Lenaerts, Maselis &
Gutman 2014, p. 48-106, 215-249 and 456-479.
5. For the interplay between the direct action for annulment and the indirect way of the
preliminary reference procedure, see: Lenaerts, Maselis & Gutman 2014, p. 465-467 and
475.
6. The purpose is not to give a detailed account of each bank State aid case. This would not
be feasible, since the judgments are often quite extensive. For instance, the judgment
in Case T-457/09 comprises no less than 424 recitals (which roughly corresponds to 67
pages).
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these cases? These questions will be answered in sections 5.2 to 5.19. In
particular, sections 5.2 to 5.18 provide a brief description of each case, while the
concluding observations can be found in section 5.19.
Interestingly, there are some cases in which the applicant claimed that the
Commission had infringed the principle of equal treatment. The second pur-
pose of this chapter is therefore to discuss how the Court has interpreted the
principle of equal treatment. This will take place in section 5.20. This constitutes
the prelude to chapter 6 (in which other interpretations of the principle of equal
treatment will be discussed).
5.2 The case of ING
Joined Cases T-29/10 and T-33/10, Kingdom of the Netherlands and ING
Groep NV v. European Commission; C-224/12 P, Commission v. Kingdom of
the Netherlands and ING Groep NV.
The main issue in the case of ING concerned the private investor principle.
The essence of the private investor test is that the behaviour of the State is
compared to that of a hypothetical private investor. If the State acts like a pri-
vate investor would do (under similar circumstances), then the measure
contains no aid-element. Consequently, the measure does not constitute State
aid and falls outside the scope of the prohibition of Art. 107(1) TFEU.7
In November 2008, ING received a capital injection from the Netherlands.
This capital injection was not made in the form of ordinary shares, but in the
form of Core Tier 1 securities (which have to be repaid eventually). At the
time of the capital injection, the Netherlands and ING agreed on the terms for
repaying the capital injection. However, a few months later, the Netherlands
and ING amended these repayment terms. The Commission considered that
the amended repayment terms were more favourable to ING than the original
repayment terms. Therefore, in the decision on ING of 18 November 2009
(“the ING-decision”), the amendment of the repayment terms was classified as
additional State aid. Both the Netherlands and ING challenged the ING-deci-
sion by bringing an action for annulment: joined cases T-29/10 and T-33/10. The
Netherlands and ING criticised the classification of the amendment of the
repayment terms as additional State aid. According to ING and the Netherlands,
the modification of the repayment terms did not constitute State aid. They
argued that the Commission should have applied the private investor test.
7. An in-depth discussion of the private investor principle was provided in section 2.3.3.
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On 2 March 2012, the General Court rendered its judgment. The General Court
considered that State aid may have been granted both on the making of the
capital contribution, and on the amendment to the repayment terms, if it
becomes apparent that the State did not act in each of those situations as a
private investor in a similar situation would have done.8 Thus, the Commission
cannot evade its obligation to assess the economic rationality of the amendment
to the repayment terms in the light of the private investor principle solely on the
ground that the capital injection subject to repayment already itself constitutes
State aid.9
The Commission lodged an appeal against the judgment of the General Court.
In its judgment of 3 April 2014, the Court rejected all the grounds of appeal and
dismissed the appeal dismissed in its entirety. In particular, the Court consid-
ered that the application of this case-law cannot be compromised merely because
the ING-case concerns an amendment to the conditions for the redemption of
securities acquired in return for state aid.10 Any holder of securities may wish
or agree to renegotiate the conditions of their redemption. It is therefore mean-
ingful to compare the behaviour of the State in that regard with that of a hypo-
thetical private investor in a comparable position.11 The Court concluded that
the General Court had not erred in law.12
5.3 The case of FIH
Case T-386/14, FIH Holding A/S and FIH Erhvervsbank A/S v. Commission;
C-579/16 P, Commission v. FIH Holding and FIH Erhversbank
The main issue in the case of FIH concerned the private investor principle.
According to the applicants in this case, the Commission should have applied
the market economy creditor principle. By contrast, the Commission claims to
have applied the correct test, namely, the market economy investor principle.
8. Joined Cases T-29/10 and T-33/10 (Netherlands and ING Group v Commission), para. 98.
9. Joined Cases T-29/10 and T-33/10 (Netherlands and ING Group v Commission), para. 99.
10. Case C-224/12 (Commission v Netherlands and ING Group), para. 34.
11. Case C-224/12 (Commission v Netherlands and ING Group), para. 35.
12. For more information on this case, see: R.E. van Lambalgen & E. Oude Elferink, ‘Gevoegde
zaken T-29/10 en T-33/10, Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en ING Group NV t. Commissie’,
SEW 2012, p. 153-154; M.G.A.M. Custers, JOR 2012/147; M.R. Mok, NJ 2012/192; Drijber
2012; Fanoy & Plomp 2012; Van Lambalgen 2014a; Van Lambalgen 2014b; Ludding 2012;
Lund & Petterson 2013; Slot 2012.
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FIH is a Danish bank. In 2009, FIH received State aid under the Danish sup-
port scheme. In particular, FIH received a hybrid tier 1 capital injection of
DKK 1.9 billion (approximately EUR 225 million) and it benefited from a State
guarantee. These aid measures were approved as compatible aid.13
In 2012, Denmark adopted further measures in favour of FIH: the most prob-
lematic assets of FIH were to be transferred to NewCo, a new subsidiary of
FIH Holding. Subsequently, the Financial StabilityCompany (FSC)14 was to buy
the shares in NewCo, which would be wound up in an orderly manner there-
after. The measures thus effectively amounted to a transfer of impaired assets. In
its decision on FIH of 11 March 2014 (“the FIH-decision”), the Commission
held that these measures in favour of FIH constituted State aid within the
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. In particular, the Commission considered
that these measures did not observe the principle of the market economy inves-
tor, since no market economy operator would have invested in NewCo on
equivalent terms and conditions.
FIH and its holding company (FIH Holding) brought an action for annulment
against the FIH-decision. According to the applicants, the Commission should
have applied the market economy creditor principle instead of the market econ-
omy investor principle. The applicants argued that the Commission failed to take
into consideration the pre-existing risk for Denmark of suffering very large
losses on the DKK 1.9 billion hybrid tier 1 capital injection and the DKK 42
billion in State guaranteed bonds issued by FIH. According to the applicants,
the transfer of assets was intended to remove this risk.
On 15 September 2016, the General Court rendered its judgment. The General
Court considered that it may be economically rational for Denmark to accept
measures such as a transfer of impaired assets, in so far as they have a limited
cost and involve reduced risk and that, without such measures, it would be
highly likely that it would have to bear losses in an amount greater than that
cost. The General Court held that the Commission had applied an incorrect
legal test, namely, the market economy investor principle, instead of exami-
ning the measures in the light of the market economy creditor principle. The
General Court considered that Denmark’s conduct, when it adopted the
measures at issue in 2012, could not be compared to that of an investor seeking
to maximise its profit, but that of a creditor seeking to minimise the losses to
13. Commission Decision of 3 February 2009 on State aid scheme N31a/2009 – Denmark.
14. The Financial Stability Company (‘the FSC’) is a public body set up by the Danish authori-
ties in the context of the financial crisis.
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which it is exposed in the event of inaction. The General Court therefore con-
cluded that the Commission committed an error in law in applying an incor-
rect legal test.15
5.4 The case of ABN AMRO
Case T-319/11, ABN AMRO Group NV v. Commission
This case revolved around the acquisition ban that was imposed on ABN
AMRO. On 5 April 2011, the Commission adopted a decision on ABN
AMRO (“the ABN AMRO-decision”). This decision included an acquisition
ban for a period of three years, with the exception however of acquisitions of
specified types and of a specified minimum size. That ban would be extended
to five years if the Dutch State continued to own more than 50% of ABN
AMRO at the end of three years.
ABN AMRO brought an action for annulment against that decision. In
support of the action, ABN AMRO relied on two pleas in law. In its first plea,
it challenged the scope of the acquisition ban imposed on it. In its second
plea, it contested the duration of the prohibition. In particular, ABN AMRO
alleged an infringement of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and a misapplication of
the Crisis Communications, an infringement of the principle of proportiona-
lity, an infringement of the principle of equal treatment and an infringement of
the principle of good administration, together with a failure to state reasons
under Article 296 TFEU. In the context of this PhD-study, the plea alleging an
infringement of the principle of equal treatment is most interesting. As will be
discussed in section 5.20.1, this plea in law was rejected by the General Court.
The other pleas in law were also rejected. Consequently, the action for annul-
ment was dismissed in its entirety by the General Court in its judgment of
8 April 2014.16
15. For a more detailed summary of this judgment, see: R.E. van Lambalgen & E. Oude
Elferink, ‘Zaak T-386/14, FIH Holding A/S en FIH Erhvervsbank A/S t. Commissie’, SEW
2016, p. 440-441. See also: Cyndecka 2017.
16. For a more detailed summary of this judgment, see: R.E. van Lambalgen & E. Oude
Elferink, ‘Zaak T-319/11, ABN AMRO Group NV t. Commissie’, SEW 2014, p. 296-297.
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5.5 The case of WestLB
Case T-457/09, Westfälisch-Lippischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband v.
Commission
This case concerned the State aid to WestLB. An important aspect of this case
is that the action for annulment was not brought by the bank or the Member
State, but by one of the shareholders of the bank.
The background of the case was as follows. The decision on WestLB of 12 May
2009 (“the WestLB-decision”) included an obligation for the owners of WestLB
to sell WestLB to an unconnected third party (hereafter: “the obligation to sell”).
In the opening decision, the Commission had already noted that the difficul-
ties of WestLB were probably due to its ownership structure and to the differ-
ent interests among the owners and expressed its doubts as to the possibility of
an appropriate strategic reorientation in the absence of a solution to those struc-
tural issues. Westfälisch-Lippischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband was one of
the owners of WestLB and brought the present action for annulment.17
On 17 July 2014, the General Court rendered its judgment.18 One of the major
questions in this case was whether the action was admissible. Since the WestLB-
decision was addressed only to the Member State, the applicant would only
have standing to bring proceedings if it was directly and individually concerned
by that decision.
In that regard, the General Court noted that the applicant had an interest in
bringing proceedings separate from that of WestLB as regards the obligation
to sell. Indeed, that obligation applied only to the owners, who were forced to
waive their property rights in WestLB in order for the aid granted to that bank
to be authorised. WestLB, however, was not required to take any action under
that obligation, which did not affect its assets and had no bearing on its con-
duct on the market. However, as regards the other conditions attaching to the
WestLB-decision, including those relating to the reduction of WestLB’s balance
sheet, the General Court noted that they related to the commercial activity of
17. The applicant also requested interim measures. By order of 18 March 2011 in Case T-457/
09 R, the application for interim measures was dismissed.
18. This case was assessed by the First Chamber in its Extended Composition. The extended
composition underlines the importance of this case. In essence, there are several indicators
of the importance of a judgment. In the first place, the composition of the chamber indi-
cates the importance that the Court attaches to a case. In the second place, judgments that are
considered important are translated into all the EU-languages. In the third place, there is
usually a press release (“communiqué de presses”) in important cases.
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that bank and the sale or liquidation of its assets. WestLB could itself put for-
ward any argument, in the context of an action brought against the WestLB-
decision, relating to the unlawfulness or to the absence of necessity for those
conditions.19
The Court held that, as regards the conditions attaching to the WestLB-
decision other than the obligation to sell, the applicant’s interest in bringing
proceedings was indissociable from that of WestLB and, therefore, it was not
individually concerned by the WestLB-decision. However, the applicant was
individually concerned by that decision in so far as authorisation of the guar-
antee at issue was made subject to compliance with the obligation to sell.20
Consequently, the pleas put forward by the applicant were admissible only
in so far as they were intended to show that the inclusion of the obligation to
sell in the WestLB-decision was unlawful.
In support of its application, the applicant submitted eight pleas in law. Those
pleas alleged infringement, first, of the principle of collegiality, secondly, of
Article 87(1) EC, since the distortion of competition caused by the guarantee
at issue was not examined, thirdly, of Article 87(3)(b) EC, fourthly, of the
principle of proportionality, fifthly, of the principle of equal treatment, sixthly,
of Article 295 EC, seventhly, of Article 7(4) of the Procedural Regulation, and,
eighthly, of the obligation to state reasons. All these pleas were rejected as
unfounded by the General Court. In the context of this PhD-study, the plea
alleging an infringement of the principle of equal treatment is most interest-
ing. This plea in law will be discussed in section 5.20.2.
5.6 The case of HSH Nordbank
Case T-499/12, HSH Investment Holdings Coinvest-C Sàrl and HSH Invest-
ment Holdings FSO Sàrl v. Commission
This case concerned the State aid to HSHNordbank. HSHNordbank was owned
by the City State of Hamburg and the State of Schleswig-Holstein (the
“Länder”) and several minority shareholders. A major question of this case
19. Case T-457/09, para. 115-117.
20. Case T-457/09, para. 120. Another interesting aspect of this case is that the decision of
12 May 2009 (i.e. the contested decision) was repealed by the decision of 20 December
2011. In that regard, the Court noted that the applicant was subject to the obligation to sell
for a period of more than two years. Admittedly, that obligation was not enforced in practice.
However, the General Court noted that the applicant retained an interest in seeking annulment
of the contested decision in that that obligation was attached to it. Against that background,
the applicant retained an interest in having the contested decision found to be unlawful. See:
Case T-457/09, para. 123-145.
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concerned the admissibility of the action for annulment, since the action was
brought not by the beneficiary bank itself, but by two minority shareholders
of the beneficiary bank.
On 12 November 2015, the General Court rendered its judgment. As regards
the admissibility, the General Court made a distinction between the first part
and the second part of the application. In the second part of the application,
the applicants sought the annulment of the HSH Nordbank-decision in its
entirety. In that regard, the General Court held that the applicants had not
shown that they had an interest in bringing proceedings separate from that of
HSH Nordbank. Therefore, they could not be considered to be individually
concerned for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.21 The
second part of the action was therefore declared inadmissible.
The General Court then assessed the admissibility of the first part of the action,
in which the applicants sought the partial annulment of the HSH Nordbank-
decision, in so far as, by that decision, the Commission had imposed obligations
on the applicants as minority shareholders.
These obligations had the following background. In 2009, HSH Nordbank
received State aid in the form of a EUR 3 billion recapitalisation (which took
place in the form of ordinary shares with voting rights). An important feature
of the recapitalisation was that only the Länder injected capital into HSH
Nordbank; the minority shareholders did not participate in the recapitalisa-
tion. As a result, they were diluted. However, in its Opening Decision on HSH
Nordbank, the Commission considered that the issue price of the State recap-
italisation was too high and that consequently, the minority shareholders bene-
fited disproportionately by not being completely diluted.22 Therefore, in the
final decision (“the HSH Nordbank-decision”), the Commission took into
account several additional burden-sharing measures. This additional burden-
sharing was achieved by means of a capital increase in exchange for a lump-sum
payment of EUR 500 million. Firstly, HSH Nordbank had to make a payment
of EUR 500 million to HSH Finanzfonds (which was owned and controlled
by the Länder). Secondly, at the same time that amount was used by HSH
Finanzfonds to acquire new shares in HSH Nordbank, thus increasing its share-
holding in that undertaking. Thirdly, that capital increase for the sole benefit of
HSH Finanzfonds automatically reduced the stake held by the other sharehol-
ders, including the applicants. In other words: they were diluted.
21. According to settled case-law, an applicant must show that it has an interest in bringing
proceedings separate from that possessed by an undertaking which it partly controls and
which is concerned by a European Union measure. Otherwise, in order to defend its interests
in relation to that measure, its only remedy lies in the exercise of its rights as a member of the
undertaking which itself has a right of action. See: Case T-499/12, para. 31.
22. HSH Nordbank, 22 October 2009, para. 72.
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By the HSH Nordbank-decision, the minority shareholders were banned
from acquiring new shares. The General Court held that this ban adversely
affected the applicants’ property rights, since the minority shareholders of
HSH Nordbank were prohibited from retaining their relative shareholding in
the capital of HSH Nordbank. As a result, the General Court concluded that
the applicants had established that they had an interest in bringing proceed-
ings separate from that of HSH Nordbank. The action was therefore admissi-
ble since the applicants were directly and individually concerned by the HSH
Nordbank-decision in so far as one of the conditions set by the Commission was
to increase HSH Nordbank’s capital for the sole benefit of HSH Finanzfonds.
As regards substance, the applicants questioned the validity of the Commission’s
position on the possible existence of indirect aid in favour of the minority
shareholders of HSH Nordbank. In that regard, the General Court held that the
Commission had taken into account all the relevant facts and had not made a
manifest error of assessment in considering that the issue price of EUR 19 per
share was too high and that this had to be compensated by additional burden
sharing among the shareholders.23 The action for annulment was therefore dis-
missed.24
5.7 The case of BayernLB
Case T-427/12, Austria v. Commission
This case involved two banks: the German BayernLB (Bayerische Landesbank)
and the Austrian HGAA (Hypo Group Alpe Adria). HGAA was a subsidiary
of BayernLB, until 23 December 2009, when HGAA was nationalised by the
Austrian State. In the context of this nationalisation, it was agreed that
BayernLB would continue to provide intra-group funding of EUR 2,638 billion
to HGAA until the end of 2013. BayernLB received a guarantee from Austria
that this amount would be reimbursed (hereafter: “funding guarantee”).
In the decision on BayernLB (“the BayernLB-decision”), the Commission held
that the funding guarantee granted to BayernLB by Austria constituted State
aid.25 The Commission considered that without the granting of the funding
guarantee, BayernLB would probably have lost a large part of the funding it had
provided to HGAA. Indeed, HGAAwas in a distressed situation and the fund-
ing guarantee relieved BayernLB from the credit risk on its funding to HGAA.
23. Case T-499/12, para. 103.
24. For a more detailed summary of this judgment, see: R.E. van Lambalgen & E. Oude Elferink,
‘Zaak T-499/12, HSH Investment Holdings Coinvest-C Sàrl en HSH Investment Holdings
FSO Sàrl t. Commissie’, SEW 2016, p. 25-26.
25. BayernLB, 5 February 2013, para. 131.
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Austria brought an action for the annulment of the BayernLB-decision in so
far as it concerned the funding guarantee. Austria claimed that it never had the
intention of granting State aid to BayernLB. It claimed, in particular, that the
Commission wrongly concluded that there had been State aid.
On 28 January 2016, the General Court rendered its judgment. According to the
General Court, the Commission did not err in law in finding that the benefit
conferred on BayernLB constituted State aid and that it was compatible with
the Restructuring Communication. The General Court therefore dismissed the
action for annulment.
5.8 The case of Banco Privado Português (I)
Case T-487/11, Banco Privado Português SA and Massa Insolvente do Banco
Privado Português v. Commission; case C-93/15, Banco Privado Português
SA and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português v. Commission
This case concerned the State aid to Banco Privado Português (BPP). The defin-
ing feature of this case is that Portugal failed to submit a restructuring plan.
On 5 December 2008, the Portuguese State decided to grant BPP a State guar-
antee. This State aid measure was authorised by the Commission for a period of
six months on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC, on the assumption that the Por-
tuguese authorities would implement their commitment to submit a restructur-
ing plan within six months (i.e. by 5 June 2009). Portugal failed however to
present a restructuring plan within this timeframe. As a result, the aid became
unlawful since 6 June 2009. Moreover, since the restructuring plan was essential
to the compatibility of the State aid measure26, the failure to submit such a
restructuring plan resulted in the aid measure being incompatible. In the decision
on BPP of 20 July 2010 (“the BPP-decision”), the Commission ordered the
Portuguese State to proceed with an immediate and effective recovery of the aid.
BPP and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português27 requested the Court
to annul the BPP-decision. The applicants had raised several pleas in law. Two
of them – the fourth and sixth plea in law – concerned the order for recovery.
By the fourth plea in law, the applicants alleged infringement of Article 108(2)
TFEU. By the sixth plea in law, the applicants essentially claimed that the prin-
ciples of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate expectations pre-
cluded the order for recovery of the aid in question, at the very least as regards
26. As the Commission explained in its Opening Decision (10 November 2009, para. 39), the
commitment to submit a restructuring plan was especially important in the case of BPP,
because the remuneration that BPP paid for the State aid was quite low.
27. Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português was the general body of creditors of BPP.
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the recovery ordered for the period between 5 December 2008 and 5 June 2009,
which was covered by the authorisation given in the decision of 13 March
2009.28
The seventh plea in law is worth mentioning. By this plea in law, the appli-
cants alleged infringement of the right to ‘fair treatment’. The Court held that
this plea in law must be construed as referring to the principle of equal treat-
ment.29 This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.20.3.
On 12 December 2014, the General Court rendered its judgment. The General
Court concluded that the Commission had not committed any manifest errors
of assessment or errors of law in the application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, in
founding that, since no restructuring or liquidation plan had been submitted
as of 5 June 2009, the State guarantee as well its extension beyond 5 June
2009 had to be declared incompatible with the internal market.30 All the pleas
in law were dismissed. Consequently, the General Court dismissed the action
in its entirety.
The applicants brought an appeal against the judgment of the General Court.
On 15 October 2015, the Court rendered its judgment,31 by which it dismissed
the appeal. It is noteworthy that in this judgment the Court referred many
times to its judgment of 5 March 2015 in case C-667/13. This judgment will
be discussed in the following section.
5.9 The case of Banco Privado Português (II)
Case C-667/13, Estado português v. Banco Privado Português SA and Massa
Insolvente do Banco Privado Português SA
This case also concerned the State aid to Banco Privado Português (BPP). But
unlike the judgment discussed in the previous section (which concerned a
direct action), the judgment discussed in the present section was a preliminary
ruling.32
28. Case T-487/11, para. 122.
29. Case T-487/11, para. 138.
30. Case T-487/11, para. 91.
31. An interesting feature of this judgment is the fact that it is only available in the French and
Portuguese language (i.e. the working language and the language of the case). By contrast,
in most bank state aid cases, the judgments are available in all the official languages of the
European Union.
32. The case of BPP thus illustrates that the beneficiary bank can challenge the validity of the
decision on two fronts: by means of an action for annulment and via a preliminary ruling.
In their annotation, Pereira & Mucha (2015, p. 533-535) stressed this particular aspect of
the case of BPP.
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By the BPP-decision, the Portuguese State was ordered to recover the aid
granted to BPP. The attempt by the Portuguese State to recover the aid from
BPP led to proceedings before the Tribunal do Comércio de Lisboa (Lisbon
Commercial Court) between the Portuguese State and BPP/Massa Insolvente
do Banco Privado Português. Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português
argued that the BPP-decision was unlawful and that Portugal’s claim (resulting
from the BPP-decision) had thus no legal basis. The Tribunal do Comércio de
Lisboa had doubts as to the validity of the BPP-decision and therefore referred
several questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. On 5 March
2015, the Court rendered its judgment.
One of the questions raised by the Tribunal do Comércio de Lisboa was
whether the BPP-decision was based on a contradictory statement of reasons
since it stated on the one hand that the aid became unlawful as from 6 June
2009, while it stated on the other hand that the same aid had to be held to be
incompatible with the internal market as from 5 December 2008. In that regard,
the Court held that the fact that the BPP-decision mentions different dates
from which the State aid must be regarded as unlawful, on the one hand, and
incompatible with the internal market, on the other, does not disclose any con-
tradiction in the statement of reasons underlying that decision.
Another noteworthy question related to the argument raised by BPP that the
Commission had concluded that the guarantee was incompatible on the basis
of non-compliance on purely procedural grounds, namely the fact that the Por-
tuguese Republic did not submit a restructuring plan for BPP within the six-
month period. This question concerns the relevance of submitting a restructuring
plan and will be discussed in section 10.2.
The Court concluded that examination of the questions referred by the Tribunal
do Comércio de Lisboa had disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity
of the BPP-decision.
5.10 The case of ARCO (I)
Case T-664/14, Belgium v. Commission; case T-711/14, Arcofin and Others v.
Commission
Strictly speaking, the case of ARCO is not a bank State aid case, since ARCO
is not a bank. Indeed, the ARCO Group consisted of three financial coopera-
tive companies (ARCOPAR, ARCOPLUS and ARCOFIN). However, ARCO
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was one of the main shareholders of Dexia, a Belgian-French bank.33 In the
context of the recapitalisation of Dexia, the Belgian State decided to extend
the Belgian Deposit Guarantee Scheme so that the individual shareholders in
financial cooperatives would be protected against losses up to the limit of EUR
100.000 (hereafter: “the cooperative guarantee scheme”).
The Commission was of the opinion that the cooperative guarantee scheme
was tailor-made for ARCO, which had run into trouble because of its invest-
ments in Dexia. The Commission therefore considered that the guarantee con-
ferred a selective advantage to the Belgian financial cooperative ARCO, the
only beneficiary of the scheme.
In the decision on the cooperative guarantee scheme (“the ARCO-decision”), the
Commission concluded that the Belgian cooperative guarantee scheme con-
stituted State aid. In the context of the compatibility-assessment, the Commis-
sion held that financial cooperatives are not financial institutions. As a result,
the guarantee scheme did not fall under the 2008 Banking Communication. The
Commission therefore assessed the aid directly under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
The Commission came to the conclusion that the guarantee could not be con-
sidered compatible with the internal market because it was neither appropriate
nor necessary nor proportionate for the purposes of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU
and it did not come within the scope of any other provision governing com-
patibility of State aid. Since the guarantee was incompatible, ARCO had
received an undue advantage. By the ARCO-decision, the Commission ordered
the recovery of the aid. In other words: ARCO had to pay back the undue
advantage it received.
Both the Belgian State and Arcofin brought an action for annulment against
the ARCO-decision. NB: this PhD-study was concluded on 1 August 2017. At
that time, the Court had not yet rendered a judgment in this case.
5.11 The case of ARCO (II)
Case C-76/15, Paul Vervloet and Others
The case of ARCO also led to a preliminary ruling. Paul Vervloet and other
investors felt disadvantaged because they did not qualify for the cooperative
guarantee, since they had invested their money not in shares in ARCO but
directly in shares in Dexia. For that reason, these investors considered that the
33. Dexia was a financial group with operational entities in Belgium, France and Luxembourg.
The parent company, Dexia SA, was incorporated as a limited company under Belgian law
and listed on the Euronext Paris and Euronext Brussels stock exchanges.
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cooperative guarantee scheme infringed the principle of equality. They therefore
instituted legal proceedings against the Belgian State. In the context of these
proceedings, the Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of
Belgium) requested a preliminary ruling.
On 21 December 2016, the Court rendered its judgment. In essence, the Court
was asked to assess two aspects of the cooperative guarantee scheme. In
the first place, the Court was requested to examine whether a guarantee scheme
such as the Belgian one was compatible with the EU deposit-guarantee legisla-
tion laid down in Directive 94/19/EC (“the DGS Directive”).
In line with the Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott of 2 June 2016, the
Court concluded that the DGS Directive does not oblige nor prevent the Mem-
ber States to include shares held by natural persons in recognised financial coop-
eratives in their respective national deposit-guarantee schemes.
In the second place, the Court was requested to assess the validity of the ARCO-
decision. In the main proceedings before the Belgian court, ARCO was calling
into question the validity of the ARCO-decision (by recourse to the same argu-
ments as those on which it also based its action for the annulment of that
decision before the General Court in case T-711/14).34 Among others, ARCO
argued that the cooperative guarantee scheme did not confer a selective
advantage on the ARCO cooperatives. The Court, however, considered that
there was no doubt that the ARCO Group benefited from the cooperative
guarantee scheme. It was that guarantee scheme alone which protected the
ARCOGroup from the imminent flight of private investors in the ARCOGroup.
The Court concluded that the examination of the questions had disclosed no
factor such as to affect the validity of the ARCO-decision.
5.12 The case of Banca Tercas
Case T-98/16, Italy v. Commission; case T-196/16, Banca Tercas v. Commission
This case concerned the contribution paid to Banca Tercas by the Fondo
Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi (FITD), the Italian deposit guarantee
scheme. The contribution was provided in order to bring up the negative equity
of Banca Tercas to 0 before the business was taken over by Banca Popolare di
Bari (BPB).
34. The AG also explained the relation between the outcome of the preliminary ruling
procedure and the action for annulment against the ARCO-decision: while the judgment
of the Court in the preliminary ruling procedure would not have any formally binding
effect on the General Court in pending Cases T-664/14 and T-711/14, it would certainly
constitute “a not insignificant de facto precedent with regard to the outcome of those
proceedings”. Opinion in Case C-76/15, para. 107.
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Italy considered that the intervention by the FITD did not constitute State aid,
because the FITD’s resources could not be considered as State resources, and
the decision to use them was solely imputable to the FITD’s members. The
Commission, however, did not accept these arguments. In the Banca Tercas-
decision, the Commission declared that the contribution paid to Banca Tercas
by the FITD constituted State aid.
Furthermore, the Commission considered that the State aid was incompatible
with the internal market. This conclusion was based on the following factors:
i) the absence of a restructuring plan; ii) insufficient burden-sharing by the
subordinated creditors; and iii) the lack of remuneration for the FITD interven-
tion. Since the State aid was incompatible, the Commission ordered the recov-
ery of the State aid.
Both the Italian State and Banca Tercas brought an action for annulment against
the Banca Tercas-decision. NB: this PhD-study was concluded on 1 August
2017. At that time, the Court had not yet rendered a judgment in this case.
5.13 The case of the Slovenian banks
Case C-526/14, Kotnik and Others v. Državni zbor Republike Slovenije
This case concerned the burden-sharing measures that were taken by Slovenia
in line with points 40 to 46 of the 2013 Banking Communication. These pro-
visions of the Banking Communication require burden-sharing by shareholders
and subordinated creditors.
On 17 December 2013, the Central Bank of Slovenia adopted a decision con-
cerning extraordinary measures and ordered five Slovenian banks – Abanka,
NLB, NKBM, Probanka and Factor Banka – to write off all eligible liabilities.
These measures were contested before the Ustavno sodišče (i.e. the Constitu-
tional Court of Slovenia). According to the Ustavno sodišče, while the objec-
tions of the applicants in the main proceedings were directed against provisions
of the Slovenian law on the banking sector, their actual target was the 2013
Banking Communication. This was because the purpose of the Slovenian law on
the banking sector was to establish a legal framework for burden-sharing in
accordance with the requirements of the Banking Communication. The Ustavno
sodišče therefore asked for a preliminary ruling. On 19 July 2016, the Court
rendered its judgment.35
35. For a more detailed discussion of this judgment, see: Babis 2016; Vlahek & Damjan 2016.
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One of the questions was whether the Banking Communication was binding
on Member States. As explained in section 3.4.3, this question was answered
in the negative by the Court.36 Another question was whether points 40 to 46
of the 2013 Banking Communication – which require burden-sharing by
shareholders and subordinated creditors – were compatible with Articles 107
TFEU, 108 TFEU and 109 TFEU. This question will be explained in more
depth in chapter 12.
Another noteworthy question was whether points 40 to 46 of the 2013 Bank-
ing Communication were compatible with several provisions of Directive
2012/30 (a recast of the Second Company Law Directive). This Directive
provides that any increase or reduction in the capital of a public limited liabil-
ity company must be subject to a decision by the general meeting of the com-
pany.
The Court noted that Directive 2012/30 is intended to reassure investors
that their rights will be respected by the governing bodies of the companies in
which they have invested, particularly when a company is formed and when
its share capital is increased and reduced. Consequently, the measures pro-
vided for by Directive 2012/30 in order to guarantee that protection relate to
the normal operation of public limited liability companies. By contrast, the
burden-sharing measures constitute exceptional measures. They can be adopted
only in the context of there being a serious disturbance of the economy of a
Member State and with the objective of preventing a systemic risk and ensur-
ing the stability of the financial system. The Court concluded that Directive
2012/30 does not preclude measures relating to share capital being adopted, in
certain specific circumstances, such as those mentioned in the 2013 Banking
Communication, without the approval of the general meeting.37
36. On 18 February 2016, Advocate-General Wahl delivered his Opinion. As explained in
section 3.4.3, the AG’s opinion in this case contained some interesting considerations on
the legal status of the Crisis Communications.
37. Case C-526/14, para. 89.
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5.14 The case of Irish Life and Permanent (PTSB)
Case C-41/15, Dowling and Others v. Minister for Finance
This case concerned the State aid to Irish Life & Permanent (Permanent TSB or
PTSB). Following PTSB’s recapitalisation, a number of PTSB’s former share-
holders filed a lawsuit notably on the grounds that the capital injection was
incompatible with the Second Company Law Directive.38 The High Court of
Ireland asked for a preliminary ruling.39
On 8 November 2016, the Court rendered its judgment.40 In line with the
judgment in case C-526/14 (Kotnik and Others), the Court considered that
the rights conferred upon shareholders by the Second Company Law Directive
do not preclude a Member State from urgently recapitalising an ailing bank in
a situation where there is a serious disturbance of the economy and financial
system of a Member State.
5.15 The case of Banco Espirito Santo (I)
Case T-812/14, BPC Lux 2 and Others v. Commission
The applicants in this case were subordinated creditors of Banco Espírito Santo
(BES). BES was a Portuguese bank which in August 2014 was split-up into a
Bridge Bank and a Bad Bank. All the sound business activities of BES were
transferred to the Bridge Bank, while the shareholders and subordinated debt
holders were left in the Bad Bank. The Bridge Bank was capitalised by the
Portuguese resolution fund. In its decision of 3 August 2014, the Commission
considered this State aid measure to be compatible with the internal market (the
“BES-decision”).
The applicants requested the Court to annul the BES-decision. The Commis-
sion contended that the action was inadmissible as the applicants did not have
legal standing to bring proceedings for annulment of the BES-decision.
The General Court recalled that an action for annulment is admissible
only in so far as that person has in interest in the annulment of the contested
measure. In that regard, the General Court considered that that if the BES-
decision were to be annulled, that would not have the effect of obliging the
Portuguese Republic to reverse its decision to create a Bridge Bank and not
38. Directive 77/91/EEC.
39. When the Commission adopted its final decision, the action of PTSB’s former shareholders
was still pending before Irish courts. This did not prevent the Commission from adopting a
final decision. See: IL&P (PTSB), 9 April 2015, para. 18.
40. On 22 June 2016, Advocate-General Wahl delivered his Opinion.
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to include in the assets of that bank bonds of the kind held by the applicants.
An annulment of the BES-decision would thus procure no advantage for the
applicants. The action was therefore dismissed as inadmissible.
5.16 The case of Banco Espirito Santo (II)
Case T-814/14, Banco Espírito Santo v. Commission
This case concerned the Monitoring Trustee appointed in the case of Banco
Espírito Santo (BES). Pursuant to point 9 and 18 of Annex II of the BES-
decision, the Monitoring Trustee was to be remunerated by the Bad Bank. In the
present case, Banco Espírito Santo (i.e. the Bad Bank resulting from the split-up
of BES) sought the partial annulment of point 9 and 18 of Annex II of the BES-
decision. The applicant argued that there was no basis (in the EU legislation
concerning State aid) for imposing the responsibility for remunerating the Mon-
itoring Trustee on the Bad Bank, which was not an addressee of the BES-
decision nor a beneficiary of the aid.
On 1 December 2015, the General Court rendered its judgment. As regards the
admissibility of the action for annulment, the General Court recalled that par-
tial annulment of a Commission decision is possible only if the elements whose
annulment is sought may be severed from the remainder of the decision. The
General Court concluded that this was not the case. The appointment of a Mon-
itoring Trustee was one of the commitments made by Portugal. In that regard,
the General Court recalled that when the Commission adopts a decision not to
raise objections, it does so by taking into account the commitments made by
the Member State. The commitments thus form an integral part of the notified
measure. Since the commitments are inextricably linked to the notified aid
measure, the applicant cannot seek the annulment of only the commitments.41
The action for partial annulment was therefore inadmissible.
5.17 The case of SNS REAAL
Case T-321/13, Adorisio and Others v. Commission
This case concerned the State aid to SNS REAAL in 2013. On 1 February 2013,
SNS REAAL was nationalised by the Dutch State. In the context of the nation-
alisation, the shareholders and subordinated debt holders were expropriated.
41. It should be noted that, unlike Banco Espirito Santo, ABN AMRO was allowed to seek the
annulment of one behavioural restriction. However, the decision on ABN AMRO was a
conditional decision (in which the Commission imposed certain behavioural restrictions),
while the decision on Banco Espirito Santo was a commitment-decision.
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Until the nationalisation of SNS REAAL, Stefania Adorisio and the other 363
applicants held subordinated bonds issued by SNS REAAL. In the current case,
they requested the Court to annul the decision of the Commission of 22 February
2013 (“the contested decision”). In the contested decision, the Commission
concluded that the State aid to SNS REAAL was compatible with the internal
market under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
The Commission argued that the action was inadmissible. The General Court
accepted the argument of the Commission that the applicants did not have a
legal interest in bringing proceedings. The Commission correctly argued that
the applicants were unlikely to derive any benefit from the annulment of the
contested decision. The annulment of the contested decision would not result
in the Netherlands reversing its expropriation decision.42 By order of 26 March
2014, the action was therefore dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.43
5.18 The case of MPS
Case T-313/13, Codacons v. Commission
Another case in which the action was dismissed as manifestly inadmissible
is the case of MPS. In 2012, the Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS)
received State aid, which was approved by the Commission in the rescue
decision of 17 December 2012. On 11 June 2013, Coordinamento delle asso-
ciazioni per la tutela dell’ambiente e dei diritti degli utenti e consumatori
(Codacons) had brought an action for annulment against the rescue decision of
17 December 2012. By order of 3 July 2013, the action was dismissed as
manifestly inadmissible. The General Court recalled that there is a time-limit of
two months for bringing an action for annulment. Since the action in this case
was brought too late, the action was dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.
42. The General Court noted that an annulment of the expropriation could only be obtained
before the competent national court (“Raad van State”) and that the applicants indeed
brought an action before the Raad van State. Case T-321/13, para. 27.
43. It should be noted that the General Court did not go into the substance of the case, since the
General Court only decided on the pleas of inadmissibility.
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5.19 Concluding observations on the case-law on bank State aid
The following table gives an overview of the cases discussed in the present
chapter.44
noitces
ni
dessucsi
D
Action for annulment Reference for a preliminary 
ruling
Who initiated proceedings?
Beneficiary bank or 
Member State
Shareholders or other 
investors
Beneficiary 
bank or 
Member 
State
Shareholders or other 
investors
5.2 ING and Netherlands
(in the case of ING)
5.3 FIH
(in the case of FIH)
5.4 ABN AMRO
(in the case of ABN 
AMRO)
5.5 Westfälisch-Lippischer 
Sparkassen- und 
Giroverband 
(in the case of WestLB)
5.6 HSH Investment 
Holdings
(in the case of HSH 
Nordbank)
5.7 Austria 
(in the case of BayernLB)
5.8 BPP
(in the case of BPP)
5.9 BPP
(in the case 
of BPP)
5.10 *Belgium and Arcofin
(in the case of ARCO)
5.11 Paul Vervloet and 
Others
(in the case of ARCO)
5.12 *Italy 
(in the case of Banco 
Tercas)
5.13 Kotnik and Others 
(in the case of the 
Slovenian banks)
5.14 Dowling and Others 
(in the case of Irish 
Life and Permanent)
5.15 BPC Lux 2 and Others 
(in the case of BES)
5.16 BES
(in the case of BES)
5.17 Adorisio and Others
(in the case of SNS 
REAAL)
5.18 Codacons 
(in the case of MPS)
44. Cases that were dismissed as inadmissible are shown in red. Cases in which the Court
assessed the validity of the Commission decision are shown in green. Cases that were
partially inadmissible are shown in orange. Cases in which the validity of the Commission
decision was not questioned are shown in yellow. Cases that are still pending before the
Court are marked by an asterisk.
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In total, there are 17 cases (or 15, since the cases of ARCO and BPP were
counted twice).45 However, this total number of cases needs to be nuanced in
three ways.
In the first place, only in 9 of these 17 cases, the legality (or validity) of the
Commission decision was actually assessed by the CJEU. How to explain this
difference? Firstly, of the 17 cases discussed, only 13 cases concerned direct
actions; the other 4 cases concerned references for a preliminary ruling. A
reference for a preliminary ruling can concern the interpretation or the validity.
In two of the cases (i.e. BPP and Vervloet), the referring court asked questions
about the validity of the Commission decision. The other two cases (i.e. Kotnik
and Dowling) did concern State aid to banks, but they did not question the
validity of a bank State aid decision. Secondly, some cases were dismissed as
inadmissible (though for various reasons). As a consequence, the Court did not
go into the substance of the case. This means that in those cases, the legality (or
validity) of the Commission decision was not assessed.
In the second place, the contested decisions in the cases of BPP, ARCO and
Banco Tercas were all recovery decisions. In that sense, these cases are ‘atypi-
cal’. In the ‘typical’ bank State aid cases, Member States and banks are more
reluctant to initiate legal proceedings.
In the third place, there are several cases – such as WestLB and HSH
Nordbank – in which the action for annulment was not brought by the bank
or Member State, but by the shareholders of the bank. Indeed, of the 13 direct
actions, 8 were brought by the beneficiary bank or Member State.46 The other
5 actions for annulment were brought by the shareholders or other investors
of the bank.47 It can also be observed that competing banks and other Member
States are somewhat reluctant to challenge bank State aid decisions before
the CJEU.
Thus, a prime observation is that most bank State aid decisions are not chal-
lenged before the Court of Justice.48 In that regard, it is worth recalling that
section 1.3.2 set out a distinction between three stages: anticipating the
“treatment”, negotiating the “treatment” and challenging the “treatment”.
From a quantitative point of view, the third stage is not that important. In total,
45. Counting the cases is not straightforward. The cases of ARCO and BPP are counted twice.
The case of ING is counted as 1 case, even though the bank and the State initiated
proceedings separately (cases T-29/10 and T-33/10).
46. ING, FIH, ABN AMRO, Austria (in BayernLB), BPP, Belgium (in ARCO), Italy (in Banco
Tercas), BES.
47. WestLB, HSH Nordbank, ARCO, the Slovenian banks, SNS REAAL, MPS.
48. In his annotation on the ING-case, Rivas (2014, p. 723) remarked that the Crisis Framework
has been largely untested before the Court of Justice.
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there are almost 100 bank State aid cases. Only in 9 cases, the CJEU actually
reviewed the legality of the Commission decision. So in most bank State aid
cases, the second stage is the final stage.
5.20 The principle of equal treatment in the case-law on bank
State aid
In the cases of ABN AMRO, WestLB and BPP (discussed in sections 5.4, 5.5
and 5.8 respectively), it was claimed that there was an infringement of the
principle of equal treatment. Given the relevance of the principle of equal
treatment to this PhD-study, these pleas in law will be discussed in detail in the
present section.
5.20.1 The case of ABN AMRO
ABN AMRO claimed that the Commission infringed the principle of equal
treatment by imposing an acquisition ban which was significantly more strict
than in other decisions.49 The acquisition ban entailed that ABN AMRO would
not acquire control of more than 5% of any undertaking. This acquisition ban
includes two relevant aspects. Firstly, it concerns ‘any undertaking’. Secondly,
it concerns acquisition ‘of more than 5%’. As regards the first aspect, ABN
AMRO argued that the vast majority of Commission decisions adopted at the
same time only prohibited the acquisition of financial institutions or competing
businesses. As regards the second aspect, ABN AMRO argued that most of the
relevant decisions, including the Lloyds, ING, RBS and LBBW decisions, pro-
hibited only the full acquisition of companies or the acquisition of control of
them.
The General Court first recalled that the principle of equal treatment requires
that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situa-
tions must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively
justified. The General Court then considered that it is very difficult to establish
whether bank State aid decisions are comparable or not.50 In that regard, the
General Court recalled that bank State aid can be approved only if the essential
conditions laid down in the Restructuring Communication are satisfied, which
requires an overall analysis of the Commission’s decisions, based on a restruc-
turing plan and on appropriate commitments and conditions. As a result, a com-
parison of the individual measures imposed in different decisions is particularly
dangerous.51
49. Case T-319/11, para. 102.
50. Case T-319/11, para. 112.
51. Case T-319/11, para. 113.
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In any event, in so far as the Court was able to undertake a comparative
examination of conditions imposed in different decisions, the burden of proof
that the situations at issue are comparable, would fall on the applicant (in this
case: ABN AMRO).52
In support of its plea, ABN AMRO referred to the decisions on Commerzbank,
LBG, KBC, ING, RBS, LBBW, Dexia and Sparkasse KolnBonn. The General
Court noted that, even though those banks were in the same business sector
as ABN AMRO, they all displayed particular characteristics and operated in a
specific environment. The General Court held that “with regard to those banks,
a restructuring plan was submitted to the Commission, the characteristics of
which have not been established to be the same as that of ABN AMRO, together
with specific commitments, circumstances which call into question the compa-
rability of the situations at issue”.53
In addition, the General Court observed that the scope of the prohibitions as it
was accepted in respect of those other banks was not always as limited as is
claimed by ABN AMRO. Admittedly, in several decisions, the prohibition was
limited to the acquisition of shareholdings in companies active in the same
sector. However, there are also decisions in which the acquisition ban extended
to undertakings outside the financial sector. The General Court concluded that
these decisions called into question ABN AMRO’s argument that an equally
strict prohibition was not imposed on any other bank.54
In essence, the General Court concluded that ABN AMRO had failed to estab-
lish that the other cases were comparable. ABN AMRO also failed to establish
that the acquisition ban in the case of ABN AMRO was more strict than the
acquisition ban in other cases. The plea in law was therefore rejected.55
5.20.2 The case of WestLB
The applicant in this case claimed that the WestLB-decision infringed the
principle of equal treatment. According to the applicant, making the authorisa-
tion of aid to a bank subject to the obligation to sell the bank was unprece-
dented in the Commission’s decision-making practice. The applicant argued that
a comparison of theWestLB-decision with the decision on Commerzbank would
clearly show that there had been unequal treatment, because in the Commerz-
bank-decision (which was adopted a week before the WestLB-decision), the
52. Case T-319/11, para. 114.
53. Case T-319/11, para. 116.
54. Case T-319/11, para. 121.
55. The plea in law alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment with regard to the
duration of the acquisition ban was also rejected. Case T-319/11, para. 190.
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Commission did not require a change in the ownership structure of the benefi-
ciary bank. In addition, the applicant produced a table which, in its view, showed
that the WestLB-decision was the only decision in which authorisation of the
aid at issue was made subject to a change in the beneficiary’s ownership struc-
ture.56
The General Court recalled the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treat-
ment and held that the applicant had not demonstrated that WestLB was in a
situation comparable to that of the other beneficiary banks.57 In that regard, the
General Court held that the effect of restructuring aid granted to a bank in dif-
ficulty in a situation of financial crisis fundamentally depended on a set of indi-
vidual circumstances, which include the bank’s economic situation and its
prospects of being restored to economic viability. However, the applicant did
not examine whether the Commission, in the decisions relating to the banks
which it cited (such as Commerzbank), had considered that the ownership
structures were as problematic as that of WestLB.58
In addition, the General Court noted that it is only in the context of Article 87
(3)(b) EC59 that it is necessary to assess the legality of a Commission decision
declaring that new aid does not fulfil the requirements for application of that
derogation, and not in the light of its previous decision-making practice, assum-
ing that the latter is established. This was clarified as follows: “The concept of
State aid and the conditions necessary for ensuring the restoration of the ben-
eficiary’s viability reflect an objective situation which must be appraised on
the date on which the Commission takes its decision. Thus, the Commission’s
reasons for having made a different appraisal of the situation in an earlier deci-
sion must remain immaterial to the appraisal of the lawfulness of the contested
decision.”60
Furthermore, the General Court considered that the Commission cannot be
deprived of the opportunity to set compatibility conditions stricter than those
in previous decisions if so required by the development of the common
market and the objective of undistorted competition within that market.61
56. Case T-457/09, para. 360-361.
57. Case T-457/09, para. 365.
58. Case T-457/09, para. 366.
59. Article 87(3)(b) EC corresponds to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
60. Case T-457/09, para. 368. See also: Judgment of the ECJ of 30 September 2003 in joined
Cases C-57/00 P and C-61/00 P, para. 52-53.
61. Case T-457/09, para. 369.
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The General Court also pointed at the fact that it is the Member State who pro-
poses commitments and that the Commission only considers whether these com-
mitments are adequate (in order to ensure viability, burden-sharing and limiting
competition distortions). As a consequence, differences between the restructur-
ing plans are due to a choice by the Member State concerned, rather than being
due to a choice by the Commission. For that reason, the General Court held that
“in principle, the fact that authorisation of restructuring aid is made subject to
compliance with the measures provided for by the restructuring plan to which
the Member State concerned has committed itself cannot result in an infringe-
ment of the principle of equal treatment”.62
On the basis of these considerations, the General Court concluded that the
applicant had failed to demonstrate that the Commission discriminated against
the applicant. The plea in law (alleging infringement of the principle of equal
treatment) was therefore rejected.
5.20.3 The case of Banco Privado Portugues (BPP)
By the seventh plea in law, the applicant (in case T-487/11) alleged infringe-
ment of the right to ‘fair treatment’. In support of this plea in law, the applicant
referred to several other bank State aid decisions. In particular, the applicant
argued that in the decision on Banco Português de Negócios (BPN), the Com-
mission was more ‘tolerant’ than in the case of BPP, even though BPN and
BPP were in a comparable situation. The applicant raised three arguments to
support its view that BPN and BPP were in a comparable situation: first, the two
State aid measures in question had been notified at almost the same time;
second, in BPN’s case, the Portuguese authorities had also been slow to submit
a restructuring plan; third, the State aid measures in the case of BPN were much
more significant from a financial point of view.
In its judgment of 12 December 2014, the General Court held that this plea in
law (alleging infringement of the right to ‘fair treatment’) should be interpreted
as referring to the principle of equal treatment.63 The General Court recalled
the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treatment and considered that
the applicant had not demonstrated, to the requisite legal standard, that BPN
and BPP were in a comparable situation. In particular, the General Court held
that BPN eventually did present a restructuring plan, whereas BPP failed to do
so. This was an essential difference between the two cases.
62. Case T-457/09, para. 370-371.
63. Case T-487/11, para. 138.
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In addition, the General Court considered that the mere notification at more
or less the same time of the aid measures planned by the Portuguese authori-
ties to assist these two banks was not decisive. Furthermore, in BPN’s case, the
Commission initiated the formal examination procedure not because there was
no restructuring plan at all, but because the initial restructuring plan submitted
had become obsolete owing to the sale of BPN and the Commission had to
assess a revised plan at a later stage.
The General Court concluded that the key differences in the respective sit-
uations of BPN and BPP warranted the finding that the situations were not
comparable and that, therefore, the principle of equal treatment as relied on by
the applicant could not apply in the present case. The plea in law was therefore
rejected.64
5.20.4 Reflection
The discussion of the cases of ABN AMRO, WestLB and BPP has shown that
none of the applicants could successfully claim that the Commission had
violated the principle of equal treatment. In each of the three cases, the plea in
law alleging an infringement of the principle of equal treatment was rejected
by the Court. This is illustrative of the fact that the Court almost never finds
that the principle of equal treatment is infringed. This is due to three compli-
cating factors.
In the first place, it should be recalled that the principle of equal treatment
requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different
situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objec-
tively justified. Thus, in order to be able to apply the principle of equal treat-
ment, one must be able to establish whether situations are comparable or not.
However, as is illustrated by the cases of ABN AMRO, WestLB and BPP, it
is very difficult to establish whether beneficiary banks are in a comparable sit-
uation. Indeed, banks are different, State aid measures are different and restruc-
turing plans are different. Hence, there are always circumstances that “call into
question the comparability of the situations at issue”.65
64. Case T-487/11, para. 141. NB: in appeal (Case C-93/15), the judgment of the General Court
was upheld by the ECJ.
65. As the General Court considered in Case T-319/11 (ABN AMRO), para. 116.
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In the second place, there is a more fundamental problem. It is established case-
law that it is only in the context of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU that it is necessary to
assess the legality of a Commission decision, and not in the light of its previous
decision-making practice.66 This essentially means that beneficiary banks and
Member States cannot refer to other decisions to support their argument that
in the contested decision, the Commission departed from its earlier decision-
making practice.67
In the third place, it should be recalled that there are commitment decisions
and conditional decisions.68 The restructuring measures are sometimes depicted
as being imposed by the Commission. This may be true de facto, but from a
strictly legal perspective, the restructuring measures are proposed by the
Member State concerned. Only if the Commission adopts a conditional deci-
sion, the restructuring measures are imposed by the Commission. If, on the
contrary, the Commission adopts a commitment decision, the restructuring
measures are commitments by the Member State. As the Court held in the case
of WestLB, “in principle, the fact that authorisation of restructuring aid is made
subject to compliance with the measures provided for by the restructuring plan
to which the Member State concerned has committed itself cannot result in
an infringement of the principle of equal treatment”.69
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the principle of equal treatment is
interpreted very narrowly by the Court of Justice.
5.21 Concluding remarks
As set out in section 5.1.2, this chapter had a twofold purpose: to give an over-
view of the case-law of the CJEU on bank State aid and to discuss how the
CJEU has interpreted the principle of equal treatment in bank State aid cases.
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. In the first
place, most bank State aid decisions are not challenged before the Court of
Justice (see section 5.19). In the second place, the principle of equal treatment
is interpreted very narrowly by the Court of Justice (see section 5.20). This
PhD-study takes into account both findings. The narrow CJEU-definition of
66. Case T-171/02 (Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission), para. 177; Joined Cases
C-57/00 P and C-61/00 P (Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission), para. 52 and 53.
67. The principle that the Commission can depart from its previous decision-making practice
is somewhat alleviated by the fact that the Commission cannot depart from its guidelines
and communications, and that these guidelines and communications are sometimes
codifications of the Commission’s decisional practice.
68. The distinction between commitment decisions and conditional decisions was explained in
section 3.7.3.
69. Case T-457/09, para. 370-371.
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the principle of equal treatment might be considered problematic. However,
since only a small fraction of the bank State aid cases are assessed by the CJEU,
the fact that the CJEU interprets the principle of equal treatment in such a nar-
row way, is less problematic. This justifies looking at other – possibly broader –
definitions of the principle of equal treatment. This will be done in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 6. Applying the principle of equal
treatment to bank State aid cases
6.1 Introduction
While the previous four chapters provided some indispensable backgrounds
to the topic of this PhD-study, the present chapter is essentially a continuation
of chapter 1. Indeed, chapter 1 set out the main aim of this PhD-study: to provide
a framework which can be used to establish whether a bank State aid decision
complies with the principle of equal treatment. A fundamental question in that
regard is how the principle of equal treatment can be applied to bank State aid
cases. The current chapter focusses on this fundamental question.
To that end, section 6.2 provides a brief overview of the principle of equal treat-
ment. Section 6.3 outlines that there are differences in the restructuring plans.
From that perspective, banks are treated differently. Does this different treat-
ment constitute a violation of the principle of equal treatment? In my view, there
are three possible approaches to finding out whether the different treatment con-
stitutes an unequal treatment. However, two of these approaches are problem-
atic, as is explained in sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The core of the present chapter
can be found in section 6.7 which introduces the ‘relevant characteristics
approach’ – this is the approach that I will take in this PhD-study to find out
whether the bank State aid decisions are in line with the principle of equal treat-
ment. Section 6.8 introduces a concept that plays a central role in the ‘relevant
characteristics approach’: the relevant context. Building upon the ‘relevant char-
acteristics approach’, section 6.9 addresses some further issues and thereby pro-
vides the basic outline of the remainder of this PhD-study.
6.2 The principle of equal treatment
The previous chapter introduced the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal
treatment. It should be stressed that the CJEU-definition is only one of the
many manifestations of the principle of equal treatment.
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In that regard, the principle of equal treatment has been aptly called “a scat-
tered principle found in different locations and in different forms”.1 This is
manifested in the variations in legal status, function, scope and wording of
the principle of equal treatment. The principle of equal treatment started as a
moral notion which became a general principle of law: the many Treaties and
Constitutions in which the principle of equal treatment is codified, illustrate
this. The principle of equal treatment exists both within and outside the EU. In
the EU-context, the principle of equal treatment can be found in the Treaties and
in the Charter.2 In addition, it was developed in the case-law of the CJEU.
Besides these different locations, there are different forms of the principle
of equal treatment. Firstly, the principle of equal treatment is sometimes expressed
in the form of a prohibition of discrimination.3 In those instances, the principle
of equal treatment is related to the idea that all people are equal and should be
treated as equals. Secondly, the addressees of the different manifestations of
the principle of equal treatment vary: sometimes, it is aimed specifically at the
legislator and the administrative bodies; sometimes, it also applies to horizontal
relations.
This PhD-study focusses on the principle of equal treatment in the context
of State aid to banks. Consequently, the principle of equal treatment will only
be discussed to the extent that it is relevant in that specific context.4 This PhD-
study is interested in the principle of equal treatment as a guiding principle for
the Commission to ensure a sound/proper/good administration.5 In this function,
the principle of equal treatment serves as a standard of review. From this per-
spective, there are essentially two definitions of the principle of equal treat-
ment: the definition given by the CJEU and the Aristotelian formula.
1. Bell 2004, p. 244.
2. The Charter of fundamental rights contains some important provisions on equality. Article 20
provides that everyone is equal before the law. Article 21 provides that “any discrimina-
tion based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features,
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority,
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited”.
3. The non-discrimination principle is a specific form of the principle of equal treatment.
4. The aim of this PhD-study is not to demonstrate that the principle of equal treatment is
fundamental. Entire books have been written about the principle of equal treatment. For
more information on the principle of equal treatment, see: J.H. Gerards, Rechterlijke toetsing
aan het gelijkheidsbeginsel. Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar een algemeen toetsings-
model, Dissertation 2002.
5. In Dutch administrative law, the term “algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur (a.b.b.b.)”
is used to describe the principles that ensure a good administration. However, this PhD-study
will not use the term “principle of good administration”, because in EU-law, this term is
reserved for a specific principle.
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The CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treatment
As explained and illustrated in the previous chapter, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) can be called upon to review the legality of adminis-
trative decision-making by the Commission. This judicial review entails that the
CJEU has to check whether the decisions are in accordance with the applica-
ble rules and legislation, and whether they are in accordance with the general
principles of EU law. Since the principle of equal treatment is one of the general
principles of EU law, this principle thus functions as a standard of review. In
this specific function, the principle of equal treatment was primarily developed
in the case-law of the CJEU. According to settled case-law, the principle of equal
treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently
and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treat-
ment is objectively justified.6
The Aristotelian formula
The Aristotelian formula requires that “like cases must be treated alike, and
unlike cases unalike, proportionate to the differences between them”. This
formula resembles the definition of the CJEU. The striking difference between
the CJEU-definition and the Aristotelian formula can be found in the last part of
the Aristotelian formula: the notion that “unlike cases should be treated unalike,
proportionate to the differences between them” is not reflected in the CJEU-
definition.
6.3 Which definition should be used in this PhD-study?
6.3.1 A different definition
As set out in the previous section, there are two main definitions of the princi-
ple of equal treatment. Nevertheless, in this PhD-study, I do not use the CJEU-
definition nor the Aristotelian formula. Instead, I propose a different definition7;
see section 6.7.
6. See case T-319/11, para. 110 and case-law cited. T-487/11, para. 139. The Court refers to
case C-127/07 (para. 23, 25 and 26) and case C-176/09 (para. 31 and 32). It is sometimes
elaborated as follows: “The comparability of different situations must be assessed with
regard to all the elements which characterize them. These elements must in particular be
determined and assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the European
Union act which makes the distinction in question. The principles and objectives of the
field to which the act relates must also be taken into account.”
7. As regards terminology: with the term ‘definition’, I do not only mean the way how the
principle of equal treatment is defined, but also the way how it is interpreted and applied.
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Why do I propose a different definition? This is due to the following three rea-
sons. In the first place, I am of the opinion that the CJEU-definition is unsat-
isfactory for the purposes of this PhD-study (see subsections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3).
In the second place, I am of the opinion that I am not bound to use the CJEU-
definition. In my view, it is justified to use other definitions of the principle of
equal treatment (see subsection 6.3.4). One of these other definitions is the afore-
mentioned Aristotelian formula. However, I am of the opinion that the Aris-
totelian formula is unfeasible in the specific context of bank State aid cases (see
subsection 6.3.5).
6.3.2 When is a definition satisfactory?
In my opinion, a definition of the principle of equal treatment is satisfactory
when it can remedy the lack of clarity that was established in section 1.2. This
lack of clarity concerns the fact that there are many differences among the cases
and many differences among the treatments.8
As regards the differences among the treatments, it should be recalled that the
restructuring measures are different for each beneficiary bank. Some banks have
to divest a substantial part of their activities, while other banks do not have to
divest so much. Also the behavioural commitments may differ. All these dif-
ferences mean that there is a different treatment. However, a different treatment
does not necessarily mean that the principle of equal treatment is violated. A
different treatment is justified if the cases are different.
As regards the differences among the cases, it was described in chapter 3 that
there is a wide variety of State aid measures. These measures can differ in sev-
eral ways. First of all, some measures are part of a general rescue scheme, while
other aid measures are adopted on an ad-hoc basis. Secondly, some measures
(such as impaired asset measures) are targeted at the asset-side of the balance
sheet, whereas other measures (such as recapitalisations and guarantees) are
targeted at the liability-side of the balance sheet. Thirdly, the size and modali-
ties of the aid measures are different. Fourthly, sometimes banks benefit from
solely one aid measure, but sometimes a combination of different measures
is taken for a particular bank. Moreover, not only aid measures are different;
banks themselves are also different. Banks can differ in size, scope, business
model, activities, funding, etc. All those characteristics make banks different
from each other.
8. As a preliminary note: the “cases” are constituted by the banks that benefit from State aid
measures, the “treatment” is constituted by the restructuring measures that are required from
beneficiary banks.
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It is thus abundantly clear that bank State aid cases are different. Because of
all those differences, the situations of beneficiary banks are not the same. In
Aristotelian terms, the cases are not alike. Consequently, the cases should not be
treated alike. This makes it quite evident that the treatment should not be the
same. But do the differences between the State aid cases justify the differences
in treatment?
This question is not easy to answer. In that regard, there is a lack of clarity. The
purpose of this PhD-study is to provide clarity. As a corollary, the definition
(of the principle of equal treatment) employed in this PhD-study should be
capable of providing clarity. Otherwise, the definition would not be satisfactory
for the purposes of this PhD-study.
6.3.3 Why is the CJEU-definition unsatisfactory?
In my opinion, the CJEU-definition is unsatisfactory, because it does not pro-
vide a way of establishing whether the differences between the bank State aid
cases justify the differences in treatment. The CJEU has held that “comparable
situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be
treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified”. However,
since there are always circumstances that “call into question the comparability
of the situations at issue”9, the CJEU-definition is in my view very narrow. This
is underlined by the three cases discussed in section 5.20. For instance, in its
judgment on ABN AMRO, the CJEU held that it is difficult to establish that
situations are actually comparable when dealing with bank State aid decisions.10
This illustrates my point: since bank State aid cases are evidently different, the
different treatment of those cases is completely in line with the principle of
equal treatment, as defined by the CJEU.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the principle of equal treatment is inter-
preted very narrowly by the CJEU. And because the CJEU-definition is so
narrow, it cannot remedy the lack of clarity. Indeed, it cannot provide a way
of establishing whether the differences between the bank State aid cases justify
the differences in treatment. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the CJEU-
definition is unsatisfactory for the purposes of this PhD-study.
9. As the General Court considered in case T-319/11 (ABN AMRO), para. 116.
10. T-319/11, para. 184. It should be noted that the comparison in the case of ABN AMRO was
about a specific restructuring measure (i.e. the acquisition ban) rather than the total pack-
age of restructuring measures. The Court held that a comparison of a specific restructuring
measure is of little relevance, since the Commission undertakes an overall analysis on a case-
by-case basis.
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6.3.4 Why is it justified to use other definitions of the principle of equal
treatment?
It could be argued that the Commission, as an EU-Institution, is only bound by
the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treatment. However, in my opin-
ion, the Commission should not only be concerned by the CJEU-definition of
the principle of equal treatment, but also by other possible interpretations of the
principle of equal treatment.
It is not inconceivable that a Commission decision does not infringe the prin-
ciple of equal treatment as defined by the CJEU, but that it does infringe the
principle of equal treatment as defined by the Aristotelian formula. In such a
case, the decision cannot be successfully challenged before the CJEU. How-
ever, it is worth recalling that section 1.3.2 set out a distinction between three
stages: 1) anticipating the “treatment”, 2) negotiating the “treatment” and3) chal-
lenging the “treatment”. In the second stage, more and different arguments may
be used than only the arguments that the CJEU would accept. Although the
third stage might cast a shadow to the second stage, the parties in the second
stage (i.e. the Commission, the Member State and the beneficiary bank) are not
bound by the CJEU-interpretation of the principle of equal treatment. Thus, even
though the argument that a Commission decision infringes the Aristotelian
principle of equal treatment cannot be used to challenge this decision before
the CJEU, it can still be used as an argument in the negotiations with the Com-
mission. In that regard, it is worth recalling that the second stage may even be
more important than the third stage. Especially from a quantitative perspective,
the second stage is more important than the third stage. Indeed, one of the main
conclusions of chapter 5 was that for most beneficiary banks, the second stage is
the final stage.
6.3.5 Why is the Aristotelian formula unfeasible?
At first glance, the Aristotelian formula offers a better way (than the CJEU-def-
inition) of addressing the question whether the differences between the bank
State aid cases justify the differences in treatment. Indeed, the Aristotelian
principle requires not only that unlike cases are treated unalike; they should be
treated unalike, proportionate to the differences between them. From this per-
spective, it is not enough to simply establish that cases are different, it should
also be established how different the cases are. The treatment should be corre-
spondingly different. So this raises the question as to the comparability of the
cases and the comparability of the treatments.
The comparability (or the degree to which cases are different) is a rather
vague concept if it is not defined in what respect the cases are different. In my
opinion, there are essentially two approaches. State aid cases are characterised
by many different characteristics. One can either compare the cases on the basis
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of all those different characteristics, or one can combine all those characteristics
into one single metric11 and compare the cases on the basis of this metric. So
there are two approaches, which I have labelled in this PhD-study as the ‘one-
metric approach’ and the ‘many-variables approach’. However, both approaches
are problematic. This will be explained in sections 6.4 and 6.5.
6.4 The ‘one-metric approach’
6.4.1 Introduction
The previous section explained that there are many differences among the cases.
These differences warrant a different treatment, but how different should dif-
ferent cases be treated? The “one-metric approach” attempts to find an answer
to this question.
The first step of this approach would be the following. Bank State aid deci-
sions can contain a wide array of commitments and conditions with all differ-
ent modalities. Would it be possible to use a single metric to capture all of these
restructuring measures? If all the different restructuring measures can be cap-
tured into one single metric, then it becomes possible to compare the treatments
in terms of that metric. What metric should be used? In other words: the treat-
ments are to be compared in terms of what? One could choose a metric such as
the severity (or harshness) of the restructuring measures. Since restructuring
measures are often seen as “punishment”, it would make sense to look how
severe the treatment is. The treatments can then be compared on the basis of
their severity.12
The next step would be to do the same for the “cases”. State aid cases have many
characteristics. The characteristics of the “case” are constituted by a combina-
tion of the characteristics of the bank and the characteristics of the State aid
measure. In order to compare the cases, these characteristics of the cases should
be combined into a single metric. One could choose for a metric such as the
amount of ‘harm’ that the State aid has caused. If the amount of harm can
11. I use the term “metric” and not “measure”, because the term “measure” may cause confusion
with other terms such as “State aid measures” and “compensatory/restructuring measures”.
The Dutch language has an advantage here, because there the terms “maatstaf” and
“maatregel” exist.
12. The following considerations of the General Court in case T-319/11 support the approach
to compare the treatments in terms of the degree of severity: “Further, as contended by the
Commission, all those banks were compelled to undergo balance sheet reductions and also,
for the most part, to divest themselves of certain businesses, a fact which may clearly have
an effect on the degree of severity of the behavioural measures accepted, which may again
call into question their comparability with this case.”
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be established, then the cases can be compared on the basis of this metric. In
other words: it comes down to determining how different the cases are in terms
of harm that they caused.
The final step would be to find out if the degree to which the cases differ from
each other (in terms of the metric) can be related to the degree to which the
treatments of those cases are different. The underlying idea is that the gravity
of the case is related to the severity of the treatment. This follows from the
principle of proportionality, which requires that the treatment is proportionate.
In other words: banks where many things are wrong, deserve a harsher pun-
ishment (i.e. far-reaching restructuring measures).13
This line of reasoning can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that
there are two cases (A and B) and that both the gravity of each case and the
severity of the treatment can be quantified. The gravity of case A is 1 and the
gravity of case B is 2. The severity of treatment A is 3 and the severity of treat-
ment B is 6. See the following table.
A B
gravity of the case 1 2
severity of the treatment 3 6
There are two types of relations:
– The relation between (the gravity of) the case and (the severity of) the treat-
ment, so the relations 1:3 and 2:6. This is the proportionality.
– The relation between the cases, so the relations 1:2 and 3:6. This is the com-
parability (the degree to which cases are different).
The principle of proportionality only concerns the relations [1:3] and [2:6].
The principle of equality concerns the way how these relations relate to each
other, so [1:3]=[2:6] or [1:2]=[3:6]. The principle of equality works in two
ways, which lead to the same outcome. It requires that the proportionality is
the same for each case. So if treatment A is three times higher than the gravity
of case A, then treatment B should also be three times higher than the gravity
of case B. In numerical terms, [1:3]=[2:6]. Another way of putting it, is that
the principle of equality requires that the degree to which cases A and B differ,
should be reflected in the treatments. So if the gravity of case B is two times
higher than the gravity of case A, then the severity of treatment B should also be
two times higher than the severity of treatment A. In numerical terms, [1:2]=
[3:6].
13. The Commission expressed this in the following terms: “As a general rule, the more
significant the reliance on State aid, the stronger the indication of a need to undergo in-depth
restructuring.” (point 15 of the First Prolongation Communication).
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This example clearly illustrates that the one-metric approach can only work if
the gravity of the case and the severity of the treatment can be quantified. Cases
can only be compared in terms of a metric if a certain value can be assigned to
that metric. Since this is not the case, the one-metric approach will not work in
practice. In the following two subsections, this will be explained in more detail.
6.4.2 Determining the comparability of the cases
In the previous subsection, the metric ‘harm’ or ‘harmfulness’ was mentioned as
an example. However, is this really a good metric? Can State aid cases be com-
pared in terms of the harm that the State aid has caused? Intuitively, such a
metric would make sense. State aid is harmful. That is the whole reason why the
EU has set up State aid control. The purpose of State aid control is to contain the
harmful effects of State aid, either by prohibiting the State aid measures or by
requesting restructuring measures. This means that comparing State aid measu-
res in terms of their harmfulness may be meaningful.
On a conceptual level, the harmfulness may thus be a good metric. On a
practical level, however, it is somewhat problematic. This is due to the fact
that there are different kinds of harm caused by State aid: the distortion of the
level playing, moral hazard, the risk of a subsidy race between Member States,
the fact that State aid may allow an inefficient firm to stay on the market.14
Some of those harmful effects may be hard to quantify. This makes it even more
difficult to add up these harmful effects. In other words: the ‘total amount’ of
harm cannot be determined.15 If the total amount of harm cannot be established,
then it cannot be established how different the cases are with respect to their
harmfulness.
6.4.3 Determining the comparability of the treatment
While in popular conception, the restructuring plan might be perceived as pun-
ishment, the treatment serves more objectives than only punishing banks.
For instance, the restructuring measures are also taken to ensure that the bank
will become viable in the long run. In chapter 3, it was explained that the
Restructuring Communication is based on three basic principles: i) restoration of
long-term viability of the bank, ii) burden sharing, and iii) minimization of
14. In that respect, Lo Schiavo (2013, p. 152) speaks of a “multifaceted theory of harm”.
15. For the specific types of harm, one could try to find some relation between the harm and
the severity of the compensatory measures. For instance, if the State aid has caused large
distortions of competitions, one would expect more and more severe compensatory
measures. If the State aid has caused a large moral hazard problem, one would expect
more burden sharing measures. However, some compensatory measures may be aimed at
both problems (of competition distortions and moral hazard). It is very hard to establish a
one-to-one relation between a problem and a solution, if the solution is aimed at more
problems.
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competition distortion. This means that the “treatment” serves three purposes.
While some restructuring measures may be aimed specifically at one of those
three purposes, this is not always the case. For instance, a divestment may be
needed to restore the long-term viability of a bank. At the same time, it is an own
contribution of the bank.16
It would therefore be wrong to assume that the treatment is only about
punishing the banks that received State aid. This does not, however, mean that
treatments cannot be compared in terms of their punitive effect. It could be
argued that, while not having the purpose of punishing a bank, a compensatory
measure may have the effect of punishing a bank. Consequently, treatments can
be compared in terms of their punitive effect.
Even if punitive effect (or severity) is used as a metric, there are problems with
the actual application of this metric. One of the most severe restructuring
measures is the divestment. Assume that Bank A has to divest 5% of its assets
and that Bank B has to divest 20%. At first sight, it seems that Bank B is ‘pun-
ished’ more than Bank A. However, only looking at the percentages is deceiv-
ing. The picture (that Bank B is punished more) may change if the example is
extended: assume that Bank A has to divest 5% within one year and that Bank
B has to divest 20% within three years. The timeframe can be a very relevant
aspect. It may be much harder to divest a small stake of 5% within one year
than it is to divest a larger stake within three years. This makes it hard to deter-
mine which bank is punished more (i.e. which structural remedy is more severe).
The severity of the divestment is also influenced by the prevailing market
conditions. In good times, it may be easier to find potential acquirers than in
bad times.17 In addition, if the market knows that the bank is forced to divest a
certain subsidiary, then the bank finds itself in a difficult bargaining position.
16. This is corroborated by the General Court in its judgment in T-319/11 (para. 118): “Admit-
tedly, as argued by ABN Amro, some of the structural measures imposed on those other
banks were imposed in the interests of ensuring the viability of the bank. Nonetheless, it is
obvious that, at least in some cases, the divestments were also imposed in the interests of
offsetting or limiting distortions of competition. In that regard, as stated by the Commission,
the Commerzbank, Lloyds, KBC, ING, RBS, LBBW, Dexia, Sparkasse Köln/Bonn and
Aegon decisions are examples of decisions in which, unlike the ABN Amro decision,
structural measures were imposed, with the aim of, inter alia, limiting the risks of distortion of
competition.”
17. Since the probability that market conditions will change over the course of 3 years is larger
than the probability that market conditions will change over the course of only one year, a
longer divestment timeframe would enable the bank to wait for a favourable moment to
divest.
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The severity of the divestment is also determined by the modalities of the
divestment. A divestment of 20% can be achieved by selling one subsidiary of
20% or by selling 10 different activities of each 2%.18 This also influences the
severity of the treatment.
Consider the following example. Bank X has to divest a subsidiary; this
subsidiary is structurally loss-making. The commitment to divest a loss-making
subsidiary is not really a punishment.
That a divestment is not always bad, is also illustrated by the fact that some
banks voluntarily divest subsidiaries. For instance, Barclays chose to divest its
global investment banking business.19 Mamdani argued that “although the
measures required to ensure a return to long-term viability may have appeared
very radical, however, it should be borne in mind that the restructuring under-
taken by aided banks was not dissimilar to the sort of restructuring that their
unaided competitors were doing of their own accord”.20 However, it should be
borne in mind that a voluntary divestment is different from a forced divestment,
because the bargaining position of the bank vis-à-vis potential acquirers would
probably be better in the case of a voluntary divestment.
The aforementioned examples make clear that it is difficult to compare struc-
tural remedies in the form of divestments. A percentage alone is not enough to
determine the severity of a divestment. The severity depends not only on the size
of a divestment, but also on its timeframe, the modalities of the divestment and
the nature of the divested subsidiaries (profit-generating or loss-making).21
6.4.4 Relation between aid intensity and balance sheet reduction
In some studies, an attempt is made to compare State aid cases. For instance,
Laprévote & Paron have examined the relation between the aid intensity and
the balance sheet reduction.22 The aid intensity is measured by the aid amount
divided by the risk-weighted assets (RWA) of the bank. Laprévote & Paron
plotted the balance sheet reduction (expressed as a percentage) as compared to
the aid amount/RWA-ratio. They found a positive relation between these two
parameters – although there were a number of outliers – and concluded that
18. This is of course a stylized example, but the cases of ING and KBC show that such
different modalities also arise in reality. KBC had to divest a large number of small
subsidiaries and branches, whereas ING had to divest a small number of large subsidiaries
and branches. This difference was also observed in the media: see, for instance, FD of
3 June 2011.
19. This is mentioned by Laprévote & Paron 2015, p. 110.
20. Mamdani 2012, p. 250.
21. This is also observed by Laprévote (2012, p. 103). As he – correctly – points out, it may be
argued that a divestiture or withdrawal from a domestic core market is a greater concession
from the beneficiary bank than the sale of a subsidiary in a non-core market.
22. Laprévote & Paron 2015, p. 100.
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“the extent of the restructuring required depends on the intensity of the State
intervention”.23 In other words: the higher the aid intensity, the more restruc-
turing is needed.
More or less the same approach was taken by the Dutch committee of inquiry
(“commissie-De Wit”).24 This committee listed the balance sheet reductions of
six banks25 and compared these balance sheet reductions with the aid intensity
(as measured by the aid/RWA-ratio).
In my opinion, this approach may be a good starting point, but it is far from con-
clusive. The main problem of this approach is that the extent of restructuring
is only measured by the balance sheet reduction. As is apparent from chapter 3,
there are many restructuring measures and the balance sheet reduction is only
one of them. In the end, it is about the total package of restructuring measures.
A low balance sheet reduction can be compensated for by strict behavioural
remedies, and vice versa, a far-reaching structural remedy can be compensated
for by lenient behavioural commitments.26 In section 6.3, I defined the treat-
ment as the total package of restructuring measures. If one is interested in the
treatment in its entirety, then an approach that only focusses on one aspect of
the treatment, does not suffice. The approach taken by Laprévote & Paron
and the committee-DeWit is therefore too narrow in the sense that it fails to take
into account other restructuring measures.27 The balance sheet reduction might
be a “rough indicator”, but it is not a sufficient metric for the severity of the
restructuring plan.
Similarly, using the aid intensity as a metric for the amount of harm might be
intuitively attractive. However, in my opinion, it is not a good metric. While
the idea that a higher amount of State aid is more harmful than a lower amount
of State aid might be true in many cases, there are situations in which equal
amounts of aid (to firms that are of equal size) can result in different amounts of
harm. Assume that two firms of exactly the same size receive exactly the same
amount of State aid. If one of those two firms is efficient, while the other one is
23. Laprévote & Paron 2015, p. 100.
24. Commissie-De Wit II, p. 526.
25. Commerzbank, Dexia, KBC, ING, Lloyds Banking Group and Aegon.
26. This is also recognised by the committee of inquiry. The committee refers to the stand-
point of the Commission with respect to the KBC-case. The Commission argues that the
relatively low balance sheet reduction in that case can be explained by the severe behav-
ioural commitments, by the high remuneration that KBC had to pay and by the fact that
KBC was required to divest in its home market. See: Commissie-De Wit II, p. 526.
27. Laprévote & Paron recognise that “because of the diversity of the measures involved, it is
difficult to compare the depth of individual restructuring plans”, but they consider the
balance sheet reduction to be “a good (if rough) indicator”. Unfortunately, they do not
explain why they take the view that it is a good indicator.
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not, then the State aid to the inefficient firm is much more distortive and harmful
than the (exact amount of) State aid to the other (efficient) firm. This example
illustrates that the aid intensity is not always tantamount to the harm that the
State aid causes.
To conclude, while there might be a positive relation between the aid intensity
and the need for in-depth restructuring28, this is not a one-to-one relationship.
This is also apparent from the Commission’s consideration in one of its Com-
munications: “as a general rule, the more significant the reliance on State
aid, the stronger the indication of a need to undergo in-depth restructuring”.29
This phrase might seem to indicate that there is a (one-to-one) relation between
the aid intensity and the need for in-depth restructuring, but a thorough reading
shows that the Commission uses two caveats in this phrase: “as a general rule”
and “indication”. Furthermore, the preceding and succeeding phrases both
contain the notion that the specific situation (of each institution) should be taken
into account.
In the Commission Staff Working Paper, the Commission stresses that great
caution should be applied when making comparisons across bank State aid
cases.30 The Commission warns that the amount of aid is nothing more than a
proxy of the level of competition distortions. In other words: the amount of aid
cannot be equated with the harmfulness of the State aid. This means that com-
paring the bank State aid cases in terms of their harmfulness is not possible on
the (sole) basis of the amount of aid.
Similarly, the Commission observes that “the size of the [balance sheet]
reduction might not always reflect the quality of the structural measures under-
taken”.31 This means that the severity of the treatment cannot be established by
solely looking at the size of the divestments.
6.4.5 Concluding remarks
The difficulty of the application of the principle of equal treatment resides in the
last part of the Aristotelian formula. Establishing that cases are different is not
difficult. Determining how different the cases are, is much more difficult. The
degree to which State aid cases are alike (in other words: the comparability of
28. As is suggested in the DG Competition Staff Working Document of 30 April 2010, p. 6:
“The various Commission Communications […] set out a clear relationship between i) the
size of aid and ii) the sound or distressed situation of the aid beneficiary on the one hand,
and the extent of a need for restructuring on the other.” See also WestLB, C43/2008,
12 May 2009, para. 64: “As the Commission has indicated in previous guidance, the
depth of restructuring required to return to viability is likely to be in direct proportion to
the scope and volume of the aid provided to WestLB on the one hand and to the fragility
of its business model on the other hand.”
29. Prolongation Communication 2011, point 15.
30. Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 95-96.
31. Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 96.
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State aid cases) is almost impossible to establish. This is because it is not pos-
sible to combine all the characteristics of the treatment into one single metric
(such as severity). So this approach is not a viable one. Another approach (one
that focusses on the individual characteristics) will be explored in the follow-
ing section.
6.5 The ‘many-variables approach’
6.5.1 Finding a link between the characteristics of the cases and the
treatments
The ‘many-variables approach’ is aimed at finding a (causal) link between the
characteristics of the case and the characteristics of the treatment. If there is a
link between a certain characteristic of the case and the treatment, then this link
should be present in all bank State aid cases where that particular characteristic
is present. Otherwise, the principle of equal treatment will be violated.
This approach entails the following steps. The first step would consist of map-
ping all the relevant characteristics of the banks that received State aid.32 The
next step would consist of mapping all the relevant characteristics of the State
aid measures granted to those banks.33 Together, the characteristics of the bank
and the characteristics of the State aid measures constitute the characteristics
of the “case”. The third step would be to list all the characteristics of the “treat-
ment” (i.e. all the modalities of the restructuring measures). The last step would
be to link the characteristics of the case with the characteristics of the treat-
ment. How can such a link be established?
Ideally, one should find two cases that are completely similar in all aspects
except one. In other words: there is one characteristic on which the two cases
differ; on all the other characteristics, the two cases score the same. So if the
treatment of these two cases is different, the difference in treatment can only
be caused by that one characteristic on which they differ. This way, the influ-
ence of that particular characteristic on the treatment can be established. In
statistical terms, if a dependent variable (Y) is influenced by several independent
variables (X1, X2, X3), then the influence of variable X1 can only be estab-
lished, if one controls for the influence of the other independent variables
(X2 and X3).
32. Those characteristics can be: the size of the bank, the systemic relevance of the bank, the
business model of the bank, etc.
33. Those characteristics can be: the type of aid measure, the aid amount, etc.
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This approach can only work if there are cases which are completely similar in
all aspects but one. However, in reality there are so many differences between
cases, that one can never find two cases which differ only on one characteristic.
So the isolated influence of a particular characteristic cannot be established. To
conclude, there is no statistical way to establish a (causal) link between the char-
acteristics of the case and the characteristics of the treatment.
6.5.2 Other complicating factors
There are two complicating factors. Firstly, some characteristics can, by their
very nature, never apply to certain State aid cases. The following example
is a good illustration of this. If a bank is nationalised and its shareholders are
expropriated without receiving any compensation, then this is a relevant char-
acteristic. The fact that shareholders are expropriated means that there is an
(ex ante) “own contribution”, which reduces the need for (ex post) burden shar-
ing measures to be included in the restructuring plan. Assume that Bank A
and Bank B are both nationalised and assume further that the shareholders
of Bank A receive a compensation for the fact that they are expropriated, and
the shareholders of Bank B do not receive such a compensation. So Bank A
and Bank B are different in this respect. This difference between Bank A and
Bank B justifies a different treatment. Assuming that there are no other differ-
ences between Bank A and Bank B, the need for burden-sharing measures
would be lower for Bank B, because the shareholders already contributed.
This example illustrates that the fact that expropriated shareholders receive
no compensation, is a relevant characteristic of a State aid case. If two banks
score differently on this characteristic, then this difference justifies a different
treatment. However, the question whether or not the expropriated shareholders
receive a compensation can only apply in the context of a nationalisation. This
can be illustrated by extending the foregoing example with Bank C.34 Assume
that Bank C is supported by State aid measures, but without being nationalised.
Then there is no compensation for the shareholders of Bank C, because of the
simple fact that they were not expropriated, so there is no need for compensa-
tion. On this point, Bank C cannot be compared with Bank A and B.
Secondly, the ‘many-variables approach’ requires that all the data on the charac-
teristics are known. However, this is not always the case, since not all informa-
tion is publicly available. As explained in section 3.6.4, some data are regarded
34. This example also illustrates the importance of how the relevant characteristics are defined.
The relevant characteristic could be defined as the fact that the shareholders of the Bank
receive no compensation. It could also be defined as the fact that there is an ex ante own
contribution by the shareholders of the Bank. If it is defined in the first mentioned way,
then the characteristic can only apply in the context of a nationalisation. If, on the other
hand, it is defined in the second mentioned way, then the characteristic can be applicable in
other contexts as well.
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as confidential. These data are therefore removed from the Commission deci-
sions. Since these data are often of a quantitative nature, the non-visibility of
these data hampers a quantitative analysis.
6.5.3 Concluding remarks
For the reasons set out above, the ‘many-variables approach’ is not feasible. In
addition to the problems discussed above, there are some problems in determi-
ning the “cases” and “treatments”. This will be discussed in the following sec-
tion.
6.6 Problems in determining “cases” and “treatment”
In section 6.3, the concepts of “cases” and “treatment” were introduced. The
following definitions were given: the “cases” are constituted by the banks that
benefit from State aid measures, the “treatment” is constituted by the restruc-
turing measures that are imposed on the beneficiary banks.35 Although these
definitions might seem straightforward, there are some problems when defin-
ing the cases and treatments in this way.
In the first place, the distinction between the treatment by the Member State and
the treatment by the Commission is not always clear-cut. This PhD-study is not
about the treatment of banks by their Member States, but about the treatment of
banks by the Commission. The “treatment” was defined above as the restruc-
turing measures that are imposed on the beneficiary banks. The restructuring
measures are sometimes depicted as being imposed by the Commission. This
may be true de facto, but from a strictly legal perspective, the restructuring
35. There is another way to define “treatment”. “Treatment” could be defined along the lines
of the judgment of the General Court of 8 April 2014 in Case T-319/11 (ABN AMRO).
ABN AMRO argued that the acquisition ban that was imposed upon the bank, was
significantly more strict than in some other cases. ABN AMRO referred to the following
Commission decisions: the Commerzbank decision, the Lloyds decision, the KBC deci-
sion, the ING decision, the RBS decision, the LBBW decision, the Dexia decision the
Sparkasse Köln/Bonn decision. The General Court considered that those other banks were
compelled to undergo structural remedies (balance sheet reductions), a fact which may
clearly have an effect on the degree of severity of the behavioural remedies. In this
situation, the treatment is clearly interpreted as the imposition of the acquisition ban. The
severity of this treatment (compared to the other banks) is justified by the fact that ABN
AMRO did not have to undergo strict structural remedies. So the difference in treatment is
justified by the difference in the cases – the difference being the imposition of structural
remedies. The imposition of the structural remedies constitutes a relevant difference
between ABN AMRO and the other banks. This means that the structural remedies are part
of the “case” (instead of being part of the “treatment”).
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measures are proposed by the Member State concerned. Only if the Commission
adopts a conditional decision, the restructuring measures are imposed by the
Commission. If, on the contrary, the Commission adopts a commitment decision,
the restructuring measures are commitments by the Member State. In that
regard, the CJEU has held that the commitments form an integral part of the
State aid measure.36
This essential difference between commitment decisions37 and conditional
decisions38 – which was set out in section 3.7.3 – complicates the interpreta-
tion of “the treatment”. For instance, when the Commission imposes a dividend
ban on a beneficiary bank, then this dividend ban is part of the “treatment”. But
what if the Member State commits that the bank will comply with a dividend
ban: is this dividend ban still part of the “treatment”? On the one hand, this divi-
dend ban cannot be considered as a treatment by the Commission, since it was
not imposed by the Commission. This would mean that the dividend ban is part
of “the case” rather than being part of “the treatment”. On the other hand: for
the beneficiary bank itself (and its shareholders), there is no real difference
between a dividend ban that is imposed by the Commission and a dividend ban
that is imposed by the Member State. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the
Member State has proposed the dividend ban in anticipation of what the Com-
mission would expect. In addition, it has been remarked that “commitment deci-
sions risk being more a Commission’s unilateral decision rather than a truly
‘negotiated’ solution”.39 For these reasons, it would not make sense to make a
distinction between restructuring measures proposed by the Member State and
restructuring measures imposed by the Commission.
In the second place, the distinction between the rescue of a bank and the restruc-
turing of a bank is not always clear-cut. This makes it difficult to equate the
restructuring plan with the treatment. For instance, the transfer of impaired assets
to an Asset Management Company is obviously a State aid measure (and would
thus be part of the “case”), but since the transfer of impaired assets constitutes a
deleveraging effort, it also figures in the restructuring plan (and would thus be
part of the “treatment”).
Another example is the case of Banco de Valencia (BVA). In 2011, this
Spanish bank faced a capital shortfall. Since BVA failed to raise capital from its
key shareholders or from other private investors, the Bank of Spain took control
over BVA and appointed the FROB as administrator. It was decided that BVA
would be sold through an open, transparent and competitive tender procedure. In
that context, CaixaBank purchased all the shares of the FROB in BVA at a price
of EUR 1. The takeover of BVAwas made under the condition that the FROB
36. Case C-287/12 P, para. 67. See also: Case T-814/14 (Banco Espirito Santo), para. 31.
37. Taken on the basis of article 4(3) of the Procedural Regulation.
38. Taken on the basis of article 7(4) of the Procedural Regulation.
39. Lo Schiavo 2013, p. 166.
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would carry out a capital injection into BVA for an amount of EUR 4,5 billion
and that the FROB would grant an asset protection scheme (APS). Should the
takeover of Banco de Valencia by CaixaBank be considered as part of the “case”
or as part of the “treatment”? On the one hand, the takeover necessitated several
State aid measures (i.e. the capital injection of EUR 4,5 billion and the APS).
Since it is so closely related to the rescue of BVA, the takeover could be con-
sidered as part of the “case”. On the other hand, in the decision on Banco de
Valencia, the Commission noted the following: “As part of the Restructuring
Plan, Banco de Valencia will be bought by CaixaBank”.40 From this perspec-
tive, the takeover would be part of the “treatment”. This example illustrates that
some measures can be considered as both a rescue measure (and thus a State aid
measure) and a restructuring measure. This makes it difficult to equate the “case”
with the rescue measures and the “treatment” with the restructuring measures.
Thus, the picture can be a bit blurred sometimes. For instance, a Member State
may nationalise a bank in the context of a rescue operation. The nationalisation
may be achieved by expropriating the shareholders of the bank. The nationalisa-
tion is viewed positively by the Commission, because it constitutes burden-
sharing by shareholders.41 But how to characterise the nationalisation: as part of
the “case” or as part of the “treatment”?
To conclude, it is difficult to pinpoint the “case” and the “treatment” when the
abovementioned definitions are used. This forms yet another reason why the
‘one-metric approach’ and the ‘many-variables approach’ are not feasible.
Indeed, these two approaches are based on the abovementioned definitions of
cases and treatment.
Section 6.7 introduces another approach: the ‘relevant characteristics
approach’. When this approach is used, the problems in determining the cases
and treatments are avoided. This is because the relevant-characteristics approach
redefines “cases” and “treatment” – as will be discussed in section 6.7.2.
6.7 The ‘relevant-characteristics approach’
6.7.1 Introduction
As I have discussed in sections 6.3 to 6.6, the CJEU-definition is unsatisfactory
and the Aristotelian formula is unfeasible. The CJEU-definition is unsatisfac-
tory, because it does not go further than merely establishing that cases are differ-
ent. The Aristotelian formula is unfeasible, because it is not possible to establish
40. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 10.
41. This will be discussed in detail in section 12.5.
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how different cases are. Therefore – as I have indicated in section 6.3.1 –
I propose a different approach to the principle of equal treatment. My approach
does not simply establish that bank State aid cases are different, it does not aim
to find out how different bank State aid cases are; rather, it aims to find out in
what respect bank State aid cases are different.
The starting point of my approach is the following. In order to establish that
cases are different, it is important to first establish which differences should be
taken into account. It goes without saying that only relevant differences should
be taken into account. This leads to the question: which differences are relevant?
Relevant differences can only be based on relevant characteristics. If banks
differ on certain characteristics, then those differences are only relevant if those
characteristics are relevant. This leads to the question: which characteristics are
relevant?
6.7.2 Identifying the relevant characteristics
It should be recalled that aid measures are only authorised by the Commission
if it considers the aid measures to be compatible with the common market. In
its bank State aid decisions, the Commission states reasons why it considers
the aid measures to be compatible with the common market. The statement of
reasons is based on the characteristics of the case.
To give an example: in several cases, the senior management of the beneficiary
bank was replaced. This was noted positively by the Commission, because the
change of management provided a valuable signal against moral hazard. The
change of management was therefore one of the reasons to declare the aid com-
patible. The fact that the senior management of the bank has been replaced is
thus a relevant characteristic of the case. To conclude, the characteristics that
are being used in the State aid decisions as a reason to consider the aid measures
to be compatible, are relevant characteristics.
In essence, the relevant-characteristics approach redefines “cases” and “treat-
ment”. Under the relevant-characteristics approach, “cases” are constituted by
banks that benefited from State aid and that are subject to restructuring
measures. The “treatment” is no longer constituted by the restructuring measu-
res, because the restructuring measures are now considered to be part of the
“case”. The “treatment” is now constituted by the Commission’s assessment of
the compatibility of the aid.
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In that regard, it is important to keep in mind that the Commission’s assess-
ment of State aid measures consists of five steps:
• In the first place, it has to be assessed whether a certain aid measure
constitutes State aid within the meaning of article 107(1) TFEU.
• In the second place – when the measure constitutes State aid – it has to be
assessed whether the compatibility of the State aid measure should be
assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (and thus on the basis of
the Crisis Framework).
• In the third place – when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the
compatibility-assessment – it has to be assessed whether the State aid meets
the cumulative criteria of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality. NB:
in the specific case of an asset relief measure, the measure has to comply with
the criteria of the Impaired Assets Communication.
• In the fourth place – when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and pro-
portionate – it has to be assessed whether a restructuring plan is required for
the beneficiary bank.
• In the fifth place –when a restructuring plan is required – it has to be assessed
whether the restructuring plan achieves long-term viability, burden-sharing
and the limitation of competition distortions.
Thus, the “treatment” (i.e. the Commission’s assessment whether the State aid
is compatible) is constituted by the Commission’s assessment whether the
State aid is appropriate, necessary and proportionate and whether the restruc-
turing plan achieves the three objectives (of restoration of long-term viability,
burden-sharing and minimizing competition distortions). And the relevant
characteristics of the case are the reasons that are given by the Commission to
support its conclusion that the aid is compatible. The relevant-characteristics
approach is aimed at identifying these relevant characteristics. To that end, the
statements of reasons of all bank State aid decisions will be analysed and
compared.
6.7.3 Consistency
In my view, the principle of equal treatment requires that the Commission con-
sistently assesses whether the relevant characteristics are present in the case at
hand. Otherwise, the decisional practice would be arbitrary. Admittedly, restruc-
turing measures are tailor-made, but a tailor-made approach should not result
in an arbitrary approach.42 This PhD-study takes the view that the Commission’s
decisional practice cannot be in line with the principle of equal treatment if
42. This is recognised by the Commission in (point 30 of) its Restructuring Communication:
“Measures to limit the distortions of competition should be tailor-made to address the
distortions identified on the markets where the beneficiary bank operates following its
return to viability, while at the same time adhering to a common policy and principles.”
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the decisional practice is not based on a well-defined State aid control frame-
work.43 The principle of equal treatment thus requires some kind of assessment
framework. In the context of State aid to banks, the relevant assessment frame-
work is the Crisis Framework. The Crisis Framework (which is based on the
general framework of article 107 TFEU) contains general compatibility-criteria.
These general compatibility-criteria are broken down into more specific assess-
ment criteria.44 These specific assessment criteria effectively correspond to the
relevant characteristics. To give an example, if the characteristic “change of
senior management” is welcomed by the Commission in a certain decision, then
this characteristic should be an assessment criterion that has to be taken into
account in all State aid cases. The aim of this PhD-study is to find out if the
relevant characteristics are consistently taken into account by the Commission.
In addition, this PhD-study investigates how these relevant characteristics are
elaborated by the Commission. For instance, the fact that the beneficiary bank
is subject to an acquisition ban is a relevant characteristic.45 Importantly,
acquisition bans are characterised by various modalities, such as the scope of
the ban, the duration of the ban and exceptions to the ban. These modalities
can be considered as the ‘characteristics’ of the relevant characteristic. In my
opinion, the Commission should not only take into account the acquisition ban
(i.e. the relevant characteristic), it should also take into account the modalities
of the acquisition ban (i.e. the ‘characteristics’ of the relevant characteristic).
Since the term “characteristics of the relevant characteristic” might be confu-
sing, I will refer to it as “the elaboration of the relevant characteristic”. The
elaboration of the relevant characteristics essentially means that the Commis-
sion should go ‘one level deeper’.
Another example is the fact that the senior management of the bank has
been replaced. This is a relevant characteristic.46 But what exactly constitutes
“senior management”? “Senior management” is a vague term that may be inter-
preted in various ways. Divergent interpretations of “senior management”would
be contrary to the principle of equal treatment. The principle of equal treat-
ment thus not only requires that the relevant characteristics are consistently
used as assessment criteria, it also requires that the relevant characteristics are
elaborated in a consistent manner.
43. This is in line with Klap 2012, p. 332: “Het gelijkheidsbeginsel speelt dus vooral een rol
bij gebreke van beleidsregels of als er nog geen vaste gedragslijn tot ontwikkeling is
gekomen waar het ter discussie staande besluit bij aansluit.”
44. In the Commission’s own words: “The fourth chapter of the Banking Communication, the
Recapitalisation Communication and the Impaired Assets Communication translate these
general principles into conditions specific for recapitalisations and impaired assets relief.”
This phrase can be found in several bank State aid decisions (see, for instance: KBC, C18/
2009, 30 June 2009, para. 59).
45. As will be explained in section 13.9.
46. As will be explained in section 11.2.
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Thus, in this PhD-study, the principle of equal treatment is effectively interpreted
by means of the principle of consistency. This PhD-study takes the view that the
principle of equal treatment is infringed when there are inconsistencies. As I
have set out above, an inconsistency can occur at two levels. The first level con-
cerns the question whether the Commission has consistently assessed whether
the relevant characteristics are present in the case at hand. The second level con-
cerns the way how the relevant characteristics are elaborated in the decisions.
An evolving policy
A consistent approach means that the approach should not be arbitrary. It does
not mean that the approach can never change. Changes are allowed if they are
legitimate. An evolving State aid control policy is thus possible. This was also
recognised by Advocate-General Wahl in his Opinion in Case C-526/14:
“The Commission must be able to adapt its analysis under Article 107 TFEU
to the changing circumstances in the markets affected by the aid and, more
generally, in the whole EU economy. The Commission should, furthermore,
be able to learn from its past practice and consequently adapt its methods of
evaluating notified aid by virtue of its accrued experience”.47
I agree with this statement. Although this statement was made in the context
of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations, it is also relevant to
the principle of equal treatment (as interpreted in this PhD-study). Therefore,
in my opinion, the principle of equal treatment does not necessarily have to be
infringed when the Commission does not take into account a certain characte-
ristic (which it had taken into account in earlier bank State aid cases), when this
not-taking into account is due to a policy change. Nevertheless, this policy
change should be justified and explained.
Relation to other principles of law
To some extent, the principle of equal treatment might overlap with other gen-
eral principles of law, such as the principle of protection of legitimate expecta-
tions. It might even overlap with the obligation to state reasons. The aim of
this PhD-study is not to provide a theoretic discussion of how the principle of
equal treatment interacts and overlaps with other general principles of law. This
PhD-study takes a pragmatic approach towards the principle of equal treatment,
rather than a dogmatic approach. This PhD-study takes as a starting point that
the decisional practice of the Commission should be ‘fair’. The aim of this
47. Opinion in Case C-526/14, para. 68. The AG referred to established case-law: Case C-350/
88, para. 33, and Case C-1/98 P, para. 52.
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PhD-study is not to philosophise on when the decisional practice is ‘fair’. As
explained in the present chapter, I am of the opinion that the decisional practice
cannot be considered ‘fair’ when it infringes the principle of equal treatment
because of inconsistencies.
The importance of consistency
A striking observation is that the Commission attaches importance to consis-
tency. In many decisions, the Commission referred to other decisions in order to
underline that its decisional practice is consistent. This can be illustrated by the
decision on the Greek bank ATE. In this decision, the Commission concluded
that the sale of the viable activities of ATE Bank to Piraeus Bank did not
constitute aid to the buyer (i.e. Pireaus Bank). In footnote 37 of the decision, the
Commission referred to similar cases in which the sale did not constitute aid to
the buyer.48
In some decisions, the Commission makes an effort to explain the difference
between the case at hand and similar cases. To give an example, in the decision
on Dunfermline, the Commission explained the key difference between the case
of Dunfermline and the similar – but different – case of Bradford&Bingley.49
This illustrates that the Commission is concerned with treating cases consist-
ently.
Another example is the decision on Amagerbanken, in which the Commis-
sion noted the following: “In line with the Restructuring Communication and
the Commission’s decisional practice in the Kaupthing Luxemburg and
Northern Rock decisions, burden-sharing is considered to be sufficient when
the shareholders lost control of the bank and all financial stakes therein without
any compensation”.50
These examples illustrate that the Commission attaches importance to consis-
tency. This is a striking observation. What makes this observation even more
striking is that according to established case-law, the Commission is not bound
by its previous decision-making practice. Indeed, as was discussed in section
5.20, the CJEU has held that “it is only in the context of Article 87(3)(b) EC
that it is necessary to assess the legality of a Commission decision declar-
ing that new aid does not fulfil the requirements for application of that dero-
gation, and not in the light of its previous decision-making practice, assuming
that the latter is established”.
The fact that the Commission attaches importance to consistency provides
a justification for the relevant-characteristics approach (which requires the
Commission to consistently take into account the relevant characteristics).
48. ATE, SA.35460, 3 May 2013, footnote 37. The Commission referred to Fionia Bank and
Dunfermline Building Society.
49. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 113.
50. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 106.
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALTREATMENT TO BANK STATE AID CASES
173
6.7.4 Limitations of the relevant-characteristics approach
The relevant-characteristics approach entails analysing the characteristics that
are mentioned in the bank State aid decisions. However, it is not inconceivable
that there are some additional circumstances that are relevant, but that are not
explicitly mentioned in the decisions.
There may be other factors at play. For instance, it is sometimes suggested that
Neelie Kroes (a Dutch national who was European Commissioner for Com-
petition in the period 2004-2009) was particularly tough on the Dutch banks,
in order to avoid creating the impression that she was favouring of Dutch
banks.51
Lobbying of Member States at the Commission is also a relevant factor. In that
regard, the personality of the negotiators may be relevant. This is illustrated by
the negotiations that ING conducted with the Commission. The person who
was initially leading the negotiations on behalf of ING was said to operate
with Dutch bluntness.52 This direct communication-style worked counterpro-
ductively. In September 2012, he was replaced by someone else who was said
to operate in a more diplomatic manner. This example underlines that the
personality of the negotiators may be relevant.
Since the relevant-characteristics approach focusses on the relevant characte-
ristics that are mentioned in the decisions, it does not take into account other
potentially influencing factors. This is a limitation of the relevant-characteris-
tics approach.
6.7.5 Concluding remarks
On one level, the cases are obviously not equal (because there are differences
among banks, differences among State aid measures and differences among
the restructuring plans). However, on a higher level, the cases are equal: in each
case, the Commission should take into account the relevant characteristics. In
that respect, cases are equal. Consequently, the banks should be treated equally.
The “treatment” is constituted by the assessment of whether the aid is com-
patible. An equal treatment thus entails that every assessment should be based
on the relevant characteristics. If there are cases in which the Commission does
51. De Kok 2015, p. 234 (footnote 105); Murphey 2013, p. 285.
52. Een ‘klein mannetje’ met een grote missie. Eli Leenaars wacht hoge beloning als hij ING
langs lastige Brusselse klippen laveert, FD 25 September 2012. Hollandse directheid van
ING botst met diplomatieke aanpak Brussel, FD 24 September 2012. Tegen beter weten in,
FD 6 October 2012.
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not assess the presence of the relevant characteristics, then these cases are not
treated equally (as compared to other cases in which the Commission did take
into account the relevant characteristics).
To conclude, this PhD-study takes the view that a correct application of the
principle of equal treatment requires the following. Firstly, the Commission
should asses in every bank State aid case whether the relevant characteristics
are present in that case. In other words: the relevant characteristics should be
consistently used as assessment criteria. Secondly, the Commission should elab-
orate the relevant characteristics in a consistent manner.
The principle of equal treatment as defined in this PhD-study does not com-
pletely correspond with the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treatment.
In my opinion, the principle of equal treatment is interpreted very narrowly by
the CJEU – this was one of the main conclusions of chapter 5.53 It should be
stressed that this PhD-study does not suggest that the CJEU should change or
broaden its interpretation of the principle of equal treatment. However, this
PhD-study takes the view that – irrespective of the question whether the CJEU-
definition is infringed – the decisional practice is not ‘fair’ when the relevant
characteristics are not consistently taken into account by the Commission. And
as discussed in section 6.3.4, the Commission should not only be concerned
by the CJEU-definition of the principle of equal treatment, but also by other
possible interpretations of the principle of equal treatment.
6.8 The relevant context
6.8.1 Introduction
One of the central ideas of this PhD-study is that the context matters. There is
no standard way of rescuing and restructuring a beneficiary bank. This means
that there are different ‘end states’. Indeed, some beneficiary banks continue to
exist as a standalone entity, while other banks are being wound-down (liquida-
ted), taken-over by another bank or split-up into a ‘good bank’ and ‘bad bank’.
The ‘end state’ or final situation that the beneficiary bank finds itself in, con-
stitutes a relevant context. Accordingly, the following contexts can be distin-
guished:
• The C-context means that the beneficiary bank continues to exist as a
standalone entity. So the “C” stands for continuing to exist as a standalone
entity.
• The W-context is understood as the context in which the beneficiary bank is
put in wind-down. So the “W” stands for wind-down.
53. See, in particular, section 5.20.4 and 5.21.
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• The T-context means that the beneficiary bank is taken-over by another
bank. So the “T” stands for take-over (or transfer).
• The S-context means that the beneficiary bank is split-up into a ‘good’ part
and a ‘bad’ part. So the “S” stands for split-up. Within the S-context, a
distinction can be made between the S/T/W-context and the S/C/W-context.
An illustration of the C-context: the case of ING
During the financial crisis, ING benefited from several State aid measures,
such as a capital injection and an impaired asset measure. The restructuring
plan for ING envisaged a spectacular downsizing of the bank: in total, ING’s
balance sheet would reduce by 45%. Although ING had to reduce the size of
its balance sheet by 45%, ING nonetheless continued to exist as a standalone
entity.
An illustration of the W-context: the case of Factor Banka
Factor Banka, a Slovenian bank, experienced difficulties in 2013. The Slovenian
State decided to wind-down Factor Banka. Factor Banka would thus not be
immediately liquidated; rather, it would be wound-down over a period of three
years. This orderly winding-down would allow Factor Banka to realise a sig-
nificantly higher yield from the realisation of its assets (loans, securities, fixed
assets, etc.) than it would be the case under immediate liquidation or bankruptcy.
In order to stabilise the liability side of Factor Banka’s balance sheet while
proceeding to its orderly winding down, the Slovenian State granted Factor
Banka a State guarantee on newly issued debt. The purpose of State aid to a bank
in the W-context is thus to allow an orderly winding down and to maintain con-
fidence while avoiding negative spillover effects such as possible bank runs.
An illustration of the T-context: the case of Banco de Valencia
The T-context usually follows a nationalisation of the beneficiary bank, after
which the State sells all the shares in the beneficiary bank to the acquiring
bank. To give an example: the rescue and restructuring of Banco de Valencia
(BVA) consisted of a takeover by CaixaBank. Following an open, transparent
and competitive tender procedure, CaixaBank purchased all the shares of the
FROB in BVA at a price of EUR 1. The takeover of BVAwas made under the
condition that the FROB would carry out a capital injection into BVA and that
the FROB would grant an asset protection scheme (APS). The State aid was
thus used to facilitate the take-over of BVA’s activities. In other words: while
BVA ceased to exist as independent legal entity, the State aid allowed BVA’s
activities to continue to exist within CaixaBank.
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An illustration of the S/T/W-context: the case of AB Ukio bankas
AB Ukio bankas was split-up into a ‘good’ part and a ‘bad’ part. In the decision
on AB Ukio bankas, the ‘good’ part is referred to as the Transfer Package, while
the ‘bad’ part is referred to as Rump Ukio. The ‘good’ part (approximately 80%
of Ukio bank’s assets or approximately 80% of its liabilities) was sold and
transferred to Siauliau bank. The ‘bad’ part (consisting of the unsold assets and
liabilities remaining under the legal entity of AB Ukio Bankas) was being
wound-down.
6.8.2 The main differences between the relevant contexts
The difference between the C-context and the S-context lies in the number of
potential beneficiaries. When a bank is split-up in the S/T/W-context, there are
two (potential) beneficiaries: the remaining activities in the Rump bank and
the transferred activities. As illustrated by the aforementioned case of AB Ukio
Bankas, the transferred activities might constitute an economic continuity. By
contrast, when a bank is split-up in the C-context, then there is only one bene-
ficiary. For instance, ING was a so-called bank insurance company: it consisted
of a banking branch and an insurance branch. As part of the restructuring, ING
had to divest its insurance activities, but only the bank was considered to be
the beneficiary of the State aid. The divested insurance activities were not con-
sidered to constitute an economic continuity.
The difference between the S/T/W-context and the S/C/W-context is the exis-
tence of an acquiring bank. In the S/T/W-context, there is an acquiring bank.
In the S/C/W-context, there is no acquiring bank. This means that even if certain
activities are to be sold, the case is still labelled as S/C/W if there is not yet an
acquiring bank. A split-up into a bad bank and bridge bank takes thus place in a
S/C/W-context.
The difference between the T-context and the S/T/W-context is that in the T-con-
text, all the bank’s activities are taken over by another bank. More specifically,
the acquiring bank acquires all the shares in the beneficiary bank.
6.8.3 The relevance of the context
One of the central ideas of this PhD-study is that the context matters. So, in
addition to the relevant characteristics, I distinguish between the relevant con-
texts. The relevant context can be considered as a relevant characteristic on
a higher level. For instance, the fact that the beneficiary bank is split-up, is
relevant, because it influences the way in which the relevant characteristics are
interpreted. In addition, some characteristics are only applicable in certain con-
texts.
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6.9 Introduction to the following seven chapters
6.9.1 The structure of the following seven chapters
The present chapter has set out how the Commission decisions will be analysed
in this PhD-study; the actual analysis of the Commission decisions will take
place in the following seven chapters.
To a large extent, the way how the following seven chapters are structured is
guided by the way how the Commission decisions are structured – or more
precisely: by the way how the assessment-part of the decisions is structured.
As was explained in section 3.5,54 the Commission’s assessment of State aid
measures consists of five steps. These five steps are presented in the following
table. The first column indicates how I have labelled the steps; the second
column indicates what the steps in the assessment entail; the third column
indicates in which chapter of this PhD-study the five steps are discussed. As
the table indicates, each of the following seven chapters will discuss the char-
acteristics that are relevant to a particular step of the Commission’s assessment.
For instance, the characteristics that are relevant to the assessment that the State
aid measure is appropriate, necessary and proportionate (i.e. the first stage of
the compatibility-assessment) are discussed in chapter 8.
Steps in the Commission’s assessment of bank State aid measures
Preliminary steps Assessment of whether a measure constitutes State
aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Chapter 7
- when the measure constitutes State aid:
Chapter 7Assessment of whether the compatibility of the State
aid measure should be assessed on the basis of Article
107(3)(b) TFEU.
First stage of the
compatibility-
assessment
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the
compatibility-assessment,
Chapter 8
- in case of a guarantee or recapitalisation:
Assessment of whether the State aid measure meets the
criteria of appropriateness, necessity and
proportionality.
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the
compatibility-assessment,
- in case of an asset relief measure:
Assessment of whether the asset relief measure
complies with the criteria of the Impaired Assets
Communication.
Chapter 9
54. And reiterated in section 6.7.2.
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Intermediate step - when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and
proportionate/complies with the IAC-criteria:
Assessment of whether a restructuring plan is requi-
red for the beneficiary bank.
Chapter 10
Second stage of the
compatibility-
assessment
- when a restructuring plan is required:
Assessment of whether the restructuring plan meets the
three restructuring objectives:
• restoring long-term viability Chapter 11
• burden-sharing Chapter 12
• minimising competition distortions Chapter 13
The term “preliminary steps” already indicates the relative importance that these
steps have in this PhD-study. Although every step in the Commission’s assess-
ment will be discussed, this PhD-study focusses on the compatibility-assess-
ment. Why this special focus on the compatibility-assessment? It should be
recalled that this PhD-study is about State aid to banks. What makes the assess-
ment of bank State aid special is that the Commission created a specific assess-
ment framework (i.e. the Crisis Framework), which addresses the compatibility
of bank State aid. This justifies a special focus on the compatibility-assessment.
As a consequence, every step in the assessment that precedes the compatibility-
assessment, is regarded (in this PhD-study) as a preliminary step.
While the main focus of this PhD-study is on the compatibility-assessment,
this PhD-study focusses in particular on the second stage of the compatibility-
assessment. This is due to the following: in my view, the Commission attaches
the most importance to the second stage of the compatibility-assessment.55 For
this reason, the chapters 11, 12 and 13 –which discuss the characteristics that are
relevant to this second stage of the compatibility-assessment – can be considered
as the main chapters of this PhD-study.
6.9.2 Presenting the relevant characteristics
The following chapters will discuss the relevant characteristics. Each relevant
characteristic will be presented as follows:
* The fact that…
55. As was explained in section 3.5.2, the Commission was quite lenient in the first stage of
the compatibility-assessment, while being very strict in the second stage of the compa-
tibility-assessment. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the Commission attaches more
importance to the second stage. The relative importance of both stages will be elaborated
in section 8.1.4.
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With respect to each relevant characteristic, the following three questions will
be addressed: Firstly, why is this a relevant characteristic? Secondly, has the
Commission consistently taken into account this relevant characteristic?
Thirdly, how is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
6.9.3 “Taken into account”
The aim of this PhD-study is to identify the relevant characteristics and to
analyse whether the Commission has consistently taken into account these
relevant characteristic. It might be worthwhile to clarify what is understood by
“taken into account”.
In essence, ‘taking into account’ requires that the relevant characteristic is
mentioned in the decision. Indeed, if a relevant characteristic is not mentioned
at all in a decision, then the Commission did not show that it took into account
the relevant characteristic. Accordingly, such a decision is categorised as a deci-
sion in which the relevant characteristic is not taken into account.
The situation is less clear when a relevant characteristic is mentioned in a deci-
sion. The fact that the relevant characteristic is mentioned does not automatically
mean that the relevant characteristic is taken into account by the Commission. It
depends on the way how it is mentioned. Indeed, when the Commission only
mentions a relevant characteristic in a bank State aid decision, without using it as
an assessment criterion, then this relevant characteristic is not really “taken into
account” by the Commission. There are four possibilities in which a relevant
characteristic can be mentioned, as will be discussed below.
Option 1: Mentioned in the assessment-part of the decision
Section 3.6.2 explained the structure of the Commission decisions. Although
there are some differences in the way how the decisions may be structured,
every decision consists of a description-part and an assessment-part. A relevant
characteristic that is mentioned in the assessment-part of the decision is clearly
taken into account by the Commission in its assessment.
Option 2: Mentioned in the description-part of the decision
If a relevant characteristic is purely mentioned as a description, then this PhD-
study does not categorise the decision as a decision in which the relevant charac-
teristic is taken into account. This was the case with the market characteristics
discussed in section 13.3. In several decisions, the market presence was men-
tioned as a description of the beneficiary bank, rather than as an indication of
the competitive impact of the aid.
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Nevertheless, if a restructuring measure is only mentioned in the descrip-
tion-part of the decision, the fact that it is mentioned in the decision means that
it is taken into account. Indeed, in its compatibility-assessment, the Commis-
sion takes into account the restructuring measures.
Option 3: Mentioned in the Rescue Decision
In a few instances, the relevant characteristic is not mentioned in the Restruc-
turing Decision but in the Rescue Decision. For instance, the Restructuring
Decision on Anglo/INBS does not mention management changes nor remunera-
tion restrictions. However, management changes and remuneration restrictions
were mentioned in the Rescue Decision on Anglo Irish Bank.56 How should this
case be categorised? As a case in which the Commission took into account the
relevant characteristic or as a case in which the relevant characteristic was not
taken into account? In that regard, it should be noted that in the Rescue Deci-
sions, the Commission usually holds that “this assessment is without prejudice
to that which the Commission will reach following the analysis of the restruc-
turing plan if these measures are maintained in it”.57
Option 4: Mentioned in the decision on the bank support scheme
As will be explained in section 11.2, the Commission did not explicitly men-
tion the replacement of senior management in the assessment-part of the deci-
sions on the Danish banks Amagerbanken, Roskilde Bank and Fionia Bank.
However, in the decision on the Danish winding-up scheme, the Commission
noted positively that removing control from OldBank’s management was a
measure to minimise moral hazard.58 Since the cases of Amagerbanken, Ros-
kilde Bank and Fionia Bank are in line with the principles of the winding-up
scheme, it can be argued that the relevant characteristic is indirectly mentioned
in these cases. Whether a relevant characteristic is taken into account by the
Commission is thus a matter of interpretation.
56. Anglo Irish Bank, N356/2009, 26 June 2009, para. 66.
57. See, for instance: Anglo Irish Bank, N356/2009, 26 June 2009, para. 73; AIB/EBS,
SA.33296, 15 July 2011, para. 83.
58. N407/2010, para. 43.
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6.10 Conclusion
How can the principle of equal treatment be applied to bank State aid cases?
The current chapter focussed on this fundamental question. To that end, the
CJEU-definition59 and the Aristotelian formula60 were discussed. As I have set
in the present chapter, I am of the opinion that the CJEU-definition is unsat-
isfactory and that the Aristotelian formula is unfeasible. I therefore propose a
different approach towards the principle of equal treatment: the ‘relevant-
characteristics approach’.
The ‘relevant-characteristics approach’ entails the following. Firstly, the Com-
mission should asses in every bank State aid case whether the relevant charac-
teristics are present in that case. In other words: the relevant characteristics
should be consistently used as assessment criteria. Secondly, the Commission
should elaborate the relevant characteristics in a consistent manner.
As set out in chapter 1, the aim of this PhD-study is to provide a framework
which can be used to establish whether a bank State aid decision complies with
the principle of equal treatment. Using the ‘relevant-characteristics approach’,
this framework effectively consists of a list of relevant characteristics that the
Commission should take into account.
Which relevant characteristics should be included on this list? In other words:
which characteristics are relevant to the Commission’s assessment of bank
State aid cases? Another crucial question is whether the Commission has con-
sistently taken into account these relevant characteristics. The following seven
chapters of this PhD-study will provide an answer to these questions.
59. Under the CJEU-definition, the principle of equal treatment requires that comparable
situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the
same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.
60. The Aristotelian formula requires that “like cases must be treated alike, and unlike cases
unalike, proportionate to the differences between them”.
CHAPTER 6
182
Chapter 7. Preliminary steps in the
Commission’s assessment
7.1 Introduction
The main focus of this PhD-study is on the compatibility-assessment (i.e. the
assessment of whether the State aid is compatible with the internal market).1
As a corollary, this PhD-study treats the steps that precede this compatibility-
assessment as preliminary steps.2 There are essentially two preliminary steps;
and these will be discussed in Part I and Part II of the current chapter. The first
preliminary step is the question whether the aid measures constitute State aid
within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The second preliminary step is the
question on which legal basis the compatibility of the State aid has to be asses-
sed.
Part I. The first preliminary step
7.2 Existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 107 (1)
TFEU?
When the Commission assesses State aid measures, the first step is the question
whether the aid measures constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107
(1) TFEU. This step does not concern the compatibility of State aid, but the
existence of State aid. It is – from the viewpoint of this PhD-study – a
preliminary step, since the question of the compatibility only becomes relevant
when the aid measures fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.
The question whether a particular measure constitutes ‘State aid’ within the
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU is sometimes a difficult question which
requires a thorough assessment. As discussed in chapter 2, there is an entire
body of case-law about the notion of ‘State aid’, which indicates that the
1. Why this focus on the compatibility-assessment? This will become clear in section 7.2.
2. An overview of all the steps in the Commission’s assessment of bank State aid measures
was provided in section 6.9.1.
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question whether a particular measure constitutes State aid is a difficult one.
However, with respect to State aid to banks, this question is usually easy to
answer. Indeed, it is often quite clear that the measures taken by Member States
to rescue ailing banks constitute State aid. Moreover, when Member States
notify aid measures in favour of banks to the Commission, they usually agree
that these measures constitute State aid, but they consider this aid to be com-
patible. The point at issue is thus often the compatibility of aid, rather than the
existence of aid.3
Nevertheless, there are sometimes questions about the existence of State aid.
In that respect, the main issues that arise, are the question whether the aid is
imputable to the State and the question whether the State acted as a market
economy investor. These questions will be discussed in section 7.3 and 7.4.
Another question concerns the identification of beneficiaries of State aid. This
will be discussed in section 7.5.
7.3 State resources and imputability
As explained in section 2.3.1, financial support measures can only be catego-
rised as State aid, when they are imputable to the State. Imputability is one of the
cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU. Although section 2.3.1 already
discussed the imputability-criterion from a general viewpoint, with respect to
State aid to banks, the following two issues are of particular relevance.
7.3.1 Intermediary
Sometimes, a Member State does not grant aid to a bank directly, but rather
grants the aid through an intermediary, such as a state-owned public company.
Are such aid measures imputable to the State?
This question was addressed in several decisions. In these decisions, the Com-
mission referred to settled case-law from the Court of Justice. For instance, the
Court of Justice has clarified that “imputability to the State of an aid measure
taken by a prima facie independent body (for instance, a public undertaking) can
be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case,
such as the fact that the body in question cannot take the contested decision
3. This explains the focus on the compatibility-assessment. In addition, the focus on the com-
patibility-assessment can be explained by the fact the compatibility of State aid is assessed on
the basis of a special framework (i.e. the Crisis Framework), while the existence of State aid
is assessed on the basis of settled case-law.
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without taking into account the requirements of the public authorities, or the fact
that, apart from factors of an organic nature which link it to the State, it has to
take into account the directives issued by the State before taking the decision
allegedly involving State aid”.4 In addition, the Court of Justice has held that the
fact that private persons participate in the running of an entity is not sufficient to
exclude imputability to the State of the measure at issue.5
In all bank State aid cases involving an intermediary, the Commission came to
the conclusion that the aid measures were imputable to the State. For instance, in
the case of the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB), the
intervening authority providing the measures, the Commission considered that
the FROB essentially acted as the prolonged arm of the State.6
Sometimes, the imputability-question is more complicated; for instance, when
private investors are involved in the intermediary. This was the case in Spain,
where an Asset Management Company (AMC) was set up: the Sociedad de
Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB).
Ailing Spanish banks could transfer their impaired assets to this AMC. The
AMC thus provided asset relief to the beneficiary banks.7 Although private
investors had a majority holding in the AMC8, the Commission concluded that
the transfer of impaired assets to the AMC involved State resources.9 This con-
clusion was based on three reasons. First, the AMC was set up for a public
policy objective (i.e. to help troubled Spanish banks by transferring their most
risky assets off their balance sheet and thus by helping them implement their
restructuring plans). The Commission added that the “genesis in public policy
considerations is also underlined by the fact that the AMC was set-up between
the Spanish authorities and its international partners as a result of the MoU and
the special legal setting implemented by the Spanish authorities for the AMC.”
4. AB Ukio Bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 56; Quinn Insurance, SA.33023,
12 October 2011, para. 67.
5. Quinn Insurance, SA.33023, 12 October 2011, para. 68; Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM),
NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 101; Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), SA.41924, 2 July
2015, para. 39.
6. Liberbank, SA.35490, 20 December 2012, para. 63.
7. Asset relief measures – also referred to as impaired asset measures – will be discussed
in-depth in chapter 9 of this PhD-study.
8. In para. 24 of the Liberbank decision, it was explained that the capital structure of the
AMC consists of a non-majority holding of the FROB and a majority holding by private
investors.
9. Liberbank, SA.35490, 20 December 2012, para. 64. The same consideration can be found
in Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 77.
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Second, the FROB was the single largest investor in the AMC and the bonds
issued by the AMC were guaranteed by the State. Third, the Spanish public
authorities were keeping a high degree of oversight over the AMC’s decisions
and overall management issues.10
Under the French refinancing scheme, the Société de Refinancement des
Activités des Etablissements de Credit (SRAEC) was set up (later renamed
Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF)).11 The SRAECwas a
refinancing company. It issued securities guaranteed by the French State12 and
it used these funds to grant loans to eligible banks in France or to subscribe
to shares or debt instruments issued by those banks. The French refinancing
scheme was thus an indirect guarantee scheme: instead of directly guaranteeing
securities issued by the banks, the French State guaranteed the securities issued
by the SRAEC, which in turn subscribed to securities issued by the banks.
According to the French State, the scheme did not classify as State aid, since
the scheme was intended to function as a normal market mechanism.13 The
SRAEC was not completely State-owned: it was owned for 34% by the French
State, while the other 66% of its capital was held by certain banks in France.14
Contrary to the French State, the Commission concluded that the operations of
the SRAEC were imputable to the French State.15 Notwithstanding the fact that
the SRAEC was not state-owned, it was state-controlled. Several elements
led to this conclusion. Firstly, a representative of the French State attended the
meetings of the board of administration and he had a right of veto. Secondly, the
French State bore the economic risk of the operations of the SRAEC.
7.3.2 Intervention by a DGS
In several bank State aid cases, the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) is used to
rescue and restructure ailing banks. With respect to the intervention by a DGS,
two remarks are in order.
In the first place, where a DGS carries out measures other than paying out
depositors in the liquidation of a bank, it should comply with State aid rules.
This was observed by the Commission in several cases. For instance, the
Resolution scheme of the Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund
10. Liberbank, SA.35490, 20 December 2012, para. 64.
11. N548/2008, 30 October 2008.
12. Because of this guarantee, the SRAEC had a Aaa-rating. See: https://www.moodys.com/
research/Moodys-assigns-Aaa-to-debt-of-SRAEC-SFEF-guaranteed-by–PR_166628.
13. N548/2008, 30 October 2008, para. 39.
14. N548/2008, 30 October 2008, para. 5.
15. N548/2008, 30 October 2008, para. 55. See also Gebski 2009.
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(HDIGF) assisted in the rescue of Proton Bank. The Commission noted that
– unlike the deposit guarantee part of the HDIGF, which was created following
the implementation of an EU Directive – the Resolution scheme of HDIGF was
not created to implement EU legislation. In other words: Greece was not bound
by an obligation originating from EU law when it decided to create the Reso-
lution scheme of HDIGF. The Commission therefore concluded that the Reso-
lution scheme was imputable to the Greek State.16
The same conclusion was reached in the case of the Italian DGS. The Fondo
di Garanzia dei Deposanti del Credito Cooperativo (i.e. the Italian DGS)
facilitated the transfer of the ailing BRC to ICCREA by making up the negative
difference between the transferred assets and liabilities The Commission held
that “unlike the pay-out of covered deposits by DGSs in cases of liquidation
of banks, which are mandatory under Directive 94/19/EC, the FGDCC’s inter-
ventions in transfers of assets and liabilities in the context of national insolvency
proceedings as in the case at hand are discretionary and fulfil a public policy
mandate laid down in Italian law at the discretion of the State”.17
In the second place, deposit guarantee schemes are often financed by contribu-
tions from banks. This raises the question whether the support measures involve
State resources. The determining factor is whether the financial means by which
the aid measure is funded, are under public control.18 This is the case when the
contributions are made compulsory by state legislation and are managed and
apportioned in accordance with that legislation.19 In that regard, the Commis-
sion has held that “the mere fact that resources are financed in part by private
contributions is not sufficient to rule out the public character of those resources
since the relevant factor is not the direct origin of the resources but the degree of
intervention of the public authority within the definition of the measure and its
method of financing”.20
The two remarks made in the present subsection are reprised in point 63 of the
2013 Banking Communication. In essence, this provision of the 2013 Banking
Communication codifies that the intervention by a DGS may constitute State
aid.
16. Nea Proton Bank, SA.34488, 26 July 2012, para. 32.
17. Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), SA.41924, 2 July 2015, para. 41.
18. AB Ukio Bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 55. The decision on MKB (SA.40441,
16 December 2015, para. 82) also speaks of “under public control”.
19. Danish winding-up scheme, N407/2010, 30 September 2010, para. 28; AB Ukio bankas,
SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 54; Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), NN61/2009, 29 June
2010, para. 97.
20. Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), SA.41924, 2 July 2015, para. 36.
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7.4 Market Economy Investor Principle (MEIP)
Section 2.3 discussed the cumulative conditions that have to be met for a
measure to fall under the definition of State aid. One of these conditions is that
the measure must confer an ‘advantage’ to the recipient. In order to be able to
assess whether an aid measure entails an advantage, the Commission applies
the Private Investor Test – also referred to as Private Investor Principle, Market
Economy Investor Principle (MEIP) or Market Economy Operator Princi-
ple (MEOP).21 The essence of the private investor test is that the behaviour
of the State is compared to that of a hypothetical private investor. If the State acts
like a private investor would do (under similar circumstances), then the measure
contains no aid-element. In other words: the hypothetical private investor serves
as the benchmark against which the economic rationality of a State intervention
is assessed.
7.4.1 Application of the MEOP in bank State aid cases
In its assessment of whether the Member State acted as a market economy
operator when it rescued a bank, the Commission took into account the fol-
lowing relevant characteristics of the case:
The fact that there is no reasonable return on the investment
With respect to recapitalisation measures, the Commission held that a market
economy investor expects a reasonable return on his investment and that if a
firm is in difficulty, it is normally not justified to assume a reasonable return.22
When a State recapitalises a bank, it does not act as a private investor, if a private
investor would not be willing to inject capital at all or not at such a low level of
remuneration.23 If there is no prospect of profit, a market economy investor
would not be willing to enter in such a transaction.24
With respect to a transfer of impaired assets to an Asset Management Com-
pany, the Commission noted in several decisions that the transfer value of the
portfolio was (equal to the real economic value and) higher than the market
21. In this PhD-study, the terms “private investor” and “market economy investor” are used as
synonyms.
22. Anglo Irish Bank, SA.32504, 31 March 2010, para. 95.
23. For instance, in the decision on CCM (NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 110), the Commis-
sion held that the low level of remuneration was not justified from a market investor’s
perspective.
24. Quinn Insurance, SA.33023, 12 October 2011, para. 74.
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value. This led to the conclusion that the transaction could not be considered
to be in line with the Market Economic Operator Principle.25 Indeed, a market
economy investor would not be willing to purchase assets at a price above
market value.
The fact that the transaction is on market terms
Interestingly, in two recent cases, the Commission considered that the impaired
asset measures did not constitute State aid. On 10 February 2016, the Commis-
sion adopted a decision on the Italian securitisation scheme (Garanzia sulla
Cartolarizzazione delle Sofferenze – “GACS”) and a decision on the Hungarian
Asset Management Company (Magyar Reorganizációs és Követeléskezelő Zrt –
“MARK”).26
Under the Italian scheme27, each participating bank would set up a securitisation
structure: an individually managed, private securitisation vehicle would buy
NPL’s from the bank and pool them. The funding necessary to buy these NPL’s
is raised through issuing senior and junior notes to private investors. The senior
notes would benefit from a State guarantee (which will only become active after
the originating bank has sold to private investors at least 50% plus one share of
the junior tranche).
The Commission noted positively that the risk for the Italian State is limited, as
only the guarantee only applies to the senior tranche. In addition, the guarantee
fee will be based on a market benchmark (a basket of CDS prices of Italian-
based companies) and correspond to the level and duration of the risk the State
takes granting the guarantee. Taking risk and remuneration together, the Com-
mission concludes that the scheme is at market terms. The MEIP is therefore met
and, accordingly, the guarantee does not constitute State aid.
The Commission has been criticised for being too lenient in these two cases.28
Italy was very keen on avoiding the impaired asset measures being classified as
State aid, because such a classification would trigger resolution and the appli-
cation of the bail-in tool.29 In that regard, it should be noted that many share-
holders of Italian banks are families and small investors rather than professional
investors.
25. Abanka/Banka Celje, SA.38522, 16 December 2014, para. 102; Liberbank, SA.35490,
20 December 2012, para. 69.
26. Italian securitization scheme, SA.43390; MARK, SA.38843.
27. The GACS is mentioned in the IMF Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation. The
other Italian initiative “Atlante” is also mentioned.
28. See, for instance, FD 28 January 2016, ‘Europa te mild voor Italiaanse banken’.
29. Pursuant to Article 32(4)(d) BRRD, a bank is ‘failing or likely to fail’ when extraordinary
public financial support (i.e. State aid) is required. Chapter 4 of this PhD-study gave a detailed
account of the relation between State aid and resolution.
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The fact that the aid measure is driven by public policy considerations
In many cases, the State intervention was driven by the desire to avoid a further
deterioration in the financial position of the bank, which would represent a threat
to the stability of the financial system.30 The State is obviously concerned about
maintaining financial stability, whereas a private investor is only concerned by
a reasonable return on his investment. In that regard, the Commission recalled
that “public, economic and social policy considerations must be disregarded in
the assessment of the principle of the private investor in a market economy”.31
This point was also illustrated in the case of the Greek T Bank. In this case,
the argument was raised that the aid amount would be lower than what the
HDIGF/the State already paid and might still have to pay if T Bank had been
let to go bankrupt. The Commission held that it was not a valid comparison:
“any such payment by the HDIGF or by the State to indemnify depositors would
not be made as a market operator but would be made as a public authority”.32
The fact that the Member State notified the measure as State aid contributes to
the conclusion that the Member State did not act in line with the MEOP.33
The fact that private investors are participating
The fact that there is a private investor participating in the same investment
on the same terms as the State is a relevant characteristic. This is illustrated by
the case of Dexia. The split-up of Dexia (October 2011) comprised the sale of
Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg (Dexia BIL) to a Qatari investment
group (Precision Capital SA) and the Luxembourgish State. Precision Capital
acquired 90% of Dexia BIL, the other 10% was acquired by the Luxembourgish
State. Since Luxembourg was participating on the same conditions as Precision
Capital, the Commission considered that Luxembourg was acting as a private
investor.34
However, the concomitant provision of capital from private investors does not
always lead to the conclusion that the state is acting as a market economy
investor. This is because the investment decisions of the private investors are
sometimes – especially if market conditions are bad – likely to be influenced by
30. See, for instance: UNNIM Banc, SA.33095, 30 September 2011, para. 44; MKB,
SA.40441, 16 December 2015, para. 83.
31. Dexia, C9/2009, 26 February 2010, para. 126. See also: Danish guarantee scheme, para. 32.
In this decision, the Commission remarked that the Member State only benefits indirectly “by
avoiding spill over effects to the entire economy, a consideration that is irrelevant to a private
investor”.
32. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 29.
33. See, for instance: Abanka/Banka Celje, SA.38522, 16 December 2014, para. 98.
34. Dexia BIL, SA.34440, 25 July 2012, para. 94.
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the very fact that the State is investing alongside them. Therefore, the provision
of capital from private investors may be concomitant but not necessarily ‘pari
passu’.35
In a similar vein, the Commission noted in its Opening Decision on LBBW
that (according to the statement of Germany) many of the owners of LBBW
would not have provided the capital injection without the guarantee measure
from the Land Baden-Württemberg.36
In fact, there are several cases in which the State did not act in line with the
MEOP, even though private investors were participating in the State interven-
tion. In that regard, the Commission recalled that the “public intervention must
not only be made in parallel with other private interventions, but the interven-
tions needs to be proportionate to each party’s interests, and must be provided
under the same conditions and industrial rationale”.37
The fact that the aid measure follows prior aid measures
Many banks received State aid not only once, but several times. This can have
an impact on the MEOP, because the aid measure must be seen in the context
of earlier State aid granted to the bank.38 Sometimes, it is not possible to view
an aid measure separately from prior aid measures to the beneficiary bank.
This can be illustrated by the case of Lloyds Banking Group (“LBG”). LBG
received a capital injection (of £14.7 billion) in January and June 2009. After-
wards, in the context of the so-called Seaview project, LBG undertook a rights
issue of £13.5 billion, in which the shares were offered to the existing share-
holders at a deep discount to the stock market price. As a result of the capital
injections in January and June 2009, the UK State had acquired a 43,5% stake in
LBG. To maintain its 43,5% stake, the UK government participated in the
Seaview project and subscribed to 43,5% of the newly issued shares.
With respect to the State participation in the Seaview project, the UK
authorities and LBG argued that a private investor would have participated in
the share offer in similar circumstances since the shares were offered to the
existing shareholders at a deep discount to the stock market price. Not participa-
ting would mean foregoing the possibility to purchase these shares at a dis-
counted price.39
The Commission did not accept these arguments. The Commission noted that
the State’s participation in the Seaview project followed other aid measures
granted to LBG (i.e. the £14.7 billion recapitalisation in January and June 2009).
35. Portuguese recap scheme, para. 61; Swedish recap scheme, para. 26.
36. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 42.
37. Danish guarantee scheme, para. 32.
38. Bank of Ireland, para. 167; Northern Rock, 28 October 2009, para. 90; LBG, para. 128;
CCM, para. 113; Alpha Bank, 2015, para. 68.
39. Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), N428/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 128.
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The State participation in the Seaview project could not be considered as free of
aid, because the opportunity to buy shares at a deep discount price exclusively
resulted from an aid measure granted in the prior months, i.e. the £14.7 billion
recapitalisation. A private investor would not find itself in the situation of
the State since it would not have granted the £14.7 billion recapitalisation. The
Commission therefore concluded that the State participation in the Seaview
project did fulfil the market economy operator principle.40
The fact that actual private investors are unwilling to invest in the bank
In some instances, the actual conduct of private investors is taken into account
by the Commission in its application of the MEOP. This is illustrated by the
case of SNS REAAL. When SNS REAAL experienced financial difficulties,
first a private sector solution was sought. This private sector solution proved,
however, not to be possible and the Dutch State had to intervene and rescue SNS
REAAL.41 In its assessment of whether the Dutch State was acting as a market
economy investor, the Commission took into account the fact that the private
sector solution failed, because this fact made clear that private investors did not
want to rescue SNS REAAL on similar terms to those accepted by the Dutch
State.42
Similarly, in the decision on Anglo Irish Bank, the Commission referred to
the fact that the Irish State was only investing because no market economy
operator was willing to invest on similar terms.43
Footnote 2 to point 15 of the IAC provides that a guarantee (with respect to
impaired assets) is presumed to constitute State aid when the beneficiary bank
cannot find any independent private operator on the market willing to provide
a similar guarantee.
To conclude, the fact that private investors are unwilling to invest in the bank,
is a relevant characteristic (and taken into account in several decisions44).
The fact that private investors are not able to invest in the bank
In some decisions, the Commission did not only refer to the unwillingness of
private investors to support the bank, but also to the ability of private investors
to rescue the bank. For instance, in its decision on Fortis, the Commission con-
sidered that “for the purposes of applying the principle of the market economy
investor, the conduct of the State must be compared with that of private investors
in the situation prevailing at the precise moment that the transaction was effected
40. Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), N428/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 128.
41. SNS REAAL, SA.35382, 22 February 2013, para. 25.
42. SNS REAAL, SA.35382, 22 February 2013, para. 49.
43. Anglo Irish Bank, C11/2010, 31 March 2010, para. 95.
44. UNNIM Banc, para. 44; FIH, 11 March 2014, para. 86; CCB, 2014, para. 103.
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– that is to say investors who were greatly constrained in their financing by the
almost complete drying-up of the interbank market – and not the situation of the
State, which, as a public authority, experienced no great difficulty in raising
finance”.45
By the same token, the Commission noted in its decision on Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS) that “in the current state of financial markets, no market operator
would be able to guarantee the size proposed”.46 Also in the decision on Anglo/
INBS, the Commission considered that “it would not be possible for a market
operator to obtain such financing”.47
7.4.2 Concluding remarks
In many bank State aid cases, it is more or less straightforward that the State
did not act as a private investor. There are therefore many decisions in which
the Commission limited itself to the observation that under the then-current
market conditions, a market economy investor would not be willing to grant
such a measure on a comparable scale and on similar terms.
Sometimes, a Member State argues that it acted in line with the MEOP.48 In
these cases, the Commission has to assess (in its decision) whether the MEOP is
met. By contrast, when a Member State recognises that the aid measure con-
stitutes State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU, then there is less need for
the Commission to dwell on the MEOP.49
7.5 Identification of beneficiaries
Of crucial importance is the identification of the beneficiaries of State aid. While
the beneficiary bank is obviously the beneficiary of State aid, the identification
of beneficiaries is not always that simple – as will be illustrated in the present
section.
45. Fortis, NN42/2008, 3 December 2008, para. 50.
46. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 119.
47. Anglo/INBS, SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 103.
48. One of these cases is the case of ING, which was discussed in depth in section 5.2. Other
examples are: BPN, 2012, para. 65; the Irish guarantee scheme, para. 36-37.
49. The impact of the position of the Member State on the extensiveness of the Commission’s
assessment can be illustrated by the following recital from the decision on the French
refinancing scheme: “France rejects the classification of the notified scheme as State aid and
the Commission must therefore carry out a detailed analysis of the classification.” (N548/08,
para. 54)
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7.5.1 Aid to the investors of the bank?
When a Member State rescues a failing bank, this is not only beneficial to the
bank itself, but also to those who invested in the bank. Indeed, the bailout of a
failing bank prevents that the investors lose their investments in that bank. The
Commission has recognised that investors usually benefit from the bailout. As
will be explained in detail in chapter 12, shareholders and subordinated debt
holders are normally required to contribute to the restructuring of the bank.
This “own contribution-requirement” addresses the fact that these investors
would otherwise benefit from the State aid.
Are retail depositors beneficiaries of State aid? This question was addressed
in the case of Bradford&Bingley (B&B). In this case, the retail deposit book
of B&B was sold to another institution (together with several other assets and
liabilities), while the remainder of B&B’s business was wound-down. The
Commission noted that the main beneficiaries of the State aid measure were
the retail depositors of B&B: the aid measure enabled the transfer of some of
B&B’s business (including the retail deposit book). Without this aid measure
and the subsequent transfer of the retail deposit book, the deposit holders
would have suffered serious difficulties in accessing their deposits. In addi-
tion, they might also have lost some of their deposits.50 The depositors thus
clearly benefited from the State aid measure. Nevertheless, the Commission
remarked that retail depositors are individuals and therefore not considered
as undertakings. Since Article 107(1) TFEU only applies to ‘undertakings’,
depositors fall outside the scope of the State aid rules.51 Moreover, even if
there were some undertakings among the depositors, the aid should be con-
sidered ‘de minimis’ aid and therefore outside State aid control.52
In several other bank State aid decisions, the Commission reiterated its
considerations of the decision on Bradford&Bingley to underline that retail
depositors fall outside the scope of the State aid rules.53 The approach of the
Commission with respect to depositors is thus consistent.
50. Bradford&Bingley, NN41/2008, 1 October 2008, para. 34.
51. What is an ‘undertaking’? This question was addressed in section 2.3.2.
52. Bradford&Bingley, NN41/2008, 1 October 2008, para. 34.
53. Dunfermline, 25 January 2010, para. 44; CajaSur, 8 November 2010, para. 52; Caja Castilla-
La Mancha (CCM), 29 June 2010, para. 120; Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, 9 July 2009,
para. 37; Kaupthing Bank, Finnish Branch, 21 January 2009, para. 32.
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7.5.2 The relevance of the context
Section 6.8 introduced the concept of the “relevant context”.54 This concept is
especially relevant in relation to the question which entities benefit from the
State aid measures.
If a beneficiary bank continues to exist as an independent and standalone
bank (i.e. the C-context), then the identification of the potential beneficiary of
State aid is quite simple: namely the beneficiary bank. However, in other con-
texts, the identification of potential beneficiaries of State aid is less straight-
forward.
In the T-context, the activities of the ailing bank are transferred to another
entity (i.e. the acquiring bank). Thus, in this context, there is another entity;
and this entity could also be a beneficiary of State aid. This means that in the
T-context, there are usually two potential beneficiaries: i) the economic
activities sold, and ii) the acquiring bank.
In the S/T/W-context, there are even more potential beneficiaries. In this
context, the ailing bank is split-up into a bad bank (to be wound-down) and a
good bank (to be sold). Thus, in this context, there are usually three potential
beneficiaries: the economic activities sold, ii) the acquiring bank, and iii) the
activities that remain in the bad bank.
Aid to the acquiring bank?
Point 20 of the Restructuring Communication recognises that the sale of a bank
may involve State aid to the buyer. The transfer of an ailing bank to the acquiring
bank is usually facilitated by the State. The fair value of the transferred liabilities
may exceed the fair value of the transferred assets. The difference (i.e. the
funding gap) is covered by the State (which constitutes State aid).55
There is an advantage to the buyer if the price that the buyer paid for the trans-
ferred activities is too low and does not reflect the market price. In that regard,
point 49 of the 2008 Banking Communication laid down the following require-
ments: i) the sales process should be open and non-discriminatory, ii) the sale
should take place on market terms, iii) the sales price for the assets and liabilities
54. The C-context means that the beneficiary bank continues as a standalone entity. The T-context
means that the bank is taken over by another bank. TheW-context means that the bank will be
wound down. The S/T/W-context means that the bank is split-up into a bad bank (to be
wound-down) and a good bank (to be sold). The S/C/W-context means that the bank is split-
up into a bad bank (to be wound down) and a good bank (that continues to exist as a
standalone entity).
55. See, for instance: T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 20.
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involved should be maximised. These requirements are reprised in point 80 of
the 2013 Banking Communication.56 If these requirements are met, then the
transaction does not entail State aid to the buyer.
The open and transparent tender is regarded by the Commission as a competitive
process that ensures that aid is limited to the minimum. In one of its decisions,
the Commission expressed that it considered an open tender procedure as “a
proper way to gauge market interest and to determine the selling price”.57
It is worth stressing that an open and transparent tender is relevant for three
reasons. In the first place, an open and transparent tender ensures that the sale
price reflects the market price. This means that there is no aid to the buyer. In the
second place, since an open and transparent tender ensures that the sale price
reflects the market price, the aid is limited to the minimum.58 In the third place,
an open and transparent tender ensures equal opportunities for potential bid-
ders.59 The first and second reason for the relevance of an open and transparent
tender (‘no aid to the buyer’ and ‘aid limited to the minimum’) are in essence
two sides of the same coin. Indeed, there is an advantage to the buyer if the
price that the buyer paid for the transferred activities is too low and does not
reflect the market price. At the same time, this means that the State aid is not
limited to the minimum.
In most cases involving a sale of the ailing bank, the requirement of an open and
transparent tender was met. However, there are a few exceptions, as is illustrated
by the cases discussed below.
In the case of the sale of the viable activities of ATE Bank (a Greek bank), the
Commission observed that the Bank of Greece had only contacted a limited
number of banks. In its decision, the Commission indicated that it would
normally consider that contacting such a limited number of buyers does not
allow it to conclude that the tender was open. However, the Commission went
on to observe that at that time, the situation of Greece was very specific, because
foreign banks were trying to reduce their exposure to the Greek economy
while Greece was in an unprecedented and protracted recession. The Commis-
sion therefore accepted that, since the international investment banks that the
56. The requirement that the sales process should be open and non-discriminatory is now
phrased as “open, unconditional and non-discriminatory”. However, in my opinion, this is
only a cosmetic difference and does not entail a substantive difference between the 2008
Banking Communication and the 2013 Banking Communication.
57. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 150.
58. See, for instance: Eik banki, SA.31945, 6 June 2011, para. 41.
59. This is relevant for the assessment of the competition distortions.
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Bank of Greece contacted indicated that there was no foreign interest in ATE
Bank, it was not necessary to contact other foreign banks as it was reasonable to
anticipate that they would show no interest for the activities of ATE Bank.60
Similar observations can be found in the decisions on other Greek banks, such as
T Bank, Panellinia Bank and Cooperative Bank of Peloponnese.61
As mentioned before, the split-up of Dexia (in October 2011) comprised the
sale of Dexia Banque Internationale à Luxembourg (Dexia BIL) to a Quatari
investment group (Precision Capital SA) and the Luxembourgish State. Preci-
sion Capital acquired 90% of Dexia BIL, the other 10% was acquired by the
Luxembourgish State. In the Opening Decision on Dexia BIL, the Commission
took the view that the sale process for Dexia BIL had not been open, transparent
and non-discriminatory, because the sale process had been restricted to bilateral
negotiations with a number of potential buyers without a call for tenders.62 By
contrast, in its decision of 25 July 2012, the Commission concluded that the sale
of Dexia BIL did not constitute State aid. This decision was based on additional
information that the Commission received following the opening decision. The
Commission noted that the sale of Dexia BIL was subject to a fairness opin-
ion.63 The Commission examined this fairness opinion and noted that the price
of the transaction lied within the range of the fairness opinion. The price paid
could therefore be regarded as a market price.64
To conclude, in most cases, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that
the sales process was open and transparent (and that aid to the acquirer could
therefore be excluded). In some cases, the sales process was not completely
open and transparent. However, the Commission has consistently taken into
account elements that could justify why the sales process was not entirely
open and transparent.
Aid to the transferred activities?
In order to assess whether the transferred activities are beneficiary of aid, the
Commission assesses whether these transferred activities constitute an eco-
nomic continuity of the beneficiary bank.65 The aid measure might constitute
60. ATE, SA.35460, 3 May 2013, para. 53.
61. T Bank, 16 May 2012, para. 34; Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 62; Cooperative
Bank of Peloponnese, 17 December 2015, para. 42.
62. Dexia BIL, SA.34440, 25 July 2012, para. 51.
63. A fairness opinion is an evaluation by a third party of whether the terms of the transaction
are fair.
64. Dexia BIL, SA.34440, 25 July 2012, para. 90-92.
65. The following factors are usually taken into consideration: the subject-matter of the transfer,
the price of the transfer, the identity of the shareholders or the owners of the undertaking
which takes over and of the initial undertaking or the economic logic of the operation. Hypo
Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), SA.32554, 3 September 2013, para. 112.
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an advantage to the transferred activities, if these activities would have been
put in run-off without the aid measure.66 In other words: if the aid measure
allowed the continuation of the transferred activities (within the acquiring
bank), then the transferred activities are a potential beneficiary of the aid.67
The determining factor is whether the transferred activities constitute an eco-
nomic continuity of the beneficiary bank. This is the case when the functional
identity continues to exist.68 If most assets, infrastructure, IT systems, employees
and customers of the failing bank are transferred to the acquiring bank, then
the identity of the sold economic entity continues to exist and the sold part of the
failing bank can be considered as a commercial entity that perpetuates the
commercial activity of the failing bank.69
In the T-context, usually all of the beneficiary bank’s activities are transferred.
This clearly constitutes a continuation of the economic activity and there is not
much discussion whether the transferred activities are a beneficiary of the aid.
By contrast, in the S/T/W-context, the question whether the transferred activi-
ties are a beneficiary of the aid is much more complicated, for only a part of the
bank’s activities are transferred. Does the functional identity of the bank’s
activities continue to exist in case of a split-up?
A sale ‘en bloc’ is as indicator of the continuation of the economic activity. In
its decision on the Greek T Bank, the Commission noted that the aid measure
allowed a sale ‘en bloc’: all the key productive banking assets were transferred
(employees, branches, deposits, loans and headquarters). The Commission
concluded that there was an advantage to the economic activity that continued
to exist due to the sale of T Bank’s assets ‘en bloc’.70
The Commission takes into account the business model of the transferred
activities. In the decision on Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), the Commis-
sion noted that the business model of the entities to be sold was different from
the business model of HGAA. Also the client base was different: HGAA
focussed on large-scale business and key clients; in contrast, the entities to be
66. See, for instance: Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 91.
67. What is the relevance of the classification of the transferred activities as beneficiary of State
aid? As a result of this classification, the transferred activities are subject to a restructuring
plan. Any potential acquirer should take this into account. As Laprevote & Paron (2015,
p. 96-97) note, this might complicate the rescue and restructuring of an ailing bank.
68. Eik banki, SA.31945, 6 June 2011, para. 26; Kommunalkredit Austria (KA), SA.32745,
19 July 2013, para. 65.
69. Eik banki, SA.31945, 6 June 2011, para. 26-28.
70. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 30.
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sold would focus on SME business. The Commission concluded that once the
operational entities would be sold and HGAA would cease to exist there
would be no continuation of the economic activity of HGAA. 71
An important aspect is whether the transferred activities are integrated into the
acquiring bank’s existing structure. For instance, in the case of Roskilde Bank,
the transferred branches were integrated into the branch network of the acquiring
banks. The Commission concluded that the transferred branches cannot be seen
as being separate from the buyers.72 In other words: there is no continuation of
the functional identity of the economic activities of the bank.
In its decision on Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, the Commission observed
that the buyers acquired only some of the Bank’s liabilities, without any infra-
structure that would enable them to continue to offer banking services on the
market independently. The Commission held as follows: “The deposits of
the Bank’s former customers will be immediately transferred to Crédit Agricole
Belgique or Keytrade Bank accounts and will therefore be immediately
integrated into the buyer’s existing structures. Consequently, even though the
aid has made possible the orderly and ‘en bloc’ transfer of deposits from the
Belgian branch to the buyers, this does not constitute the continuation of an
independent undertaking but the transfer of a ‘distinct set of liabilities’”.73
In some cases, there was no integration. For instance, Nationwide – which
took over the Dunfermline business – intended to operate Dunfermline as a sep-
arate brand.74 This contributes to the finding of a continuation of the functional
identity.
To conclude, where the previous subsection showed that the Commission
always arrived at the conclusion that aid to the buyer could be excluded, the
current subsection showed that the conclusions with respect to the transferred
activities is not always the same. In some cases, the transferred activities are
considered as beneficiary of State aid, while in other cases, they are not. The
determining factor is whether the functional identity of the transferred activities
continues to exist.
Aid to the activities that remain in the ‘Rump bank’?
In the S/T/W-context, the ailing bank is split-up into a good bank (to be sold)
and a bad bank (to be wound-down). This bad bank is usually referred to as
the “Rump bank”. Is the Rump bank a beneficiary of State aid?
71. Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), SA.32554, 3 September 2013, para. 111-115.
72. Roskilde Bank, NN39/2008, 5 November 2008, para. 68.
73. Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, N344/2009, 9 July 2009, para. 47.
74. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 49.
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In several decision, the Commission held as follows: even though the Rump
bank is to be liquidated, it will still carry out some economic activities, albeit
on a small scale and in a running-down objective. Such activities may include
offering banking services to their remaining customers. Since these activities
are also carried out by other operators on the market, the Rump bank will poten-
tially compete with them. The Rump bank is therefore considered as a ben-
eficiary of State aid.
The determining factor is thus whether the Rump bank will carry out economic
activities. In some instances, this is not the case. Consequently, in these cases,
the Rump bank is not a beneficiary of State aid. For instance, in the case of AB
Ukio bankas, the Commission noted that Rump Ukio was under bankruptcy
proceedings and no longer had a banking license. In the decision, it was indi-
cated that Rump Ukio may carry out certain limited activities in relation to loans,
such as extension of repayment terms, restructuring of loans, realising certain
securities etc. to secure the value of assets. However, it may not issue additional
loans or provide drawdowns from existing facilities.75 The Commission
therefore concluded that Rump Ukio was not a beneficiary of State aid. 76
7.5.3 The relevance of the identification of the beneficiaries
Why does it matter who the beneficiaries of State aid are? The answer lies in the
fact that the Commission assesses the compatibility of the State aid on the basis
of the restructuring plan. When there are several beneficiaries, then the State aid
to each beneficiary should be compatible with the internal market. This means
that each beneficiary should be subject to restructuring measures.
To give an example, in the case of Amagerbanken, there were two beneficiaries:
i) the sold economic activities, and ii) the remaining business. In the first place,
the Commission assessed whether the restructuring measures would ensure the
viability of the sold economic activities, whether there was sufficient burden-
sharing with respect to these activities, and whether the competition distortions
were satisfactorily addressed.77 In the second place, the Commission assessed
whether the winding-down of the remaining business was conducted in an
orderly manner, whether there was sufficient burden-sharing with respect to
these activities, and whether the compensatory measures were sufficient to limit
the competition distortions.78 Thus, for each of the two beneficiaries, the Com-
mission assessed whether the State aid was compatible in light of the restruc-
turing measures.
75. AB Ukio bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 34.
76. AB Ukio bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 50.
77. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 102-112.
78. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 113-136.
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Part II. The second preliminary step
7.6 Assessment on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) or (c) TFEU?
When an aid measure falls under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, it is pro-
hibited. However, it may be declared compatible if it falls under one of the
exceptions provided for in Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU. With respect to State
aid to ailing banks, the relevant provisions are 107(3)(b) and (c) TFEU. Art. 107
(3)(b) TFEU provides that aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy
of a Member Statemay be considered to be compatible with the internal market.
Pursuant to Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU, aid to facilitate the development of certain
economic activities or of certain economic areas may be considered to be com-
patible with the internal market. The compatibility of State aid to banks can thus
be assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) and (c) TFEU.
7.6.1 The relevance of the choice of legal basis
The choice of legal basis determines which framework of assessment is used:
under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, the Crisis Framework is the relevant framework
of assessment, whereas under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the relevant framework
of assessment is constituted by the principles of the R&R-guidelines. Since the
principles of the Crisis Communications allow for more flexibility than the
R&R-guidelines,79 the choice of legal basis is thus quite relevant.
7.6.2 “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy”
As was explained in chapter 3, the Commission adopted the Crisis Framework
in October 2008. Pursuant to this Crisis Framework, the Commission chose to
use Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as the legal basis for the compatibility-assess-
ment. Article 107(3)(b) TFEU empowers the Commission to find that aid
is compatible with the internal market if it is intended “to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. In essence, the choice for
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU was prompted by the financial crisis, which created
“exceptional circumstances where financial stability at large is at risk”.
Thus, in the Crisis Communications, the Commission justified its choice for 107
(3)(b) TFEU as legal basis for the compatibility-assessment. In addition, the
Commission assessed in each bank State aid decision on which legal basis
the aid measures had to be examined. In that regard, the relevant assessment
79. The differences between the R&R-guidelines and the Crisis Communications were
explained in section 3.4.2.
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criterion is thus whether the State aid is intended to remedy a serious disturbance
in the economy. In every case (taken after the adoption of the 2008 Banking
Communication), the Commission came to the conclusion that the aid measure
in question was aimed at remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. How
did the Commission come to this conclusion? In that regard, the following recital
is illustrative of the Commission’s reasoning:
“The Commission considers that the present scheme concerns the entire
German banking industry. It does not dispute the analysis of the German
authorities that the current global financial crisis has made access to liquidity
more difficult for financial institutions across the board and has also eroded
confidence in financial institutions’ creditworthiness. If the issues of lack
of liquidity and lack of confidence are not addressed, it will result not only
in difficulties for the banking sector but, owing to that sector’s pivotal role in
providing financing to the rest of the economy, will also have a systemic
effect on the German economy as a whole. The Commission does not dispute
that the present scheme is designed to address the problems of the lack of
liquidity and lack of confidence that are currently striking German financial
institutions. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious
disturbance in the German economy”.80
Although this recital was taken from the decision on the German bank support
scheme, the same considerations can be found in decisions on the bank support
schemes of other Member States. The cited recital is thus illustrative of the
Commission’s reasoning. The main elements of this reasoning are the following.
Firstly, there are exceptional circumstances created by the financial crisis. In that
regard, the Commission noted that the global financial crisis has led to a “lack
of liquidity and lack of confidence”. Secondly, the Commission refers to the
“systemic effect on the (German) economy”. This element relates to the systemic
importance of banks. These two (interrelated) elements can be summarised as
follows: in a crisis situation, the failure of a systemic important bank can create a
serious disturbance in the economy. State aid measures aimed at avoiding the fall
of a systemic important bank are thus aimed at remedying a serious disturbance
in the economy.
In decisions on aid measures to individual banks, the Commission usually refers
to its considerations from its decision on the bank support scheme of the Mem-
ber State concerned. This can be illustrated by the following recital from the
decision on the German LBBW in which the Commission referred to “its recent
approval to the prolongation of the German Rescue package.
80. German bank support scheme, N512/2008, 27 October 2008, para. 46.
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“The Commission acknowledged in its recent approval to the prolongation
of the German Rescue package that the threat of a serious disturbance in
the German economy continues and that measures supporting banks are apt
to remedy a serious disturbance in the German economy”.81
In this recital, the Commission mentions the “threat of a serious disturbance in
the German economy”. This corresponds to the first element of the Commis-
sion’s reasoning (i.e. the financial crisis which created exceptional circumstan-
ces where financial stability at large is at risk).
The second element (i.e. the systemic importance – sometimes referred to
as ‘systemic relevance’82 – of the bank) is usually elaborated in decisions on
aid measures to individual banks. For instance, in the decision on the German
LBBW, the Commission considered as follows:
“Given the systemic importance of LBBW and the significance of its
lending activities for specific regional markets, its cross border presence,
and its integration and cooperation with other public sector banks, the
Commission accepts that its failure would have entailed serious consequen-
ces for the German economy. The aid must therefore be assessed under
Article 87(3) (b) of the EC Treaty”.83
To conclude, the criterion ‘aimed at remedying a serious disturbance in the
economy’ is thus substantiated by two (interrelated) elements: i) the financial
crisis, and ii) the systemic importance of the bank. Given the relevance of
these elements, the following subsection will delve into the question of when a
bank has systemic importance.
7.6.3 Systemic importance
When is a bank systemically important? In that regard, it might be interesting
to take a look at how “systemic importance” is defined in the financial reg-
ulation. Systemically important banks have received attention from financial
regulators in an effort to address the “too-big-to-fail problem”. In economic
terms, the “too-big-to-fail problem” constitutes a negative externality. As
explained in section 3.2, the fall of a bank may have dramatic repercussions
on the stability of the financial system. Systemically important banks represent
a higher risk for the financial system. Accordingly, to compensate for this higher
risk, these banks should comply with higher own funds requirements.
81. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 47-48.
82. ‘Systemic relevance’ and ‘systemic importance’ are used as synonyms.
83. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 48.
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In that context, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published a policy
framework concerning ‘systemically important financial institutions’ (SIFI’s).84
SIFI’s are defined as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure,
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”. As
part of the effort by the FSB effort to address the “too-big-to-fail problem”, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) developed a methodology
to identify G-SIFI’s.85 The measurement approach is based on five indicators: i)
size, ii) interconnectedness, iii) substitutes or financial institution infrastructure,
iv) cross-jurisdictional activity, and v) complexity. These indicators are also
enumerated in Article 131(2) CRD IV, which employs the term ‘global sys-
temically important institutions’ (G-SII’s).
The identification of systemically important banks in the financial regula-
tion serves a specific purpose: in order to reduce the probability of failure of
systemically important banks, these banks have to comply with higher loss-
absorbency requirements. The identification of systemically important banks in
State aid control serves a different purpose: it is aimed at establishing whether
the aid is appropriate to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy. Because
the concept of “systemic importance” serves a different purpose in State aid
control, the Commission is not bound by any definition of “systemic impor-
tance” given in the financial regulation.
How is “systemic importance” defined by the Commission? The following
recital is illustrative of the Commission’s approach towards the notion of
“systemic importance”.
“Given the systemic importance of BCP – being one of the leading banks
in Portugal – and the significance of its lending activities for the Portuguese
economy, the Commission accepts that its failure to satisfy strengthened
capital requirements would have entailed serious consequences for the
Portuguese economy”.86
This recital illustrates that the Commission takes into account the systemic
importance of the beneficiary bank. It also illustrates that the systemic
importance is almost taken as a given: it is only substantiated by the fact that
84. FSB, Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 4 November
2011.
85. BCBS, Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional
loss absorbency requirement, November 2011. The assessment methodology was updated
in July 2013: BCBS, Global systemically important banks: updated assessment method-
ology and the higher loss absorbency requirement, July 2013.
86. Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), 30 August 2013, para. 77. A similar consideration can
be found in BFA, SA.34820, 27 June 2012, para. 49.
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BCP is one of the leading banks in Portugal. In the decision on RBS, the Com-
mission gave a more detailed explanation of the systemic importance of the
bank:
“Given the global nature of RBS’s banking activities, given that RBS is one
of the leading ‘high street’ banks in the UK especially in the retail, SME and
corporate segments, given the significance of its lending activities for the UK
economy, and given its intense financial relationships with other banks, the
Commission accepts that RBS is a systemically relevant bank. The Commis-
sion, therefore, concludes that the collapse of RBS would entail a serious
disturbance for the UK financial sector and thus the UK economy. The aid
must therefore be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU”.87
The recitals that are cited above might create the impression that only large
banks are systemically relevant. This impression is not correct, for the Commis-
sion has consistently held that even small banks may have systemic relevance.
Amagerbanken, Eik Bank, Fionia Bank, Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, LCCU,
Banif, Banco Privado Portugues and Carnegie Bank were all characterised as
small banks. Notwithstanding their small size, these banks were considered to be
systemically important (in the sense that their bankruptcy would undermine trust
in the financial system).88
With respect to these small banks, the Commission used the same reasoning
to substantiate their systemic relevance.89 The following recital from the deci-
sion on Amagerbanken can serve as an illustration of the Commission’s rea-
soning:
“The financial crisis has created exceptional circumstances in which the
bankruptcy of one bank may undermine trust in the financial system at
large, both at national and international level. That may be the case even
for a bank of small size, such as Amagerbanken, and particularly so in the
case of a relatively small economy such as Denmark where counterparts
may tend not to distinguish between individual banks, thus extending the
lack of confidence generated by the failure of one bank to the whole sector.
Given the great uncertainty due to the financial crisis and the necessity of
87. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 129.
88. See: Fionia Bank, N560/2009, 25 October 2010, para. 68. Amagerbanken, SA.32634, 6 June
2011, para. 48.
89. Only in the case of the Portuguese bank Banif, the Commission used a different reason.
The Commission noted that Banif had a high market share on Madeira and the Azores. The
Commission therefore concluded that “even though the bank is de facto only a small-sized
financial undertaking, its local presence gives it some systemic importance.” Banif,
SA.34662, 21 January 2013, para. 54.
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external funding for the Danish banking sector, as previously stated in the
Commission decision of 28 June 2010 extending the Danish guarantee
scheme, a lack of confidence in the Danish financial system could severely
affect the whole Danish economy”.90
It is noteworthy about this recital that the Commission mentions the financial
crisis. This illustrates that the two elements that were identified in section
7.6.2 (i.e. the financial crisis and the systemic importance) are interrelated. The
approach of the Commission actually amounts to the following: in a financial
crisis, almost every bank has systemic relevance (in the sense that its failure
would create a serious disturbance in the economy).91
7.6.4 Decisions taken before the adoption of the 2008 Banking
Communication
Several bank State aid decisions were taken before the introduction of the Crisis
Framework: Roskilde Bank (31 July 2008), Northern Rock (5 December 2007),
West LB (30 April 2008), Sachsen LB (4 June 2008), Bradford&Bingley
(1 October 2008) and IKB (21 October 2008). Since these decisions were
taken before the Commission accepted Article 87(3)(b) EC as legal basis, the
compatibility of the aid measures was assessed on the basis of Article 87(3)(c)
EC.92 Interestingly, in these decisions, the Commission analysed whether
Article 87(3)(b) EC could be used as legal basis. It concluded, however, that
this was not possible. For instance, in the Opening decision on WestLB of
30 April 2008, the Commission held that it had found no grounds for com-
patibility of the measures on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC.
Interestingly, the Restructuring decision in the case of WestLB was taken
on 12 May 2009, i.e. after the introduction of the Crisis Framework. Con-
sequently, the legal basis was Article 87(3)(b) instead of (c). The Commission
justified this change as follows:
“In the opening decision the Commission declared that Article 87(3)(c) EC
is the legal basis for the compatibility assessment of the aid measure in
question. The Commission also analysed whether the aid measure should
90. Amagerbanken, SA.32634, 6 June 2011, para. 48. This recital is reiterated in Amagerbanken,
SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 98.
91. In the literature, this view is supported by, inter alia: Psaroudakis (2012, p. 210). Avgoules
et al. (2013, p. 212) argue that “the failure of a bank in normal times may well be possible
without systemic ramifications (for example, Barings in 1995), while the failure of the
same bank in times of stress may generate large systemic effects.”
92. The few bank State aid cases before the outbreak of the financial crisis were also taken on
the basis of Art. 87(3)(c) EC. See, for instance, the decision on Credit Lyonnais of 20 May
1998.
CHAPTER 7
206
also be assessed on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC. Art. 87(3)(b) EC
provides that aid to remedy serious disturbance in the economy of a Member
State may be considered to be compatible with the common market. The
Commission pointed out that at the time when the aid measure to WestLB
was granted the crisis on the subprime market had not yet lead to a serious
disturbance in the German economy in the meaning of Article 87(3)(b).
Furthermore the Commission had not received evidence from the German
authorities demonstrating that not granting aid to WestLB would have led to
such serious disturbance.
In the meantime the Commission has acknowledged in its three Com-
munications and in its approval of the German Rescue package that there is
a threat of serious disturbance in the German economy and that measures
supporting banks are apt to remedy serious disturbance in the German
economy. Therefore the legal basis for the assessment of the aid measure
should be Article 87(3)(b) EC.”
Does this change of approach violate the principle of equal treatment? It can
be argued that cases before the adoption of the Banking Communication and
cases after the adoption of the Banking Communication are treated differently
by the Commission. However, as discussed in section 6.7.2, I take the view that
the principle of equal treatment does not preclude the possibility of a policy
change, provided that this policy change is justified and explained. In that
regard, it should be recalled that in the 2008 Banking Communication, the
Commission justified its choice for Article 87(3)(b) EC as legal basis. Moreover,
the abovementioned recital from the decision on WestLB illustrates that the
Commission took some effort in explaining the policy change. For these rea-
sons, I am of the opinion that the change of legal basis does not amount to an
inconsistency.
7.6.5 Concluding remarks
It should be noted that the Crisis Communications do not explicitly mention
‘systemic importance’ as an assessment criterion. Rather, the assessment
criterion is ‘serious disturbance in the economy’. Nevertheless, the Commission
usually assesses the systemic importance of the bank, so the systemic impor-
tance is at least implicitly used as an assessment criterion. This is not surprising,
since only banks with systemic importance can create a serious disturbance in
the economy. However, since the Commission takes the view that in the situ-
ation of a financial crisis, every bank that collapses can create a serious dis-
turbance, every bank is considered to have systemic importance. Consequently,
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the (implicit) assessment criterion ‘systemic importance’ is always met. This
means that although the fact that the bank is systemically important is a relevant
characteristic, it is not a distinguishing characteristic.93
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the preliminary steps in the Commission’s assessment
of bank State aid cases. As set out in Part I of this chapter, the first step is to
establish whether the measure constitutes State aid. As set out in Part II of this
chapter, the second step is to establish whether the compatibility of the aid
measure has to be assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The essential
criterion in that respect is the systemic importance of the bank.
After taking the preliminary steps, the Commission proceeds with the compa-
tibility-assessment. The first stage of the compatibility-assessment concerns the
appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of the aid measure. When is a
State aid measure appropriate, necessary and proportionate and which characte-
ristics of the case are relevant to that assessment? This question will be
addressed in the next chapter.
93. In the context of this PhD-study, the main question is: has the Commission consistently
applied this relevant characteristic? This question will be addressed in section 8.2.2.
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Chapter 8. Appropriate, necessary and
proportionate
8.1 Introduction
The concepts of “appropriateness”, “necessity” and “proportionality” are of
crucial importance. Indeed, the Commission only approves State aid measures
when they are appropriate, necessary and proportionate. These criteria are
cumulative, so an aid measure has to fulfil all three criteria in order for it to
be approved. When is a State aid measure appropriate, necessary and propor-
tionate and which characteristics of the case are relevant to that assessment? This
question will be addressed in the present chapter.
8.1.1 Assessment in two stages
The majority of the bank State aid cases are characterised by a two-stage
compatibility-assessment. As will be explained in the following subsection, this
changed with the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication. However,
since most cases were assessed under the Crisis Communications before the
adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication, this chapter takes the two-stage
compatibility-assessment as a starting point.1
The two-stage compatibility-assessment entailed the following. First, the Com-
mission would assess whether the aid was appropriate, necessary and propor-
tionate. State aid could only be declared compatible with the common market
if the aid was appropriate, necessary and proportionate.2 The conclusion that the
1. The tables in Annex IV provide an overview of the compatibility-assessment and indicate
in which instances the compatibility-assessment comprises two stages.
2. The first mention of “appropriateness, necessity and proportionality” can be found in the deci-
sion on the Danish guarantee scheme of 10 October 2008 (i.e. a few days before the adoption
of the 2008 Banking Communication). In that decision, the Commission held the following:
“Although there is no established practice as to the conditions for compatibility of aid granted
under Article 87 (3) b) EC, it must be stressed that in order for such aid to be compatible,
any aid or aid scheme must comply with general criteria for compatibility under Article 87 (3)
EC, viewed in the light of the general objectives of the Treaty and in particular Article 4 (2)
EC, which imply compliance with the following conditions: appropriateness, necessity and
proportionality.” (para. 41). These three criteria also appear – though not in the exact same
words – in point 15 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
209
State aid was appropriate, necessary and proportionate would result in the tem-
porary approval of the aid. The final approval was dependent on whether the
restructuring plan met the three restructuring objectives (viability, burden-
sharing and competition distortions). So the assessment takes two stages, which
can be described in the following manner: the first stage of the assessment
mainly concerns the aid, while the second stage of the assessment mainly con-
cerns the restructuring plan. This chapter focusses on the first stage; i.e. the
assessment of whether the aid is appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
8.1.2 Impact of the 2013 Banking Communication
One of the most important changes introduced in the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication concerns the procedure of the compatibility-assessment. Under the
2008 Banking Communication, recapitalisation measures and asset relief
measures were temporarily approved as rescue aid, while the in-depth analysis
of the aid measures was postponed to the restructuring stage. In the 2013
Banking Communication, the Commission departed from this approach. Under
these new rules, the Commission will authorise recapitalisation measures
and asset relief measures as restructuring aid only after an agreement on the
restructuring plan has been reached.3 With respect to these aid measures, the
Commission thus starts immediately with the second stage of the compatibility-
assessment. In other words: the two-stage compatibility-assessment has been
abandoned for a one-stage compatibility-assessment. There is, however, one
exception: point 50 of the 2013 Banking Communication provides for the
possibility to grant rescue aid in the form of recapitalisation and impaired asset
measures.4 This means that in exceptional circumstances, recapitalisation and
impaired asset measures can be authorised as rescue aid before a restructuring
plan is approved. In such cases, there is thus still a two-stage compatibility-
assessment.
8.1.3 Where can the two stages of the compatibility-assessment be found?
In principle, the pattern is as follows: the first stage of the assessment can be
found in the Rescue Decision, whereas the second stage of the assessment can be
found in the Restructuring Decision.5
3. NB: these new rules apply only to recapitalisation and impaired asset measures. With
respect to guarantees and liquidity support, the two-stage compatibility-assessment
continues to apply.
4. The case of Abanka (SA.37690, 18 December 2013) is a nice illustration of points 50-53 of
the 2013 Banking Communication.
5. Section 3.6.1 discussed the different types of bank State aid decisions, such as Rescue
Decisions and Restructuring Decisions.
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However, deviations from this pattern are possible. In that regard, it should be
recalled that aid can be granted as ad hoc aid or under a bank support scheme.
The compatibility of bank support schemes is assessed by the Commission in a
decision. In these decisions, the Commission assesses whether the scheme is
appropriate, necessary and proportionate. This corresponds to the first stage of
the compatibility-assessment. State aid granted under an approved bank support
scheme does not have to be assessed again: since the scheme is approved, the
State aid is already considered to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate.6
Banks that benefited from aid under a bank support scheme did not always
have to submit a restructuring plan. In these cases, the compatibility-assessment
only comprised one stage: i.e. the assessment of the appropriateness, necessity
and proportionality of the aid. This assessment took place in the decision in
which the support scheme was approved; there is no separate Rescue Decision
for the beneficiary bank.7
In some instances, banks that benefited from State aid under a scheme had
to submit a restructuring plan.8 In these cases, the Commission adopted a
Restructuring Decision (in which it assessed the compatibility of the aid, taking
into account the restructuring plan; i.e. the second stage of the compatibility-
assessment). Thus, in some cases, there is only a Restructuring Decision and not
a Rescue Decision.9
Sometimes, the picture is more complicated. This is the case when the ben-
eficiary bank has benefited from several aid measures. For instance, BancoMare
Nostrum (BMN) had received guarantees on bonds issued under the guarantee
scheme (“measure A”) and it was recapitalised under the FROB recapitalisation
scheme (“measure B”). These FROB I preference shares were converted into
normal equity (“measure C”). In 2012, BMN was again recapitalised (“measure
D”). In addition, BMN benefited from an asset relief measure (“measure E”). For
all these aid measure, it had to be assessed whether they were compatible with
the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. This assessment did
not take place in the same decision. This is illustrated by the following recital
from the Restructuring Decision on BMN:
6. It should be noted that when the Commission authorises a bank support scheme, this
authorisation is restricted to six months and any extension of the scheme must be notified to
the Commission. Also any amendment to the scheme must be notified to the Commission.
7. For instance in the cases of the French banks.
8. The requirement to submit a restructuring plan is discussed in-depth in section 10.2.
9. For instance the cases of Commerzbank, BCP and BPI. Also in the case of Dunfermline,
there is only a Restructuring Decision. This is because – as the Commission noted in para.
59 of the decision – the measures taken in this case combined a direct restructuring of part
of Dunfermline’s business (through a transfer of the Transfer Package) and a liquidation of
the remaining part, rather than a rescue measure which is later followed by a restructuring.
APPROPRIATE, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE
211
“BMN has benefitted and will continue to benefit from aid measures granted
under a scheme (measures A and B) which have already been found
compatible by the Commission. BMN will further benefit from several State
aid measures whose compatibility has not been previously assessed by the
Commission, namely measures C, D and E”.10
It should be noted that additional State aid that is granted before the Commission
has adopted a Restructuring Decision, has to be notified individually. However,
this additional State aid is not subject of a separate decision. Rather, it is taken
into account in the Commission’s final decision on the bank.11
In the Restructuring Decision on BMN, all the measures (A-E) were
examined as restructuring aid under the Restructuring Communication, in light
of the restructuring plan. This concerns the second stage of the compatibility-
assessment. Also in this decision, the Commission conducted an assessment
of the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of measures C, D and E;
i.e. the first stage of the compatibility-assessment. So with respect to measures A
and B, the two stages of the compatibility-assessment are in separate decisions,
while with respect to measures C, D and E, the two stages of the compatibility-
assessment are both in the same decision. This illustrates that a Restructuring
Decision can also include the first stage of the compatibility-assessment.
8.1.4 The relative importance of the two stages of the assessment
As explained above, the compatibility-assessment used to comprise two stages.
In the first stage, the Commission was quite lenient: in none of the cases, the
Commission concluded that the State aid was not appropriate, necessary or pro-
portionate. In the literature, it has been remarked that “the EU largely rubber-
stamped almost all of the interventions made by Member States to support their
domestic banking industries”.12
By contrast, in the second stage of the assessment (when the Commission
assesses the restructuring plan), the approach of the Commission can be char-
acterised as strict: in all cases, remedies were required. Thus, the Commission
could afford to be lenient in the first stage, because the Commission took into
account that it would be strict in the second stage.
10. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 98.
11. See, for instance: Greek bank support scheme (prolongation), N260/2010, 30 June 2010,
para. 34-35. See also point 16 of the Restructuring Communication.
12. Marsden & Kokkoris 2010, p. 875. See also Winckler & Laprevote 2009, p. 13: “In practice,
despite the great diversity of measures, the appropriateness of a measures has rarely, if ever,
been contested by the Commission to date.”
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As a consequence, the second stage of the compatibility-assessment is much
more important than the first stage. This is reflected by the fact that this PhD-
study contains three chapters that are devoted to the second stage of the assess-
ment (i.e. chapters 11, 12 and 13), and only one chapter devoted to the first stage
of the assessment (i.e. the present chapter).
8.1.5 Scope of this chapter
Chapter 3 introduced the three main types of State aid measures: recapitalisa-
tion measures, guarantee measures and asset relief measures. The compatibi-
lity of asset relief measures is based on a very specific assessment framework:
the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). For this reason, the compatibility
of asset relief measures will be discussed in the following chapter, while the
current chapter focusses on the compatibility of recapitalisation measures and
guarantee measures.
Part I: Appropriateness
The first of the three compatibility-criteria is the criterion that the aid should be
appropriate. When is aid “appropriate”? Appropriateness is defined as follows:
“The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve
the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. This would
not be the case if the disturbance would also disappear in the absence of the
measure or if the measure is not appropriate to remedy the disturbance.”
This definition figures in every decision in which the appropriateness of the
State aid is assessed. A central element in the definition of appropriateness is
‘a serious disturbance in the economy’. This element was also relevant in the
context of the choice of legal basis for the compatibility-assessment. As was
explained in the previous chapter, this element relates to the fact that the bank
has systemic importance. Moreover, the aid measures should restore market
confidence. These relevant characteristics will be discussed in sections 8.2 and
8.3.
Furthermore, it should be recalled that State aid can be granted ad hoc or under
a bank support scheme. In the latter case, the assessment of the appropriateness
of the aid takes place in the decision in which the bank support scheme is
approved. For the interpretation of “appropriateness”, it does not matter if the
State aid is granted under the scheme or as individual aid. However, in case of a
scheme, there is a factor that is taken into account by the Commission: the
eligibility to the scheme, which will be discussed in section 8.10.
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8.2 Systemic importance
* The fact that the beneficiary bank has systemic importance.
8.2.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
In some decisions13, the systemic importance of the beneficiary bank is men-
tioned in the context of the appropriateness of the aid measure. The mentioning
of the systemic importance of the bank makes sense: the aid measure should be
appropriate, not (only) to rescue to the bank, but also to rescue the banking
sector. Indeed, the appropriateness-criterion requires that the aid should achieve
the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy.
It should be noted that not every decision mentions this serious disturbance
in the economy or the systemic importance of the bank in the compatibility-
assessment. This not-mentioning is not problematic, because if the systemic
importance of the bank was already established when the legal basis for the
compatibility assessment was chosen, then there is no need to reiterate that the
bank has systemic importance. However, the fact that some decisions mention
the systemic importance of the bank in the compatibility-assessment while other
decisions do not, creates a somewhat chaotic impression.
8.2.2 Concluding remarks
In the context of this PhD-study, the main question is: has the Commission
consistently applied this relevant characteristic? The answer to this question
depends on the view that one takes on the systemic relevance of banks. If one
takes the view that all banks have systemic relevance, then the observation that
the Commission has consistently held that the beneficiary bank has systemic
relevance, means that there is no inconsistency. By contrast, if one takes the
view that some banks are systemically important while others are not, then the
approach of the Commission amounts to an inconsistency.
In the literature, differing viewpoints can be found. For instance, Waldbauer
criticises the Commission for attributing systemic importance to almost every
European bank.14 Gandrud & Hallerberg argue that some banks are rescued not
because they are systemically important financial institutions (SIFI’s), but
because they are politically important financial institutions.15
13. See, for instance: Anglo Irish Bank, 14 January 2009, para. 50; Anglo Irish Bank, 26 June
2009, para. 56; Bank of Ireland, 26 March 2009, para. 60; AIB, para. 75; KBC, 18 December
2008, para. 58; Alpha Bank, 27 July 2012, para. 58; KA, 31 March 2011, para. 57; SNS
REAAL, 10 December 2008, para. 50; NLB, 7 March 2011, para. 51;
14. Waldbauer 2014, p. 512-513.
15. C. Gandrud & M. Hallerberg, ‘Not SIFIs but PIFIs’, blog post Bruegel, March 2015.
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Honohan recognises that systemic importance depends on the current
market conditions. He argues that in normal times, small banks may be
allowed to fail, while in times of heightened risk aversion and uncertainty,
such banks may be candidate for a bailout.16 A report to the G-20 also stresses
that the assessment of systemic importance is likely to be time-varying
depending on the economic environment.17
In that regard, it should be pointed out that the assessment whether a bank has
systemic importance is not only made by the Commission. Indeed, this assess-
ment also takes place at the national level. Member States that consider to res-
cue ‘their’ banks will usually determine whether the rescue is necessary for the
stability of the financial sector. In other words: they will assess whether the
failing bank has systemic importance.18 It is only after the granting of State aid
by the Member State that the Commission assesses whether the beneficiary bank
has systemic importance.
8.3 Restoring market confidence
* The fact that the aid measure strengthens the bank and restores market
confidence.
8.3.1 Appropriateness of a guarantee
The appropriateness of guarantee schemes is nicely explained by the following
recital:
“As regards appropriateness, the Commission acknowledges that the objec-
tive of the guarantee scheme is to provide safety to investors in newly issued
debt of participating institutions, in order to provide sufficient liquidity to
16. Honohan 2010, p. 130.
17. Report prepared by staff of IMF, BIS and FSB, ‘Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance
of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations’, October 2009,
p. 7.
18. This raises the following question: which banks were not considered to be systemically
relevant and thus allowed to fail? It should be noted that – in contrast to the US where the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) publishes a list of bank failures – there is
no clear list of bank failures in the EU.
In the Netherlands, DSB Bank was not rescued by the State. In Germany, there were 3
banks that were allowed to fail: Weserbank, Noa Bank and FXdirect Bank. These three
banks were mentioned in: Deo et al. 2015, p. 168. Another example of a bank that was
allowed to fail was Heta Asset Resolution (a case which is ‘famous’ for being the first case
in which a bank was put into resolution under the BRRD).In the literature, it has been
pointed out that in the US much more banks were allowed to fail. For instance, in the
period 2008 – July 2013, there were 494 banks that failed.
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participating banks. This is a reaction to the international market-failure
where even solvent banks are having difficulties getting access to liquidity.
The Commission considers that such guarantee schemes should help to
overcome this market failure, by establishing the conditions for the revival
of the interbank lending market and financial markets more generally and
regards it therefore as an appropriate means”.19
This recital shows the main elements in the Commission’s reasoning to
substantiate the appropriateness of the guarantee: ‘market-failure’, ‘safety net’,
‘revival of (interbank) lending market’. These elements appear in almost every
decision in which the appropriateness of a guarantee (scheme) is assessed.
An interesting observation can be found in the decision on the Polish guarantee
scheme. In this decision, the Commission held that the mere existence of the
scheme already contributed to the stability of the financial markets, because it
provided a safety net. So it did not matter if there were banks that actually made
use of the scheme.20
8.3.2 Appropriateness of a recapitalisation
The Commission has held in many decisions that a recapitalisation “is in
principle an appropriate means to strengthen the financial institutions and thus
to restore market confidence”.21 As the Commission put it, the objective of the
recapitalisation scheme is “to ensure that banks are sufficiently strongly
capitalised so as to better withstand potential losses”.22
The reasoning of the Commission can thus be summarised in a few sentences.
In fact, in many decisions, the assessment of the appropriateness of a recapi-
talisation measure only takes a few sentences. However, there are also decisions
in which some additional aspects can be found. These aspects mainly relate to
the capital requirements and the objectives of the recapitalisation (scheme).
Capital requirements
An important aspect of the assessment of the appropriateness of a recapitalisa-
tion concerns the applicable capital requirements. In some instances, the need
for a recapitalisation is caused by an increase of the capital requirements. For
instance, on 18 February 2011, Spain introduced more stringent regulatory
19. Slovenian guarantee scheme, N531/2008, 12 December 2008, para. 33.
20. Polish bank support scheme, N208/2009, 25 September 2009, para. 38.
21. In addition, the Recapitalisation Communication indicates three objectives of capital injec-
tions; see point 4-6 of the Recapitalisation Communication. In the decision on Anglo/INBS
(SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 127), the Commission explicitly referred to point 6 of the
Recapitalisation Communication.
22. German bank support scheme, N512/2008, 27 October 2008, para. 48.
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capital requirements for its banking sector. Pursuant to this new legislation, all
banks operating in Spain had to meet a 10% capital principal solvency ratio
over risk weighted assets by 30 September 2011 at the latest. 23 As a result of
this new legislation, several Spanish banks required additional capital in order to
meet the higher solvency levels.24
In its decision of 11 February 2013 on the prolongation of the Polish bank
recapitalisation scheme, the Commission observed that the applicable prudential
requirements had been significantly increased by the European regulators. This
led to concerns about the creditworthiness of certain banks.25 The Commission
therefore concluded that a backstop mechanism by the Member State was an
appropriate means to strengthen financial institutions and thus to restore market
confidence.26
It should be pointed out that recapitalisation measures are not only taken with
respect to banks that experience a capital shortfall; also banks that comply
with the regulatory capital requirements are sometimes the beneficiary of a
capital injection. The need for a capital injection is sometimes caused by rising
international capital market expectations in relation to capital levels for finan-
cial institutions. In one of the decisions on Anglo Irish Bank, the Commission
explicitly recognised that these expectations can make it necessary also for
banks that meet the regulatory solvency ratios, to further strengthen their capital
ratios.27
Lending to the real economy
Another aspect concerns the objectives of a recapitalisation. In the first place,
a recapitalisation (scheme) is meant to provide banks with sufficient capital, so
that they are able to withstand potential losses. Another objective of a recap-
italisation is to ensure that banks provide sufficient lending to the real economy;
to avoid a credit crunch. The Commission attaches great importance to this latter
objective.28
23. Novacaixagalicia (NCG) Banco, SA.38143, 20 June 2014, para. 15-16.
24. For instance, NCG required EUR 2.622 million of additional capital. See: Novacaixagalicia
(NCG) Banco, SA.33734, 28 November 2012, para. 15.
25. Polish recapitalisation scheme (prolongation), SA.35943, 11 February 2013, para. 16. This
recital also figures in other decisions. See, for instance: Lithuanian bank support scheme
(prolongation), SA.36047, 22 February 2013, para. 30.
26. Polish recapitalisation scheme (prolongation), SA.35943, 11 February 2013, para. 16.
27. Anglo Irish Bank, N9/2009, 14 January 2009, para. 42.
28. See: Austrian bank support scheme, 557/2008, 9 December 2008, para. 85-86.
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Most bank support schemes include a requirement for the beneficiary banks
to continue lending to the real economy.29 For instance, the objective of the
Danish recapitalisation scheme was “to stimulate the supply of credit to viable
and healthy undertakings and households by increasing the capital and the sol-
vency of credit institutions in Denmark and thus enhancing their possibility to
offer finance to the real economy”.30
With respect to the requirement to continue lending to the real economy, three
remarks are in order. Firstly, what is the added value of this requirement? Does
the requirement to continue lending to the real economy change the behaviour
of banks? Or would they also have continued lending without the obligation to
do so (in exchange for State aid)?
Secondly, the requirement to continue lending to the real economy is a useful
way to avoid a credit crunch to the real economy. It should, however, be kept in
mind that excessive lending is not beneficial to society.31
Thirdly, the beneficiary bank is usually required to reduce its activities
(“downsizing”). There is some tension between the requirement to continue
lending to the real economy and the downsizing-requirement.32
8.3.3 Concluding remarks
In some decisions, the Commission referred to earlier decisions in order to
underline that its decisional practice is consistent. Consider, for instance, the
following recital.
“The Commission has already observed in several cases that recapitalisa-
tion is in principle an appropriate mean to strengthen the banks and thus to
restore market confidence”.33
The approach of the Commission with respect to the current relevant characte-
ristic can thus be considered consistent. However, it should be recalled that
the fact that a capital injection is an appropriate means to strengthen the bank,
is to a very large extent self-explanatory. It would have been very hard for the
Commission to be inconsistent (by claiming that a capital injection would not be
suitable to strengthen the bank). This illustrates that the Commission easily
arrives at the conclusion that the aid measure is appropriate.
29. See also: Ayadi, De Groen & Thyri 2015.
30. Danish bank support scheme (amendment), N31a/2009, para. 4.
31. Admati et al. 2011, p. 44.
32. This was also observed by Winckler & Laprevote (2009, p. 14) and by Adler, Kavanagh &
Ugryumov (2010, p. 69).
33. Hungarian bank support scheme, N664/2008, 12 February 2009, para. 46.
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Part II: Necessity
The second of the three compatibility-criteria is the criterion that the aid should
be necessary. When is aid “necessary”? Necessity is defined as follows:
“The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the
objective. That implies that it must be of the minimum amount necessary to
reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the dis-
turbance. In other words, if a lesser amount of aid or a measure in a less
distortive form were sufficient to remedy a serious disturbance in the entire
economy, the measure in question would not be necessary”.34
The necessity of ad hoc guarantees and ad hoc recapitalisation measures will
be discussed in sections 8.4 and 8.5. In case of a bank support scheme – which
can be a guarantee scheme, recapitalisation scheme or any other scheme – there
is an additional relevant characteristic: the fact that the bank support scheme has
a maximum budget. This will be discussed in section 8.10.
8.4 Material and temporal scope of the guarantee
* The fact that the guarantee (scheme) is limited in time and scope.
8.4.1 Material scope of the guarantee
The (material) scope of the guarantee concerns the question which securities are
covered by the guarantee. As a general principle, the scope of the guarantee
should be limited to the form of financing that is experiencing the greatest prob-
lems at that moment.
Existing debt versus newly issued debt
As a general rule, the Commission notes positively that existing debt is not cov-
ered but only newly issued debt.35 However, there are some guarantee schemes
under which a guarantee for existing debt is possible. The Latvian guarantee
scheme is such a scheme. However, the decision points out that the Latvian State
will only guarantee existing debt in exceptional cases; for instance, when a gov-
ernment guarantee is needed to avoid the bank’s immediate bankruptcy.36 The
scheme contained the commitment that banks whose existing liabilities were
guaranteed, have to present a restructuring plan.37
34. See also the definition in: Kommunalkredit Austria (KA), SA.32745, 31 March 2011,
para. 58.
35. See, for instance: UK bank support scheme, N507/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 59.
36. Latvian guarantee scheme, N638/2008, 22 December 2008, para. 10 and 40.
37. Latvian guarantee scheme, N638/2008, 22 December 2008, para. 21.
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Subordinated debt
As a general rule, the Commission notes positively that subordinated debt
is excluded from the scope of the guarantee scheme.38 However, there are
exceptions, as is illustrated by the Irish guarantee scheme. This scheme also
included subordinated debt (Lower Tier-2).39 The Commission observed that
the extended scope of the Irish scheme made Ireland an exception (compared to
the guarantee schemes of the other Member States).40 In the decision on the
scheme, the Commission held that although the inclusion of subordinated debt
was remarkable, it was nonetheless justified.41 Firstly, the inclusion was nec-
essary to ensure revolving of existing subordinated debt. Secondly, the scheme
introduced a safeguard to mitigate the concerns that the inclusion of sub-
ordinated debt could raise. This safeguard consisted of the requirement that
banks benefiting from the guarantee on subordinated debt had to maintain at
least the solvency ratio initially obtained when this financing took place during
the whole duration of the guarantee period.
Covered bonds
There are three guarantee schemes that included covered bonds: the Finnish,
German and Swedish scheme.42 The Commission did not consider this to be
problematic, because of the following reasons. In the first place, a premium was
charged. The Commission took the view that the level of remuneration would
ensure that the guarantee would only exceptionally be called for covered
bonds.43 In the second place, the covered bonds were an integral part of the
Swedish financial system and the Danish experience had shown that the
exclusion of covered bonds form the guarantee would lead to the drying up of
the market.
8.4.2 Temporal scope of the guarantee
The principle that the aid should be limited to the minimum necessary requires
that the guarantee should be limited in time. The temporal scope of the guarantee
can concern two aspects: the maturity/duration of the guarantee and the time
window of the guarantee scheme (issuance period).
38. See, for instance: UK bank support scheme, N507/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 59.
39. Irish guarantee scheme, NN48/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 17.
40. Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 48.
41. Irish guarantee scheme, NN48/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 64.
42. Swedish bank support scheme, N533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 42; Finnish guarantee
scheme, N567/2008, 13 November 2008, para. 23 and 38.
43. German bank support scheme, N625/2008, 12 December 2008, para. 75.
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Time window of the scheme/issuance period
With respect to the UK Guarantee scheme, the Commission noted positively
that the scheme had a short issuance period (i.e. six months instead of two
years).44 A time window of six months means that banks have only a window of
six months to issue the new debt that would benefit from the guarantee. As a
result of this short issuance period, the overall amount of debt covered is lower
than if the guarantee would be given for newly issued debt over a two year
period. The temporal scope is thus limited.
Maturity/duration
The duration of the guarantee should be as short as possible. In principle, this
should be 3 years. Nevertheless, in justified exceptional cases, the guarantee
may apply for five years. However, this may occur only up to a certain amount
(up to one third of the debts of the bank). This precondition is also reprised in
point 59(b) of the 2013 Banking Communication. In addition, the six-monthly
reports must include an update on the granting of such guarantees and the
justification in each case.45
In some decisions, some specific elements can be found. For instance, in the
decision on the Hungarian guarantee scheme, it was noted that in the Hungarian
market, funding to finance housing loans is an important part of the market.
Since the duration of these loans usually exceeds 3 years, the Commission
considered that it was justified that part of the guarantee budget could be used to
cover loans of between 3 and 5 years duration.46
Another element can be found in the decision on the Swedish scheme. Under
the Swedish guarantee scheme, covered bonds were guaranteed for a period for
up to 5 years. This exceptional duration was justified by the fact that covered
bonds were an integral part of the Swedish financial system.47
8.4.3 Concluding remarks
The present section has shown that the Commission consistently assessed
whether the guarantee was limited in time and scope. For instance, in most
cases, the Commission welcomed the fact that the guarantee did not include
existing debt (but only newly issued debt). In the cases where the guarantee did
cover existing debt, the Commission noted that the extended scope of the
guarantee was justified. Thus, in either case, the relevant characteristic was taken
into account by the Commission.
44. UK bank support scheme, N507/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 60.
45. Polish guarantee scheme, N208/2009, 25 September 2009, para. 44.
46. Hungarian bank support scheme, N664/2008, 12 February 2009, para. 60.
47. Swedish bank support scheme, N533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 44.
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8.5 Necessity of recapitalisation measures
‘Necessity’ means that the aid amount should be limited to the minimum
necessary; the aid amount should not be more than is needed to achieve the
objective of the aid measure. The necessity of the measure is thus closely linked
to the objective of the measure. In that regard, it should be recalled that the
objective of a recapitalisation is usually to ensure that the bank complies with the
regulatory capital requirements.
Thus, the amount of the capital injection should be limited to what is necessary
to ensure that the bank fulfils its regulatory capital requirements. For instance, in
the Rescue Decision on Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the Commission
considered that the aid was limited to covering MPS immediate capital needs,
catering also for further foreseeable risk factors which could endanger compli-
ance with EBA minimum capital ratios.48
The Commission finds the aid to be limited to the minimum necessary when the
aid amount is derived from the calculation of the specific capital needs of the
bank.49 It should, however, be noted that the Commission does not assess
whether the capital needs of the bank are correctly calculated. The Commission
essentially limits itself to the observation that the aid amount will ensure that the
bank will again fulfil its regulatory capital requirements.
Thus, the Commission does not usually dwell on the exact amount of aid needed
to cover the bank’s capital needs. Nevertheless, in a few cases, the Commission
referred to the fact that the financial supervisor had determined the amount of
State aid needed.50
The analysis of the bank State aid decisions reveals that the Commission never
concludes that the aid amount is not limited to the minimum necessary. Just as
the Commission always accepts a recapitalisation as an appropriate measure
(see subsection 8.3.3), a recapitalisation is always accepted as a necessary
measure. It is worth stressing that this does not mean that Member States can
just grant large amounts of aid. Indeed, the amount of aid has repercussions
for the extent of restructuring required (as will be explained in section 10.3).
48. Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), SA.35137, 17 December 2012, para. 37.
49. See, for instance: Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), SA.35062, 18 July 2012, para. 50.
50. For instance, in its assessment of the necessity of the State aid to NKBM, the Commission
held as follows: “The Commission recognises the need for the recapitalisation in favour
of NKBM. The letters from the Bank of Slovenia endorse that necessity. In particular, the
Bank of Slovenia states that currently the level of the CT1 is insufficient for the Bank to
meet regulatory requirements from the end of 2012 and that NKBM is a systemically
important bank for Slovenia.” See: Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709,
20 December 2012, para. 37.
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Part III: Proportionality
After establishing that the aid is appropriate and necessary, the Commission
proceeds to the third compatibility-criterion, according to which the aid should
be proportionate. When is aid “proportionate”? Proportionality is defined as
follows:
“The positive effects of the measures must be properly balanced against the
distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the
minimum necessary to reach the measures’ objectives. This follows from
Article 3(1)(g) EC and Article 4(1) and (2) EC, which provide that the
Community shall ensure the proper functioning of an internal market with
free competition.”
State aid measures are usually considered to be proportionate if three elements
are present: in the first place, there should be an adequate remuneration (see
section 8.6), in the second place, there should be exit incentives (see section 8.7),
in the third place, there should be behavioural safeguards in place (see section
8.8).
8.6 Adequate remuneration
* The fact that the beneficiary bank pays an adequate remuneration to the
State.
8.6.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Beneficiary bank do not receive State aid for free: in return for the State aid,
the bank has to pay a remuneration to the State. For instance, when the bank is
recapitalised by the State, the bank has to pay interests or dividends to the State.
Similarly, when a bank benefits from a State guarantee, it has to pay a guarantee
fee to the State.
The remuneration of State aid is a key element of the compatibility-assess-
ment.51 This is illustrated by the following recital, which can be found in several
decisions:
51. It should be noted that an adequate remuneration is also important in the context of the
assessment of burden-sharing and own contribution, since the remuneration (that the
beneficiary bank pays to the State) constitutes an own contribution by the beneficiary bank.
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“As regards proportionality, the distortions of competition is minimised by
various safeguards. Above all, the aid amount is minimised through market
orientated premiums”.52
In essence, the remuneration should be adequate. The fact that the beneficiary
bank pays an adequate remuneration to the State is thus a relevant characteristic.
8.6.2 Pricing of guarantees
The Commission has provided guidance in the form of pricing principles.
Initially, these pricing principles were based on the Recommendations of
20 October 2008 of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.
The pricing principles were updated twice: by the DG Competition Staff
Working Document (30 April 2010)53 and by the Second Prolongation Com-
munication.
The pricing principles
The ECB Recommendations of 20 October 2008 made a distinction between
guarantees on bank debt with maturities exceeding 1 year, and guarantees on
bank debt with maturities of less than or equal to 1 year. In the latter case, the
pricing should be based on an overall flat fee of 50 basis points. The pricing
formula of guarantees on bank debt with a maturity exceeding 1 year, was more
complicated. It comprised two elements: the pricing should be based on i) the
bank’s CDS spread54, and ii) an add-on fee (of 50 basis points).
A bank’s CDS spread is a good measure of the (credit-)risk profile of a
bank.55 Sometimes, there are no CDS data (or no representative CDS data).
However, if the bank has a credit rating, then the CDS spread can be derived
from the CDS spreads of banks with the same credit rating.
In April 2010, the pricing principles were updated by the DG Competition Staff
Working Document.56 Although the financial markets had not yet returned to
entirely normal functioning, the Commission observed a “gradual stabilisation
52. Polish bank support scheme, para. 45; Greek bank support scheme, para. 70; Slovenian
guarantee scheme, para. 37; UK bank support scheme, para. 61;
53. DG Competition Staff Working Document of 30 April 2010 on the application of State aid
rules to government guarantee schemes covering bank debt to be issued after 30 June
2010.
54. The bank’s median five-year senior debt CDS spread observed in the period 1 January to
31 August 2008.
55. This view is not shared by everyone. For instance, the Turner Review (p. 109) argues that
CDS spreads are poor indicators of risk.
56. Another important feature of this DG Competition Staff Working Document is that it
introduced a requirement to submit a viability plan when certain thresholds (of total
outstanding guaranteed liabilities) are exceeded. This will be discussed in detail in section
10.2.3.
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of the market situation”which led to a reduction of the risk premium for unguar-
anteed bank debt.57 As a result, sound banks chose to attract funding on the
financial market without using the government guarantee. The DG Competition
Staff Working Document of 30 April 2010 therefore provided for an increase of
the guarantee fee by 20-40 basis points.58
A second update of the pricing principles took place by the adoption of the
Second Prolongation Communication in December 2011. Thus far, the guaran-
tee fees were based on the banks’ CDS spreads, because those CDS spreads
were thought to reflect the risk profile of the individual banks. However, the
Commission noticed that the banks’ CDS spreads were not only influenced by
bank-specific factors, but that those spreads were also affected by the growing
tensions in sovereign debt markets.59 In addition, there was an overall increase
in the perception of risk in the banking sector as a whole. The pricing formula
was therefore updated “to isolate the intrinsic risk of individual banks from
changes in CDS spreads of Member States and of the market as a whole”.60
The decisional practice
Most guarantee schemes provided for a guarantee fee that was in line with
the ECB recommendations of 20 October 2008. If the fee was in line with the
ECB recommendations, the Commission considered the remuneration to be
appropriate.61
In ‘duly justified cases’ a lower remuneration can be accepted. The case of
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) is such a ‘duly
justified case’. Anglo and INBS were merged. The merged entity essentially was
a resolution vehicle which facilitated the orderly resolution of Anglo and INBS.
The merged entity would not carry out any economic activities besides those
necessary to work out the loan book. The Commission further noted that Anglo
and INBS would both disappear from the Irish lending and deposit markets.
These circumstances justified that the merged entity did not pay a fee for the
guarantee.62
57. DG Competition Staff Working Document, para. 24.
58. By 20 basis points for banks with a rating of A+ or A, by 30 basis points for banks with a
rating of A-, by 40 basis points for banks with a rating below A-. In June 2011, another DG
Competition Staff Working Document was published. In this document, it was concluded
that “with the price increase in May 2010 the right incentives were set in order to trigger an
exit from the reliance on State guarantees” and that a further price increase would not be
necessary.
59. In that regard, Pesaresi & Mamdani (2012, p. 770) stress that the Second Prolongation
Communication should be seen in the context of the sovereign debt crisis.
60. Point 17 of the Second Prolongation Communication.
61. German bank support scheme, N512/2008, 27 October 2008, para. 66.
62. Anglo/INBS, SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 137.
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Banco Privado Portugues (BPP) had to pay a fee of 20 basis points for the
guarantee. The Commission observed that this was well below the level of
remuneration normally required for distressed banks. The Commission consi-
dered that the low level of remuneration was needed to keep BPP afloat. The
Commission concluded the remuneration appropriate only for the rescue
phase.63 Importantly, the remuneration was subject to the submission of a
restructuring plan.64
8.6.3 Pricing of recapitalisations
The Recapitalisation Communication stresses that closeness of pricing to market
prices is the best guarantee to limit competition distortions.65 Nevertheless, the
Commission recognises that the remuneration for recapitalisations cannot be as
high as the then-current market levels.66 At the same time, the Commission
stresses that the total expected return on recapitalisation to the State should not
be too distant from current market prices.67
The ECB recommendations
With respect to the issue of remuneration, the Recapitalisation Communica-
tion refers to the ECB recommendations: on 20 November 2008, the Gover-
ning Council of the European Central Bank provided recommendations on the
pricing of recapitalisations. Pursuant to the ECB recommendations, the required
rate of return for fundamentally sound banks68 could be based on a “price cor-
ridor”. The price corridor consists of a lower bound and an upper bound. The
lower bound is the required rate of return on subordinated debt.69 The upper
bound is the required rate of return on ordinary shares.70 Pursuant to this
63. Banco Privado Português (BPP), C33/2009, 20 July 2010, para. 57.
64. Portugal failed to submit a restructuring plan.
65. Point 19 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
66. Point 24 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
67. Point 25 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
68. This methodology applies to fundamentally sound banks. By contrast, the remuneration for
distressed banks should be higher.
69. The required rate of return on subordinated debt would be determined as the sum of the
following components: i) the government bond yield of the country where the bank is
domiciled; ii) the issuing bank’s 5 year CDS spread on subordinated debt, where representa-
tive data is available, in order to account for the credit risk of the individual institution; iii) an
add-on fee of 200 basis points per annum to cover operational costs and provide banks with
adequate incentives, as well as to avoid significant discrepancies with the observed average
yield on subordinated debt in the euro area.
70. The required rate of return on ordinary shares would be determined as the sum of the
following components: i) the government bond yield of the country where the bank is
domiciled; ii) an equity risk premium of 500 basis points per annum; iii) an add-on fee of 100
basis points per annum to cover operational costs and provide banks with adequate
incentives. A lower add-on fee is considered appropriate for ordinary shares for several
reasons, including the fact that they represent higher quality (core Tier-1) capital.
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methodology, the minimum remuneration will amount to between 7,0% and
9,3% on average71 for fundamentally sound banks, according to the bank’s risk
profile and the structure of the capital instrument. As such, the average price
corridor represents an indicative range.72
Pursuant to point 28 of the Recapitalisation Communication, the Commission
accepts a minimum remuneration based on this methodology. This remuneration
is differentiated at the level of an individual bank on the basis of i) the type of
capital chosen, ii) appropriate benchmark risk-free interest rate, iii) the indivi-
dual risk profile. On top of this entry level of remuneration, Member States may
include a step-up clause. This follows from point 29 of the Recapitalisation
Communication; and will be discussed in section 8.7.
Many recapitalisation schemes included a remuneration methodology in line
with the Recapitalisation Communication and the ECB recommendations.
There were some exceptions. For instance, the Lithuanian recapitalisation
scheme contained a remuneration formula that differed from the ECB formula.73
Instead of using the bank’s CDS spread, the sovereign CDS was used.74 The
Commission accepted this, because the remuneration exceeded the remuneration
calculated on the basis of the ECB formula.75 In footnote 6, it was remarked that
some Lithuanian banks had a higher credit rating than the Lithuanian State.
Another interesting case is the case of the Finnish recapitalisation scheme.
Under this scheme, the Finnish State subscribed to subordinated debt issued
by the beneficiary banks. The interest that those banks had to pay was based
on the Finnish government 5-year bond yield with an add-on of 600 basis
points.76 Two things are of importance here. Firstly, this remuneration level
significantly exceeded the remuneration level set by the ECB recommendations
of 2008. Secondly, the remuneration under the Finnish scheme is not based on
the risk profile of the individual banks. The Commission observed that this “one
size fits all” solution might – in theory – create a biased outcome in favour of the
banks with a high risk profile. However, with reference to the “particular
situation of Finland” the Commission found this “one size fits all” solution to be
71. The percentages of 7,0% and 9,3% are calculated by using average (mean or median) values
of the relevant parameters (government bond yields, CDS spreads, equity risk premia). See
point 27 of the Recapitalisation Communication and points 3 and 4 of the ECB recommenda-
tions.
72. Point 27 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
73. The interest rate that Lithuania charged, consisted of the sum of i) the yield of comparable
government bonds, ii) Lithuania 5 year CDS, and iii) an add-on fee of 200 basis points.
74. Lithuanian bank support scheme, N200/2009 and N47/2010, 5 August 2010, para. 30-31,
102-104.
75. Lithuanian bank support scheme, N200/2009 and N47/2010, 5 August 2010, para. 104.
76. Finnish recapitalisation scheme, N329/2009, 11 September 2009, para. 9.
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justified. The Finnish banking sector is characterised by a relative homogeneity
of the prudential situation of the banks. There is no bank with a regulatory
capital ratio below 8,5%, so the overall level of capitalisation of the Finnish
banks is relatively high.
The cases of the Lithuanian recapitalisation scheme and Finnish recapitalisation
scheme illustrate that the Commission accepts alternative pricing methodolo-
gies, provided that they lead to a higher remuneration than the methodology
based on the ECB recommendations.77
Specific guidance on variable remuneration
In the Second Prolongation Communication, the Commission gave some fur-
ther guidance, in particular with respect to capital instruments bearing a variable
remuneration. Thus far, the Commission guidance mainly applied to capital
instruments bearing a fixed remuneration.78 Point 8 of the Prolongation Com-
munication requires that the new shares should be subscribed at a discount to the
market price.79 With respect to hybrid instruments, the Second Prolongation
Communication introduced an “alternative coupon satisfaction mechanism”.80
This mechanism requires that coupons which cannot be paid out in cash would
be paid to the State in the form of newly issued shares.81
Pursuant to the guidance provided in the Second Prolongation Communica-
tion, the new Spanish recapitalisation scheme provided that the entry price for
the recapitalisation via ordinary shares would be based upon a discount, of at
least 25%, on the market or economic value of the beneficiary bank. The dilution
effects, due to the recapitalisation of the FROB, would be taken into considera-
tion before that discount is computed.82 As the Commission noted in its decision
on NordLB, “an acceptable discount in its recent decisional practice has been
identified to be 25%”.83 A sufficient discount is a form of an ex-ante remunera-
tion of the capital injection.84
77. This is also recognised in point 30 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
78. See also: Pesaresi & Mamdani 2012.
79. As Lienemeyer, Kerle & Malikova (2014, p. 277) put it, the Second Prolongation Com-
munication brought an end to the situation in which some Member States avoided diluting
ordinary shareholders by paying too high a price per share.
80. Point 13 of the Second Prolongation Communication.
81. Point 13 of the Second Prolongation Communication.
82. Spanish (new) recapitalisation scheme, SA.35069, 25 July 2012, para. 27.
83. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 119. The Commission referred to its decision on
the new Portuguese recapitalisation scheme (SA.34055, 30 May 2012).
84. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 153.
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Participation of private investors
The Recapitalisation Communication stresses that closeness of pricing to
market prices is the best guarantee to limit competition distortions.85 This
general principle is translated into the following criterion: if there is a significant
participation of private investors (30% or more) on equal terms as the State, then
the Commission considers the remuneration to be appropriate.86 This criterion
– which is laid down in point 21 of the Recapitalisation Communication – is
applied in the cases of the Swedish recapitalisation scheme, the Portuguese
recapitalisation scheme, the German scheme and the new Spanish recapitalisa-
tion scheme.87
To take the Swedish scheme as an example: under this scheme, the Swedish
State would only take part in recapitalisations if there was a participation of at
least 30% of private investors. Another condition was that the State and the
private investors would participate on equal terms.88 Point 21 of the Recapita-
lisation Communication further stresses that in case of a significant participa-
tion of private investors, there does not appear to be any need for ex ante
competition safeguards or exit incentives. There is however one precondition:
the terms of the deal are not such as to significantly alter the incentives of private
investors. The decision on the Swedish recapitalisation scheme provides some
further clarification about this precondition.89 Firstly, the private contribution
should not stem mainly from the current shareholders or other investors with a
vested interest in the bank. Secondly, the remuneration should not be below the
remuneration indicated as appropriate in point 26 to 30 of the Recapitalisation
Communication.
The recapitalisation of Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB) took place through a
public offering of the shares. First, the existing shareholders were given the
opportunity to take up the new shares (pro-rata to their shareholdings). Second,
shares not taken up by the existing shareholders were offered to the open
market. The Slovenian State was one of the existing shareholders (49%) and
subsequently acquired 49% of the newly issued shares. In addition, the Slo-
venian State had committed to purchase any shares not taken up by the general
public.90 This commitment amounted to an underwriting of the capital increase
85. Point 19 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
86. Point 21 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
87. Portuguese recapitalisation scheme, N556/2008, 20 May 2009, para. 76-78; German bank
support scheme, N512/2008, 27 October 2008, para. 54; Spanish (new) recapitalisation
scheme, SA.35069, 25 July 2012, para. 31. The 30%-participation by private investors was
also briefly mentioned in N 557/2008 – Austria, 9 December 2008, para. 28. It was specified
that “territorial authorities and public undertakings within the meaning of the Transparency
Directive do not rank as private investors”.
88. Swedish recapitalisation scheme, N69/2009, 10 February 2009, para. 37.
89. Swedish recapitalisation scheme, N69/2009, 10 February 2009, para. 39.
90. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.32261, 7 March 2011, para. 19.
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of NLB. Because of the (implicit) underwriting by the Slovenian State, the
Commission considered that the NLB-case was not comparable to the situation
contemplated in point 21 of the Recapitalisation Communication. The Commis-
sion concluded that regardless of the outcome of the IPO, the Slovenian State
cannot be said to have acted on equal terms with private investors.91
Compensation by far-reaching restructuring
An important (pricing) principle can be found in points 15 and 44 of the
Recapitalisation Communication. Pursuant to these points, a low remuneration
can be accepted on the condition that the lower remuneration will be reflected
in the restructuring plan. This principle has been applied in several bank
State aid cases. For instance, in the Rescue Decision on Catalunya Banc, the
Commission considered that it was justified that no remuneration was paid for
the recapitalisation measure provided that the absence of remuneration would
be compensated by in-depth restructuring in the restructuring plan.92
A low remuneration thus has to be compensated for by far-reaching restruc-
turing. This principle can be linked to a greater concept: the need for far-
reaching restructuring. As will be discussed in-depth in chapter 10, the “need
for far-reaching restructuring” is a central concept in the Commission’s State
aid control policy. While there are also other factors that trigger the need for
far-reaching restructuring, section 10.4 will focus specifically on the principle
that a low remuneration has to be compensated for by far-reaching restruc-
turing.93 In the context of the current chapter, it can be concluded that the
Commission has shown some flexibility by accepting a lower remuneration in
several bank State aid cases.
8.6.4 Concluding remarks
It can be observed that the Commission has consistently assessed whether the
remuneration was adequate. Indeed, in every case, the Commission either
concluded that the remuneration was in line with the ECB recommendations
or concluded that the low level of remuneration was justified and/or had to be
compensated for by far-reaching restructuring.
91. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.32261, 7 March 2011, para. 39.
92. Catalunya Banc, SA.33103, 30 September 2011, para. 51.
93. This principle will also be touched upon in section 9.10.
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8.7 Exit incentive
* The fact that there are exit incentives.
8.7.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Two key elements in the proportionality-assessment are the fact that there is an
adequate remuneration (see section 8.6) and that there are behavioural restric-
tions (see section 8.8). There is another key element which is on the interface of
the adequate remuneration and behavioural restrictions. This key element will be
discussed in the present section and concerns the exit incentive. ‘Exit’ means
exit from reliance on State aid. There are two types of exit incentives: a step-up
clause in the remuneration (see subsection 8.7.2) and behavioural constraints
(see subsection 8.7.3).
8.7.2 Step-up clause
A step-up clause means that the remuneration (that the beneficiary bank has to
pay to the State) increases over time. This is a powerful incentive for beneficiary
banks to pay back the injected capital. It is therefore welcomed by the Com-
mission.94
A step-up clause can be designed in several ways, as is illustrated by the
following four examples:
– The Portuguese recapitalisation scheme contained a step-up clause: each
year, the remuneration rate would increase by 50 basis points until the
injected capital was reimbursed.95
– The Slovak scheme provided for an increase by 50 basis points in the fourth
year after the capital injection, and by 100 basis points in the fifth year after
the capital injection.96
– The Greek FSF recapitalisation scheme contained a special step-up clause.
The preference shares were supposed to be redeemed within five years. If
that five-year had lapsed and the redemption of the preference shares had
not been completed, an annual cumulative surcharge of 2% was to be
charged.97
– The Polish scheme included a step-up factor, which was calculated as
(1+2*Lombard rate)n, where n indicated the length of the State engagement
in years.98
94. Point 31 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
95. Portuguese recapitalisation scheme, N556/2008, 20 May 2009, para. 29 and 80. NB: this
applied to recapitalisations where there was no significant participation of private investors.
96. Slovak bank support scheme, N392/2009, 8 December 2009, para. 15 and 64.
97. Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund, N328/
2010, 3 September 2009, para. 29 and 63.
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The Finnish recapitalisation scheme – which was described in section 8.6.3 –
did not include a step-up clause. However, the remuneration rate was very
high. The Commission therefore concluded that there was no prima facie need
for exit incentives.99 The Commission went on to consider that Finland had
committed to provide information on the path to exit.
Similarly, in the case of the Swedish recap scheme, the Commission
concluded that there was no prima facie need for exit incentive, because – as
explained in section 8.6.3 – there was a significant participation of private
investors which meant that the remuneration was market-oriented.100 This con-
sideration is in line with point 21 of the Recapitalisation Communication which
indicates that there does not appear to be any need for exit incentives, in case of
a significant participation of private investors.
8.7.3 Other exit mechanisms
Several cases included a dividend ban. The Commission considered that the
dividend ban was an (additional) incentive for banks to reimburse the injected
capital.101 A dividend ban is aimed at the bank’s shareholders. It gives them an
incentive to support or demand a reimbursement of the injected capital at the
earliest opportunity.
The Portuguese recapitalisation scheme did not include a dividend ban, but it
contained the clause that if a beneficiary bank decided to pay out dividends to
its shareholders, the remuneration rate of the injected capital would be increased
by 50 basis points.102 The Commission concluded that this could be regarded as
a further incentive to pay back capital to the State as quickly as possible.103
In fact, all behavioural constraints are to some extent ‘painful’ and make it
unattractive for a bank to be dependent on State aid over a long period. Not only
restrictions on dividend payments, but also restrictions on the executive
remuneration policy are exit incentives. In the decision on the Polish recapita-
lisation scheme, the restrictions on the executive remuneration policy were
98. Polish recapitalisation scheme, N302/2009, 21 December 2009, para. 19 and 56.
99. Finnish recapitalisation, N329/2009, 11 September 2009, para. 41-42.
100. Swedish recapitalisation scheme, N69/2009, 10 February 2009, para. 42.
101. Slovak bank support scheme, N392/2009, 8 December 2009, para. 65. Greek bank support
scheme, N560/2008, para. 61.
102. Portuguese recapitalisation scheme, N556/2008, 20 May 2009, para. 30.
103. Portuguese recapitalisation scheme, N556/2008, 20 May 2009, para. 80.
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mentioned as exit incentives.104 A similar observation can be found in the deci-
sion on the Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU). In that case, payment of
bonuses were suspended to the LCCU staff and executives until the injected
capital was repaid.105
8.7.4 Concluding remarks
The Commission has consistently welcomed the fact that there are exit incen-
tives. As discussed in the present section, the exit incentives can be designed
differently. However, no matter how they are designed, they all have the effect of
inducing the bank to repay the aid. In that regard, there is no inconsistency.
8.8 Behavioural constraints
* The fact that there are behavioural constraints (in the rescue phase).
8.8.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
The previous section already provided some examples of behavioural con-
straints, such as the dividend ban and restrictions on the executive remuneration
policy. Other examples of behavioural constraints are the acquisition ban, the
advertising ban and the ban on aggressive commercial practices.
The presence of behavioural commitments106 forms a key element in the
assessment of the proportionality. In the first place, behavioural constraints are
relevant, because they serve as an exit incentive – as was explained in section
8.7. In the second place, behavioural constraints limit the distortions of competi-
tion. As a result of these behavioural constraints, the Commission finds the aid
proportionate.
It should be pointed out that behavioural constraints are very important to the
second stage of the compatibility-assessment (i.e. when the Commission
assesses the restructuring plan). Many behavioural constraints apply during
the entire restructuring period. However, the Commission welcomes the intro-
duction of behavioural safeguards in the rescue phase, as is illustrated by the
decision on the prolongation of the Polish bank recapitalisation scheme. In this
104. Polish recapitalisation scheme, N302/2009, 21 December 2009, para. 56.
105. LCCU, SA.34208, 26 September 2012, para. 58. NB: this consideration was part of the
assessment of the burden-sharing (and not part of the proportionality-assessment).
106. As regards terminology, it should be noted that there are various terms to express the same
concept. In the Commission decisions, the following terms can be found: behavioural
commitments, behavioural constraints, behavioural restrictions, behavioural safeguards and
behavioural measures.
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decision, the Commission observed that the rescue phase can last long
(sometimes as much as several years). From this perspective, it is – in the
view of the Commission – important that the Member State introduces behav-
ioural safeguards as early as possible.107
Bank support schemes usually include the following behavioural commitments:
remuneration restrictions; coupon/dividend ban; advertising ban; balance sheet
growth limitation. An overview of these behavioural constraints is provided in
the table in Annex V. This table indicates for each bank support scheme which
behavioural constraints are included in the scheme.
Since behavioural constraints are mainly important to the second stage of the
compatibility-assessment, they will be discussed in chapters 11, 12 and 13.
However, two behavioural constraints that were specifically taken into account
in the assessment of the proportionality of a bank support scheme, will be
discussed here; this concerns the balance sheet growth limitation (see subsection
8.8.2) and the ban on advertising (see subsection 8.8.3).
8.8.2 Balance sheet growth limitation
As is indicated in the table in Annex V, several bank support schemes included
a balance sheet growth limitation. For instance, the Swedish guarantee scheme
provided the following: the aggregate growth in balance sheet volume (of
the banks that are participating in the guarantee scheme) may not exceed the
highest of the following three percentages: i) the annual rate of growth of
Swedish nominal GDP in the preceding year; ii) the average historical growth of
balance sheets in the Swedish banking sector during the period 1987-2007; iii)
the average growth rate of the balance sheet volumes in the banking sector in the
EU in the preceding six months.108
In January 2009, Sweden amended the guarantee scheme. One of the
amendments was to repeal the balance sheet growth limitation. Sweden argued
that this behavioural constraint was an “unnecessary disincentive for eligible
institutions to benefit from the guarantee”.109 The Commission accepted this
amendment. In that regard, the Commission referred to footnote 4 (related to
point 35) of the Recapitalisation Communication, in which the Commission
recognised that balance sheet restrictions were not necessary in recapitalisation
schemes of fundamentally sound banks. The same applied to guarantee schemes,
unless there is a serious risk of displacement of capital flows between Member
States.
107. Polish recapitalisation scheme (prolongation), SA.35943, 11 February 2013, para. 22.
108. Swedish guarantee scheme, N533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 14.
109. Swedish guarantee scheme (amendment), N26/2009, 29 January 2009, para. 20.
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Following this new guidance, all Member States that had set up schemes
including a balance sheet growth limitation removed this particular behavi-
oural constraint.110
8.8.3 Ban on advertising
Banks may not use State aid to expand their activities. Therefore, as a general
rule, beneficiaries of State aid are prohibited from advertising referring to the
State aid. This behavioural constraint can be found in many cases.
In most cases, the ban on advertising is a straightforward prohibition. There
is one case, however, that contains a more nuanced restriction: one of the com-
mitments of the Bulgarian scheme (which provided liquidity support to
Bulgarian banks) was a ban on advertising. The commitment was specified as
follows: “to impose a ban on advertising referring to State support by the ben-
eficiaries of the scheme for the purpose of acquiring new clients and businesses
and to prevent them from employing any aggressive commercial strategies
which would not take place without the support of the scheme”.111 This is not a
complete ban on advertising, since it is limited to advertising ‘for the purpose of
acquiring new clients and businesses’. The limited scope of the advertising ban
was justified by the circumstances on the Bulgarian financial markets. Appa-
rently, there was a risk of a bank run. Banks therefore needed to reassure their
depositors. This particular situation justified the narrower scope of the behavi-
oural constraint.
8.9 Restructuring plan
As explained in section 8.1.3, the appropriateness, necessity and proportio-
nality of State aid measures are sometimes assessed in the Restructuring
Decision (instead of the Rescue Decision). For instance, the Restructuring
Decision on Banco Mare Nostrum included an assessment of the appropria-
teness, necessity and proportionality of measures C, D and E, while measures
A and B were already assessed in the Rescue Decision. The fact that the pro-
portionality of some State aid measures is assessed in the Restructuring Decision
means that in its assessment of the proportionality, the Commission can take
into account the restructuring plan that the Member State has submitted for
the beneficiary bank. Indeed, in the Restructuring Decision on Banco Mare
Nostrum, the Commission held as follows:
110. Finland, N44/2009, para. 23; Spain, N588/2009, 1 December 2009, para. 13; UK, N650/
2008, para. 26;
111. Bulgarian liquidity support scheme, SA.38994, 29 June 2014.
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“The Commission considers that, in principle, the proportionality of mea-
sures C and D should be assessed in the light of the depth of the Restruc-
turing Plan, taking into account measures to ensure burden-sharing and
limiting distortions of competition. It therefore refers to its assessment of the
measures under the Restructuring Communication below”.112
This recital shows that the aid measures were considered proportionate in
the light of the restructuring plan. This illustrates that there is some overlap
between the (first stage) compatibility-criterion ‘proportionality’ and the (second
stage) compatibility-criteria ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘limiting competition distor-
tions’. The fact that the Commission in this Restructuring Decision merely refers
to the second stage of the compatibility-assessment also fits in with the obser-
vation that the main focus of the Commission is on the second stage of the
compatibility-assessment (and not on the first stage).
Part IV: Other observations
8.10 Additional relevant characteristics in the context of a bank
support scheme
Many Member States have set up bank support schemes. The most common
schemes are recapitalisation schemes and guarantee schemes.113 When assess-
ing the compatibility of a bank support scheme, the Commission usually
welcomes the fact that the scheme is targeted at the appropriate beneficiaries
(see subsection 8.10.1), the fact that the scheme is open to subsidiaries of for-
eign banks (see subsection 8.10.2), and the fact that the scheme has a maximum
budget (see subsection 8.10.3).
8.10.1 Targeted at the appropriate beneficiaries
May every bank benefit from State aid under the scheme or is the scope of the
scheme limited to certain banks? This question concerns the eligibility for
the scheme. Many guarantee schemes and some recapitalisation schemes were
112. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 107. The decision on
BMN is taken as example. These recitals can also be found in decisions on several other
Spanish banks, such as Catalunya Banc (para. 137-139) and Liberbank (para. 94-96). See
also: BFA, para. 155 and 162. These decisions were all taken in November/December 2012
and were structured in a similar way. See also: RBS, para. 142; KA, 31 March 2011, para.
61.
113. An asset relief scheme, a bond loan scheme and a wind-down scheme are examples of
other types of bank support schemes.
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targeted at solvent/fundamentally sound banks. The Commission consid-
ered that those schemes were targeted at the appropriate beneficiaries. The
fact that the scope of the bank support scheme is limited to solvent/fun-
damentally sound banks thus appears to be a relevant characteristic.
The following recital clearly explains the rationale of limiting the eligibility of
the recapitalisation scheme:
“This is in principle an appropriate means to strengthen financial institu-
tions and thus to prevent credit supply restrictions and limit the passing-on
of the financial markets difficulties to other businesses. This is all the more
so as the Scheme is exclusively aimed at institutions that are fundamentally
sound, and thus, rather than absorbing new capital simply to ensure their
solvency, will be in a position to translate a more comfortable capital levels
into increased lending activities”.114
By contrast, the Commission does not clearly explain the rationale of limiting
the eligibility for the guarantee scheme. The Commission merely indicated
that “the scheme is targeted at the appropriate beneficiaries as the eligibility of
participating firms is limited in principle to solvent companies”.115
With respect to the elaboration of the relevant characteristic, it should be noted
that the guarantee schemes use the term “solvent”, while the recapitalisation
schemes use the term “fundamentally sound”.116 While “fundamentally sound”
refers to the well-known indicator (i.e. aid amount exceeding more than 2% of
the bank’s RWA), the decisions do not apply a uniform definition of ‘solvent’.117
For instance, the under the Swedish guarantee scheme ‘solvent’ was understood
as banks with at least 6% Tier 1 capital and at least 9% combined Tier 1 and Tier
2 capital.118 In a decision on another scheme, ‘solvent’ was interpreted as a Tier
1 ratio of 7%.
114. Swedish recapitalisation scheme, N69/2009, 10 February 2009, para. 32. See also: Finnish
recapitalisation scheme, N329/2009, 11 September 2009, para. 35.
115. See for instance: Finnish guarantee scheme, N567/2008, 13 November 2008, para. 35.
116. The UK scheme is an exception to this observation, since it limits the eligibility for the
entire scheme (which includes a guarantee scheme and recap scheme) to solvent banks.
117. The 2013 Banking Communication introduced an additional criterion with respect to the
eligibility for guarantee schemes: pursuant to point 60a, the scheme must be restricted to
banks without a capital shortfall. The guarantee schemes that were assessed on the basis of
the 2013 Banking Communication were all in line with this new requirement. For instance, in
July 2013, Poland limited the eligibility of the guarantee scheme to solvent banks which
have no capital shortfall according to the most recent Union-wide capital exercise or other
equivalent national exercises by the national supervisory authorities. See: Polish guarantee
scheme (prolongation), SA.36965, 23 July 2013, para. 5. Footnote 10 specified that ‘no
capital shortfall’means a capitalization of at least 9% (according to the EBA capital exercise).
118. Swedish guarantee scheme, N533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 5.
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Although the Commission welcomes the fact that the scheme is limited to fun-
damentally sound/solvent banks, it is not applied consistently. Many recapita-
lisation schemes were open to fundamentally sound banks as well as distressed
banks. While the Commission noted positively the fact that the scheme was
aimed at fundamentally sound banks, it did not note negatively the fact that the
scheme was open to all banks.
More importantly, the fact that the scheme is limited to fundamentally
sound/solvent banks is not really a relevant characteristic. Indeed, even if
distressed banks are excluded from the scope of the recapitalisation scheme,
they can still be recapitalised by means of an individual aid measure.
8.10.2 Open to subsidiaries of foreign banks
Banks often operate across national borders (through subsidiaries or branches).
In principle, subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks should be eligible for
a support scheme. This was clearly established by the 2008 Banking Commu-
nication. Point 18 of the 2008 Banking Communication requires that the
eligibility criteria for a guarantee scheme should be objective and non-discri-
minatory. Point 18 further specifies that “in application of the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, all institutions incorporated in the
Member State concerned, including subsidiaries, and with significant activi-
ties in that Member State should be covered by the scheme.” Although this
requirement was specified in the context of guarantee schemes, it also applies to
recapitalisation schemes and other types of bank support schemes, pursuant to
point 35 and 44 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
The analysis of the bank State aid decisions reveals that all schemes comply
with this requirement. There is no scheme that excludes subsidiaries of foreign
banks.119 This can be explained by the fact that the scheme should be open
for subsidiaries of foreign banks, is a clear requirement to which Member States
have to comply. If a Member State would have proposed a scheme that excluded
subsidiaries of foreign banks, then the scheme would most probably not be
approved by the Commission.
8.10.3 Maximum budget of the scheme
Most guarantee schemes and recapitalisation schemes had a maximum budget.
This was welcomed by the Commission, because a maximum budget ensures
that the aid measure is limited to a certain amount.120 This maximum budget can
119. Only the Irish scheme initially excluded foreign-owned banks, but the exclusion of foreign-
owned banks was later reversed. For more information on this particular aspect of the Irish
scheme, see: Honohan 2009, p. 220-221; Gebski 2009, p. 93; Kluth & Lynggaard 2013,
p. 783. Nicolaides & Rusu 2010, p. 761; Grossman & Woll 2014, p. 586.
120. Hungarian bank support scheme, N664/2008, 12 February 2009, para. 50.
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be expressed in absolute terms or in relative terms. The Latvian guarantee
scheme is an illustration of the latter: this scheme contained a maximum of 10%
of Latvia’s GDP.121 In addition, the maximum budget can relate to the individ-
ual bank or to the entire banking sector (or to both). For instance, the Swedish
guarantee scheme had both an overall maximum budget and a maximum amount
for each beneficiary bank.122
Sometimes, when a bank support scheme is prolonged, the Member State
choses to decrease the maximum budget of the scheme. As a general rule, the
Commission notes positively such a decrease.123 This illustrates clearly that
the amount of the budget of the bank support scheme matters to the Commis-
sion. The opposite is also possible: in 2010, the ceiling for the Greek guarantee
scheme was increased from EUR 15 billion to EUR 30 billion.124 The Com-
mission accepted this amendment to the scheme, because of the specific situ-
ation of the Greek banking sector. Because of severe fiscal imbalances, Greece’s
credit rating was downgraded. Consequently, the credit ratings of Greek banks
were also downgraded, which restricted their access to the money market and
capital market. 125
The analysis of the bank support schemes reveals that that most schemes had
a maximum budget. Only the Irish guarantee scheme did not have a maximum
budget. In its Commission Staff Working Paper, the Commission observed
that this made Ireland an exception (compared to the guarantee schemes of the
other Member States).126
While it is true that a maximum budget ensures that the aid is limited to a cer-
tain amount, there are still some questions that can be asked. To what extent is
the exact amount of the maximum budget important? And is it only about the
amount in absolute terms or should it be related to the size of the banking sector?
In the Commission’s decisions, only the amount of the maximum budget is
mentioned. No reference is made to the size of the banking sector.
121. Latvian guarantee scheme, N638/2008, 22 December 2008, para. 47. Interestingly, this
maximum budget was not discussed in the context of the criterion of necessity, but in the
context of the proportionality of the guarantee scheme.
122. This maximum amount consisted of either: a) the sum of that bank’s debt instruments, or b)
20% of that bank’s deposits as of 1 September 2008. Support measures for the banking
industry in Sweden, N 533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 9.
123. See: Portuguese guarantee scheme (prolongation), N51/2010, 22 February 2010, para. 28.
124. The original Greek guarantee scheme contained a maximum budget of EUR 15 billion. In
footnote 2 of the Commission decision (N560/2008, 19 November 2008), it was indicated
that this maximum could be amended, but that it could not exceed the amount of EUR 23
billion. It was also indicated that any amendment would have to be approved by the
Commission.
125. Greek bank support scheme (amendment), N163/2010, 12 May 2010.
126. Commission Staff Working Paper 2011, p. 48.
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8.10.4 Concluding remarks
The present section discussed three characteristics of bank support schemes
that are usually welcomed by the Commission in its decisions on bank support
schemes. I am of the opinion that although the Commission welcomes these
characteristics, the relevance of these characteristics is limited. Indeed, since a
Member State can always grant State aid outside the context of the scheme, the
characteristics that are specific to the scheme have only limited relevance.
8.11 Conclusion
The characteristics that were discussed in this chapter are relevant to the assess-
ment of whether the State aid was appropriate, necessary and proportionate. The
conclusion that the State aid was appropriate, necessary and proportionate would
result in the temporary approval of the aid. The final approval was dependent
on whether the restructuring plan met the three restructuring objectives. As set
out in section 8.1, most bank State aid cases were characterised by this two-stage
compatibility-assessment.
A remarkable thing about the two-stage compatibility-assessment is that the
first and second stage are to some extent overlapping. Admittedly, the two stages
focus on different aspects of the bank State aid case: the first stage of the assess-
ment mainly concerns the aid, while the second stage of the assessment mainly
concerns the restructuring plan. Nevertheless, some of the relevant characteris-
tics discussed in the present chapter are not only relevant to the first stage of
the compatibility-assessment, but also to the second stage. In other words: the
relevance of these relevant characteristics transcends the first stage of the com-
patibility-assessment.
This finding applies in particular to the relevant characteristics discussed in
sections 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8. Indeed, the fact that the bank pays an adequate remu-
neration to the State (i.e. the relevant characteristic discussed in section 8.6) is
also relevant in the context of burden-sharing/own contribution (i.e. the second
pillar), because the remuneration constitutes an own contribution. In the same
vein, exit incentives and behavioural commitments (i.e. the relevant characte-
ristics discussed in section 8.7 and 8.8) are not only relevant in the rescue phase,
but also in the restructuring phase. Consequently, they are relevant in the con-
text of compensatory measures (i.e. the third pillar). The overlap between the
first and second stage of the compatibility-assessment is also evidenced by
the fact that in several cases, the Commission concluded that the aid could be
considered appropriate, necessary and proportionate in light of the restructuring
plan (see section 8.9).
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The finding that the relevance of these relevant characteristics transcends the
first stage of the compatibility-assessment has an important implication: the
relevance of these relevant characteristics is unaffected by the 2013 Banking
Communication, which – as explained in section 8.1 – largely abolished the
two-stage compatibility-assessment.
The present chapter has elaborated on recapitalisation measures and guarantee
measures, while asset relief measures are absent in this chapter. This is because
the compatibility of asset relief measures is based on a very specific assessment
framework: the IAC, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 9. Compatibility with the Impaired
Assets Communication
9.1 Introduction
As explained in the previous chapter, State aid measures have to be appropri-
ate, necessary and proportionate. With respect to asset relief measures (also
referred to as impaired asset measures1), there is a special compatibility-assess-
ment: these measures have to be compatible with the principles of the Impaired
Assets Communication (IAC).2 In that regard, the IAC sets out the following
criteria for the compatibility of asset relief measures: i) eligibility of assets, ii)
transparency and disclosure, iii) management of assets, iv) valuation, and v)
burden-sharing and remuneration.
These five criteria can be found in section 5 of the IAC. The bank State aid
decisions explicitly refer to section 5 of the IAC and its various subsections.3
This makes it all the more surprising that the decisions are structured in a slightly
different way than section 5 of the IAC. Since this PhD-study analyses the deci-
sional practice, the present chapter will follow the structure of the decisions
(rather than the structure of section 5 of the IAC).
The current chapter discusses how the Commission has analysed the compa-
tibility of impaired assets measures. Asset relief measures can have a compli-
cated structure. Therefore, before focussing on the specific compatibility-criteria,
1. In the bank State aid decisions, the terms “asset relief measures” and “impaired assets
measures” are used interchangeably.
2. In addition, point 16 of the IAC recalls that asset relief measures should comply with the
general principles of necessity, proportionality and minimisation of competition distor-
tions.
3. These subsections are:
▪ 5.1. Appropriate identification of the problem and options for solution: full ex ante
transparency and disclosure of impairments and an upfront assessment of eligible
banks
▪ 5.2. Burden-sharing of the costs related to impaired assets between the State, share-
holders and creditors
▪ 5.3. Aligning incentives for banks to participate in asset relief with public policy
objectives
▪ 5.4. Eligibility of assets
▪ 5.5. Valuation of assets eligible for relief and pricing
▪ 5.6. Management of assets subject to relief measures
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it is useful to describe the basic features of asset relief measures. This will be
done in section 9.2. The compatibility-criteria will be discussed in sections 9.4
to 9.10. Before discussing the criteria set out in the IAC, a preliminary ques-
tion should be addressed: is the IAC applicable? The applicability of the IAC
will be discussed in section 9.3.
9.2 Asset relief measures
9.2.1 The rationale of asset relief measures
As footnote 5 of the IAC explains, banks typically hold a variety of assets, such
as financial assets (treasury bills, debt securities, equity securities, traded loans
and commodities), derivatives (swaps, options) and loans. During the financial
crisis, the market value of many assets fell dramatically. As a result, many banks
had “impaired assets” on their balance sheets. Impaired assets are assets whose
market value has fallen below the book value. Impaired assets are sometimes
described by the term “toxic assets”. However, the notion of “impaired assets” is
broader than “toxic assets”.4 Impaired assets also include assets on which high
losses are expected.5
If losses materialise and a bank has to write down on these assets, then this
results in a decline of equity, which might endanger the viability of the bank.
Markets know that banks have impaired assets, but they do not know how large
the losses on these assets will be. The very existence of impaired assets there-
fore creates uncertainty. Uncertainty can be around the exposure of banks to
impaired assets or around the size of expected losses.
As highlighted before, confidence is crucial to the banking sector. Uncertainty
regarding asset valuation can be damaging in several ways. First of all, markets
may overestimate the expected losses on impaired assets. Such a negative
market perception may result in higher financing costs for banks.6 Secondly,
uncertainty may have repercussions to the real economy. Writing down on
impaired assets reduces the bank’s equity. In order to restore the capital ratio, the
bank either has to attract new equity or to reduce the RWA. Since investors may
not always be interested in providing capital to troubled banks, those banks
may opt for the second option (i.e. reducing assets). Reducing the amount of
4. Boudghene & Maes 2012a, p. 778.
5. Another term is “illiquid assets”. These are assets which cannot be sold on the market,
because the market may have been frozen or dried up.
6. Landier & Ueda 2009, p. 5. Quigley (2010, p. 353) noted that “the main problem
preventing the banks from raising capital on the financial markets was the massive element
of bad loans on their books from the property development sector”.
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assets can be achieved in two ways. The first way is by not renewing maturing
loans. This might lead to a contraction of credit; in other words: a credit crunch.
The second way to reduce the amount of assets is by selling some of the assets.
However, this may further depress asset prices. This phenomenon is known as
“fire sales”.
In order to remove market uncertainty and to revive market confidence, Mem-
ber States have undertaken measures to relieve banks from their impaired
assets. The aim of asset relief measures is to reduce the provisioning or write-
down needs of the beneficiary bank and to protect its capital base. Asset relief
measures remove a source of volatility on the bank’s balance sheet. In that
regard, asset relief measures free up capital, because they reduce the RWA of
the beneficiary bank. The ultimate goal of asset relief measures is improving the
financial position of banks and their access to finance and increasing bank
lending to the real economy.
9.2.2 Types of asset relief measures
Although asset relief measures can take several forms – asset purchase, asset
insurance, asset swap or some hybrid form7 – annex II of the IAC distinguishes
between two broad approaches: i) the segregation of impaired assets from
good assets, and ii) an asset insurance scheme. Also in the literature, two main
types of asset relief measures are usually distinguished: asset purchases and asset
guarantees.8
Asset purchase
An asset purchase means that the State effectively purchases the impaired
assets from the bank. Usually, the State does not purchase the impaired assets
itself. Rather, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is created, which is fully or par-
tially sponsored by the State. It is the SPV that purchases the impaired assets
from the bank. The impaired assets are transferred to the SPV, usually referred
to as Asset Management Company. In order to be able to pay for the impaired
assets, the SPV needs funding. The SPV has to issue equity or debt to finance its
purchase of impaired assets. The SPV is usually sponsored by the state, which
means that the state injects capital or guarantees debt.
7. Point 11 of the IAC.
8. See: Boudghene & Maes 2012b, p. 4.
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Asset guarantee
An asset guarantee is a form of insurance. The State commits to bear some or all
of the losses on the impaired assets. Usually, the losses are divided into tranches.
The first tranche of losses – sometimes referred to as “the first-loss position” –
will be borne by the bank, while the second tranche of losses will be borne by the
State. In exchange for this guarantee, the bank has to pay a fee.9
Asset guarantee measures can be structured in different ways. Sometimes, the
second tranche of losses is entirely borne by the State; sometimes, the bank also
has to bear part of the second tranche of losses. For instance, in the UK Asset
Protection Scheme, the UK government committed to cover 90% of the losses
in excess of the first-loss position, so 10% of the second tranche of losses would
be borne by the bank.10
Sometimes, there are only two tranches; sometimes, there are three tranches
(in which case the State only covers the second tranche; losses beyond the
second tranche are covered by the bank).11
The differences between both types of asset relief measures
While asset purchases and asset guarantees are both asset relief measures,
there are some important differences between them. The first difference con-
cerns the upside potential. The market value of an impaired assets portfolio is
not constant. On the one hand, there is a risk that the value of the portfolio will
decrease. This is known as the downside risk.12 On the other hand, there is a
chance that the value of the portfolio will increase. This is known as the upside
potential. Asset purchase measures and asset guarantee measures have in com-
mon that the downside risk is (partially or fully) transferred to the State. But in
the case of an asset guarantee, the impaired assets remain on the bank’s balance
sheet. As a result, if the value of the impaired asset portfolio increases, then the
bank will benefit. So the upside potential remains with the bank. From the view-
point of the bank, this is an advantage, while from the viewpoint of the state, it is
disadvantageous.
9. Sometimes, the bank is also obliged to lend to the real economy at agreed levels on
commercial terms. See Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009,
para. 42.
10. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 42.
11. See, for instance: HSH Nordbank, N264/2009, 29 May 2009, para. 15.
12. Another definition of ‘downside risk’ is: the risk that ex post losses will turn out to exceed
ex ante expected losses. See Boudghene & Maes 2012a, p. 778.
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The second difference concerns the payment. An asset purchase implies that
the SPV has to pay for the impaired assets. This constitutes an advantage for the
bank (who receives cash or receivables), and a disadvantage for the State (who
has to make an upfront investment).13 In the case of an asset guarantee, there is
no need for such an upfront investment.14
To sum up: in the case of an asset purchase, the State has to make an upfront
investment, but enjoys the upside potential. In the case of an asset guarantee, the
State does not have to make an upfront investment, but it does not enjoy the
upside potential.
9.2.3 Asset relief scheme
In most instances, asset relief measures were granted as ad hoc aid. There are,
however, also some cases in which asset relief measures were granted in the
context of an asset relief scheme. Two prime examples of asset management
companies are NAMA in Ireland and SAREB in Spain.15 Other asset relief
schemes are: the Austrian asset relief scheme, the German asset relief scheme
(N314/2009, 31 July 2009) and the Lithuanian asset relief scheme (N47/2010,
5 August 2010). Interestingly, these schemes have never been used.
NAMA – which stands for National Asset Management Agency – was the asset
relief scheme for banks in Ireland. This scheme was approved by the Commis-
sion by decision of 26 February 2010.16 The impaired asset measures by which
the impaired assets were transferred from the Irish banks to the NAMAwere not
assessed individually by the Commission. The decisions on the Irish banks that
also benefited from other State aid measures do thus not contain an assess-
ment of the compatibility of the impaired asset measures to the IAC. Never-
theless, reference is made to the NAMA and the decision approving the NAMA.
The approach with respect to NAMA stands in contrast to the approach with
respect to the Spanish asset management company SAREB (“Sociedad de
Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria”). Unlike
the decision on NAMA, there is no overall decision in which the transfers of
impaired assets to the SAREB are approved. The measures by which the
impaired assets were transferred to the SAREB were assessed separately for
each individual beneficiary bank.17
13. Point 11 of the IAC recognises that the budgetary situation of the Member State is an
important consideration in the choice of asset relief measure.
14. Boudghene, Maes & Scheicher 2010, p. 14.
15. For more information about NAMA, see, inter alia: Quigley 2010; Murphy 2013.
16. NAMA, N725/2009, 26 February 2010.
17. Banco Mare Nostrum, NCG, Banco CEISS, Liberbank, Cajatres.
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9.2.4 Overview of asset relief measures
Which banks benefited from an asset relief measure? The table in Annex VI
provides an overview of the asset relief measures. The table indicates which
banks have benefited from an asset relief measure. In addition, the table indi-
cates the type of asset relief measure (asset purchase, asset guarantee or a hybrid
form).
9.3 Applicability of the IAC
* The fact that the measure has the effect of relieving the bank from its
impaired assets.
9.3.1 Material scope of the IAC
Asset relief measures have to be assessed under the Impaired Assets Com-
munication (IAC). However, State aid measures are sometimes designed in such
a way that it is not crystal clear whether they qualify as asset relief measures.
The IAC defines asset relief as any measure whereby a bank is dispensed
from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes.
In deciding whether a State aid measure has to be assessed under the IAC, the
Commission looks at the effect of the State aid measure. If the aid measure has
the effects of an asset relief measure, then it falls within the scope of the IAC.
That the IAC has to be applied to all measures that qualify as asset relief measure
was stressed by the Commission in its decision on the risk shield of HSH
Nordbank. In this case, Germany argued that the IAC was not applicable to the
risk shield. According to Germany, the IAC had to be regarded “as an admin-
istrative instruction only, designed solely to ensure consistent administrative
practice and binding on the Commission alone”. Germany therefore argued that
the compatibility of the risk shield with the internal market should be assessed
directly under the TFEU.18 The Commission held as follows:
“Contrary to what is argued by Germany, the Impaired Assets Communica-
tion does not serve merely to ensure consistent administrative practice.
Rather, it sets out the State aid rules to be applied to asset relief measures.
Taking account of their specific features, it translates the State aid rules into
compatibility criteria to be applied to such measures. Applying the Impaired
Assets Communication should ensure consistency between asset relief
measures introduced by the Member States and compliance with State aid
monitoring requirements. (…) Thus the objectives of the Communication
18. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 110-112.
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are broader than what is argued by Germany, and are not confined to admin-
istrative practice. To fulfil the above objectives the Commission has to apply
the Impaired Assets Communication to all asset relief measures”.19
The question as to the applicability of the IAC was addressed in several cases.
For instance, in the case of the Austrian bank BAWAG, Austria argued that
the IAC was not applicable. The asset relief measure in the case of BAWAG
had a complicated structure. BAWAG had sold its impaired assets to four indi-
rectly wholly-owned special purpose subsidiaries and agreed that these special
purpose subsidiaries could defer payment.20 Austria had granted a guarantee
for the payment of the receivables from the special purpose subsidiaries.
Austria argued that the IAC was not applicable to the guarantee.21 However,
the Commission considered that – since the equity of the subsidiaries was
relatively low – an impairment of the assets by the subsidiaries would almost
certainly lead to an impairment of the receivables.22 The Commission therefore
concluded that the measure acted as if it guaranteed the underlying impaired
assets and provided BAWAG with an asset relief. The measure thus fell within
the scope of the IAC.
The remainder of this subsection will focus on two particular situations that
raise the question whether the IAC is applicable: i) asset relief measures which
are similar to recapitalisation measures (see subsection 9.3.1.1), and ii) the split-
up of the bank (see subsection 9.3.1.2).
9.3.1.1 Asset relief measures which are similar to recapitalisation measures
Some asset relief measures are very similar to recapitalisation measures. This
raises the question whether these measures should be considered as recapitalisa-
tion measures or as asset relief measures. The cases of OVAG, HGAA, ABN
AMRO and KBC illustrate how the Commission has addressed this question.
These cases will be discussed below.
The Austrian banks Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA) and Österreichische
Volksbanken AG (OVAG) both benefited from an asset guarantee. This asset
guarantee differed from standard impaired asset measures, because it was
structured in such a way that it did not influence the banks’ RWA. Rather, it
was aimed at reducing the loan-loss provisions that the banks had already made
for expected losses on the covered assets. OVAG and HGAAwould be able to
draw the guarantee and request the recourse from the State (the guarantor) if
19. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 162.
20. BAWAG, N640/2009, 22 December 2009, para. 25.
21. BAWAG, N640/2009, 22 December 2009, para. 39.
22. BAWAG, N640/2009, 22 December 2009, para. 54.
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they provided evidence that the debt was irrecoverable and only if and as far
as the recourse was necessary to avoid that the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio
would fall below a certain threshold. The asset guarantee also differed in other
aspects from a standard impaired asset measure, since the asset guarantee cov-
ered the first-loss position. In addition, any amount drawn needed to be repaid
to the State. The Commission concluded that the asset guarantee, as it was con-
structed, protected the capital base of OVAG and HGAA. It was therefore simi-
lar to a capital injection (and should thus be assessed as such).23
One of the aid measures in the case of ABN AMRO was a capital relief instru-
ment (CRI). The CRI had a very particular background: it was related to the con-
sequences of the acquisition of ABNAMROHolding by the Consortium (Fortis,
RBS and Santander) in 2007. The consortium members intended to separate
ABN AMRO Holding into three parts and created so-called ‘tracking shares’
representing the economic ownership of the businesses attributed to each con-
sortium member. Fortis became the economic owner of ABN AMRO N. Items
that were not allocated to the individual consortium members were brought
together in the so-called ABN AMRO Z-share (“ABN AMRO Z”). Each con-
sortium member held a pro-rata stake in ABN AMRO Z. In October 2008, the
Dutch State acquired Fortis Bank Nederland (FBN) and the ABN AMRO
Holding assets owned by FBN.
The CRI covered the Dutch mortgage portfolio of ABN AMRO N.24 With
respect to the CRI-measure, the Commission noted that the guaranteed portfolio
was not made of impaired assets. By contrast, it was a traditional Dutch mort-
gage portfolio of which neither ABN AMRO N nor external experts expected
the performance to deteriorate to a significant extent.25 The Commission con-
sidered that the CRI was de facto a proxy for a recapitalisation measure: the
CRI-measure reduced the RWA of ABN AMRO N. Accordingly, it provided a
capital relief and therefore covered the capital shortage (at the level of ABN
AMROZ) without implementing a standard capital increase.26 The Commission
noted that the choice of the Dutch State to grant a credit protection instrument
instead of a standard recapitalisation had been only dictated by the fact that
prior to the separation of ABN AMRO N from the ABN AMRO Holding, the
Dutch State could not ring-fence capital contributions in ABN AMRO Bank.
In other words, since ABN AMRO N was not a separate legal entity, a capital
injection in ABN AMRO Bank could also have benefited the other two con-
sortium members.27
23. Österreichische Volksbanken AG (OVAG), SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 91; Hypo
Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), SA.32172, 19 July 2011, para. 30.
24. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 101.
25. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 294.
26. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 February 2010, para. 104.
27. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 109.
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Even though the Commission concluded that the CRI was de facto a proxy
for a recapitalisation measure, it considered that the CRI-measure should be
assessed by analogy on the basis of the principles laid down in the IAC, in order
to ensure that the CRI-measure was consistent with other capital relief
schemes.28 In particular, in order to maintain a level playing field, the Commis-
sion assessed whether the CRI was not used to shift expected losses on the port-
folio to the Dutch State.
It should be noted that – in contrast to the asset guarantee in the case of
OVAG and HGAA – the CRI was designed as a typical asset relief measure:
ABN AMRO N kept a first-loss of 20% and a vertical slice of 5% of the
remaining risk.29
The State Protection measure in the case of KBC was structured in three
tranches. Losses within the first tranche had to be borne by KBC. For losses
within the second tranche (the “Equity Range”), the Belgian State would pro-
vide fresh capital to KBC. For losses within the third tranche (the “Cash Range”),
the Belgian State would provide KBC with cash. The Commission considered
that a distinction should be made between the Equity Range and the Cash Range
of the measure. The Commission considered that the Cash Range, where the
Belgian State is committed to compensate KBC for losses in cash, should be con-
sidered as an asset relief measure. Therefore its compatibility was assessed under
the IAC. By contrast, the Commission considered that the commitment to inject
capital, subject to the trigger event of specific realised losses, associated with
the Equity Range should be considered as equivalent to a capital injection.
Therefore, the compatibility of the Equity Range was assessed under the Recapi-
talisation Communication.30
9.3.1.2 The split-up of the bank
In several cases, the beneficiary bank was split-up into a good bank (to be sold)
and a bad bank (to be wound-down).31 For instance, Dunfermline Building
Society was split-up; the good part of Dunfermline was transferred to Nation-
wide (following an open and transparent tender), while the remaining part
(“Rump Dunfermline”) was put in wound-down. The Commission treated the
break-up of Dunfermline Building Society as an asset relief measure.32 Con-
sequently, the Commission applied the IAC. In its decision on Dunfermline, the
Commission pointed out that the Dunfermline business transferred to Nation-
wide, being the continuation of economic activity of the former Dunfermline,
28. ABNAMRO, C11/2009, 5 February 2010, para. 103; ABNAMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011,
para. 284.
29. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 104-105.
30. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 119-120.
31. In this PhD-study, this is referred to as the S/T/W-context.
32. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 68-70.
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would not have to bear the consequence of potential losses on the assets left
behind in the Rump Dunfermline. The Commission noted that the effect of the
aid measures undertaken by the UK was the creation of an entity (sold to
Nationwide) that was relieved from the impaired assets of its predecessor.33
This consideration can also be found in other decisions (taken in the S/T/
W-context). For instance, in the decision on Northern Rock, the Commission
held that the effect of the aid measures undertaken by the UK had resulted in
the creation of a bank (i.e. BankCo) that is relieved from the impaired assets of
its predecessor (i.e. Northern Rock).34 By the same token, the split-up of
Quinn and of Parex Banka was considered as an asset relief measure.35
Remarkably, there are also cases (in which the bank was split-up) that were
not treated as asset relief measures. This is the case for KA36, Eik Banki,
Amagerbanken, Fionia Bank, Banco Espirito Santo and Bradford&Bingley.
9.3.2 Temporal scope of the IAC
Should the IAC be applied to asset relief measures that were introduced before
the adoption of the IAC on 26 March 2009? This question was answered
in the affirmative in several decisions.37 For instance, in the decision on
WestLB, the Commission held as follows:
“Although the measure at issue predates the adoption of the Impaired Assets
Communication, the Commission has to apply the law and guidelines in force
at the time its decision is adopted, irrespective of the time at which the aid
measures were designed or notified”.38
9.3.3 Relevance of the applicability-question
Why does it matter if a State aid measure has to be assessed under the IAC?
The classification of a State aid measure as an asset relief measure means that
the measure can only be authorised by the Commission if it satisfies the criteria
of the IAC. In that regard, section 5 of the IAC sets out several criteria that have
to be complied with. These IAC-criteria will be discussed in the following sec-
tions of the present chapter.
33. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 68.
34. Northern Rock, C14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 105.
35. Parex Banka, C26/2009, 15 September 2010, para. 109.
36. The case of KA is even more remarkable, because even though the Commission considered
that the split-up of KA had to be regarded as an impaired asset measure, it did not explicitly
apply the IAC to this case.
37. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 126; WestLB, C40/2009, 20 December 2011,
para. 125; HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 155.
38. WestLB, C40/2009, 20 December 2011, para. 125.
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9.4 Eligibility of assets
* The fact that the ‘eligibility-criterion’ of the IAC has been met.
The compatibility-assessment usually starts with the ‘eligibility-criterion’ of the
IAC. In that regard, many decisions recall that “section 5.4 of the IAC39 indi-
cates that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets and that
certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility”.40
In most cases, the eligibility of assets is not really an issue. For instance, in the
case of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), the guaranteed portfolios
mainly consisted of assets such as RMBS, CMBS, CDO’s, CLO’s and ABS.41
The Commission held that these are “typically assets for which there is a market
failure and at which impaired asset relief measures are targeted”.42 Similarly,
in the case of the Belgian bank KBC, the Belgian State had granted protection
on KBC’s CDO portfolio.43 Since only CDO’s were covered, this case did not
raise any issues of eligibility. The Commission recalled that in Annex 3 of the
IAC, CDO’s are mentioned as examples of impaired assets which can be
included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility.44 Thus, in
cases involving structured securities, it is quite easy to establish that the ‘eligi-
bility-principle’ of the IAC has been met.
However, not only structured securities are eligible to asset relief measures. The
approach of the Commission with respect to the eligibility of assets can be char-
acterised as broad. This is apparent from point 32 of the IAC, which proposes
“a pragmatic approach including elements of flexibility, which would ensure
that other assets also benefit from relief measures to an appropriate extent and
where duly justified”. This is elaborated in points 34 and 35 of the IAC. Point 34
provides for the possibility of extending eligibility to “well-defined categories
of assets corresponding to the systemic threat upon due justification, without
quantitative restrictions”. Point 35 provides for the possibility for banks to be
relieved of impaired assets outside the scope of eligibility set out in points 32,
33 and 34 of the IAC without the necessity of a specific justification for a maxi-
mum of 10-20 % of the overall assets of a given bank. Point 36 of the IAC is
39. Section 5.4 of the IAC corresponds to points 32-36 of the IAC.
40. This is a standard consideration which can be found in many decisions. See, for instance:
MKB, 16 December 2015, para. 93.
41. The abbreviations RMBS, CMBS, CDO’s, CLO’s and ABS stand for residential mortgage-
backed securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations,
collateralized loan obligations and asset-backed securities.
42. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 57.
43. KBC, C18/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 29.
44. KBC, C18/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 73.
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also of importance, since it stipulates that the wider the eligibility criteria, the
more thorough the restructuring and the remedies to avoid undue distortions
of competition will have to be.45
The broad approach of the Commission as regards the ‘eligibility of assets-prin-
ciple’ is visible in several decisions. For instance, in the case of WestLB, the bad
bank did not only consist of structured securities but comprised also corporate,
State, municipal, and student loans. The Commission recalled that the IAC rec-
ognised the necessity of a pragmatic and flexible approach to the selection of
asset types for impaired assets measures. Furthermore, the Commission noted
that the range of asset classes affected by the financial crisis became broader due
to spill-over effects. In particular, student loans and securities related to ship-
ping, aircraft and real estate in general, face illiquid markets and/or were subject
to severe downward adjustments. The Commission therefore considered that
asset relief for such assets could help to achieve the objectives of the IAC, even
if such assets were not included in the assets classes that initially triggered the
financial crisis. However, the Commission held that pursuant to point 36 of the
IAC, the comparatively broad range of assets affected required an increased
depth of restructuring.46
9.5 Transparency and disclosure
* The fact that the ‘transparency and disclosure-criterion’ of the IAC has been
met.
As regards the ‘transparency and disclosure-criterion’, many decisions refer to
section 5.1 of the IAC47, which requires full ex ante transparency and disclosure
of impairments on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures.48 The
term ‘ex ante’ means that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to
government intervention.
45. In several decisions, the Commission referred to point 36 of the IAC: WestLB, C40/2009,
22 December 2009, para. 56; HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 167;
Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 133.
46. WestLB, C40/2009, 22 December 2009, para. 56.
47. Section 5.1 of the IAC corresponds to points 19 and 20 of the IAC.
48. As the Commission explains in footnote 1 relating to point 20 of the IAC, the terms
‘transparency’ and ‘full disclosure’ should be understood as meaning transparency vis-à-vis
the national authorities, the independent experts involved and the Commission.
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As the Commission explained in one of its decisions, ex-ante transparency
implies a clear identification of the assets and exposure. This is necessary to
identify the amount of aid in the asset relief measure and to ascertain whether
the aid is needed to address a temporary problem or whether the bank in ques-
tion is technically insolvent.49
Point 20 of the IAC also stresses that transparency should be based on adequate
valuation certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the rel-
evant supervisory authority.50
In addition, point 20 of the IAC stipulates that the valuation should be in line
with the principles of valuation developed in section 5.5 of the IAC. Valuation
is a requirement that appears in section 5.5 of the IAC, but it is also part of the
requirement of section 5.1 of the IAC. This is also apparent in the Opening
Decisions on ING51 (31 March 2009, para. 58) and on LBBW (30 June 2009,
para. 60), in which the Commission concluded that the requirement of section
5.1 of the IAC was met, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation. Fur-
ther in these two decisions, in the context of section 5.5 of the IAC, the Com-
mission indicated that it had doubts regarding the valuation. In my opinion,
the relation between section 5.1 and 5.5 of the IAC can be understood as fol-
lows: section 5.5 concerns the methodology of the valuation, whereas section
5.1 concerns the procedural aspects (i.e. there should be an ex ante valuation and
the valuation should be certified and validated).
Although in some Opening Decisions52 the Commission may have expressed
some doubts, in the end, the Commission always concluded that the ‘transpar-
ency and disclosure-criterion’ of section 5.1 of the IAC was met.
49. Northern Rock, C14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 107.
50. For instance, in the decision on Banka Celje/Abanka, the Commission noted positively that
independent consultants had been engaged by Slovenia to review the quality of assets in
the context of the Slovenian Asset Quality Review 2013 exercise and that the valuation of
the assets had been performed by the Bank of Slovenia. Banka Celje/Abanka, SA.38522,
16 December 2014, para. 115.
51. Even though ING is a multinational which operates worldwide, I refer to it as a Dutch
bank (since it is headquartered in Amsterdam, Netherlands). In that regard, it is noteworthy
that companies can have several ‘nationalities’; this is the case when the ‘legal home’,
‘financial home’ and ‘home for managerial talent’ differ. This phenomenon –which is known
as “multiple corporate citizenship” – is discussed in the pioneering work of A.A. Bootsma et
al. Equally noteworthy: the fact that many banks operate cross-border was used by E.V.A.
Eijkelenboom in her awesome contribution at the IvO/ICFG-conference of 3 December 2014
(“De toekomst van het toezicht op accountants”), in which she drew some parallels between
the banking union on the one hand and the (need for) European supervision on cross-border
audit firms on the other hand.
52. See, for instance: WestLB, C40/2009, 22 December 2009, para. 57-59.
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9.6 Management of the assets
* The fact that the ‘management-criterion’ of the IAC has been met.
The ‘management-criterion’ relates to the management of assets. In that regard,
section 5.6 of the IAC53 requires a clear functional and organisational separation
between the beneficiary bank and its impaired assets in order to prevent conflicts
of interest and facilitate the beneficiary bank’s focus on the restoration of via-
bility.54 How this IAC-criterion is interpreted in the decisional practice, depends
on the type of asset relief measure.
In case of an asset purchase
In case of an asset purchase, the impaired assets are hived off the bank’s balance
sheet. As a result, the ‘management-criterion’ is clearlymet. For instance, several
Spanish banks transferred impaired assets to an Asset Management Company
(AMC). Since the AMC is fully independent from the banks, the Commission
concluded that the separate asset management was in line with the require-
ments of the IAC.55
In case of a split-up of the bank
Also in case of a split-up of the bank, the ‘management-criterion’ is clearly met.
For instance, in the case of Dunfermline (in which the good parts were sold to
Nationwide, while the remaining parts were wound-down in Rump Dunferm-
line), the Commission noted that the impaired assets remaining in the Rump
Dunfermline were managed exclusively by the Rump Dunfermline and its
administrators. The Rump Dunfermline was separate and organisationally
independent from the transferred entity. The Commission therefore concluded
that the requirements of section 5.6 of the IAC were met.56 To conclude, in case
of a split-up of the bank, the impaired assets (remaining in the bad bank) are
functionally and organisationally separated from the good bank.
In case of an asset guarantee
A defining feature of the asset guarantee is that the impaired assets remain on
the bank’s balance sheet. In such a case, how can a ‘clear functional and organi-
sational separation between the beneficiary bank and its impaired assets’ be
achieved?
In the case of HSH Nordbank, the shielded assets remained on the bank’s
balance sheet under direct management and supervision of the bank. The Com-
mission had therefore doubts about the compatibility of the measure in relation
53. Section 5.6 of the IAC corresponds to points 44-46 of the IAC.
54. Point 46 of the IAC.
55. Liberbank, SA.35490, 20 December 2012, para. 106.
56. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 75.
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to the management of the assets.57 In the final decision, the Commission noted
favourably that HSH Nordbank had set up a restructuring unit; this was an inter-
nal winding-down bank with separate management.58
Also in the case of BayernLB, a restructuring unit was set up (which was
functionally and organisationally separated from the bank’s other units).59 The
Commission therefore considered that Germany had put in place adequate safe-
guards to prevent conflicts of interest and to ensure that losses on the covered
assets were reduced to the minimum.60
Similarly, in the decision on RBS, the Commission noted that adequate safe-
guards were put in place to prevent conflicts of interest.61 In addition, the Com-
mission considered the 10% vertical slice of losses in excess of the first-loss as
a positive element, because this gave RBS an incentive to maximise recoveries
on defaulted assets and hence minimising losses.62
To sum up, even though the impaired assets remained on the bank’s balance
sheet, the Commission always concluded that the ‘management-criterion’ was
met, when adequate safeguards were in place to prevent conflicts of interest.
9.7 Valuation
* The fact that the ‘valuation-criterion’ of the IAC has been met.
9.7.1 Market value, transfer value and ‘real economic value’
An important issue is the valuation of impaired assets. Before discussing the
valuation-criterion of the IAC, it is useful to clarify the various concepts of
value. A distinction can be made between the i) nominal value, ii) market value,
iii) real economic value (REV), and iv) transfer value.
The market value is what the market is willing to pay for the assets. Normally,
the market value should reflect the intrinsic value of financial assets. However,
the market value of impaired assets does not reflect their intrinsic value. The
IAC therefore introduces the concept of real economic value. The real eco-
nomic value corresponds to the net present value of the underlying cash flows,
57. HSH Nordbank, C29/2009, 22 October 2009, para. 45.
58. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 169.
59. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 141.
60. In that regard, it ensures that the aid is limited to the minimum. See also: UNNIM Banc,
SA.33733, 25 July 2012, para. 171-172.
61. These safeguards included adequate independent oversight and supervision rules, conflict
of interest resolution policies and a right for HM Treasury to step in to potentially take over
the management of covered assets if needed. See Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/
2009, 14 December 2009, para. 178. See also: Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012,
para. 154.
62. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 178.
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and should reflect the underlying long-term economic value of the assets.63 The
ex ante expected losses on the impaired assets are taken into account in the
calculation of the real economic value.
Another value concept is the transfer value. The transfer value is the price that
the State-sponsored special purpose vehicle (SPV) pays for the assets. In case of
an asset purchase, the impaired assets are really transferred to the State-spon-
sored SPV. But what is the ‘transfer value’ in case of an asset guarantee? In such
a case, the ‘transfer value’ corresponds to total nominal value of the shielded
assets minus the first-loss tranche.64 In other words: the transfer value is under-
stood as the insured amount.65
The difference between the transfer value and the market value is the amount
of aid that is incorporated by the asset relief measure. The aid amount thus
corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets and the
market value. It should be pointed out that in case of an asset guarantee, the
aid amount results from the difference between the transfer value and the market
value of the shielded assets, capped at the notional amount of the guarantee.66
The different concepts of value can be clarified bymeans of an example. Assume
that the nominal value of the portfolio of impaired assets is EUR 100, whereas
the market value is only EUR 50. Assume that the REV is EUR 80 and that the
portfolio is transferred at a price of EUR 80 (i.e. the transfer value is EUR 80).
The aid amount incorporated in the asset transfer is 30 (i.e. the difference
between the transfer value of 80 and the market value of 50). The bank has to
write-down the portfolio from 100 to 80, so the own contribution of the bank
is 20. This own contribution is known as ‘burden-sharing’ and will be discussed
in depth in section 9.8.
63. Sometimes referred to as ‘fundamental value’. See: Landier & Ueda 2009, p. 22.
64. This is also formulated as “the point at which the State compensates the bank for losses in
the form of cash” (see KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 124).
65. Footnote 1 related to point 41 of the IAC.
66. In some cases, the difference between the transfer value and the market value exceeds the
notional amount of the guarantee. For an example, see: BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February
2013, para. 128. See also: “To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current
market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has
mostly dried up, as claimed by the German authorities, this implies that there is no market
price in the absence of a market as defined by the Communication on impaired assets. There-
fore the aid amount is likely to be the same as the amount of the guarantee, i.e. € 5 billion.”
(WestLB, C43/2008, 12 May 2009, para. 58).
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9.7.2 Valuation methodology
The transfer value should be based on the real economic value (REV).67 The
valuation of the impaired assets is therefore very important. In that regard,
section 5.5 of the IAC68 notes that a correct and consistent approach to valuation
is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition.69
In cases involving asset relief measures, Member States provide evidence (usu-
ally from the national supervisory authority or a contracted valuation expert)
explaining how the transfer value was calculated. That valuation and the
underlying methodology is scrutinised by the Commission. To this end, the
Commission enlists assistance from external valuation experts.
The assessment of the valuation methodology is very technical and the Com-
mission decisions do not contain much information about the precise assess-
ment. Indeed, many decisions onlymention that theMember State had appointed
an external expert to assess the portfolio (in order to determine the transfer value)
and that the national supervisory authority had validated the valuation. In addi-
tion, it is usually indicated that the Commission has contracted external experts
to scrutinise the valuation.
There are a few decisions that elaborate a bit on the Commission’s assess-
ment of the valuation methodology. For instance, in the decision on Dexia, the
Commission indicated that it assessed whether (i) the valuation was based as
far as possible on observable inputs, (ii) it made realistic and prudent assump-
tions about future cash flows, and (iii) it was based on prudent stress-testing at
the time that the valuation was carried out.70 Mainly when the Commission has
doubts whether the ‘valuation-criterion’ has been met, the (opening) decision
elaborates on the valuation method. For instance, in its Opening Decision on
LBBW, the Commission noted that its external experts indicated doubts on the
establishment of the REVof the guaranteed portfolios, in particular as regards (i)
the choice of default probabilities for some assets, (ii) the choice of default
correlations, (iii) the choice of some recovery rates, (iv) house price assump-
tions, and (iv) other valuation issues.71
Of special interest is point 38 of the IAC, which provides that where the valu-
ation of assets appears particularly complex, alternative approaches could be
considered such as the creation of a ‘good bank’ (whereby the State would pur-
chase the good rather than the impaired assets) or public ownership of a bank
67. Pursuant to point 41 of the IAC.
68. Section 5.5 of the IAC corresponds to points 37-43 of the IAC.
69. In particular, point 42 of the IAC stresses that the valuation should take place according to
the principles listed in Annex IV of the IAC.
70. Dexia, C9/2009, 26 February 2010, para. 154.
71. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 69.
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(including nationalisation). In case of a nationalisation, no ex-ante valuation of
assets is needed insofar as the valuation is carried out over time in the context
of restructuring or liquidation. In its decisional practice, the Commission
referred only once to point 38 of the IAC. This only reference can be found in
the decision on Northern Rock, which was nationalised in 2008 by the UK State.
The Commission considered that “according to the IAC, the objective of valua-
tion is to calculate the amount of aid and thus the level of competition distor-
tion for the purposes of determining how far-reaching the restructuring should
be”.72 The Commission considered the restructuring in this case to be very far-
reaching. In view of the nationalisation of Northern Rock and the far-reaching
restructuring, the Commission concluded that an ex ante valuation was not nec-
essary.73 In my opinion, this decision is quite special in the sense that the assess-
ment of the ‘valuation-criterion’ already mentions the extent of restructuring.
In a few other cases, the Commission came to the conclusion that no ex ante val-
uation of the assets had been conducted. One of these cases was the case of
Dunfermline Building Society, a financial services institution based in the UK.
It should be recalled that Dunfermline was split-up: the good part of Dun-
fermline was transferred to Nationwide (following an open and transparent
tender), while the remaining part (“Rump Dunfermline”) was put in wound-
down. The transfer of the good part of Dunfermline to Nationwide was facili-
tated by means of State aid (which the Commission considered to be an impaired
asset measure). This State aid measure was unrelated to the REVof the impaired
assets remaining in Rump Dunfermline. Rather, it was based on the amount of
cash needed to compensate depositors and ensure the sale of the good part of
Dunfermline’s business. Consequently, the exposure of the UK to the Rump
Dunfermline was not determined objectively ex-ante.74 The Commission there-
fore concluded that the measure did not meet the valuation-criterion of the IAC.
The same consideration can be found in the decision on Quinn Insurance.75 This
case was similar to that of Dunfermline, in the sense that the split-up of Quinn
Insurance was also treated as an asset relief measure. If there is no valuation,
then there is a risk that the transfer value is too high (as compared to the REV).
This illustrates the importance of a (correct) valuation.
The ‘valuation-criterion’ of the IAC is quite related to the burden-sharing
requirement of the IAC. Indeed, if the valuation is based on assumptions that are
too optimistic, then the estimated REV is probably higher than the actual REV.
72. Northern Rock, C14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 108-110.
73. Northern Rock, C14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 111.
74. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 76.
75. Quinn Insurance, SA.33023, 12 October 2011, para. 112.
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Consequently, the transfer value (based on the estimated REV) exceeds the
actual REV. This would mean that burden-sharing is likely to be insufficient.
The issue of burden-sharing will be explored further in the next section.
9.8 Burden-sharing and remuneration
* The fact the ‘burden-sharing and remuneration criterion’ of the IAC has been
met.76
9.8.1 Burden-sharing through a write-down/first-loss tranche
As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle
that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maxi-
mum extent.77 That implies first78 that the bank should bear the difference
between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets.79
It should be recalled that the difference between the nominal value and the
real economic value corresponds to the expected losses on the impaired assets.
The principle of burden-sharing requires that these losses are not borne by the
State, but by the bank. This is achieved by a write-down of the impaired assets
from their nominal value to the real economic value. In case of an asset guaran-
tee, burden-sharing can be achieved by retaining a first loss commensurate to
such write-down.80 In some of its decisions, the Commission clarified that the
first-loss tranche should be sufficiently large to cover all expected losses of the
portfolio.81 Point 24 of the IAC stipulates that the first-loss tranche should nor-
mally be at least 10% of the shielded portfolio.82
76. In the Commission decisions, ‘burden-sharing’ and ‘remuneration’ are often bracketed
together. This would suggest that burden-sharing is only achieved by means of a correct
remuneration. However, it should be pointed out that burden-sharing is also related to other
compatibility-criteria. This follows from point 21 of the IAC, according to which banks
should “bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent”. Point 21
requires ex ante transparency and disclosure, followed by the correct valuation of assets
prior to government intervention and a correct remuneration of the State for the asset relief
measure. Burden-sharing is thus related to the following three criteria: i) transparency and
disclosure, ii) valuation, and iii) remuneration.
77. Section 5.2 of the IAC corresponds to points 21-25 of the IAC.
78. Furthermore, the Impaired Assets Communication explains that burden-sharing is achieved
through an adequate remuneration of the aid.
79. ING, C10/2009, 31 March 2009, para. 72; Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW),
C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 75.
80. See also: Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 75-76.
81. See, for instance: UNNIM Banc, SA.33733, 25 July 2012, para. 129; Banco CAM,
SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 117.
82. See also: HSH Nordbank, C29/2009, 22 October 2009, para. 49-50.
COMPATIBILITY WITH THE IMPAIRED ASSETS COMMUNICATION
261
9.8.2 Claw-back
As a general rule, an asset relief measure can only be declared compatible if
the transfer value is equal to or below the real economic value. A transfer value
above the real economic value means that the aid amount is too large, since
only the difference between the transfer value and the market value can con-
stitute compatible aid. The additional aid (corresponding to the amount by
which the transfer value exceeds the REV) can only be allowed if it is accom-
panied by the introduction of conditions allowing the recovery of the additional
aid at a later stage, i.e. a so-called claw-back. If no full recovery (claw-back) is
possible, far-reaching restructuring must be provided for. This follows from
point 41 of the IAC and is reiterated in Annex IV of the IAC: “The greater
any deviation of the transfer value from the ‘real economic value’, and thus
the amount of aid, the greater the need for remedial measures to ensure accurate
pricing over time (for example, through better fortune clauses) and for more
in-depth restructuring”.83
The burden-sharing principle can be clarified by means of the following
example. Assume a portfolio with a nominal value of EUR 100, a real economic
value of EUR 80 and a market value of EUR 50. The transfer value should not
exceed the real economic value of EUR 80. Assume, however, that the transfer
value is set at EUR 85. In this case, the own contribution by the bank is only
EUR 15 (i.e. the difference between the nominal value and the transfer value),
while the own contribution should have been EUR 20 (i.e. the difference between
the nominal value and the real economic value). The aid amount corresponds to
the difference between the transfer value and the market value, and amounts to
EUR 35. Of this aid amount, only the difference between the real economic value
and the market value can constitute compatible aid. So, in principle, only the aid
amount of EUR 30 can be authorised. The ‘additional aid’ of EUR 5 has to be
clawed back.
In most cases, the transfer value was equal to the REVor below the REV. How-
ever, there are also some cases in which the transfer value exceeded the REV.
In these cases, the Commission required a claw-back or far-reaching restruc-
turing.
One of those cases is the case of BayernLB. The Commission recalled that a
claw-back required that the bank would reimburse the entire amount above
the REV covered by the guarantee; this would imply a claw-back amount of
EUR 1,96 billion.84 However, BayernLB only proposed to make six annual
83. Annex IV, para. II. of the IAC.
84. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 147.
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payments of EUR 120 million.85 BayernLB claimed that it would not be able to
pay more. However, the Commission considered that a claw-back of a nominal
amount of EUR 1,96 billion in six years was feasible. According to point 41 of
the IAC, a partial claw-back should be allowed only if the full claw-back would
result in the technical insolvency of BayernLB. However, the Commission did
not believe that a technical insolvency would happen if the claw-back payments
were stretched over time, even beyond the restructuring period. The Commis-
sion considered that this would not conflict with point 41 of the IAC, which
refers not to payment within a specific period but to payment ‘at a later stage’.
Therefore the Commission considered that the burden-sharing requirement
in the IAC would be respected if a full claw-back were to be achieved over a
period of six years.86
In some instances, a claw-back is not possible. This was the case with UNNIM
Banc and Banco de Valencia. Spain had provided an Asset Protection Scheme
(APS) for these banks. The Commission considered the institution of a claw-
back clause incompatible with the sale of UNNIM Banc to a third party through
a formalised tender procedure since the bidders would have compensated in
advance the potential cost of the claw-back in demanding additional support
measures in theirs offers.87 Therefore, the capital injection element of the APS
could be deemed compatible only if it was accompanied by an in-depth and far-
reaching restructuring of the entity.88 This is a manifestation of the principle that
non-compliance with one of the IAC-criteria has to be compensated for by far-
reaching restructuring. This principle will be explored further in section 9.10.
9.8.3 Remuneration of an asset guarantee
In exchange for an asset guarantee, the beneficiary bank has to pay a guarantee
fee. This fee is the remuneration for the State aid. As was outlined in section
8.6, State aid measures should be adequately remunerated.89 In that regard, the
IAC sets out that impaired asset measures remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by
the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures
85. As a claw-back, BayernLB would pay an additional premium of 3,75% on a part of the
guarantee amounting to EUR 2 billion (i.e. EUR 75 million a year), and a special fee of
EUR 45 million a year, giving a total of EUR 120 million a year for 6 years until 2015.
That arrangement would amount to an annual claw-back payment of EUR 120 million.
86. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 148-150.
87. UNNIM Banc, SA.33733, 25 July 2012, para. 132.
88. UNNIM Banc, SA.33733, 25 July 2012, para. 133. The same consideration can be found
in the decision on Banco de Valencia (para. 151).
89. In one of its decisions (Parex banka, C26/2009, 15 September 2010, para. 124), the Com-
mission noted that “The objective of requiring remuneration (including, where applicable, a
claw-back) is two-fold: to ensure burden-sharing and to ensure a level playing field (i.e.
minimize competition distortions).
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with equivalent effects on regulatory capital.90 The explanation can be found in
footnote 1 relating to point 21 of the IAC: “Asset relief measures are somewhat
comparable to capital injections insofar as they provide a loss absorption mech-
anism and have a regulatory capital effect”.91 There are thus two key elements:
the capital relief effect and the remuneration rate.
The capital relief effect is nicely explained in the decision on KBC. The State
Protection Measure reduced the RWA of KBC by EUR 6,3 billion. This
amounted to a capital relief effect of EUR 504 million (i.e. 8% of 6,3 billion).
Using a rate of 7%, such a capital relief effect would cost EUR 35 million (i.e.
7% of 504 million).
As regards the remuneration rate, the Commission explained in its decision on
NordLB that it would accept a remuneration level of 7% on the capital relief
effect:
“In an asset guarantee scenario, it would have to be taken into consideration
that in contrast to recapitalisation measures, no liquidity is provided. Using
that guidance, the Commission has determined that the base remuneration
for a CT1-targeted measure ought to be 10%. Because of the relatively good
quality of the underlying portfolio, no additional capital remuneration
would have to be foreseen. In order to distinguish between asset transfers
and asset guarantees (where in the latter no liquidity is foreseen), a long-term
interest rate could be deducted. The Commission’s decisional practice has
put that interest rate deduction at 3%”.92
BayernLB paid 6,25% on the capital relief effect.93 The Commission considered
this to be in line with the levels approved in earlier decisions (such as LBBW).94
In the decision on LBBW, the rate of 6,25% was explained as follows:
“In view of the equity capital relief effect the compensation should how-
ever be reduced by 0,75% to 6,25% p.a. At least 50% of regulatory equity
capital must consist of tier 1 capital. According to the current legal provisions
90. Annex IV, para. II. of the IAC.
91. Footnote 1 relating to point 21 of the IAC continues by pointing out that the State generally
incurs a larger risk in the case of asset relief measures, related to a specific portfolio of
impaired assets, with no direct contribution of other bank’s income generating activities and
funds, and beyond its possible stake into the bank. In view of the larger down-side and more
limited up-side remuneration for asset relief should normally be higher than for capital
injections.
92. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, footnote 70.
93. It should be recalled that the remuneration for the risk shield for BayernLB included a
claw-back payment (as described in the previous subsection). As result, the remuneration
was higher than 6,25%.
94. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 152.
CHAPTER 9
264
the tier 2 capital must not exceed 100% of the tier 1 capital. This means that
the equity capital can consist 50% of tier 1 capital and 50% of tier 2 capital
in order to meet the regulatory requirements. As according to the Recom-
mendation of the European Central Bank of 20 November 2008 on recapi-
talisation measures a difference of 1,5% exists between the price of tier 1
capital and tier 2 capital, a reduction of 150 basis points is appropriate. If
according to the Recapitalisation Communication 7% can be regarded as
appropriate compensation for tier 1 capital without the supply of liquidity,
the tier 2 capital should then be compensated for at a rate of 5,5%. The aver-
age of both rates is 6,25%”.95
Most cases involving an asset guarantee complied with the remuneration-crite-
rion of the IAC. By contrast, in a few cases, the guarantee fee was not adequate.
For instance, in the decision on UNNIM Banc, the Commission concluded that
the APS measure had not been remunerated adequately. However, the Com-
mission noted that it is possible to accept a lower level of remuneration if it is
compensated for by a thorough and far-reaching restructuring.96 The principle
that non-compliance with one of the IAC-criteria has to be compensated for by
far-reaching restructuring was touched upon in the previous subsection and
will be explored further in section 9.10.
9.8.4 Remuneration in case of an asset purchase
With respect to asset purchases, the pricing principle can be summed up as fol-
lows: the assets should be transferred at a price that matches or remains below
their REV.
Interestingly, while in some cases, the Commission noted that the transfer had
to take place “at a price not higher than the REV”97, in several other cases, the
Commission noted that the transfer price had to be “well below the real eco-
nomic value”. For instance, in the decision on BancoMare Nostrum (BMN), the
Commission noted that the assets had been fully written down to their transfer
95. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 65.
96. UNNIM Banc, SA.33733, 25 July 2012, para. 137.
97. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 94.
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value, and that the transfer price was on a relative basis [50-60]% lower than
their real economic value.98 The Commission concluded the compensation for
the risk of the State was embedded in the low transfer price.99
9.8.5 Remuneration in case of a split-up of the bank
Section 9.3.1 introduced the cases in which the split-up of the bank was assessed
under the IAC. One of these cases was the case of Dunfermline. In the decision
on Dunfermline, the Commission noted that there was no remuneration paid
for the implied asset relief by the Dunfermline business transferred to Nation-
wide. In addition, the Commission noted that the UK State would not recuperate
any benefit which the Dunfermline business transferred to Nationwide might
enjoy as a result of the asset relief measure through a higher sale price of the
assets, since the business had already been sold without any possibility of
revising the price obtained. The Commission therefore concluded that the remu-
neration criterion was not met.100 The consequences of this conclusion will be
discussed in section 9.10.
9.8.6 Concluding remarks on burden-sharing
The current section has illustrated that burden-sharing101 is essentially based on
two elements: i) a sufficiently large write-down or first-loss tranche, and ii) an
adequate remuneration. There is another element: i.e. the claw-back. However,
this element is related to the other two elements. A claw-back mechanism is
required when the transfer value exceeds the REV. The difference between
the transfer value and REV constitutes additional aid which has to be recovered
(by means of a claw-back). It should be pointed out that a transfer value exceed-
ing the REV means that the write-down or first-loss tranche was not sufficiently
large. Thus, a claw-back is needed when the first element of burden-sharing is
98. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 125.
99. The latter consideration is derived from section II of Annex IVof the AIC. In that particular
section, the Commission explains that any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration
for the State that takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected
in the determination of the real economic value. Such remuneration may be provided by
setting the transfer price well below the real economic value to a sufficient extent so as to
provide for adequate compensation for the risk in the form of a commensurate upside.
100. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 78. The same considerations can be found
in the decision on Quinn Insurance (SA.33023, 12 October 2011, para. 114). Also in this case,
the Commission came to the conclusion that the remuneration requirement was not met.
101. It is worth stressing that the current section concerned a specific form of burden-sharing,
namely burden-sharing by the bank with respect to impaired assets. The more general appli-
cation of the burden-sharing principle will be discussed in chapter 12.
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insufficient. This way, the claw-back is related to the first element of burden-
sharing. It should also be pointed out that a claw-back can be achieved by
increasing the level of remuneration. This way, the claw-back is related to the
second element of burden-sharing.
9.9 Procedural aspects
Thus far, the substantive criteria of section 5 of the IAC were discussed. The
IAC also gave guidelines on the procedural aspects. This was done in Annex V
of the IAC and in section 5.7 of the IAC (though section 5.7 of the IAC con-
tained nothing more than a reference to Annex V).
Annex V of the IAC provided the following: if all the criteria of section 5 of
the IAC were met, the asset relief measure would be authorised for a period of
6 months, and conditional on the commitment to present either a restructuring
plan or a viability review. The definitive authorisation was given in the Restruc-
turing Decision. Just like a capital injection would be temporarily authorised
by the Commission in a Rescue Decision when the measure was appropriate,
necessary and proportionate, an asset relief measure would be temporarily
authorised when it met the IAC-criteria. In its decisional practice, the Commis-
sion has clarified that even if not all IAC-criteria were met, asset relief measures
could still be authorised for a period of 6 months.102 However, the Commission
would open the formal investigation procedure when it had doubts whether the
IAC-criteria were met.
This procedure was changed by the 2013 Banking Communication. In that
regard, point 95 of the 2013 Banking Communication stipulates that point 47
and Annex 5 of the Impaired Assets Communication are withdrawn. As set out
in section 8.1.2, the two-stage compatibility-assessment has effectively been
abandoned for a one-stage compatibility-assessment. This means that impaired
asset measures are immediately assessed as restructuring aid – instead of first
being temporarily approved as rescue aid. It should be stressed that the 2013
Banking Communication only changes the procedural aspects of the IAC; the
substantive criteria of section 5 of the IAC remain unchanged.
102. See: ING, C10/2009, 31 March 2009, para. 85-89; Landesbank Baden-Württemberg
(LBBW), C17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 85-89.
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9.10 Follow-up measures: “far-reaching restructuring”
9.10.1 The need for far-reaching restructuring
In principle, asset relief measures should satisfy the criteria of (section 5 of) the
IAC. However, some cases did not satisfy all these requirements. These cases
can still be compatible with the IAC, but they should then be subject to far-
reaching restructuring. This follows from points 49 and 50 of the IAC, which
read as follows:
49. Under State aid rules and notably those for rescue and restructuring
aid, asset relief amounts to a structural operation and requires a careful
assessment of three conditions: (i) adequate contribution of the beneficiary
to the costs of the impaired assets programme; (ii) appropriate action to guar-
antee the return to viability; and (iii) necessary measures to remedy competi-
tion distortions.103
50. The first condition should normally be achieved by fulfilling the
requirements set out in the Section 5, notably disclosure, valuation, pricing
and burden-sharing. This should ensure a contribution by the beneficiary
of at least the entirety of the losses incurred in the transfer of assets to the
State. Where this is materially not possible, aid may still be authorised, by
way of exception, subject to stricter requirements as to the other two con-
ditions.
This principle is reiterated in points 54 (“Departure from the general principles
set out in Section 5 will normally point to the need for such in-depth restruc-
turing”) and 58 of the IAC (“The need for compensatory measures will be pre-
sumed if the beneficiary bank does not fulfil the conditions set out in Section 5
and notably those of disclosure, valuation, pricing and burden-sharing”). In addi-
tion, point 41 of the IAC already stated that a transfer value that exceeds the
REV can only be accepted if it is accompanied by far-reaching restructuring
(in case a claw-back is not possible). Point 36 of the IAC also contained a
provision that far-reaching restructuring was required when the range of assets
covered by the asset relief measure was very large.
Points 36, 41 and 50 are all based on the principle that far-reaching restruc-
turing is required when the IAC-criteria have not been met. Point 36 and 41 are
specific provisions (related to specific IAC-criteria), while point 50 is a general
provision (related to the IAC-criteria in general).
103. The three conditions that are mentioned in point 49 of the IAC correspond to the three
pillars of the Restructuring Communication. Condition (ii) corresponds to the first pillar,
condition (i) corresponds to the second pillar and condition (iii) corresponds to the third
pillar.
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9.10.2 How is this principle applied in the Commission decisions?
Point 50 of the IAC has been applied by the Commission in several cases.
Indeed, the current chapter has discussed several cases that did not comply with
all the IAC-criteria. As outlined in sections 9.7 and 9.8, the asset relief measures
in the cases of Dunfermline and Quinn Insurance did not satisfy all the criteria
of section 5 of the IAC. In particular, the measures did not meet the valuation
requirement and the remuneration criterion. Notwithstanding the fact that the
valuation and remuneration criteria were not met, the Commission concluded
that these cases complied with the IAC, because they were subject to far-reach-
ing restructuring.104 In the case of Dunfermline, the Commission noted that “the
bank was split up, with a good part containing 50% of the assets of Dunfermline
sold to a new owner. Considering the size of the bank and its very limited market
shares, together with the fact that the Dunfermline business transferred to
Nationwide was sold in a process that closely resembled an open, transparent
and unconditional tender by the UK, that level of restructuring can be consid-
ered as sufficient in this context”.105
While point 50 of the IAC was applied in the cases of Dunfermline and Quinn
Insurance, in several other cases, the need for far-reaching restructuring was
based on point 41 of the IAC. As was discussed in section 9.8, point 41 of the
IAC stipulates that the transfer value should not be higher than the REV.
Nevertheless, there are several cases in which the transfer value exceeded the
REV. The most remarkable case in this respect is the case of Hypo Real Estate
(HRE). In this case, the difference between the transfer value and the REV was
EUR 16.2 billion. This enormous difference called for a particularly thorough
restructuring and downsizing of the bank.106 The Commission noted that the
restructuring plan included a “dramatic downsizing of the ‘good’ core bank, to
approximately 15% of HRE’s size at the end of 2008”.107
Similarly, in the case of Banco Português de Negócios (BPN), the impaired
assets were transferred at book value, thus well above the real economic value.
Although the Commission acknowledged that the transfer was intended to pro-
tect BPN’s viability and to allow for its sale, it considered that the transfer at
book value entailed aid that was not in line with the main requirements of the
IAC. “The IAC recognises that in-depth restructuring can compensate for
potential misalignments with the main criteria of that Communication, including
those on pricing. The existence of in-depth restructuring of BPN is an element
that could allow the Commission to find that measure compatible with the
104. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 86; Quinn Insurance, SA.33023,
12 October 2011, para. 118.
105. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 84.
106. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 84.
107. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 85. See also para. 119.
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Impaired Assets Communication. Thus, the transfer of assets to the SPVs could
be assessed together with the rest of the measures in favour of BPN and as a part
of the far-reaching restructuring”.108
Likewise, in the decisions on UNNIM Banc, Banco de Valencia and Banco
CAM (i.e. the Spanish banks that benefited from the Asset Protection Scheme
(APS)), the Commission concluded that far-reaching restructuring was requi-
red, because the APS measure was not fully in line with the IAC. This conclu-
sion was based on two reasons. Firstly, the APS did not cover only unexpected
losses of the portfolio but also part of the expected losses. The Commission
recalled that expected losses should be borne by the bank and not by the State.
Therefore, covering expected losses can be considered compatible only if it
is accompanied by an in-depth and far reaching restructuring of the entity.
Secondly, the APS measure had not been remunerated adequately. However, the
Commission noted that it is possible to accept that a bank pays remuneration
lower than is normally necessary, provided that such lower remuneration is
compensated for by a thorough and far-reaching restructuring. The Commission
noted that Spain had submitted far-reaching restructuring plans for UNNIM
Banc, Banco de Valencia and Banco CAM, including the change of ownership,
the dissolution of the bank and its disappearance as a stand-alone entity.109
9.10.3 Concluding remarks
The discussion of the cases of Dunfermline, Quinn Insurance, Northern Rock,
HRE, BPN, UNNIM Banc, Banco de Valencia and Banco CAM illustrates that
in several cases the Commission has held that the non-compliance with the
IAC-criteria would trigger the need for far-reaching restructuring. In every
case in which the IAC was applicable, the Commission has either concluded
that the IAC-criteria were met or that the non-compliance with the IAC-criteria
would have to be compensated for by far-reaching restructuring.
9.11 Conclusion
This chapter has given an insight into how the Commission assesses asset relief
measures. This assessment is based on the principles of the Impaired Assets
Communication (IAC). The IAC is only applicable to asset relief measures. As
set out in section 9.3.1, the Commission looks at the effect of the State aid
measure: if the aid measure has the effect of an asset relief measure, then it falls
within the scope of the IAC. Consequently, the fact that the measure has the
108. Banco Português de Negócios (BPN), SA.26909, 27 March 2012, para. 248.
109. Banco CAM, 30 May 2012, para. 120; UNNIM Banc, 25 July 2012, para. 136-137; Banco
de Valencia, 28 November 2012, para. 156.
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effect of relieving the bank from its impaired assets, is a relevant characteristic,
because it means that the measure will be assessed on the basis of the IAC-
criteria.
Asset relief measures are authorised by the Commission when they comply with
the IAC-criteria. The fact that an asset relief measure complies with the IAC-
criteria is thus a relevant characteristic. In this chapter, the relevant characteris-
tics are presented as the fact that one of the IAC-criteria is met. For instance, the
fact that the ‘valuation-criterion’ of the IAC has been met, is a relevant charac-
teristic. Since there are five IAC-criteria, there are also five relevant charac-
teristics.
Has the Commission consistently taken into account these five relevant char-
acteristics? In other words: has the Commission consistently assessed whether
the five IAC-criteria have been met? This chapter has shown that this is indeed
the case. In every case that involved asset relief measures, the Commission
applied the five IAC-criteria. This chapter also showed that the asset relief
measures did not always meet the IAC-criteria.110 However, these asset relief
measures were still approved by the Commission, because the non-compliance
with the IAC-criteria was compensated for by far-reaching restructuring.
The principle that a lack of adequate own contribution has to be reflected in the
need for far-reaching restructuring will be touched upon again in the follow-
ing chapter. That chapter focusses on the characteristics that are relevant to the
Commission’s assessment of whether far-reaching restructuring is required.
110. In particular, section 9.7.2 indicated that the valuation-criterion was not met in the cases of
Dunfermline and Quinn Insurance. Section 9.8 indicated that the ‘burden-sharing and
remuneration-criterion of the IAC’ was not met in the cases where the transfer value
exceeded the real economic value. Section 9.10 provided an overview of cases that did not
meet the IAC-criteria.
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Chapter 10. The need for far-reaching
restructuring
10.1 Introduction
One of the key observations made in the previous chapter was that non-
compliance with the criteria of the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC)
had to be compensated for by far-reaching restructuring (also referred to as
in-depth restructuring1). Also outside the context of the IAC, there are factors
that point at the need for far-reaching restructuring. Indeed, in several decisions,
the Commission explicitly considered that far-reaching restructuring was
required. This observation raises the question: when is far-reaching restructuring
needed (and why)?
10.1.1 The concept of “far-reaching restructuring”
It is worth stressing that “far-reaching restructuring” is not a clearly defined
concept. The concept of “far-reaching restructuring” is also difficult to pinpoint
in relation to the restructuring objectives. It should be recalled that restructur-
ing is aimed at three objectives: i) restoring long-term viability of the beneficiary
bank, ii) burden-sharing, and iii) limiting distortions of competition. Conse-
quently, there are three types of restructuring measures: viability-measures,
burden-sharing measures and compensatory measures. Sometimes, “far-rea-
ching restructuring” appears to be used as an overall term for these three types
of restructuring measures. And sometimes, the degree of restructuring seems to
be related to a specific restructuring objective. For instance, in the decision on
Ethias, the Commission considered that “(…), it is obvious that Ethias requires
in-depth restructuring to return to long-term viability”.2 Consider also the
following recital from the decision on T Bank: “The absence of remuneration
triggers the need for in-depth restructuring, both in terms of viability measures
and in terms of measures to limit distortion of competition”.3
1. In the bank State aid decisions, the terms “far-reaching restructuring” and “in-depth
restructuring” are used interchangeably.
2. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 104.
3. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 55.
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That “far-reaching restructuring” is difficult to pinpoint also follows from the
structure of the Commission decisions. Every Restructuring Decision contains
a section in which the compatibility of the State aid is assessed on the basis
of the three restructuring objectives. Some decisions also contain a preceding
section that specifically addresses the degree of restructuring required. For
instance, section 5.2.1 of the Restructuring Decision on Ethias was titled
“Degree of restructuring required”. Likewise, the Restructuring Decisions in
the cases of the four large Greek banks contain a section titled “Sources of
difficulties and consequences on the assessment under the Restructuring Com-
munication”.4 Interestingly, such sections are not found in every decision. In
most cases, the Commission’s assessment of the need for far-reaching restruc-
turing forms part of the compatibility-assessment (rather than being a prelimi-
nary assessment). In many cases, the need for far-reaching restructuring seems to
point at the need for compensatory measures.
Even though “far-reaching restructuring” is not clearly defined by the Commis-
sion, the fact remains that the Commission concluded in several cases that
far-reaching restructuring was needed. Since this conclusion influenced the
Commission’s assessment of the viability, burden-sharing and competition
distortions, it is important to analyse the characteristics that were relevant to
that conclusion.
10.1.2 Structure of this chapter
The current chapter discusses characteristics that are relevant to the assess-
ment of the degree of restructuring required. The degree of restructuring depends
primarily on i) the aid amount, and ii) the question whether the bank’s
difficulties were caused by endogenous problems or by external factors. The
fact that the aid amount is high (or the opposite: that it is low) and the fact that
the bank’s difficulties were caused by endogenous problems (or the opposite:
caused by external factors) are thus relevant characteristics. These characteristics
will be discussed in sections 10.3 and 10.5. In addition, far-reaching restructur-
ing may be needed to compensate for a lack of own contribution. This will be the
topic of section 10.4.
The chapter thus focusses on the question whether far-reaching restruc-
turing is required. There is, however, a preceding question: i.e. the question
whether a restructuring plan is required. Indeed, the degree of restructuring
only becomes relevant when the beneficiary bank has to undergo restructuring
in the first place. Although the Member State is usually obliged to submit a
4. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 101-104.
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restructuring plan to the Commission for the beneficiary bank, a restructuring
plan is not required in every bank State aid case. The question whether a
restructuring plan is required will be discussed in section 10.2.
10.2 Requirement to submit a restructuring plan
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is fundamentally sound./The fact that the
beneficiary bank is distressed.
10.2.1 Introduction
In most bank State aid cases, a restructuring plan was required: within a certain
time period, the Member State had to submit to the Commission a restructuring
plan for the beneficiary bank. However, there are also some bank State aid cases
in which a restructuring plan was not required.5
Whether a restructuring plan is required depends on three factors: i) the type of
State aid measure, ii) the question whether the aid was granted under a scheme
or as ad hoc aid, iii) the Communications that were in force at the moment the
aid was granted to the bank.
Subsection 10.2.2 will discuss whether a restructuring plan is needed in
case of an ad hoc recapitalisation measure or an ad hoc asset relief measure,
while subsection 10.2.3 will discuss the need to submit a restructuring plan in
case of a recapitalisation scheme, asset relief scheme and guarantee scheme.6
In both subsections, the impact of the Communications on the need to submit
a restructuring plan will be discussed. In addition, the tables in Annex IV pro-
vide an overview of the compatibility-assessment and indicate in which
instances a restructuring plan is required.
5. The article by Bomhoff, Jarosz-Friis & Pesaresi (2009) is very useful in that regard: this
article provides seven scenarios to illustrate in which instances a restructuring plan is
required. It should, however, be noted that this article was written in 2009, so before the
adoption of the First Prolongation Communication and the 2013 Banking Communication.
6. The need to submit a restructuring plan in case of an ad hoc guarantee will not be discussed,
for the following two reasons. First, guarantees are almost always granted in the context
of a guarantee scheme. And second, in the rare cases that a bank benefited from an ad hoc
guarantee, the bank also benefited from other State aid measures and a restructuring plan was
already required.
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10.2.2 Ad hoc recapitalisation measures and ad hoc asset relief measures
The question whether a restructuring plan was required when a bank benefited
from a recapitalisation measure or asset relief measure, hinged on the question
whether the beneficiary bank was fundamentally sound or distressed. Mem-
ber States did not have to submit a restructuring plan for banks that were
fundamentally sound. Conversely, Member States had to submit a restructur-
ing plan (within six months of the recapitalisation) for banks that were
considered not to be fundamentally sound by the Commission.7 For funda-
mentally sound banks, a viability review – sometimes referred to as a viability
plan8 – sufficed.
The aid intensity9 was used as an indicator to distinguish between fundamen-
tally sound and distressed banks. In the Recapitalisation Communication, the
Commission introduced a threshold of 2% to differentiate between fundamen-
tally sound and distressed banks. If the aid received was more than 2% of the
bank’s risk weighted assets (RWA), then the bank was deemed as distressed and
had to submit a restructuring plan. The fact that the bank is fundamentally sound
was therefore a very relevant characteristic.10
The distinction between fundamentally sound banks and distressed banks was
introduced in the 2008 Banking Communication. In the 2008 Banking Com-
munication, the link between this distinction and the requirement to submit
a restructuring plan was formulated quite tentatively.11 The Recapitalisation
Communication was much more clear on the question whether a restructuring
7. See for instance: Polish recapitalisation scheme, N302/2009, 21 December 2009, para. 24;
Lithuanian recapitalisation scheme, N200/2009 and N47/2010, 5 August 2010, para. 56;
Hungarian bank support scheme, N664/2008, 12 February 2009, para. 55. NB: in addition,
banks that are considered not fundamentally sound have to pay a higher remuneration. See,
for instance, the Finnish scheme.
8. A viability review is sometimes referred to as viability plan. Gilliams (2010, p. 287) argue
that the term ‘plan’ captures the essence better than the term ‘review’, since the viability plan
must contain measures that restore the bank’s viability.
9. The aid intensity is the relative amount of aid; i.e. the aid amount expressed as a percentage
of the bank’s risk weighted assets (RWA).
10. However, according to Psaroudakis (2012, p. 204), the practical difference between
restructuring plans and viability plans was limited.
11. The last indent of point 35 of the 2008 Banking Communication reads as follows: “the
requirement for recapitalisation as an emergency measure to support the financial institu-
tion through the crisis to be followed up by a restructuring plan for the beneficiary to be
separately examined by the Commission, taking into account both the distinction between
fundamentally sound financial institutions solely affected by the current restrictions on
access to liquidity and beneficiaries that are additionally suffering from more structural
solvency problems linked for instance to their particular business model or investment
strategy and the impact of that distinction on the extent of the need for restructuring”
CHAPTER 10
276
plan was required. Section 2.1 of the Recapitalisation Communication dealt
solely with fundamentally sound banks, while section 2.2 concerned banks
which are not fundamentally sound. Only the latter were required to submit a
restructuring plan. When a fundamentally sound bank fell into difficulties after
recapitalisation has taken place, a restructuring plan had to be notified.12
With respect to insurance companies, there was a complicating factor: unlike
the regulatory capital of banks, regulatory capital of insurance companies is not
defined in terms of RWA.13 Consequently, the aid amount cannot be expressed
as a percentage of the RWA. The Commission came up with the following
solution: since 2% of RWA represented a quarter of the minimum capital
requirements for banks, the Commission would take 25% of the minimum sol-
vency margin requirements as a relevant proxy for the 2% RWA benchmark.14
In its decisional practice, the Commission consistently assessed whether the
beneficiary bank could be considered fundamentally sound.15 There is an inter-
esting case that is worth mentioning: the case of Natixis.
Natixis was the main subsidiary of the BPCE group, i.e. the banking group
that resulted from the merger of Banque Populaire (BP) and Caisse d’Epargne
(CE) in July 2009. In 2008/2009, BPCE received a capital injection from the
French State. The Commission observed that most of the State aid to BPCE
was used to recapitalise Natixis. The Commission therefore concluded that
Natixis was the indirect recipient of most of the State aid.
The amount of aid received by Natixis exceeded 2% of its RWA. However, as
compared to the RWA of the entire BPCE group, the aid amounted to 1,6% of
BPCE’s RWA, thus below the indicative limit of 2%. An important aspect of
this case was that Natixis was not a wholly-owned subsidiary: before the
merger, BP and CE each held 35% of the shares in Natixis, while the other 30%
of Natixis’ share capital was floated on the stock market. The Commission
therefore analysed whether Natixis constituted a separate banking group or
whether it should be considered as an integral part of the newly created BPCE
group. In that regard, the Commission considered that the newly created BPCE
12. This follows from point 42 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
13. Their minimum capital requirements are defined in terms of minimum solvency margin
requirements, where the available capital defined as the available solvency margin must be
at least equal to the minimum solvency margin requirements.
14. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 103. See also: Aegon, N372/2009, 17 August
2010, para. 94.
15. Which beneficiary banks were fundamentally sound? In the Rescue Decision on Hypo Tirol
(17 June 2009, para. 39), the Commission concluded that Hypo Tirol could be considered a
sound bank, since the capital injected was below 2%. Also in the case of SNS REAAL
(2008), the aid amount was below 2% of RWA.
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group would own 70% of Natixis and that Natixis would be totally consolidated
in the new group’s accounts. The Commission concluded that the aid must be
treated as aid allocated to the BPCE group, rather than as aid granted to Natixis
taken in isolation from its parent companies.16
The Commission then analysed whether BPCE was fundamentally sound.
In line with Annex 1 of the Recapitalisation Communication, the Commission
took into account BPCE’s capital adequacy, its CDS spread and its rating. In
addition, the Commission took into account the fact that the aid amount was
only 1,6% of BPCE’s RWA.17 Based on these elements, the Commission con-
cluded that the beneficiary bank was fundamentally sound. The case of Natixis
is thus illustrative of the importance that the Commission attached to the 2%-
threshold as an indicator to distinguish between fundamentally sound and dis-
tressed banks.
In December 2010, the Commission adopted the First Prolongation Communi-
cation.18 The First Prolongation Communication removed the distinction
between fundamentally sound banks and distressed banks. As a result, for every
recapitalisation measure or impaired asset measure taken after 1 January 2011, a
restructuring plan had to be submitted, irrespective of whether the beneficiary
bank was fundamentally sound or distressed. This means that the 2%-threshold
has lost its relevance after 1 January 2011. For instance, when Nova Ljubljanska
banka (NLB) was recapitalised in March 2011, the capital injection amounted
to 1,6% of NLB’s RWA and the Slovenian State had to submit a restructuring
plan. In its decision, the Commission noted that prior to 1 January 2011, this
capital injection would most likely not have triggered the requirement to submit
a restructuring plan.19
10.2.3 Bank support scheme
Banks that benefit from State aid under a bank support scheme20 did not always
have to submit a restructuring plan. In which instances was a restructuring plan
required? This question will be answered in the current section.
10.2.3.1 Recapitalisation schemes
Before the adoption of the First Prolongation Communication, the determining
factor was whether the bank was fundamentally sound or distressed.
16. Banque Populaire & Caisse d’Épargne (BPCE), N249/2009, 8 May 2009, para. 41.
17. Banque Populaire & Caisse d’Épargne (BPCE), N249/2009, 8 May 2009, para. 48.
18. The First Prolongation Communication was discussed in section 3.4.1.5.
19. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.32261, 7 March 2011, para. 59.
20. It should be recalled that when the Commission authorises a bank support scheme, this
authorisation is restricted to six months and any extension of the scheme must be notified to
the Commission. Also any amendment to the scheme must be notified to the Commission.
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It should be recalled that some bank support schemes were only open to fun-
damentally sound banks.21 For instance, as discussed in section 8.10.1, the
Swedish recapitalisation scheme was exclusively aimed at banks that were fun-
damentally sound. However, even though these schemes were aimed at fun-
damentally sound banks, if the Commission considered that the bank in question
was not fundamentally sound, a restructuring plan for that bank had to be sub-
mitted to the Commission. Furthermore, many recapitalisation schemes provi-
ded for the following: if a bank that was initially considered fundamentally
sound would fall into difficulties after recapitalisation had taken place, a
restructuring plan for that bank had to be notified.22
A special feature could be found in the original recapitalisation schemes of
Germany, Greece and the UK.23 With respect to these schemes, the Commission
did not require a restructuring plan if the beneficiary bank had redeemed the
State’s stake within six months or if the bank committed to do so in the next
six months.24 These schemes were, however, set up before the adoption of the
Recapitalisation Communication. Once this Communication was adopted,
the Member States notified amendments of the schemes to the Commission.
The amendment entailed that participating banks that were fundamentally sound
did no longer need to provide a restructuring plan; instead, they had to provide a
viability review.25 The Commission accepted this amendment, since it was in
line with the Recapitalisation Communication.
As explained in the section 10.2.2, after the adoption of the First Prolongation
Communication, a restructuring plan is required for distressed banks as well as
for fundamentally sound banks. All prolongations of recapitalisation schemes
(notified after the introduction of the First Prolongation Communication) took
into account this new guidance. For instance, in the fourth prolongation of
the Hungarian scheme, Hungary committed to submit a restructuring plan for
any bank which would benefit from a recapitalisation after 31 December 2010,
independently of whether the beneficiary was considered to be fundamentally
sound or distressed.26 This commitment was welcomed by the Commission.
21. In these cases, the Commission usually noted that the scheme was “targeted at the
appropriate beneficiaries”.
22. This requirement also follows from point 42 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
23. UK bank support scheme, N507/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 54; Greek bank support
scheme, para. 63; German bank support scheme, para. 20-21.
24. The Commission added that this was in line with the R&R-guidelines.
25. Greek bank support scheme (prolongation/amendment), N504/2009, para. 15 and 27.
26. See, for instance: Hungarian bank support scheme (prolongation), N536/2010, 7 December
2010, para. 23 and 25.
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The 2013 Banking Communication had an impact on the possibilities to set
up recapitalisation schemes. As explained in section 8.1.2, the 2013 Banking
Communication largely abandoned the two-stage compatibility-assessment.
Under this two-stage compatibility-assessment, recapitalisation measures were
temporarily authorised (in case the scheme was appropriate, necessary and pro-
portionate), while the individual assessment took place when a restructuring
plan was submitted. Following the 2013 Banking Communication, recapitalisa-
tion measures could only be authorised after the Commission had approved the
restructuring plan. Since the authorisation is thus dependent on the approval of
a restructuring plan for each individual bank, recapitalisation schemes are
no longer possible.27 There is, however, an exception for small banks.28 Since
aid to small banks tends to affect competition less than aid granted to larger
banks, the Commission is willing to authorise schemes for recapitalisation and
restructuring of small29 banks. An example of a scheme based on point 54 of the
2013 Banking Communication is the ‘Restructuring and stabilisation scheme
for the Credit Union Sector in Ireland’.30
10.2.3.2 Guarantee schemes
In the context of a guarantee scheme, the Member States – as a general rule –
commit to submit a restructuring plan to the Commission for any bank that
causes the guarantee to be drawn.31 In other words: when a bank defaults on its
liabilities and calls upon the guarantee, the Member State has to submit a restruc-
turing plan for the bank in question.
With respect to guarantee schemes, there have been two important policy devel-
opments. Firstly, the DG Competition Staff Working Document of 30 April
2010 introduced the requirement to submit a viability review in case a new
27. The causal link between the changed approach towards the two-stage compatibility-
assessment and the possibility to set up recapitalisation schemes is not made explicit in the
2013 Banking Communication. It is, however, observed in the literature; for instance by
Flynn (2014, p. 678) who speaks of a “logical consequence”.
28. Point 54 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
29. When is a bank ‘small’ in the sense of this provision? Point 54 of the 2013 Banking Com-
munication clarifies that schemes for small banks should be limited to banks with a balance
sheet total of not more than EUR 100 million. In addition, the sum of the balance sheet totals
of the banks that receive aid under the scheme must not exceed 1,5% of the total assets held
by banks in the domestic market of the Member State concerned.
30. See: Restructuring and stabilisation scheme for the Credit Union Sector in Ireland,
SA.36262, 16 October 2014.
31. Swedish bank support scheme, N533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 49. Polish bank support
scheme, N208/2009, 25 September 2009, para. 49.
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guarantee was granted when the total amount outstanding guaranteed liabili-
ties exceeded both a ratio of 5% of total liabilities and the total amount of EUR
500 million.32 This viability review had to be submitted within 3 months from
the granting of the guarantee.
Secondly, the 2013 Banking Communication introduced the requirement to
submit a restructuring plan, in case a new guarantee is granted when the total
amount outstanding guaranteed liabilities exceeds both a ratio of 5% of total
liabilities and the total amount of EUR 500 million.33 This restructuring plan
had to be submitted within 2 months form the granting of the guarantee. The
Member States that decided to prolong their guarantee schemes had to take
into account these new requirements. For instance, the notification of the eighth
extension of the Polish bank guarantee scheme included the commitment to
submit a restructuring plan within 2 months in case the two thresholds (of 5%
and of EUR 500 million) were met.34
10.2.3.3 Other bank support schemes
In its decision on the Danish Compensation Scheme, the Commission approved
the application of the scheme to banks with a balance sheet below EUR 3 billion.
For larger banks (i.e. banks with a balance sheet of more than EUR 3 billion),
an individual application was required.35 This is in line with points 83-86 of the
2013 Banking Communication. Point 84 provides that orderly liquidation
schemes for banks of limited size can be approved, “provided they are well
designed so as to ensure compliance with the requirements on burden-sharing by
shareholders and subordinated debt-holders set out in point 44 and to remove
moral hazard and other competition concerns”. Point 86 clarifies when a bank is
‘of limited size’: aid measures with total assets of more than EUR 3000 million
must be individually notified for approval.
Under the Lithuanian asset relief scheme, Lithuania committed to provide
restructuring plans for all beneficiaries of the asset relief measure which require
in-depth restructuring pursuant to Section 6 of the IAC and viability plans for all
others (including information regarding valuation in both cases) within three
months from the beneficiary’s accession to the scheme.36
32. See, for an example of this new requirement: Lithuanian bank support scheme, N200/2009
and N47/2010, 5 August 2010, para. 58.
33. Pursuant to Point 59(d) of the 2013 Banking Communication.
34. Polish scheme (SA.36965, 23 July 2013, para. 8 and Annex II).
35. Danish compensation scheme, SA.33001-B, 1 August 2011, para. 36.
36. Lithuanian bank support scheme, N200/2009 and N47/2010, 5 August 2010, para. 51.
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10.2.4 Failure to submit a restructuring plan
The Commission approach before the adoption of the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication can be summarised as follows: rescue aid is declared compatible for
a period of six months, under the condition that the Member State submits a
restructuring plan (or liquidation plan) within those six months. The commit-
ment to present a restructuring plan is therefore essential. In almost every case,
Member States have complied with their commitment to submit a restructuring
plan. There is one notable exception; that is the case of Banco Privado Português
(BPP).
On 5 December 2008, Portugal notified to the Commission a State aid measure
in favour of BPP. Although Portugal had committed to submit a restructuring
plan for BPP within six months (so before 5 June 2009)37, it failed to do so. As
a result, the aid became unlawful since 6 June 2009. Moreover, since the restruc-
turing plan was essential to the compatibility of the State aid measure38, the
failure to submit such a restructuring plan resulted in the aid measure being
incompatible. As was explained in section 5.8, BPP started legal proceedings at
the Court of Justice.
According to BPP, the Commission had concluded that the guarantee was
incompatible with the internal market on the basis of non-compliance on
purely procedural grounds, namely the fact that the Portuguese Republic did
not submit a restructuring plan for BPP within the six-month period laid down
in the Decision of 13 March 2009. BPP therefore argued that the Commission
had failed to assess whether the aid in question was intended to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of the Member State concerned, within the meaning
of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.39
However, the Court held that, contrary to what was claimed by BPP, the
temporal limitation of aid granted in the form of a State guarantee and the obli-
gation to notify any subsequent extension of that guarantee, as well as the obli-
gation resting on the beneficiary of that guarantee to submit a restructuring plan
are not mere formal requirements, but rather necessary conditions for that aid
to be declared compatible with the internal market and means of ensuring that
the emergency aid granted to an undertaking in difficulty does not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve the common-interest objective concerned, which
consists, in the present case, in preventing a serious disturbance in the national
economy.40
37. Banco Privado Português (BPP), NN71/2008, 13 March 2009, para. 44.
38. As the Commission explained in its Opening Decision (C33/2009, 10 November 2009, para.
39), the commitment to submit a restructuring plan was especially important in the case of
BPP, because the remuneration that BPP paid for the State aid was quite low.
39. C-667/13, para. 68.
40. C-667/13, para. 74.
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As indicated before, chapter 5 provides some further backgrounds to this case.
In the context of the current chapter, the key feature of the case of BPP is that
it underlines the importance of submitting a restructuring plan.
10.2.5 Concluding remarks
Following the First Prolongation Communication, every bank which benefited
from a new recapitalisation or an impaired asset measure has to submit a
restructuring plan. Thus, the question whether a restructuring plan is needed
no longer depends on whether the bank is fundamentally sound or distressed.
From that perspective, it could be argued that the fact that the beneficiary bank
is fundamentally sound has lost its relevance. However, the fact that the
beneficiary bank is (or is not) fundamentally sound is still a relevant characte-
ristic. While it is true that the characteristic is no longer relevant to the require-
ment to submit a restructuring plan, it can still be relevant to the question how
much restructuring is needed. A bank that is not fundamentally sound most
likely needs more far-reaching restructuring measures to return to viability than
a sound bank. The assessment of the degree of restructuring required (and the
characteristics that are relevant to that assessment) are discussed in the following
sections.
10.3 Far-reaching restructuring needed? (I): amount of aid
* The fact that the aid amount is very large./The fact that the aid amount is
relatively low.
Some Restructuring Decisions contain a section entitled “Amount of aid”.
This section is (usually) placed after the assessment of the existence of aid and
before the compatibility-assessment. As a general rule, a high aid amount will
result in the conclusion that far-reaching restructuring is needed.41 Usually, the
aid amount is mentioned in relation to the need for compensatory measures
(i.e. measures aimed at limiting the competition distortions arising from the State
aid). For this reason, the relevance of the aid amount will be discussed in more
detail in section 13.2.
41. See, for instance: Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 106: “That aid
amount further confirms the need for in-depth restructuring and gives an indication of the
extent of the restructuring required.” See also CCM, 29 June 2010, para. 136: “Given that the
beneficiaries have received a considerable amount of aid a far-reaching restructuring is
needed.” See also Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.32261, 7 March 2011, para. 60: “As a
general rule, the more significant the reliance on State aid, the stronger the indication of a
need to undergo in-depth restructuring in order to ensure long-term viability.”
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Related to the amount of aid is the issue of repeated (rescue) aid. There are
some banks that repeatedly received State aid. One of those banks is Alpha
Bank, one of the four large Greek banks. In May 2009, this bank received a
capital injection under the Greek recapitalisation scheme.42 It also benefited
from aid measures under the Greek guarantee scheme and the Greek bond loan
scheme.43 In 2012, Alpha Bank received a bridge recapitalisation by the HFSF.
In the Opening Decision on Alpha Bank, the Commission noted that the HFSF
bridge recapitalisation came after prior recapitalisations and liquidity aid. The
Commission concluded that the repeated rescue aid to Alpha Bank could not be
considered as genuine rescue aid, and that consequently, the repeated aid should
be scrutinised in more depth.44 The Commission went on to observe that “more
safeguards should be required, taking inspiration from what is required for
restructuring aid”.45
Similarly, in the decision on National Bank of Greece, the Commission
considered that “the context of a protracted rescue period blurs the distinction
between rescue aid – which is normally temporarily approved without the
Commission seeking many commitments from the Member State restraining the
beneficiary's actions during the rescue period – and restructuring aid which is
approved only after a thorough assessment”.46
The decisions on the Greek banks are special in the sense that they elaborate on
the repeated nature of the state interventions. Normally, the amount of aid and
the repeated nature are bracketed together – as is illustrated by the following
recital:
“Given the scale and repeated nature of the state interventions in favour
of KBC, the Commission concludes that an in-depth restructuring plan is
required”.47
For this reason, the issue of repeated rescue aid will not be discussed separately,
but only in the context of the amount of aid.
42. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 27 July 2012, para. 37.
43. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 27 July 2012, para. 39.
44. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 27 July 2012, para. 59.
45. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 27 July 2012, para. 70.
46. National Bank of Greece (NBG), SA.34824, 27 July 2012, para. 61.
47. KBC, C18/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 72.
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10.4 Far-reaching restructuring needed? (II): lack of adequate
own contribution
(*) The fact that the remuneration is inadequate./The fact that the own
contribution is inadequate.
As was explained in the previous chapter, non-compliance with one of the
IAC-criteria triggers the need for far-reaching restructuring. In particular, point
41 of the IAC stressed that a transfer value above the real economic value (REV)
could only be accepted if accompanied by far-reaching restructuring. It should
be recalled that setting the transfer value below the REV ensures that the bank
bears the losses associated with the impaired assets to the maximum extent. This
is known as ‘burden-sharing’ or as the ‘own contribution’ by the beneficiary
bank. A transfer value that exceeds the REV means that there is insufficient
burden-sharing. This can only be accepted if it is compensated for by far-reach-
ing restructuring.
The principle that a lack of adequate own contribution has to be compensated
for by far-reaching restructuring is also applicable outside the context of the
IAC. Indeed, it is not only enshrined in the IAC; it can also be found in the
other Communications. For instance, point 25 of the Restructuring Commu-
nication sets out that any derogation from an adequate burden-sharing ex ante
which may have been exceptionally granted in the rescue phase for reasons of
financial stability should be compensated for by a further contribution at a later
stage of the restructuring, for example in the form of claw-back clauses and/or
by farther-reaching restructuring including additional measures to limit distor-
tions of competition.48
This also follows from point 31 of the Restructuring Communication which
stipulates that the Commission will take into account the extent of the ben-
eficiary bank’s own contribution, when assessing the need for compensatory
measures. The relation between the own contribution and the need for compen-
satory measures is formulated as follows: “Generally speaking, where there is
greater burden sharing and the own contribution is higher, there are fewer
negative consequences resulting from moral hazard. Therefore, the need for fur-
ther measures is reduced”.49
48. See also: Banco Portugues de Negocios (BPN), SA.26909, 27 March 2012, para. 249.
49. Point 31 of the Restructuring Communication.
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With respect to recapitalisation measures, points 15 and 44 of the Recapitalisa-
tion Communication explain that in duly justified cases, a lower remuneration
can be accepted in the short-term for distressed banks on the condition that the
lower remuneration will be reflected in the restructuring plan.50 This can be
illustrated by the following recital:
“As regards the remuneration for that measure, the Commission has accepted
that a distressed bank may pay a lower remuneration than what would
normally be necessary if such a discount is required to ensure financial
stability and is accompanied by the presentation of a thorough and far-
reaching restructuring plan, including a change in management and corpo-
rate governance where appropriate. In the case of BVA, the Commission
notes that Spain has submitted a far-reaching restructuring plan, including
the change of ownership and BVA’s disappearance as a stand-alone entity.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the absence of remuneration for
the recapitalisation measure can be accepted”.51
In short, an inadequate remuneration triggers a need for in-depth restructuring.
This principle is applied in several cases.52 In conclusion, the lower the degree
of own contribution, the more far-reaching restructuring is required. This could
indicate that own contribution and the other restructuring measures are ‘com-
municating vessels’.53
As was outlined in section 8.6, the Commission has always assessed whether
the remuneration was adequate. In the context of the current chapter, the fol-
lowing observation can be made. The assessment whether the remuneration is
adequate includes the assessment whether an inadequate remuneration should
50. Point 15 of the Recapitalisation Communication provides that “it may be necessary, in duly
justified cases, to accept lower remuneration in the short term for distressed banks, on the
assumption and condition that in the longer term the costs of public intervention in their
favour will be reflected in the restructuring necessary to restore viability and to take account
of the competitive impact of the support given to them in compensatory measures”.
51. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 127.
52. This principle is applied in: BayernLB/HGAA, 23 December 2009, para. 59-60; Ethias,
12 February 2009, para. 75; HSH Nordbank, 29 May 2009, para. 45; T Bank, 16 May 2012,
para. 53 and 55; TT Hellenic Postbank, 2013, para. 77 and 102; Anglo/INBS, 2011, para.
135-136; Bank of Ireland, 11 July 2011, para. 79-81; AIB/EBS, 2011, para. 78; Banco de
Valencia, 2012, para. 127; Caja Castilla-La Mancha, 29 June 2010, para. 174-190; Banco
Gallego, 25 July 2013, para. 103;
53. The term “adequate substitute” in the consideration of the Commission that the amount
of downsizing was an adequate substitute for the lack of adequate own contribution (HRE,
C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 120), confirms that they are ‘communicating vessels’. The
term ‘communicating vessels’ was used in the Commission Staff Working Paper (p. 32).
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be compensated for by far-reaching restructuring. Thus, although the fact that
the remuneration is inadequate is a relevant characteristic, it is not separately
assessed by the Commission. Indeed, in every case, the Commission either
concluded that the remuneration was adequate or concluded that the low level of
remuneration had to be compensated for by far-reaching restructuring.
10.5 Far-reaching restructuring needed? (III): cause of the bank’s
difficulties
(*) The fact that the bank’s difficulties are caused by external factors./The fact
that the bank’s difficulties are caused by internal factors.
10.5.1 Introduction
The cause of the bank’s problems can have a clear impact on the need for far-
reaching restructuring. The fact that the bank’s difficulties are caused by external
factors can be a mitigating factor in the sense that less restructuring is required.
A manifestation of this general principle is the “proportionate assessment”
which was introduced by the Second Prolongation Communication; this will be
discussed in subsection 10.5.2. The general principle itself will be discussed in
subsection 10.5.3.
10.5.2 “Proportionate assessment” under the Second Prolongation
Communication
The Second Prolongation Communication was adopted in December 2011 and
it is the sixth Communication of the Crisis Framework.54 As the name of the
Second Prolongation Communication indicates, it extended the temporal scope
of the Crisis Framework. In addition – and in the context of the current chapter:
more importantly – the Second Prolongation Communication introduced the
so-called “proportionate assessment”.
A proportionate assessment means that the Commission will lighten its require-
ments as regards restructuring. For instance, in the decision on Alpha Bank, the
Commission noted that “as the aid measures are less distortive, the measures
taken to limit distortions of competition should therefore be proportionately
softened”.55
54. The Crisis Communications were discussed in section 3.4.1.
55. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 263.
THE NEED FOR FAR-REACHING RESTRUCTURING
287
The introduction of the proportionate assessment by the Second Prolongation
Communication should be seen in the context of the sovereign debt crisis of
2011. Growing tensions on the sovereign debt markets lead to problems on the
bank funding markets. At the Euro Summit of 26 October 2011, the EU Heads
of State or Government agreed on several issues (such as the governance struc-
ture of the euro area, the stability mechanisms (EFSF) and the PSI56 in
Greece).57 In addition, a ‘banking package’ was adopted, which required a cap-
italisation of banks: by 30 June 2012, a capital ratio of 9% of the highest quality
capital58 should be attained after accounting for market valuation59 of sovereign
debt exposures.
As a reaction to the sovereign debt crisis, the Second Prolongation Communica-
tion introduced a proportionate assessment of restructuring plans.60 Because
of the tensions in sovereign debt markets, even banks with a viable business
model might require State aid in the form of capital injections. The Second
Prolongation Communication stresses that also with respect to those banks, a
restructuring plan is required.61 However, pursuant to point 14 of the Second
Prolongation Communication, the Commission will undertake a proportionate
assessment of the viability of those banks, “taking full account of elements indi-
cating that banks can be viable in the long term without the need for significant
restructuring”. The following three conditions have to be met:
1) the capital shortage is essentially linked to a confidence crisis on sovereign
debt;
2) the capital injection is limited to the amount necessary to offset losses
stemming from marking European sovereign bonds to market;
3) the bank in question did not take excessive risk in acquiring sovereign debt.
56. Private Sector Involvement.
57. Statement of EU Heads of State or Government of 26 October 2011.
58. i.e. Core Tier 1 capital.
59. More specifically, this means that prudential filters on sovereign debt in the Available-for-
Sale portfolio should be removed and that the sovereign debt in the Held-to-Maturity
portfolio and Loans and receivables portfolio should be valuated according to current market
prices. See: EBA, ‘Capital buffers for addressing market concerns over sovereign exposures;
Methodological note’, 26 October 2011.
60. Point 14 of the Second Prolongation Communication. In the 2013 Banking Communication
(point 9), it is reiterated that the Commission will undertake a proportionate assessment of the
long-term viability of banks where the need for State aid stems from the sovereign crisis and
is not a result of excessive risk-taking.
61. Pesaresi & Mamdani (2012) welcome this approach, since not requiring restructuring plans
would endanger consistency between banks that were recapitalised at different stages of the
crisis.
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In which decisions did the Commission apply a proportionate assessment?
In total, the proportionate assessment was applied in 8 cases. Two of them
related to Portugal (CGD and BPI), four of them related to Greece (Eurobank,
Alpha Bank, NBG and Pireaus Bank), one to Italy (MPS) and one to Germany
(NordLB). In addition, the proportionate assessment was mentioned in the deci-
sion on BayernLB (5 December 2013, para. 189).62
The decisions on the Portuguese banks CGD and BPI were adopted on 24 July
2013. Interestingly, on 30 August 2013 (so only one month later), in the decision
on another Portuguese bank – Banco Comercial Português (BCP) –, the Com-
mission did not investigate whether a proportionate assessment should be taken.
How are the three criteria elaborated in the decisions?
The difficulties faced by Greek banks came mainly from the Greek sovereign
crisis and the deep recession in Greece. The Commission noted that the capital
needs of the Greek banks stemmed mainly from the participation in the PSI
programme and not from the mismanagement or excessive risk-taking from
existing investors. In its decision on Piraeus Bank and in its decision on
Eurobank and in its decision on NBG, the Commission noted that the bank’s
exposure to the sovereign risk of its domestic country was larger than the
exposure of other banks in Greece.63 As a result, not all the losses on GGBs (the
loss on the PSI programme) could be attributed to the regular exposure of
a financial institution to the sovereign risk of its domestic country. By contrast,
in the case of Alpha Bank, the Commission noted that the bank’s exposure to the
sovereign risk of its domestic country was smaller than the exposure of other
banks in Greece.64 Consequently, this bank cannot be considered to have accu-
mulated an excessive exposure to sovereign debt.
The proportionate assessment was applied in two Portuguese cases. The
Commission considered that Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) and Banco BPI
met the three criteria. As a result, the Commission undertook a proportionate
assessment.65 With respect to the second criterion, the Commission noted that
62. “However, it should be noted that if regulatory capital requirements were in future to go
substantially beyond the level envisaged in this Decision, the Commission might have to
conduct a proportionate assessment of the kind indicated in the third sentence of point 14
of the Commission Communication on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid
rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (60); this
might possibly necessitate only a limited additional measure of restructuring.”
63. Piraeus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 321; National Bank of Greece (NBG),
SA.34824, 23 July 2014, para. 370.
64. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 263.
65. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), 24 July 2013, para. 55-58.
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the capital needs were not directly caused by the impact of marking sovereign
bonds to market. However, the underlying reason was comparable, because
EBA required banks to establish a ‘sovereign buffer’. This is a buffer related to
the amount of sovereign bonds held on the balance sheet. 66 As a consequence of
the requirement to establish this sovereign buffer, the minimum capital require-
ments increased.
With respect to the third criterion, the Commission noted that the sovereign
debt was acquired by doing carry trade transactions. The Commission added
that although under certain circumstances, such transactions could be con-
sidered as above-average risk-taking, the acquired bonds represented eligible
collateral and the relevant rating notations were well above investment grade
(AA- for Portugal).67
In the case of the Italian bank MPS, the Italian State argued that the State aid
to MPS should be subject to a proportionate assessment.68 The Commission
considered that the first two criteria were met. The capital shortfall of MPS was
identified following the EBA “EU capital exercise”.69 Without the requirement
for a sovereign buffer and on the basis of historic accounting treatment there
would have been no shortfall.70 The compliance with the third criterion – did the
bank take excessive risk in acquiring sovereign debt? – was less clear, however.
The Commission noted that MPS had been acquiring Italian governments bonds
not only before the outbreak of the sovereign crisis in 2010, but also during the
sovereign crisis.71 The Commission considered that acquiring government
bonds before the outbreak of the sovereign crisis did not amount to excessive
risk-taking. The status of the strategy of acquiring government bonds after the
outbreak of the sovereign crisis was less clear. The Commission noted, however,
that the Italian State only sought partial application of the proportionate assess-
ment.72
During the crisis, NordLB remained profitable (with the financial year 2009 as
the only exception). Furthermore, NordLB was able to obtain finance from the
market without any state support.73 The Commission noted that the recapitalisa-
tion measures for NordLB were all related to EBA requirements (which were,
66. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), 24 July 2013, para. 56; BPI, 24 July 2013, para. 59.
67. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), 24 July 2013, para. 57; BPI, 24 July 2013, para. 61.
68. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), 27 November 2013, para. 158.
69. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), 27 November 2013, para. 159.
70. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), 27 November 2013, para. 160.
71. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), 27 November 2013, para. 161.
72. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), 27 November 2013, para. 161.
73. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 11-12.
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in turn, related to the confidence crisis on sovereign debt). The Commission
therefore concluded that there was less need for significant restructuring,
meaning that compensatory measures may in principle be limited.74
What are the implications of the proportionate assessment?
The proportionate assessment means that the Commission lightens its restruc-
turing requirements. It usually concerns the need for burden-sharing measures
and compensatory measures.
For instance, in the decision on Alpha Bank, the Commission noted that the
own contribution and burden-sharing by Alpha Bank was much lower than what
the Commission would usually consider sufficient. However, the Commission
went on to observe the following:
“In view of the elements discussed in section 7.6.1 and in particular the facts
that Alpha Bank is the least aided bank among the large Greek banks and that
the aid received fully qualifies for the exemption lay down in point 14 of the
2011 Prolongation Communication, under which the Commission can accept
a lower own contribution and burden-sharing, the restructuring plan can be
considered as providing for sufficient own contribution and burden-sharing
measures”.75
This recital illustrates that the Commission lightened its burden-sharing require-
ments. The proportionate assessment also had implications for the compensatory
measures. This is illustrated by the following recital:
“As discussed in section 7.6.1 of this Decision, the distortive effect of the aid
measures is lower in the light of those factors as is the need for measures
to limit distortions of competition. For those reasons, the Commission can
exceptionally accept that, in spite of the high aid amount and the high market
share, the restructuring plan does not envisage any downsizing of the balance
sheet and loans in Greece”.76
The proportionate assessment as a manifestation of a general principle
The basic idea behind the proportionate assessment is that if the bank’s
difficulties are mainly due to external factors, then there should be less need
for far-reaching restructuring than when the difficulties are due to internal fac-
tors. While point 14 of the Prolongation Communication addresses a very
specific type of situation, the more general principle can also be seen in the
decisional practice of the Commission. This will be discussed in the following
subsection.
74. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 160.
75. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 296.
76. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 299.
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10.5.3 External or internal factors?
In several decisions, the Commission dwelled on the cause of the bank’s
difficulties. This can be illustrated by the case of the Bulgarian First Investment
Bank (FIB), which was granted liquidity support in 2014. FIB experienced a
sharp liquidity outflow. The outflow of deposits was caused by the general
liquidity crisis of June 2014 that endangered the entire Bulgarian banking
sector. This aspect was taken into account by the Commission who stressed that
the liquidity support to FIB was due to external factors (and not to structural
problems of the bank itself).77 In addition, the Commission noted that FIB did
not face any capital shortfall.78 For these two reasons, the Commission con-
sidered that lighter restructuring was required (compared to what the Commis-
sion would seek when confronted with a bank receiving State aid to cover a
capital shortfall).79 This case illustrates that that if the bank’s difficulties are
mainly due to external factors, then there should be less need for far-reaching
restructuring than when the difficulties are due to internal factors.
Furthermore, the case of FIB illustrates that also outside the context of the
proportionate assessment, the Commission takes into account the macro-
economic situation in the Member State. Another example is the case of Bank
of Ireland. When assessing the measures to limit the distortion of competition,
the Commission took into account the particular situation on the Irish finan-
cial markets.80 This particular situation consisted of “a deep recession combined
with a dramatic fall in property prices, high unemployment and foreign com-
petitors that are retrenching”.81 The Commission held that, because of this par-
ticular situation on the Irish financial markets, a careful assessment of the market
conditions and competitive environment was necessary.
It should be noted that an unfavourable macro-economic situation in the Mem-
ber State cannot be used easily as an excuse for the bank’s difficulties. In the
decision on the Irish bank PTSB, the Commission first noted that all Irish banks
were affected by the financial crisis. The Commission went on to consider that
PTSB had specific weaknesses which exacerbated its situation.82 Those specific
weaknesses consisted of a “significant funding gap way above industry norms”
77. First Investment Bank (FIB), 25 November 2014, para. 81.
78. First Investment Bank (FIB), 25 November 2014, para. 80.
79. First Investment Bank (FIB), 25 November 2014, para. 83.
80. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 232-245.
81. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 227.
82. IL&P (PTSB), SA.33311, 20 July 2011, para. 15.
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and an “exposure to the Irish and UK residential property market, combined
with loss-making tracker mortgages and lower credit standards”.83 Similarly, in
its decision on CCB/CCI, the Commission observed that “the economic
recession was an external factor worsening an existing internal problem”.84
One of the most prominent internal factors is the fact that the beneficiary bank
has taken excessive risks.85 This characteristic is important in the context of
moral hazard. Moral hazard is problematic because (the expectation of) State
aid induces banks to take excessive risks. If banks that have engaged in overly
risky behaviour are rescued by the State, then compensatory measures are
needed to address moral hazard. The problem of moral hazard is created by the
fact that banks do not bear the downside consequences of their behaviour. As
a result of the compensatory measures which are (to some extent) aimed at
inflicting “pain” on the bank, the bank is forced to bear the consequences of its
behaviour. This way, moral hazard is addressed. Conversely, if the beneficiary
bank did not take excessive risks in the past, then there is less need to “punish”
the bank.
To give an example: in its decision on ABN AMRO, the Commission
stressed that the business models of Fortis Bank Nederland (FBN) and ABN
AMRO N86 did not rely on excessive risk-taking and unsustainable lending
practices.87 Hence the need for burden-sharing and compensatory measures was
reduced:
“In this case, FBN and ABN AMRO N do not primarily need State aid
because they took flawed management decisions. The need for State aid
does not stem for instance from the accumulation of excessive risks in their
investments or in their lending policy, or because they had undertaken an
unsustainable pricing policy. (…) Consequently, the Commission consi-
ders that the aid to FBN and ABN AMRO N is significantly less distortive
83. &P (PTSB), SA.33311, 20 July 2011, para. 15. These specific weaknesses are elaborated
in para. 16-20 and 21-24.
84. Cooperative Central Bank and the Cooperative Credit Institutions (CCB/CCI), 24 February
2014, para. 23.
85. Using the fact that the bank has engaged in excessive risk-taking as a relevant characteristic,
raises the question what exactly constitutes ‘excessive risk-taking’. Banks cannot be blamed
for taking risks, because risk-taking is part of doing business. Only excessive risk-taking is
detrimental. But how to determine the difference between risk-taking and excessive risk-
taking? The dividing line may be difficult to establish. This raises also the question whether
the Commission is the appropriate authority to address excessive risk-taking and moral
hazard. This concern was raised by Lyons & Zhu (2012).
86. ABNAMRON is the part of ABNAMRO that was originally held by FBN and subsequently
held by the Dutch State.
87. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 155, 305, 316 and 320.
THE NEED FOR FAR-REACHING RESTRUCTURING
293
than the aid approved in favour of financial institutions which had
accumulated excessive risks. Therefore, the Commission considers that
further divestments are not necessary”.88
It should be noted that there are decisions in which the fact that the bank has
engaged in excessive risk-taking is not mentioned in relation to the need for
far-reaching restructuring in general, but in relation to a specific restructuring
measure. For instance, the fact that the bank has engaged in excessive risk-
taking can be a reason to replace the senior management of the bank, it can be
a reason to improve the risk management of the bank, it can be a reason to
improve the corporate governance framework of the bank, or it can be a reason
to improve the remuneration policy of the bank (so that it does not encourage
excessive risk-taking).89
In addition, there are many decisions in which these restructuring measures are
mentionedwithout reference to the cause of the bank’s problems. For instance, in
the decision on Banco Comercial Português (BCP), the Commission observed
that BCP had undertaken “a significant overhaul of strategy to strengthen its
corporate governance management, most notably on risk management practices
and controls”.90 Although this decision mentions the fact that the beneficiary
bank has committed to improve its corporate governance and risk management,
the decision does not mention whether the bank had internal problems that
necessitated these restructuring measures. The decision on BCP is just an
illustration of the many decisions in which the issue of whether the bank’s
problems are due to internal factors is not explicitly taken into account. This can
be explained by the more general observation that the Commission did not
explicitly assess in every bank State aid case whether far-reaching restructuring
was needed.
10.6 Conclusion
In several bank State aid cases, the Commission explicitly considered that
“far-reaching restructuring” was needed. The conclusion that far-reaching
restructuring is needed, influences the Commission’s assessment of whether
the restructuring plan meets the three restructuring objectives. In that regard,
the relevant characteristics discussed in this chapter can be considered as aggra-
vating and mitigating factors. For instance, the fact that the bank did not engage
88. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 320.
89. All these restructuring measures (aimed at restoring the long-term viability of the bank)
will be discussed in chapter 11.
90. Banco Comercial Português (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 87.
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in excessive risk-taking is a mitigating factor, because it reduces the risk of
moral hazard. Consequently, there is less need for burden-sharing measures and
compensatory measures – as was illustrated by the case of ABN AMRO.91
Similarly, the fact that the bank did not pay an adequate remuneration to the
State, is an aggravating factor which is taken into account by the Commission in
its assessment of whether the burden-sharing and compensatory measures are
sufficient.
Although this principle might sound simple, the decisional practice is actually
quite vague on the need for far-reaching restructuring. This is due to the fol-
lowing reasons.
In the first place, “far-reaching restructuring” is not a clearly defined concept.
What exactly is far-reaching restructuring? In the decisional practice, some
examples of far-reaching restructuring can be found: dramatic downsizing of
the bank, a change of ownership of the bank, and/or the disappearance of the
bank as a standalone entity.92 To some extent, the conclusion that far-reach-
ing restructuring is needed seems to imply that the bank should be ‘punished’.
However, even if one accepts the premise that a beneficiary bank should be
punished, it is extremely hard to establish how much punishment the bank
deserves. Indeed, for the reasons set out in section 6.4, I am of the opinion that
the exact punitive effect (or degree of severity) of the restructuring plan cannot
be established.
In the second place, in many bank State aid cases, the need for far-reaching
restructuring is not explicitly addressed by the Commission. In that regard, it
should be noted that the assessment of the need for far-reaching restructuring
sometimes takes the form of a preliminary assessment that precedes the assess-
ment of the compatibility of the restructuring plan; sometimes it is part of the
compatibility-assessment. Indeed, the decisions in the cases of CGD, BPI,
Eurobank, Alpha Bank, NBG, Pireaus Bank, Ethias and FIB93 include a section
that specifically addresses the need for far-reaching restructuring, while in all the
other cases, the need for far-reaching restructuring is addressed less prominently
in the decisions.
91. This case was discussed in section 10.5.3.
92. In the decision on WestLB (C40/2009, 20 December 2011, para. 166), the Commission held
that in-depth restructuring “can go as far as liquidation”. Indeed, WestLB was wound-down.
In the decision of Parex banka (C26/2009, 15 September 2010, para. 127), the Commission
held that the far-reaching restructuring in that case should include “a significant limitation of
size of the distressed bank”.
93. And to some extent, the decision on KBC (para. 139-140), ING (para. 118-119), Dexia
(26 February 2010, para. 162-164).
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In the third place, some of the relevant characteristics of the present chapter are
not always mentioned in relation to the need for far-reaching restructuring. For
instance – as discussed in section 10.5.3 – the fact that the bank’s problems are
caused by internal factors is sometimes only mentioned in relation to the need
for a specific restructuring measure, rather than in relation to the need for far-
reaching restructuring in general.
However, it should be noted that establishing the need for far-reaching
restructuring is not an aim in itself. Indeed, the ultimate aim of restructuring
is threefold: i) restoration of long-term viability; ii) burden-sharing; and iii)
minimising competition distortions. The Commission’s conclusion that far-
reaching restructuring is needed, is only an intermediate step, in the sense that
this conclusion influences the Commission’s assessment of whether the restruc-
turing plan meets the three restructuring objectives.
The aim of this PhD-study is to identify the characteristics that are relevant
to the Commission’s conclusion that the restructuring plan meets the three
restructuring objectives. The current chapter discussed the characteristics that
were relevant to the need for restructuring in general, while the following
three chapters will focus on the characteristics that are specifically related to
one of the three restructuring objectives: chapter 11 discusses the characte-
ristics that are relevant to the assessment of the viability; chapter 12 discusses
the characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of the burden-sharing;
and chapter 13 discusses the characteristics that are relevant to the assessment
of the competition distortions.
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Chapter 11. Restoring long-term viability
11.1 Introduction
Restoring the long-term viability1 of the beneficiary bank is the first pillar of the
restructuring plan. In every Restructuring Decision, the Commission assesses
whether the restructuring plan ensures that the beneficiary bank will return to
long-term viability. The current chapter focuses on this viability-assessment.
11.1.1 Long-term viability
Granting State aid to failing banks keeps them afloat, but it does not change the
underlying problems of these banks. Long-term viability cannot be achieved by
State aid alone. In order to restore the long-term viability of the bank, the restruc-
turing plan should identify the causes of the bank’s difficulties and the bank’s
own weaknesses.2 The restructuring plan should also propose restructuring
measures that remedy the bank’s weaknesses. The weaknesses and the corres-
ponding viability-measures can relate to funding, corporate governance, risk
management, staff remuneration, operational efficiency or the business model of
the beneficiary bank. These viability-measures will be the focus of the current
chapter.3
1. Point 13 of the Restructuring Communication gives the following definition of long-term
viability: “Long-term viability is achieved when a bank is able to cover all its costs including
depreciation and financial charges and provide an appropriate return on equity, taking into
account the risk profile of the bank. The restructured bank should be able to compete in the
marketplace for capital on its own merits in compliance with relevant regulatory require-
ments.”
2. Point 10 of the Restructuring Communication.
3. The current chapter does not focus on the question to what extent the causes of the bank’s
failure are endogenous and to what extent external, since this issue is already covered in
section 10.5.3.
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11.1.2 The relevant context
Where a bank cannot be restored to viability, it should bewound up in an orderly
fashion.4 This is – by definition – the case in the W-context.5 In this context, the
first pillar of the restructuring plan is not focussed on the restoration of long-term
viability, but on the orderly resolution. ‘Orderly resolution’ (in the W-context)
is thus the counterpart of ‘return to viability’ (in the C-context). This illustrates
the importance of the relevant context. How is the first pillar applied in the other
contexts? In the T-context, the Commission assesses whether the purchaser is
viable and capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank.6 In the S/T/W-
context, the first pillar concerns the following three points: i) break-up of the
beneficiary bank in an orderly fashion; ii) transferred business should be viable;
iii) bad bank should be liquidated in an orderly fashion.
There are several scenarios in which an ailing bank can be rescued and
restructured. It should be noted that the Restructuring Communication requires
that the notification of the restructuring plan should include a comparison with
alternative options.7 The chosen alternative should be the least costly one. This
follows from the principle that the aid should be limited to the minimum nec-
essary, a principle which shall be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
At this point, it is worth stressing that an orderly wind-down scenario is only
chosen when the viability of the bank cannot be restored.
11.1.3 Remedying the bank’s weaknesses
The restructuring plan should contain measures that remedy the bank’s weak-
nesses. These weaknesses can be manifold: they can concern the business model
of the bank, its funding model, its corporate governance framework, its risk
management system, etc. The fact that the restructuring plan addresses these
weaknesses is relevant to the assessment of the return to long-term viability.8 In
this PhD-study, each restructuring measure remedying a specific weakness is
considered a relevant characteristic. For instance, the fact that the restructuring
plan provides for a reduction of the bank’s reliance on wholesale funding is
identified as a relevant characteristic.
4. Point 9 of the Restructuring Communication.
5. As set out in section 6.8, This PhD-study distinguishes between the C-context (in which the
beneficiary bank continues to exist as a standalone entity), the W-context (in which the
beneficiary is wound-down), the T-context (in which the beneficiary bank is taken-over by
another bank), the S/C/W-context (in which the beneficiary bank is split-up in a good and bad
part) and the S/T/W-context (in which the beneficiary bank is split-up in a good part – which
is transferred to another bank – and a bad part – which is wound-down).
6. This will be discussed in section 11.10.
7. Point 9 of the Restructuring Communication.
8. In its decisional practice, the Commission explicitly indicated that it “notes positively that
the restructuring plan identifies and aims at addressing many of the sources of the bank’s
difficulties” (OVAG, 9 December 2011, para. 56).
CHAPTER 11
298
In that regard, two remarks are in order. Firstly, it should be noted that the bank’s
weaknesses are often interrelated. For instance, an excessive growth strategy
may result in a large portfolio of non-performing loans (NPL’s), which nega-
tively affects the profitability of the bank. An excessive growth strategy is
usually financed by a strong reliance on wholesale funding9, and it is made pos-
sible by a weak risk management system (such as low credit standards). In addi-
tion, a weak corporate governance framework or inadequate remuneration sys-
tem may induce the bank’s senior management to take excessive risks and to
pursue an aggressive growth strategy.10
Secondly, the distinction between the bank’s weaknesses (and the correspond-
ing restructuring measures) is not always clear-cut; they are not always classi-
fied in the same way. For instance, sometimes risk management is treated as part
of the corporate governance framework; and sometimes, it is treated separately.
Furthermore, risk management and the funding model are sometimes grouped
together under the heading ‘reduction of risk profile’. Similarly, the focus on the
bank’s core activities and the abandonment of risky activities can be classified
under ‘reduction of risk profile’, but also under ‘business model’. In addition, the
business model can be understood as concerning the bank’s activities. Conver-
sely, it can also be understood as comprising both the activities and the funding.
To conclude, the restructuring measures each constitute a partial solution to the
bank’s problems. Consequently, although the weaknesses and the corresponding
restructuring measures (and thus the relevant characteristics) are discussed sepa-
rately in the following sections, they should not be viewed in isolation.
11.1.4 Structure of this chapter
The following sections discuss the characteristics that are relevant to the via-
bility-assessment. These relevant characteristics concern the replacement of
the bank’s senior management (see section 11.2), the corporate governance
framework (see section 11.3), the remuneration policy (see section 11.4), the
risk management (see section 11.5), the funding strategy (see section 11.6), the
operational efficiency (see section 11.7) and the business model (see section
11.8). Section 11.9 focuses on a specific viability-measure: asset relief. Sections
11.10 and 11.11 address the situation in which a bank is taken over by another
bank. Furthermore, the Restructuring Communication provides that the restruc-
turing plan should demonstrate how the bank will restore its long-term viability
without State aid as soon as possible; this will be discussed in section 11.12.
9. If the bank’s loan book expands more rapidly than its deposit base, then the funding gap
will have to be met by wholesale funding.
10. The link between remuneration policies and risk management is also apparent in CRD IV.
Recital 62 stresses that remuneration policies which encourage excessive risk- taking behav-
iour can undermine sound and effective risk management.
RESTORING LONG-TERM VIABILITY
299
Almost every section of this chapter is dedicated to a specific relevant charac-
teristic. With respect to each relevant characteristic, the following questions
will be addressed: Firstly, why is this a relevant characteristic? Secondly, has the
Commission consistently taken into account this relevant characteristic? Thirdly,
how is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions? Every section
concludes with some concluding remarks: in these subsections, a summary of
the main findings is given as well as a discussion of the implications (of the main
findings) for the Commission and the beneficiary bank/Member State.
Thus, the sections of this chapter are structured in the same way and the struc-
ture of each section is based on the above-mentioned questions.11 It should be
noted that section 11.2 is more extensive than the other sections, because this
section explains how I approach the above-mentioned questions. In that regard,
section 11.2 is very instructive.
11.2 Replacement of senior management
* The fact that the senior management of the beneficiary bank has been
replaced.
11.2.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
In several bank State aid cases, the senior management of the bank was replaced
when the bank was rescued by the State. For instance, when the Dutch State
nationalised SNS REAAL in February 2013, it appointed a new CEO and a new
CFO.12
Another example is Banco Portugues de Negocios (BPN), which was
nationalised in November 2008 by the Portuguese government. As part of the
nationalization, the members of the board of BPN were replaced by executives
appointed by Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD). CGD was a State-owned bank
11. With the exception of section 11.11, because this section applies to a very specific situa-
tion.
12. SNS REAAL, SA.36598, 19 December 2013, para. 13 and 84. For background informa-
tion, see: Hoekstra & Frijns, Het rapport van de evaluatiecommissie nationalisatie SNS
REAAL.
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and it was given the task to manage BPN.13 There was a specific reason for the
replacement of BPN’s senior management: the senior management of BPN
had engaged in fraudulent behaviour.14 In its decision on BPN, the Commis-
sion welcomed the fact that BPN’s board had been changed.15
The fact that the senior management of the beneficiary bank has been replaced
is a relevant characteristic. It is relevant for two reasons. In the first place, many
restructuring plans envisage a return to a more traditional business model. This
is usually accompanied by a change in management style. The replacement of
the senior management can contribute to a change in management style.16
In the second place, the fact that the senior management of the bank is no
longer involved in the bank’s activities provides a valuable signal against moral
hazard.17 This is especially the case when the bank’s management took the deci-
sions leading to the bank’s difficulties. If the management was responsible for
the bank’s failure, then they should bear the consequences.18
The current relevant characteristic is mentioned in the Crisis Communications.
The Recapitalisation Communication holds that State aid for banks which are
not fundamentally sound, can only be accepted “on the condition of either a
bank’s winding-up or a thorough and far-reaching restructuring, including a
change in management and corporate governance where appropriate”.19
“Necessary management changes” were also mentioned in the Restructuring
Communication.20 The 2013 Banking Communication is even more clear about
the importance of management changes. Point 37 of this Communication pro-
vides that “there should be incentives for banks”managements to undertake far-
reaching restructuring in good times and, thereby, minimise the need to recourse
to State support. Accordingly, if recourse to State aid could have reasonably been
averted through appropriate and timely management action, any entity relying
13. CGD was state-owned and it was given the task to manage BPN. See Banco Portugues de
Negocios (BPN), SA.26909, 24 October 2011, para. 18 and 112.
14. Banco Portugues de Negocios (BPN), SA.26909, 27 March 2012, para. 23 and 200. See
also the Report of Financial Stability of the Bank of Portugal.
15. Banco Portugues de Negocios (BPN), SA.26909, 24 October 2011, para. 112.
16. See for instance: Parex banka, C26/2009, 15 September 2010, para. 136.
17. This was recognized by the Commission in its decision on SachsenLB (para. 126).
18. However, sometimes, the managers that could be considered responsible for the bank’s fail-
ure are no longer part of the senior management of the bank. For instance, the former CEO
of SNS REAAL, Sjoerd van Keulen, was responsible for the acquisition of Bouwfonds Prop-
erty Finance in 2006. In 2009, he was succeeded by Latenstein.
19. Point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
20. Point 11 of the Restructuring Communication.
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on State aid for its restructuring or orderly winding down should normally
replace the Chief Executive Officer of the bank, as well as other board mem-
bers if appropriate”.21
Thus, the Crisis Communications underline that the fact that the bank’s senior
management has been replaced22 is a relevant characteristic.
11.2.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The above-mentioned considerations from the Crisis Communications might
create the impression that in many bank State aid cases, the senior management
has been replaced. Surprisingly, only in 23 Commission decisions (of in total
90 cases), it is mentioned that the senior management of the bank has been
replaced. The table in Annex VII provides an overview of the decisions that
mention that the senior management has been replaced.
Two things need to be clarified. First, categorizing decisions on the basis of
whether they mention the relevant characteristic is sometimes a matter of
interpretation (see subsection 11.2.2.1). Second, there might be explanations
for the omission to mention a relevant characteristic (see subsection 11.2.2.2).
11.2.2.1 A matter of interpretation
The table in Annex VII indicates that there are only 23 decisions that mention
that the senior management has been replaced. This number should be regarded
with prudence, since categorizing cases on the basis of whether they mention the
relevant characteristic is sometimes a question of interpretation. For instance, in
the decisions on the Danish banks Amagerbanken, Roskilde Bank and Fionia
Bank, the Commission did not explicitly mention the replacement of senior
management in the assessment-part of the decision. However, in the decision on
the Danish winding-up scheme, the Commission noted positively that removing
21. Point 37 of the 2013 Banking Communication. This consideration is similar to point 49 of
the 2014 R&R-guidelines, which requires that if the beneficiary’s difficulties could have
been avoided through appropriate and timely management action, ‘appropriate manage-
ment changes’ should have been made. The notion ‘appropriate management changes’ is
less specific than point 37 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
22. A change of senior management is usually achieved by dismissing the board members. But
it can also be achieved in a different way. This is illustrated by the banks that were wound-
up under the Danish winding-up scheme. Under this winding-up scheme, the Financial
Stability Company (FSC) would establish a subsidiary bank (New Bank) that would
acquire the assets of the distressed bank (Old Bank). The FSC would appoint the board of
directors of New Bank. See: N407/2010, 30 September 2010, para. 14. In my opinion, it
does not really matter how the change of senior management is achieved. That the senior
management is replaced is more important than how the senior management is replaced.
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control from OldBank’s management was a measure to minimise moral
hazard.23 Since the cases of Amagerbanken, Roskilde Bank and Fionia Bank
are in line with the principles of the winding-up scheme, it can be argued that the
relevant characteristic is indirectly mentioned in these cases.24
In only a few decisions, the current relevant characteristic was mentioned
in the assessment-part. This is the case in 14 decisions.25 There are 19 decisions
in which the change of senior management is only mentioned in the descrip-
tion-part of the decision. It is thus not explicitly taken into account by the
Commission in its assessment. However, this does not mean that the change of
management is without significance. In these 19 decisions, the change of
management is usually mentioned in the context of the description of the
restructuring plan. For instance, one of the main features of the restructuring
(plan) of Hypo Real Estate (HRE) was that “all the executive board members of
HRE who held office before the crisis have been replaced”.26
Thus, this relevant characteristic is sometimes mentioned only in the descrip-
tion-part of the decision. In my opinion, it would be better if this characteristic
is explicitly mentioned in the assessment-part of the decision. Since this obser-
vation does not only apply to the current relevant characteristic, but to all rel-
evant characteristics discussed in this chapter, this observation will be discussed
in the final section of this chapter.
11.2.2.2 Possible explanations
The table in Annex VII shows that the replacement of the senior management
is not mentioned in every decision. Indeed, there are 67 decisions (of in total 90
cases) that do not mention whether the senior management of the beneficiary
bank has been replaced. It is striking that in so many decisions, the Commission
did not explicitly take into account the relevance of management changes. How
can this be explained?
In essence, there are four possible explanations for the omission to mention a
relevant characteristic in certain decisions. In the first place, some relevant char-
acteristics are not applicable in every context. However, regarding the current
23. N407/2010, para. 43.
24. They are therefore included in the category of decisions that do mention whether the senior
management has been replaced.
25. There are 9 decisions that mention the change of management in the assessment of the
bank’s viability. There are 4 decisions that mention the change of management in the
assessment of burden-sharing. There are 3 decisions that mention the change of manage-
ment in the assessment of competition distortions.
26. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 63.
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relevant characteristic, this explanation can be discarded, since the change of
management is applicable in every context.
In the second place, the State aid control policy of the Commission can
evolve. This possible explanation can also be discarded. The relevance of this
characteristic was not toned down in later Communications. On the contrary,
the 2013 Banking Communication really emphasised the relevance of mana-
gement changes.27
In the third place, the omission to mention the relevant characteristic could
be due to an inconsistency. This is the case when the Commission does not
mention the presence of a relevant characteristic in the decision, even though
the relevant characteristic is present in the case. In the fourth place, the omission
can be explained by the simple fact that the relevant characteristic was not pre-
sent in the case at hand. This could – but does not necessarily have to – amount to
an inconsistency. With respect to the third and fourth possible explanation, it is
important to understand the difference between, on the one hand, the situation
that the Commission does not mention if a relevant characteristic is present in
a certain case, and on the other hand, the situation that the relevant charac-
teristic is not present in the case. This is illustrated by the following matrix.
Is the relevant characteristic present?
Present Not present
Does the decision
mention whether the
relevant characteris-
tic is present?
m
en
tio
ne
d The decision mentions that
the relevant characteristic is
present.
The decision mentions that
the relevant characteristic is
absent.
Present/Mentioned Absent/Mentioned
“situation P/M” “situation A/M”
N
ot
m
en
tio
ne
d The decision omits to
mention that the relevant
characteristic is present.
The decision omits to
mention that the relevant
characteristic is absent.
Present/Omitted Absent/Omitted
“situation P/O” “situation A/O”
“Situation P/M” and “situation A/M” fall under the scope of section 11.2.3 of
the current chapter. Indeed, that section discusses the decisions that mention the
relevant characteristic. The current section focusses on the decisions in which
the relevant characteristic is not mentioned (i.e. (“situation P/O” and “situation
A/O”).
27. In addition, the fact that change of management figures as one of the general principles on
resolution illustrates the relevance of this relevant characteristic. This makes it all the more
surprising that this characteristic is not mentioned in every decision.
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▪ Situation P/O: senior management was replaced, but this was not taken
into account by the Commission in its assessment and thus not mentioned in
the decision
This situation amounts to an inconsistency. In several cases, the fact that the
senior management was replaced, was noted positively by the Commission. In
these cases, the change of management was treated as relevant characteristic that
positively contributes to the viability-assessment. If there would be cases in
which the management was replaced, but in which this change of management
was not noted positively by the Commission, then this would mean that the
change of management was not treated as a relevant characteristic in those cases.
Clearly, this would be a violation of the principle of equal treatment.
▪ Situation A/O: the Commission did not mention the relevant characteristic,
because the senior management of the bank was not replaced
This situation is more nuanced. Two remarks are in order. First, it should be
pointed out that the absence of a relevant characteristic in a case can be justified.
For instance, as will be explained below, a replacement of the bank’s senior
management is not always required.
Second, the principle of equal treatment requires that the Commission
assesses in each and every case whether a relevant characteristic is present
(unless the characteristic is not applicable in that context or no longer relevant
because of an evolving policy). The Commission should thus always assess
whether the relevant characteristic (if applicable and still relevant) is present in
the case at hand. Furthermore, this assessment should be expressed in the deci-
sion. In other words: the Commission should mention whether the relevant char-
acteristic is present. Not mentioning the absence of a relevant characteristic
can only be justified when two conditions are fulfilled: firstly, there is a jus-
tification for the absence of the relevant characteristic; and secondly, this jus-
tification of the absence of the relevant characteristic does not need to be
explained in the decision and it should be obvious that the omission to mention
the relevant characteristic means that the relevant characteristic is not present.
Are these two conditions met with respect to the current relevant characteris-
tic?
In that regard, it is worthwhile to recall point 37 of the 2013 Banking Com-
munication:
“If recourse to State aid could have reasonably been averted through appro-
priate and timely management action, any entity relying on State aid for its
restructuring or orderly winding down should normally replace the Chief
Executive Officer of the bank, as well as other boardmembers if appropriate.”
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Thus, the necessity of a management change depends on several relevant
aspects. First of all, the fact that recourse to State aid could have reasonably
been averted through appropriate and timely management action is a relevant
aspect. Another element that can be inferred from point 37 is “normally” (in the
phrase “should normally replace the CEO”). The use of the term “normally”
implies that there is room for exceptions. This, in turn, raises the question in
which circumstances such an exception is justified. A last element that can be
inferred from point 37 is “if appropriate” (in the phrase “as well as other board
members if appropriate”). Also here, the question can be raised under which
circumstances a replacement of other board members is “appropriate”.
The decisional practice (based on the 2013 Banking Communication) does
not provide answers to these questions. This is surprising, because one would
expect that the elements of point 37 of the 2013 Banking Communication would
be applied in the decisions. For instance, one would expect that in cases in which
the senior management was not replaced, the Commission would refer to the
circumstances that justify why the CEO (and other board members) should not
be replaced. It can be observed that this is not the case. Most of the decisions
that are based on the 2013 Banking Communication are silent on point 37 of that
Communication. Similarly, decisions taken before the introduction of the 2013
Banking Communication do not provide a justification why the senior mana-
gement was not replaced (provided that that is the case).
To conclude, it can only be observed that there are some decisions that do not
mention whether there has been a replacement of the bank’s senior manage-
ment. It cannot be observed whether these decisions correspond to “situation
P/O” or “situation A/O”. However, as discussed above, either situation would
amount to an inconsistency.
11.2.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The current subsection zooms in on the 23 bank State aid cases in which Com-
mission has mentioned the fact that the senior management of the bank had
been replaced. How is “senior management” defined in those decisions? “Senior
management” is a vague term that may be elaborated in various ways. As set out
in section 6.7.3, I am of the opinion that divergent elaborations of “senior
management” would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment.
It should be remarked that – although this PhD-study uses the term ‘senior
management’ as an overall term – this term is not used in the Crisis Communica-
tions. The analysis of the decisional practice shows that there have been changes
in the ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Supervisory Board’, ‘Management Board’, ‘senior
management’ or ‘top management’. Sometimes, only specific board members
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are replaced (for instance in the case of SNS REAAL, where the CEO and CFO
were replaced). Thus, the current relevant characteristic – i.e. the fact that the
senior management has been replaced – is not consistently elaborated.
It should be pointed out that CRD IV and the BRRD contain some definitions.
This will be discussed in more detail in section 11.2.4.
11.2.4 Impact BRRD
The BRRD has implications for the relevant characteristic discussed in the
current section. The BRRD introduces general principles governing resolution.
One of those principles is that the management body and senior management
of the bank under resolution are replaced.28 However, there is an exception to
this principle: “in case the retention of the management body and senior man-
agement, in whole or in part, as appropriate to the circumstances, is considered
to be necessary for the achievement of the resolution objectives”.29
As explained in section 4.4.1, the granting of State aid to an ailing bank will
usually trigger the resolution of that bank. Consequently – and in line with
Art. 34(1)(c) BRRD – the management body and senior management of that
bank should be replaced. This replacement of the bank’s management will
probably be viewed positively by the Commission in its decision on the State
aid to that bank.
It should be recalled there are three exceptions to the general rule that State
aid will trigger resolution. So it is possible to grant State aid to a bank without
triggering the resolution of the beneficiary bank. This means that in those three
situations, Art. 34(1)(c) BRRD does not apply to that bank. This does not mean,
however, that its senior management does not have to be replaced. Indeed,
notwithstanding the fact that the resolution principles of the BRRD do not apply,
the 2013 Banking Communication still applies to this situation.
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that a replacement of the bank’s man-
agement is also possible before the resolution-stage. In the early intervention-
stage, competent authorities have the power to replace the management body
and senior management. Pursuant to Art. 27(1)(d) BRRD, competent authorities
can require one or more members of the management body or senior manage-
ment to be removed or replaced if those persons are found unfit to perform
their duties pursuant to Article 13 of CRD IV. Article 28 BRRD provides for
28. Art. 34(1)(c) BRRD. That the resolution authorities should have the power to remove and
replace the senior management and directors was also one of the FSB Key Attributes (3.2.i).
29. Article 63 BRRD ensures that resolution powers are granted resolution powers. Article 63
(1)(l) BRRD provides that Member States have to ensure that resolution authorities
have the power to remove or replace the management body and senior management of an
institution under resolution.
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the possibility to remove the senior management in its entirety, when there is
a significant deterioration in the financial situation of the bank or where there
are serious infringements of law or serious administrative irregularities.
Another interesting aspect of the BRRD is that it gives a definition of the terms
‘management body’ and ‘senior management’. More precisely, the BRRD refers
to the definitions as provided by CRD IV. Pursuant to this definition, ‘senior
management’ means those natural persons who exercise executive functions
within an institution and who are responsible, and accountable to the manage-
ment body, for the day-to-day management of the institution.30
11.2.5 Concluding remarks
The replacement of the bank’s senior management is a relevant characteristic.
In my view, it is good that the senior management of a beneficiary bank is
replaced. It ensures that the bank’s management has incentives to take measures
to prevent the need for State aid. However, I recognise that there are situations
in which the bank’s management cannot be blamed for the bank’s demise. I
therefore welcome the fact that point 37 of the 2013 Banking Communication
provides for exceptions to the general rule that the senior management should
be replaced.
Although I applaud the 2013 Banking Communication, I am less enthusiastic
about the decisional practice on this point. The present section has shown that
there are many decisions that omit to mention whether the bank’s senior man-
agement has been replaced. The omission to mention the relevant characteristic
would suggest that the Commission did not take into account the relevant
characteristic. This would amount to an inconsistency.
How to remedy this inconsistency? Requiring a replacement of the senior man-
agement in all bank State aid cases is not the appropriate solution. As set out
above, I am of the opinion that there are situations in which a replacement of
30. ‘Management body’means an institution’s body or bodies, which are appointed in accordance
with national law, which are empowered to set the institution’s strategy, objectives and overall
direction, and which oversee and monitor management decision-making, and include the
persons who effectively direct the business of the institution.
See also CRD IV, recital 56: “A management body should be understood to have exec-
utive and supervisory functions. The competence and structure of management bodies
differ across Member States. In Member States where management bodies have a one-tier
structure, a single board usually performs management and supervisory tasks. In Member
States with a two-tier system, the supervisory function is performed by a separate super-
visory board which has no executive functions and the executive function is performed by a
separate management board which is responsible and accountable for the day-to-day
management of the undertaking. Accordingly, separate tasks are assigned to the different
entities within the management body.”
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the senior management is not desirable. In my view, the correct solution would
be for the Commission to clearly mention in every case whether the senior man-
agement has been replaced.
11.3 Corporate governance framework
* The fact that the restructuring plan provides for an improvement of the
bank’s corporate governance framework.
11.3.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Aweak corporate governance framework may be one of the causes of the bank’s
failure. For instance, the Commission noted that some of the Spanish banks
“had several structural limitations, such as weak corporate governance systems
which prevented those institutions from detecting problems at an early stage”.31
Consequently, restructuring plans should pay attention to corporate govern-
ance issues.32
The relevance of improving the corporate governance framework was
already recognised in the 2004 R&R-guidelines. Point 37 of the R&R-guidelines
required that “where the firm’s difficulties stem from flaws in its corporate
governance system, appropriate adaptations will have to be introduced”. Furt-
hermore, the Recapitalisation Communication provides that there should be
“a thorough and far-reaching restructuring, including a change in management
and corporate governance where appropriate”.33
The decisional practice of the Commission shows that the Commission recog-
nises the importance of corporate governance.34 In many decisions, it welcomed
measures aimed at improving the corporate governance. This can be illustrated
by the following recital:
31. This consideration can be found in many decisions on the Spanish banks. For instance:
Banco Gallego, SA.36500, 25 July 2013, para. 16.
32. Pursuant to point 11 of the Restructuring Communication, the restructuring plan should
provide information on the corporate governance framework of the beneficiary bank.
33. Point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
34. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of ‘corporate governance’, but corporate
governance usually includes the issues of risk management and executive remuneration.
Since these issues also have an independent meaning, these issues will be addressed in
sections 11.4 and 11.5. Notwithstanding this separate discussion, in several decisions, the
issues of risk management and remuneration are mentioned in relation to corporate gov-
ernance. Similarly, in the Slovenian banking cases, the pricing policy is treated in relation to
the corporate governance framework and risk management framework. In this PhD-study, the
pricing policy will be discussed in section 13.10.
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“The commitments on corporate governance ensure that strategy and deci-
sions are business-oriented and are neither biased by objectives other than
value maximisation nor subject to improper external influence. Planned
changes to the corporate governance will make the Bank less vulnerable to
external influence and at the same time will introduce more market disci-
pline through enhanced control and transparency in management deci-
sions”.35
This recital thus underlines that the fact that the beneficiary bank committed
to strengthen its corporate governance framework is a relevant characteristic.
11.3.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The table in Annex VII gives an overview of the decisions that mention that
the bank will improve its corporate governance framework. Of the 90 bank State
aid cases that were analysed in this PhD-study, only 43 decisions mention that
the corporate governance of the bank will be strengthened.36 In 47 decisions,
corporate governance is not mentioned. How can this be explained?
A possible explanation: the relevant context
To some extent, the fact that the relevant characteristic is not mentioned in 47
cases can be explained by the relevant context. Corporate governance is not
mentioned in cases in the W-context. Indeed, if a bank is to be wound-down,
then there is no need for measures that improve the corporate governance
framework of that bank.
Decisions related to cases in the T-context and S/T/W-context37 do usually
not mention corporate governance issues. While there may be corporate
governance problems, these problems are not addressed by means of corporate
governance measures. However, the transfer of the bank’s activities may con-
stitute a solution to the corporate governance problems. This is illustrated by the
decision on AB Ukio bankas, in which the Commission remarked that the sale
35. First Investment Bank (FIB), SA.39854, 25 November 2014, para. 102.
36. It should be noted that most of those 43 decisions mention the corporate governance
issues in the assessment-part of the decisions. However, there are a few decisions that
only mention the corporate governance issues in the description-part of the decision or
the annex to the decision.
37. It should be stressed that although the fact that the corporate governance of the beneficiary
bank will be improved is not applicable in the S/T/W-context, it can be mentioned in the
S/C/W-context. In the S/C/W-context, the beneficiary bank is split-up into a good bank that
continues to exist and a part that is put in liquidation. Since part of the bank continues to
exist, corporate governance measures may still be relevant in this context.
CHAPTER 11
310
of the legacy business to a buyer with a proper corporate governance struc-
ture would contribute to remedy the causes of the bank’s difficulties and set it
back on the path to a long-term viability.38
A possible explanation: absence of the relevant characteristic
Corporate governance is thus mainly relevant in the C-context (and S/C/W-
context). However, not every decision in the C-context mentions corporate
governance measures. A possible explanation for the omission is that in those
cases, the restructuring plan of the bank in question did not include corpo-
rate governance measures. This would correspond to “situation A/O” of the
matrix (introduced in section 11.2.2.2). Two questions are of importance: can
the absence of corporate governance measures in the restructuring plan be jus-
tified? And can the omission to mention the absence of corporate governance
measures be justified?
This first question can be answered affirmatively. Indeed, if a bank did not expe-
rience corporate governance problems, then there should be no need to improve
the corporate governance framework. In that regard, it is worthwhile to recall
that the Recapitalisation Communication provides that there should be “a thor-
ough and far-reaching restructuring, including a change in management and
corporate governance where appropriate”.39 The terms “where appropriate”
indicate that restructuring plans should only focus on corporate governance
where there are problems with the corporate governance of the bank.
The absence of corporate governance measures in the restructuring plan may
thus be justified. Can it also be justified that the Commission did not mention
the absence of corporate governance measures in the restructuring plan? On
a side note, it should be recalled that the Commission should always assess
whether the relevant characteristic is present. In one of its decisions, the Com-
mission considered that “under the Restructuring Communication it has also
to be assessed whether the restructuring plan addresses any existing or poten-
tial weaknesses in the corporate governance structure”.40 This consideration
– and especially the phrase “has to be assessed” – would imply that the
relevant characteristic is an assessment criterion. It could, however, be argued
that this assessment does only have to be expressed in the decisions when the
restructuring plan contains corporate governance measures. Consequently, it
does not have to be mentioned when the restructuring plan does not contain
corporate governance measures.
38. AB Ukio Bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 75.
39. Point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
40. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 190.
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There is a difference between the current relevant characteristic and the one
discussed in the previous section. Indeed, one would expect a replacement of
the senior management to be present in every case. And if there is no change
of senior management, one would expect a justification for the absence of this
relevant characteristic. By contrast, one does not expect corporate governance
measures to be present in every case (but only in cases in which there are corpo-
rate governance problems). This could justify that the absence of corporate gov-
ernance measures in the restructuring plan is not mentioned in the decision.
A possible explanation: an inconsistency
The aforementioned explanation does not leave out the possibility that the
omission to mention the relevant characteristic is due to an inconsistency. This
can be clarified by an example: assume that a beneficiary bank has taken
measures to improve its corporate governance framework. In other words: the
relevant characteristic is present. Assume further that the Commission did not
take into account these corporate governance measures undertaken by the bank.
In other words: the Commission omitted to mention the presence of the relevant
characteristic. This corresponds to “situation P/O” of the matrix. The omission to
mention the corporate governance measures in this case is clearly inconsistent
with the Commission decisions in which it did welcome corporate governance
measures (“situation P/M”).
To conclude, “situation A/O” seems to be a plausible explanation for the fact
that there are 47 decisions that do not mention corporate governance measures.
Nonetheless, “situation P/O” cannot be excluded.
11.3.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The analysis of the decisional practice reveals two conspicuous features. In
the first place, corporate governance issues are not always described with the
same level of detail (see subsection 11.3.3.1). In the second place, State involve-
ment has a particular impact on the corporate governance question (see sub-
section 11.3.3.2).
11.3.3.1 The level of detail with which the corporate governance issues are
described
As set out in subsection 11.3.2, there are 43 decisions that mention that the bank
will improve its corporate governance framework. However, these 43 decisions
do not mention the corporate governance measures with the same level of
detail. There are two extremes. On the one hand, there are decisions that merely
mention that the bank has undertaken a significant overhaul of its corporate
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governance framework.41 By contrast, some decisions explain in-depth the
corporate governance issues. In that regard, it should be kept in mind that cor-
porate governance issues can be elaborated in two ways: the measures them-
selves can be described in detail; and/or the need for those measures (and thus
their relevance) can be underlined. This can be clarified by the following exam-
ples.
The decision on Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) is an example of
a decision in which the corporate governance measures are described in
detail.42 LBBW is a German Landesbank and all its shareholders were either
public entities or in state ownership.43 Several measure were taken to improve
the corporate governance, including the following:
– The restructuring plan ensured that LBBWwould be less subject to improper
influence by the shareholders. The restructuring plan envisaged a change in
legal form: LBBW would be converted from a company governed by public
law into an SE or public limited company.44
– Important aspects of the voluntary German Corporate Governance Code
were introduced.45
– The restructuring pan envisaged that the Administrative Board of LBBW
would be reshaped into an independent Supervisory Board in accordance
with the model in the Corporate Governance Code.46
– The ‘fit and proper’ test was introduced.47
– The arms-length principle should apply in relations with shareholders.48
The decision on Sparkasse KölnBonn is an example of a decision that dwells
on the need for an improvement of the corporate governance framework.
Sparkasse KölnBonn is a German savings bank, held by city of Köln (70%)
and the city of Bonn (30%). In the Opening Decision, the Commission noted
that there was a lack of separation of the interests of the owners as public
entities and as owners of the economic entity of a bank.49 Many investment
decisions of Sparkasse KölnBonn were politically-driven.50 For instance, the
100% ownership of Sparkasse KölnBonn in Magic Media Company TV
41. For instance: Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 87;
Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 119.
42. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 84. NB:
the issue of corporate governance was not mentioned in the Opening Decision of 30 June
2009.
43. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 7.
44. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 27.
45. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 27.
46. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, annex 22.
47. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 29.
48. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, annex 25.
49. Sparkasse KölnBonn, C32/2009, 4 November 2009, para. 55.
50. Sparkasse KölnBonn, C32/2009, 29 September 2010, para. 37.
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Produktionsgesellschaft – which contributed to the need for risk provisions in
208 – seemed to be driven by the desire of the city of Koln to develop and
promote the city as a media city.51 In the Opening Decision, it was pointed out
that “it must be ensured that the problems of the past are not replicated and that
any lasting solution should therefore address the issue of corporate govern-
ance”.52
A very specific corporate governance measure can be found in the decision on
the Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS). The Articles of Association
of the Italian bank MPS contained a limitation with respect to the voting rights
that shareholders could exercise. It was stipulated that no shareholder other
than the Foundation could own ordinary shares exceeding 4% of MPS’s share
capital and that the voting rights on shares held in excess of this 4%-cap could
not be exercised. In July 2013, this 4%-cap was removed. The Commission
welcomed this, since this would introduce “market discipline through effective
shareholder control of the management actions”.
11.3.3.2 State involvement
One particular aspect of the corporate governance framework is State involve-
ment. In many cases, the State acquired a significant ownership of the bank and
some banks were completely nationalised. Many cases are thus characterised
by State involvement.53
In several Commission decisions, the State involvement is viewed as a posi-
tive characteristic. For instance, Anglo-Irish Bank faced corporate governance
difficulties.54 The Commission therefore noted positively that following the
rescue recapitalisation, the Irish State had a representative in the board of Anglo-
Irish Bank and that there were voting rights attached to the Irish State’s preferred
shares.55 As is illustrated by the case of Anglo-Irish Bank, the Member State
sometimes obtains voting rights as a result of the capital injection. However, this
is not always the case. Sometimes, recapitalisations are set up in such a way that
the Member State does not obtain voting rights. For instance, Austria subscribed
51. Sparkasse KölnBonn, C32/2009, 4 November 2009, para. 11.
52. Sparkasse KölnBonn, C32/2009, 4 November 2009, para. 55. See also: Sparkasse
KölnBonn, C32/2009, 29 September 2010, para. 37-41 and 80 for a description of the
corporate governance measures.
53. In some cases, the State acquired the right to appoint members of the (Supervisory) Board
of the beneficiary bank. For instance, the Dutch State had the right to appoint two members
of the Supervisory Board of SNS REAAL and ING. This is also a form of state involvement,
although it is very different from state involvement in the form of state ownership.
54. These were described in the decision on Anglo-Irish Bank (N9/2009, 14 January 2009,
para. 14). The corporate governance problems of Anglo-Irish bank were also signalled in
the literature; see for instance: Murphy 2013, p. 263 and 270-271.
55. Anglo-Irish Bank, N9/2009, 14 January 2009, para. 71.
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to the participation certificates (“Partizipationsscheine”) of OVAG without
obtaining voting rights.56 This aspect was not mentioned in the compatibility-
assessment – however, this can be explained by the fact that OVAG did not
experience corporate governance difficulties.
State involvement is not always welcomed by the Commission. This was
already illustrated by the above-mentioned case of Sparkasse KölnBonn: as set
out in subsection 11.3.3.1, Sparkasse KölnBonn’s investment decisions seemed
politically-driven (instead of business-oriented). Similarly, the decision on the
Slovenian bank Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB) indicates that “weak corporate
governance rules and the resulting influence of the State in the day-to-day
business of the bank was also one of the reasons leading to the problems of the
bank”.57
In the case of Alpha Bank (a Greek bank), there was a bridge recapitalisation
to be replaced by a permanent recapitalisation. One of the possibilities was that
Alpha Bank would come under State control. In that regard, the Commission
stressed the importance of an adequate corporate governance framework.
Otherwise, there would be a risk that – due to public interference in the day-
to-day management of the bank – lending decisions would no longer be taken on
the basis of commercial criteria, which would endanger the bank’s return to
viability. In that respect, the Commission observed that some of the State-con-
trolled banks in Greece had a poor track-record.58
To conclude, in some cases, State involvement is viewed as a positive charac-
teristic, whereas in some other cases, State involvement is considered to be a
negative characteristic. This reflects the fact that State involvement can be part
of the solution, or part of the problem.59
11.3.4 Concluding remarks
The fact that the restructuring plan provides for an improvement of the bank’s
corporate governance framework is a relevant characteristic (see subsection
11.3.1). The present section has shown that there is a clear link between this
relevant characteristic and the (existence and nature of the) corporate gover-
nance problems of the bank. Whether the relevant characteristic is mentioned
in the decisions depends on the question whether the bank had corporate gov-
ernance problems (see subsection 11.3.2). In the same vein, the way in which
56. OVAG, SA.31883, 9 December 2011, para. 23.
57. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 126.
58. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 27 July 2012, para. 61.
59. State involvement does not have to be problem if there is a strong corporate governance
framework which ensures that lending decisions are business-oriented and not politically-
driven.
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this relevant characteristic is mentioned and elaborated in the decisions
depends on the nature of the corporate governance problems (see subsection
11.3.3).
Thus, the mere fact that corporate governance measures are not mentioned in
all decisions does not necessarily mean that there is an inconsistency. Likewise,
the mere fact that this relevant characteristic is not always elaborated in the
same way does not necessarily amount to an inconsistency. As long as the link
– between the relevant characteristic on the one hand and the existence and
nature of the corporate governance problems of the bank on the other hand – is
consistently made, there is no inconsistency.
In other words: I am of the opinion that the Commission should mention cor-
porate governance in its decision when the case is characterised by corporate
governance measures and that the Commission does not have to mention cor-
porate governance when there are no corporate governance measures in the
case.60 Normally, I would suggest that the Commission should not only mention
the presence but also the absence of a relevant characteristic. However, for the
reasons set out in subsection 11.3.2, the omission to mention the absence of
this particular relevant characteristic can be justified.
Subsection 11.3.2 also discussed that “situation P/O” could not be excluded
as a possible explanation for the fact that there are 47 decisions that do not
mention corporate governance issues. So there is a risk of inconsistency.
Nonetheless, this risk is quite limited for future cases. Indeed, if the Commission
does not take into account the corporate governance measures undertaken by
a beneficiary bank, then this would be inconsistent. However, since it is in the
bank’s own interest that the Commission (positively) notes the presence of cor-
porate governance measures, the bank or Member State should stress the fact
that the bank has taken measures to improve its corporate governance frame-
work.
60. This would correspond to situation P/M and A/O.
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11.4 Remuneration policy
* The fact that the restructuring plan contains restrictions of the remuneration
of the beneficiary bank’s employees and managers.
11.4.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Many restructuring plans include changes to the remuneration policy. These
changes will usually entail that the remuneration of the bank’s senior manage-
ment will be restricted. This is relevant from three perspectives. In the first place,
the remuneration policy can be considered as part of the corporate governance
framework or risk management.61 Remuneration restrictions are thus relevant
from a viability-perspective.62 In the second place, limiting the staff remunera-
tion can be classified as a cost-cutting measure (see section 11.7).63 In the third
place, remuneration restrictions usually cease to apply when the State aid has
been fully repaid. In this sense, remuneration restrictions serve as an incentive
to exit from State aid. From this perspective, remuneration restrictions can be
regarded as behavioural remedies.64
The relevance of this characteristic is also underlined in the Crisis Communica-
tions.65 In particular, point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication stipu-
lates that the behavioural safeguards for distressed banks should, in principle,
include a limitation of executive remuneration or the distribution of bonuses.
61. The relation between remuneration policies and risk management is recognised in CRD
IV: “Remuneration policies which encourage excessive risk-taking behaviour can under-
mine sound and effective risk management of credit institutions and investment firms.”
(recital 62 CRD IV).
62. In the literature, it has been argued that remuneration restrictions might be counterpro-
ductive. Heimler & Jenny (2012, p. 364) argue that remuneration restrictions might induce
good managers of beneficiary banks to leave the bank for better jobs elsewhere. This
would obviously not contribute to the return to long-term viability of the bank.
63. For instance, the decision on Abanka (SA.38228, 13 August 2014, para. 142) explicitly
mentioned the restrictions on remuneration as a cost-cutting measure: “Third, as regards
covering the restructuring costs associated with the implementation of the restructuring
plan through Abanka’s internal measures, Abanka will carry out cost-cutting measures
resulting in a decrease of its operating costs from EUR 59.8 million in 2013 to EUR [50-
60] million in 2018. The restructuring plan and the commitments also provide for
restrictions to be applied, until 31 December 2018, to the total remuneration of any board
member and employee performing special work.”
64. See, for instance: LCCU, SA.34208, 26 September 2012 para. 58. In the decision on Fortis
(NN42/2008, 3 December 2008, para. 96), the Commission held that it was “not necessary
to impose any behavioural remedies, such as a prohibition on dividends or a reduction in
management remuneration, which it generally imposes as an incentive to minimising the
period of public ownership”.
65. The Restructuring Communication only required that the restructuring plan should include
information on the remuneration incentive structure. See point 11 of the Restructuring
Communication.
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Point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication only concerns distressed banks
(as opposed to fundamentally sound banks). A more general provision can be
found in the 2013 Banking Communication: point 38 provides that any bank in
receipt of State aid in the form of recapitalisation or impaired asset measures
should restrict the total remuneration to staff, including board members and
senior management, to an appropriate level. The 2013 Banking Communication
further specifies that the cap on total remuneration should be in line with Articles
93 and 94 of the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). In addition,
point 38 of the 2013 Banking Communication provides that the total remunera-
tion of a board member or senior manager may not exceed 15 times the national
average salary in the Member State where the beneficiary bank is incorporated
or 10 times the average salary of employees in the beneficiary bank.
11.4.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
In 43 decisions (of in total 90 cases), it is mentioned that the bank will adapt
its remuneration policy. In 1 decision, the Commission explicitly indicated that
a remuneration restriction was not necessary.66 Thus, in (43+1=) 44 decisions,
the Commission has assessed whether the relevant characteristic was present.67
An overview of these decisions is provided in the table in Annex VII.
An intriguing finding is the following: several Restructuring Decisions do not
mention remuneration restrictions, even though these cases were characteri-
sed by remuneration restrictions. In that regard, it should be recalled that bank
support schemes always provide for some behavioural safeguards and that one
of these behavioural constraints is the limitation of executive remuneration.
Indeed, as touched upon in section 8.8, remuneration restrictions can be found
in 23 bank support schemes. Banks are sometimes subject to remuneration
restrictions, but this is not always taken into account in the Restructuring
Decisions. To give an example: AIB/EBS participated in the Irish guarantee
scheme and was therefore subject to several behavioural constraints, including
remuneration restrictions. The Rescue Decision on AIB/EBS – though it does
not speak of remuneration restrictions – mentions that the bank is subject to
behavioural constraints as a result of its participation to the Irish guarantee
scheme. By contrast, the Restructuring Decision does not mention the behavi-
oural constraints under the scheme at all. Thus, the remuneration restrictions
were taken into account in the assessment of the proportionality of the State aid
66. Fortis, NN42/2008, 3 December 2008, para. 96. NB: this decision corresponds to “situation
A/M”.
67. In the majority of the cases, the remuneration restrictions are mentioned in the description
of the restructuring plan (either in the description-part of the decision or in the annex).
Only a few decisions mention the remuneration restrictions in the assessment-part.
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measures (i.e. the first stage of the compatibility-assessment), but they were not
taken into account in the assessment of the restructuring plan (i.e. the second
stage of the compatibility-assessment).
11.4.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The remuneration restrictions can be elaborated on the basis of their aim (see
subsection 11.4.3.1) and their modalities (see subsection 11.4.3.2).
11.4.3.1 The aim of the remuneration restrictions
A prime observation is that the remuneration restrictions are sometimes
aimed at corporate governance, sometimes at cost-cutting and sometimes at
both. To give an example, in the decisions on the four large Greek banks68, the
restrictions on remuneration are mentioned in two contexts: in the context of
corporate governance and in the context of a cost-cutting programme. This can
be illustrated by recitals 140 and 346 of the decision on Piraeus Bank. In recital
140, the restrictions of the remuneration are presented as a corporate governance
measure:
“Greece gave a number of commitments related to the corporate gover-
nance of the Bank. It committed to limit the remuneration of the Bank’s
employees and managers”.69
In recital 346, the restrictions of the remuneration are presented as a cost-cutting
measure:
The Bank has also engaged in a far-reaching cost reduction programme, as
indicated in section 2.4.2. Its costs will further decrease until 2017. Its
workforce is being reduced and salaries adjusted downwards. Greece has
also committed to limit the remuneration of the Bank’s managers, […]”.70
11.4.3.2 The modalities of the remuneration restrictions
Remuneration restrictions can differ on their modalities. Some restructuring
plans refer to a remuneration standard: such as the G20 principles and the
FSA Remuneration Code (in the decision on RBS71) or the local guidelines of
the ‘Adviescommissie Toekomst Banken’ (in the decision on SNS REAAL72).
Other restructuring plans clearly indicate a cap on remuneration. For instance,
68. i.e. Alpha Bank, Eurobank, Piraeus Bank and National Bank of Greece (NBG).
69. Pireaus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 140.
70. Pireaus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 346.
71. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 106.
72. SNS REAAL, N371/2009, 28 January 2010, para. 48.
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BayernLB had committed to a cap of EUR 500.000 on staff remuneration.73
This is an absolute cap. By contrast, point 38 of the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication provides for a relative cap: the total remuneration of a board member or
senior manager may not exceed 15 times the national average salary in the
Member State where the beneficiary bank is incorporated or 10 times the average
salary of employees in the beneficiary bank.
Another modality of the remuneration restrictions is the duration of these
restrictions. In that regard, the 2013 Banking Communication specifies that the
restrictions on remuneration should apply during the entire restructuring
period, unless the beneficiary bank has repaid the State aid before the end of
the restructuring period.
To conclude, the 2013 Banking Communication is quite clear on how the
remuneration should be restricted. By contrast, in the pre-2013 Banking
Communication, the remuneration restrictions were often designed in diverging
ways.
11.4.4 Concluding remarks
Executive remuneration is a contentious issue. Especially ‘excessive’ bonuses
are sometimes heavily criticized. There are many arguments both in favour and
against remuneration restrictions, but this PhD-study is not the place to discuss
the merits of remuneration restrictions. Rather, this PhD-study – and in particular
the present section – is aimed at finding out whether the Commission has con-
sistently taken into account the fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to remu-
neration restrictions.74
In that regard, the present section has shown that the 2013 Banking Communica-
tion is of key importance to the current relevant characteristic. In the first place,
this Communication made clear that remuneration restrictions were always
required. In the second place, this Communication is quite clear on how the
remuneration should be restricted. Subsection 11.4.3 has shown that the modal-
ities of the remuneration restrictions were often different per bank. The 2013
73. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 211 and annex point 23.
74. Although the fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to remuneration restrictions is a rele-
vant characteristic, it should be noted that remuneration restrictions are not only relevant in
the context of State aid. Indeed, every bank in the EU is confronted with some remuneration
restrictions. In particular, CRD IV contains several provisions on remuneration policy. Art. 94
CRD IV provides for a cap on the variable remuneration: the variable component shall not
exceed 100% of the fixed component of the total remuneration. CRD IV allows for the
possibility for Member States to set a lower maximum percentage. The Dutch legislator has
used this possibility. Indeed, the Wet beloningsbeleid financiele ondernemingen (Wbfo)
provides for a cap of 20% (instead of 100%).
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Banking Communication put an end to this. To conclude, the adoption of the
2013 Banking Communication made an important contribution to a consistent
application of the remuneration restrictions. From that viewpoint, I greatly wel-
come the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication.
11.5 Risk management
* The fact that the restructuring plan provides for an improvement of the
bank’s risk management.
11.5.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Banks have to deal with several kinds of risks: credit risk, concentration risk,
securitisation risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk and risk of exces-
sive leverage.75 Naturally, those risks have to be managed. Hence, risk man-
agement is very important in banking. The financial crisis showed that several
banks had a weak and inadequate risk management. Consequently, those banks
undertook to improve their risk management. This was welcomed by the Com-
mission, because an improved risk management contributes to the return to
viability. For instance, in one of its decisions, the Commission noted that the
improvements of the bank’s risk management were “very important elements
to restore viability and profitability”.76
To some extent, risk management is related to the corporate governance frame-
work and the organisational structure. For instance, the introduction of a Chief
Risk Officer (CRO)77 or the creation of a risk committee within the Board of
Directors78 are both measures that can be categorised as corporate governance
measures. Likewise, the commitment that the Risk Management department
will be fully independent from commercial networks79 concerns the organi-
zational structure of the bank.
75. See also Art. 79-87 CRD IV.
76. Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 123.
77. EBS, C25/2010, 11 October 2010, para. 88.
78. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, annex 1.1.
79. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 6.
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It should be recalled that a reduction of the bank’s risk profile can be achieved
in different ways.80 A bank can reduce liquidity risk by improving its funding
model (“liquidity profile rebalancing”81). Furthermore, a bank can focus on
its core activities and withdraw from risky activities. These risk-reducing
measures will be discussed in sections 11.6 and 11.8. The present section will
focus on risk management.
11.5.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The table in Annex VII gives an overview of the decisions that mention that
the bank will improve its risk management. In 42 decisions, risk management
issues are mentioned, whilst in 48 decisions (of in total 90 cases), it was not
mentioned that the bank would improve risk management.82 How can this be
explained? The most probable explanation is that those banks did not have
significant risk management problems, so that there would have not been any
need to improve the risk management. Furthermore, it should be recalled that a
reduction of the bank’s risk profile can also be achieved in other ways.83
The reasoning used in section 11.3.2 to justify the omission to mention the
absence of corporate governance measures in the restructuring plan also applies
to the current relevant characteristic. If one expects a relevant characteristic to
be present, the absence of this characteristic should be justified in the decision.
Conversely, if one does not expect the presence of a relevant characteristic, its
absence does not necessarily need to be justified in the decision. So this possible
explanation is a plausible one. Nonetheless, it does not leave out the possibil-
ity that the omission to mention the relevant characteristic is due to an incon-
sistency (“situation P/O” of the matrix).
80. “De-risking” (i.e. a risk-reducing policy) can consist of a number of measures. A risk-
reducing measure is a reclassification of a number of the bank’s ABS from the available for
sale category into the held-to-maturity category, thus limiting the volatility of the negative
revaluation reserve. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 52.
81. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), SA.36175, 27 November 2013, para. 68-71.
82. In two decisions (on Anglo/INBS and AIB/EBS), risk management is only mentioned as a
problem. These two decisions do not indicate that the banks in question will improve their
risk management. These decisions are therefore not included in the 43 decisions in which
the current relevant characteristic is mentioned.
83. In the decision on LBBW (para. 25), it was even indicated that “the need for risk management
and financial control will diminish as LBBW will abandon entire business areas and product
lines, reduce its presence abroad and sell subsidiary and associated companies”.
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11.5.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
It should be kept in mind that the commitment to improve the risk management
is a response to a problem (i.e. a weak risk management). Since there are
different kinds of risks, the improvement of the risk management depends on
the specific kind of problems of the bank. It can be observed that in some deci-
sions, the emphasis is on the problem; while in other decisions, the commit-
ment to improve is emphasised.
The decision on Lithuanian Central Credit Union (the LCCU) is a prime example
of a decision that really stresses the origin of the bank’s problems. The problems
concerned a very specific type of risk: concentration risk/single borrower
exposure. The LCCU had lend funds (mostly in the form of overnight deposits)
to AB Snoras bank. Unfortunately, AB Snoras bank went bankrupt in 2011. Also
unfortunately, the exposure of the LCCU to AB Snoras bank was very large. The
LCCU did comply with the requirement that the maximum exposure to a single
borrower should not exceed 25%of its capital. However, overnight deposits were
not included in this ratio. When AB Snoras bank went bankrupt, the deposit of
the LCCU in AB Snoras bank became unrecoverable. Consequently, the LCCU
experienced serious difficulties. Since the LCCU’s problems weremainly caused
by the concentration risk (single borrower exposure), the measures needed to
restore long-term viability were mainly aimed at improving the risk management
and internal control systems.84 In addition, the LCCU committed to limit its
exposure to a single borrower to 25% of its capital independently of the type of
exposure (thus including overnight deposits) during the restructuring period.85
To conclude, the way how risk management is mentioned in the decisions
depends on the nature of the risk management problems.
11.5.4 Concluding remarks
To some extent, the present section is a repetition of section 11.3.4. Indeed, the
concluding remarks that were made in relation to the corporate governance
measures also apply to the present section. My recommendation to the Commis-
sion is thus similar to the one of the section 11.3.4: the Commission should
mention risk management in its decision when the case is characterised by
measures to improve the bank’s risk management, whereas the Commission
does not have to mention risk management when there are no measures to
improve the risk management.86 My recommendation to the bank and Member
84. Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU), SA.34208, 26 September 2012, para. 46-47.
85. Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU), SA.34208, 26 September 2012, para. 48.
86. This would correspond to situation P/M and A/O.
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State is as follows: the bank and Member State should either stress the fact that
the bank committed to take measures to improve its risk management or stress
the fact that the risk management of the bank does not need to be improved.
11.6 Funding
* The fact that the restructuring plan provides for a reduction of the bank’s
reliance on wholesale funding.
11.6.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
In several reports investigating the financial crisis, it is highlighted that many
banks heavily relied on wholesale funding. For instance, the Liikanen report
mentions the reliance of banks on short-term wholesale funding as one of the
key factors in the build-up of systemic risk.87 Similarly, the Treasury Committee
of the House of Commons noted that banks which relied most heavily on
wholesale funding, rather than deposits, have proven to be most likely to fail.88
Since wholesale funding is short-term funding, it is not a very stable funding
source.89 As long as the wholesale market is functioning well, an excessive reli-
ance on wholesale funding does not have to be a problem. However, when the
wholesale market dries up – which occurred after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers – banks that are heavily dependent on wholesale funding may face
liquidity problems. Those banks are no longer able to finance their operations.
One of the key lessons of the crisis is that banks that relied too heavily on
wholesale funding should re-adapt their funding structure towards more stable
funding sources. This is also recognised by the Commission in its decisional
practice. The fact that the restructuring plan provides for a reduction of the
bank’s reliance on wholesale funding is therefore a relevant characteristic.
11.6.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The analysis of the decisional practice reveals the following. In 45 decisions, it
was mentioned that the beneficiary bank would improve its funding strategy.
Interestingly, there are also some banks that did not have funding problems.
As is shown in the table in Annex VII, there are 9 decisions that indicated that
the bank did not have funding problems. Thus, in 54 decisions (i.e. 45+9), the
Commission explicitly took into account the relevant characteristic.
87. Liikanen Report 2012, p. 50. The Liikanen Report refers to several studies that link short-
term wholesale funding and (systemic) risk.
88. House of Commons, Treasury Committee, ‘Banking Crisis: dealing with the failure of the
UK banks’, Seventh Report of Session 2008-09, p. 43.
89. By contrast, retail deposits are a more stable funding source.
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By contrast, there are 36 decisions (of in total 90 cases), in which the Com-
mission did not explicitly take into account the current relevant characteris-
tic.90 This is surprising, given the fact that there are 9 decisions in which the
Commission explicitly mentioned the absence of the current relevant charac-
teristic. If the relevant characteristic would also be absent in the 36 cases listed
above, then the omission to mention this absence would amount to an incon-
sistency between these 36 decisions and the 9 decisions (which do mention
the absence of funding problems).
Under this assumption, the 36 cases correspond to “situation A/O” of the matrix
(introduced in section 11.2.2.2), while the 9 cases correspond to “situation A/M”
of the matrix. Situation A/O (i.e. the omission to mention the absence) can be
justified, but only when it is obvious that the omission implies absence of
the relevant characteristic. However, the fact that there are decisions in which the
absence is explicitly mentioned (i.e. “situation A/M”) means that it can never be
obvious that the omission of the characteristic means absence of the characte-
ristic. Thus, the co-existence of “situation A/M” and “situation A/O” implies an
inconsistency.
11.6.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The present subsection zooms in on the 45 decisions that mention funding
issues. While the relevant characteristic concerns the improvement of the fund-
ing structure (see subsection 11.6.3.2), it might be useful to elucidate on the
funding problems (see subsection 11.6.3.1). One of the most striking observa-
tions is that some decisions explicitly mention that the bank did not have fund-
ing problems (see subsection 11.6.3.3).
11.6.3.1 Funding problems
There is a difference in the way how the funding problems are mentioned. Some-
times, they are mentioned quite prominently; sometimes, they are mentioned
only briefly. Some decisions really stress the funding problems of the bank. For
instance, the decision on Hypo Real Estate (HRE) indicates – in the section that
describes the problems of the bank – that “at the end of September 2008, HRE
faced a liquidity shortage, which put the bank on the brink of insolvency”.91
90. NB: There are some decisions that do not explicitly mention that the bank had funding
problems. However, since these decisions do indicate that the bank will improve its funding
structure, the issue of funding is taken into account by the Commission. These decisions are
therefore not included in the list of Commission decisions that to not mention the current
relevant characteristic.
91. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 24.
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This liquidity shortage was related to HRE’s reliance on wholesale funding.
Especially its subsidiary DEPFA Bank was highly dependent on an intact
interbank money market.92
Likewise, HSH Nordbank was heavily reliant on savings banks as a privi-
leged source of funding.93 “Because HSH does not have access to retail custom-
ers to any significant extent, the bank will continue to rely on the wholesale
markets where it will have difficulties securing funding. Compliance with more
stringent regulatory requirements on capitalisation, liquidity buffers, and fun-
ding mismatches would be a particular challenge for pure wholesale banks like
HSH”.94
11.6.3.2 Improving the funding structure
An excessive reliance on wholesale funding can be a problem. How to reduce
the dependence on wholesale funding? There are essentially three strategies to
solve funding problems: i) diversifying the sources of funding, ii) deleveraging
the balance sheet, and iii) transfer of the ailing bank to a bank with a good
financing position. NB: The third strategy is only applicable in the T-context and
S/T/W-context.
Diversifying the sources of funding
With respect to the first strategy, it should be recalled that a bank has several
sources of funding and that a bank can improve its funding structure by diver-
sifying the sources of funding. This is usually achieved by increasing the deposit
base. Retail deposits are considered a stable source of funding.95
The deposit base can be increased by measures aimed at attracting poten-
tial depositors and at retaining current depositors. The decision on First
Investment Bank (FIB) – a Bulgarian bank that had faced a liquidity crisis
and was aiming at strengthening its funding policy – illustrates these
measures. FIB set out a deposit-centred strategy with the aim at regaining
the deposits that it had lost. The decision on FIB indicates the measure that
FIB planned to undertake: focusing on customer communications and deepe-
ning customer relationships, preparing frontline and back-office personnel to
92. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 90.
93. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 220.
94. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 30.
95. Deposits are considered as a stable source of funding. Retail deposits are sometimes referred
to as “sluggish” (Huang & Ratnovski 2010, p. 3). The ‘sluggishness’ of retail deposits can be
explained by the fact that retail deposits are – up to a certain amount – insured by the
government.
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minimise operational risk, monitoring closely deposit inflows/outflows, with
clear mechanisms for early warning, escalation, and proactive management of
customers.96
The deposit base can also be increased by means of an acquisition. This is
clearly demonstrated in the OVAG-case. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG
(OVAG) was heavily reliant on wholesale funding. One of the Volksbanken of
OVAG acquired Livebank. This gave OVAG access to EUR 470 million of
retail funding. The Commission noted positively that the acquisition reduced
OVAG’s past reliance on wholesale funding.97 Similarly, the Hungarian FHB
acquired Allianz. The Commission concluded that this acquisition contributed
to FHB’s long-term viability.98 The acquisition of Allianz led to an increase in
retail and commercial deposits. This growth in deposits contributed to diver-
sifying the funding sources of the bank (thereby reducing FHB’s dependence
on wholesale funding).99 In total, there are 6 cases in which the Commission
noted that the liquidity position of the bank (and thus its viability) was improved
by means of an acquisition of another bank.100
Deleveraging the balance sheet
The second strategy to reduce the bank’s overreliance on wholesale funding
consists of deleveraging the balance sheet. A balance sheet reduction – such
as a reduction of the size of the bank’s loan book – will result in a reduction of
the funding needs. Consequently, the bank should be better able to satisfy its
funding needs by its deposits and it should be less dependent on wholesale
funding.
This solution to the funding problem is mentioned in several Commission
decisions. For instance, in its decision on Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
(MPS), the Commission explicitly indicated that the balance sheet reduction
envisaged in the restructuring plan would contribute to the reduction of funding
needs.101
96. First Investment Bank (FIB), SA.39854, 25 November 2014, para. 39.
97. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG (OVAG), SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 48 and
103.
98. FHB, C37/2010, 22 February 2012, para. 79.
99. FHB, C37/2010, 22 February 2012, para. 74-75. The Commission took into account that
FHB and Allianz both operated in the same retail and commercial markets, because this
meant that the State aid to FHB was not used to develop activities in new business areas
(FHB, para. 79).
100. These cases are: OVAG (19 September 2012, para. 48 and 103), FHB, Alpha Bank (para.
224), Eurobank (para. 333), Pireaus Bank (para. 281), the combination of FBN and ABN
AMRO N (para. 305).
101. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), SA.36175, 27 November 2013, para. 71.
RESTORING LONG-TERM VIABILITY
327
Integration into a larger bank
Another solution to the funding problem is to transfer the ailing bank to another
bank with a good financing capacity. This can be illustrated by the case of Kaup-
thing Bank Luxembourg. This was a subsidiary of the Icelandic banking group
Kaupthing Bank. The causes of Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg’s difficulties were
inextricably linked to the collapse of its parent company in Iceland and its ina-
bility to finance itself as a result. The Commission considered that the sale to a
buyer with adequate financing capacity would remedy the bank’s (funding)
problems.102
Similarly, in the case of Fortis, the Commission considered that once Fortis
Bank would form part of BNP Paribas, Fortis Bank would no longer have any
difficulty raising finance.103
11.6.3.3 Banks without a funding problem
Not all beneficiary banks had funding problems. In several decisions, it is
underlined that the beneficiary bank did not have funding problems. For
instance, the Commission noted that Commerzbank had a stable base of
customer deposits104 and that Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) had
a diversified financing mix.105 Likewise, the Commission noted that NordLB
was well-positioned to fund itself.106 In that case, the Commission noted posi-
tively that throughout the crisis the bank was able to issue debt on the capital
markets without State support and is in a good position to obtain funding in
the future.107 Another example is the decision on the Belgian bank KBC. KBC
had a relatively limited reliance on funding from capital markets.108 This was
based on the fact that 64% of KBC’s debt instruments were of a duration of
longer than 1 year. The decision on KBC also mentions that KBC did not suffer
from any liquidity problems. Other examples are the decision on BAWAG
(“strong liquidity position”)109 and the 2010 decision on SNS REAAL (“rela-
tively well-diversified funding strategy”).110 In total, there are 9 decisions in
which the Commission explicitly indicated that the bank did not have any
funding problems.111
102. Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, N344/2009, 9 July 2009, para. 70.
103. Fortis Bank, NN42/2008, 3 December 2008, para. 84.
104. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 62.
105. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 37 and 72.
106. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 141. See also para. 142 with respect to NordLB’s
funding needs in USD.
107. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 141.
108. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 49.
109. BAWAG, N261/2010, 30 June 2010, para. 87.
110. SNS REAAL, N371/2009, 28 January 2010, para. 49.
111. These cases are: BAWAG, KBC, Commerzbank, LBBW, NordLB, SNS REAAL (2010),
ING, Abanka, Cajatres.
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11.6.4 Concluding remarks
For a bank, funding is key (see subsection 11.6.1). The most conspicuous find-
ing of the present section is that funding issues are not mentioned in every
decision (see subsection 11.6.2). In that regard, there is a remarkable contrast in
the Commission’s approach to corporate governance problems and its approach
to funding problems. As was discussed in section 11.3.2, the Commission does
not mention that a bank does not have corporate governance problems.112 By
contrast, as is shown in subsection 11.6.3, the Commission does sometimes
mention that a bank does not have funding problems.113 This happened in 9
decisions. This makes it all the more surprising that there are 36 decisions that
omit to mention funding issues. In my opinion, the omission to mention the
relevant characteristic in these 36 cases amounts to an inconsistency.
This inconsistency can be avoided in future bank State aid cases if the Com-
mission always mentions funding issues in its decisions. In other words: the
decision should either indicate i) that the bank did not have funding problems,
ii) that the bank had funding problems and has committed to improve its funding
strategy, or iii) that the bank had funding problems but did not improve its fund-
ing strategy. Situation (i) and (ii) will be noted positively by the Commission,
while situation (iii) will be noted negatively. Thus far, situation (i) is only men-
tioned in 9 cases. My recommendation to the Commission would be to always
mention funding issues – and thus also when situation (i) occurs.
11.7 Operational efficiency
* The fact that the beneficiary bank has implemented cost-cutting measures.
11.7.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Long-term viability means that the bank must have a sufficient level of prof-
itability. In order to improve operational efficiency (and thus profitability), most
beneficiary banks have implemented cost-cutting measures (or “cost optimiza-
tion measures”).114 This is thus a relevant characteristic from a viability-per-
spective.
112. This corresponds to “situation A/O” of the matrix.
113. This corresponds to “situation A/M” of the matrix.
114. It should be pointed out that cost-cutting measures are not an exclusive feature of State-
aided banks: many banks that did not need State aid also decided to implement cost-cutting
measures.
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In addition, the fact that the bank has implemented cost-cutting measures is also
relevant from another perspective: that of burden-sharing. As will be explained
in chapter 12, the second pillar of the Restructuring Communication requires
that beneficiary banks contribute to the restructuring costs. This is referred to as
burden-sharing or an own contribution. In that regard, cost-cutting measure con-
stitute a contribution to the restructuring costs through internal resources (thus
an “own contribution”). To give an example, in the decision on Abanka, the
Commission noted that “as regards covering the restructuring costs associated
with the implementation of the restructuring plan through Abanka’s internal
measures, Abanka will carry out cost-cutting measures”.115
Thus from both a viability-perspective and a burden-sharing perspective, the fact
that the bank has implemented cost-cutting measures is a relevant character-
istic.
11.7.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The table in Annex VII gives an overview of the cases characterised by cost-
cutting measures. In almost every restructuring decision in the C-context, it is
mentioned that the beneficiary bank has implemented cost-cutting measures.
In the other contexts, this relevant characteristic cannot be found. This can be
explained by the fact that operational efficiency is primarily important in the
C-context; it is less important in the W-context. Indeed, if a bank is to be wound-
down, then there is less need for measures that improve the operational effi-
ciency of the bank. Admittedly, operational efficiency is also important in the
T-context and S/T/W-context; but in these contexts, operational efficiency is
usually achieved by cost synergies resulting from the integration of (part of) the
beneficiary bank in the acquiring bank.116
To conclude, cost-cutting measures are not mentioned in every decision,
but this can be explained by the relevant context.
115. Abanka, SA.38228, 13 August 2014, para. 142.
116. See section 11.10.
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11.7.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
Usually, the decisions provide some basic information on the different moda-
lities of the cost-cutting measures.
Firstly, it is usually indicated how the cost-cutting will be achieved. For instance,
in the decision on Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), the Commission noted that
“a reduction of the bank’s headcount and the renegotiation of contracted ser-
vices are the main levers to achieve additional savings”.117 In its decision on
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), it was indicated that the cost-reduction
was achieved “through a significant consolidation of its business premises and
branch network, a reduction in personnel, improved operational efficiency, the
acquisition of clients on a risk-adjusted profitability-driven basis, optimisation of
liquidity costs by pooling treasury positions and optimisation of other costs”.118
Secondly, the timeframe of the cost-reduction programme is mentioned. To
give an example, the decision on Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB) indicated
that NLB would reduce its operating costs to EUR [300-350] million by
31 December 2014, EUR [300-350] million by 31 December 2015, EUR
[250-300] million by 31 December 2016 and to EUR [200-250] million by
31 December 2017.119
Thirdly, the extent of cost-cutting is indicated. This can be in absolute terms
and in relative terms. For example, the decision on Banco Mare Nostrum
(BMN) indicates that the cost-cutting measures would result in a reduction of
annual operational costs by approximately EUR [200 – 300] million, which
would correspond to a decrease of approximately [30 – 40]% when compared to
2012 levels.120
Related to the extent of cost-cutting is the cost/income ratio that would be
achieved by the cost-cutting measures. In some decisions, it is mentioned that
the bank is aiming at a certain cost/income ratio. In that regard, the decision on
BMN indicates the following:
“BMN had a cost/income ratio of 77,7% in 2011, high in comparison to its
peers. BMN plans to reduce that ratio via a significant reduction in its branch
network and personnel. The Restructuring Plan projects a new cost/income
ratio of [40 – 50]% in 2017”.121
117. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), SA.35062, 24 July 2013, para. 29.
118. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 126.
119. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 47.
120. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 149.
121. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 134.
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Although the decision on BMN mentions the cost/income ratio that BMN was
aiming at, the decision does not mention whether this cost/income ratio was
sufficient.122 This observation applies to most decisions. Indeed, there are only
a few decisions in which the Commission explicitly considered the cost/income
ratio to be satisfactory. One of these decisions is the decision on BayernLB, in
which the Commission noted the following:
“BayernLB projects a [15-30]% decrease in costs over the restructuring
period, leading to an end cost/income ratio of [30-60]%. That level is in line
with those of other aided banks. The Commission considers that an improve-
ment of the cost/income ratio is necessary for the return to viability. Given
the business model of BayernLB, which does not operate retail branches
(retail branches tend to increase the cost/income ratios of retail banks), the
historical levels of the cost/income ratio cannot be considered sustaina-
ble”.123
The Commission thus explicitly assessed the cost/income ratio in the case of
BayernLB. By contrast, in most other decisions, the Commission did not explic-
itly consider whether the cost-cutting measures were sufficient. It only wel-
comed the cost-cutting measures (without evaluating the exact modalities of the
cost-cutting measures).124
To conclude, even though information is given on the modalities of the cost-
cutting measures, the Commission does not seem to draw any conclusions from
it. While it is safe to assume that the extent of cost-cutting should be higher for a
greatly inefficient bank than for a reasonably efficient bank, the extent of cost-
cutting was never used as a reason to dismiss a cost-cutting measure as inad-
equate. In fact, cost-cutting measures were never dismissed as insufficient.
11.7.4 Concluding remarks
The Commission welcomes cost-cutting measures (see subsection 11.7.1). Thus,
the fact that the bank has implemented cost-cutting measures is a relevant
characteristic, but the same cannot be said for the modalities of the cost-cutting
122. Also in the context of burden-sharing, the Commission does not explicitly refer to the
modalities of the cost-cutting measures. The mere fact that the bank implements cost-
cutting measures seems to suffice.
123. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 175. Another example is NordLB, SA.34381,
25 July 2012, para. 151: “Consequently the bank is to achieve a cost-income ratio of [< 50]%,
which the Commission considers satisfactory.”
124. Should the percentage of cost-reduction not be taken into account? For some other measures,
the percentage matters greatly. The prime example in that regard is the balance sheet
reduction. However, unlike a balance sheet reduction – which is a compensatory measure – a
cost-reduction is primarily a viability measure. It is not aimed at restoring the level playing
field, but aimed at restoring the viability of the bank.
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measures, such as the extent of cost-cutting. Although the extent of cost-cutting
is mentioned in the decision, it is not explicitly taken into account in the
assessment of the viability and burden-sharing (see subsection 11.7.3). There are
a few exceptions, such as the aforementioned example of BayernLB. In my
opinion, the decision on BayernLB shows how – in future bank State aid cases –
the Commission should take into account the modalities of the cost-cutting
measures.
11.8 Business model: focus on core activities
* The fact that the beneficiary bank will focus on its core activities (and thus
divest its non-core activities).
11.8.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
The Restructuring Communication provides that the beneficiary bank should
withdraw from activities which would remain structurally loss-making. Many
restructuring plans contain the intention that the bank will refocus on its core
activities.125 This means that non-core activities are either run-off or sold (i.e.
divested126). For instance, the restructuring plan of BayernLB envisaged sev-
eral changes to the bank’s business model and provided for a “strategic rea-
lignment of the bank”.127
Apart from the fact that divestments contribute to the bank’s refocusing on
its core activities, divestments can also have other positive effects. In the first
place, divestments reduce the amount of RWA and therefore free up capital and
increase the capital ratios. In the second place, divestments generate liquidity
which can be used to finance the restructuring or to strengthen the liquidity
basis.128 In the third place, divestments can free up management capacities. Sub-
sequently, these management capacities can be reemployed in the core business
of the bank.129
125. Although ‘business model’ can be understood as comprising both funding issues and the
activities that are funded, the current section focusses only on the bank’s activities. The
funding issues were discussed in section 11.6.
126. NB: in the decision on NLB (annex point 4.1), “divested” was explained as “sold,
liquidated or wound down”.
127. BayernLB, SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 50.
128. WestLB, C43/2008, 12 May 2009, para. 77.
129. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG (OVAG), SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 101.
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It is worth stressing that divestments are not only important from a viability-
perspective, they are also important in relation to the other two pillars of the
restructuring plan: i.e. own contribution (see section 12.3) and limiting competi-
tion distortions (see sections 13.5 and 13.6). The current section only discusses
divestments in as far as they contribute to the restoration of long-term viability.
11.8.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
At the outset, it should be noted that only in the C-context, it is necessary
to explicitly point out that the bank will focus on its core activities and termi-
nate its non-core activities. In other contexts, the focus on the core activities
or the termination of the non-core activities is already implied. Indeed, in the
W-context, all activities are categorised as non-core (and subsequently termi-
nated), while in the S-context, the bank is split-up into a good bank (which
comprises the core activities) and a bad bank (which comprises the non-core
activities).
Thus, the current relevant characteristic is only relevant in the C-context. As
can be seen in the table in Annex XII, most cases in the C-context are char-
acterised by a focus on the core activities.
11.8.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
A refocus on the bank’s core activities means that certain activities are to be
discontinued. In that regard, there are two central questions:Which activities are
discontinued? And how are these activities discontinued?
11.8.3.1 Which activities are discontinued?
With respect to the question which activities are discontinued, the simple answer
is: “non-core activities”. This, in turn, raises the following question: what are
non-core activities? Non-core activities are usually negatively defined as all
activities that are not core activities.130
Naturally, non-core activities are likely to be different for each bank. It all
depends on the bank’s business model and what the bank designates as ‘core’
and ‘non-core’. However, several general conclusions can be drawn from the
decisional practice of the Commission. In the first place, some activities – most
notably proprietary trading activities – are usually categorised as “non-core”
(and thus terminated). In the second place, when the beneficiary bank operates
130. Sometimes, a more direct description can be found: the decision on the Slovenian bank
Abanka (SA.38228, 13 August 2014, para. 36) indicates that non-core activities concern
activities “where the weakness of Abanka’s knowledge of those markets has led to
inadequate risk assessment in the past.”
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internationally, some (or all) of its foreign activities are discontinued. In the third
place, organisational structure is sometimes used as an argument to terminate
certain activities. This is most prominent in cases of financial groups that com-
bine banking and insurance activities (“bancassurance”). These three general
conclusions will be discussed below.
Type of activities
It can be observed that proprietary trading activities are usually terminated.131
Proprietary trading – sometimes referred to as ‘trading for own account’ – is
the purchase and sale of financial instruments with the intent to profit from the
difference between the purchase price and the sale price.132
It should be noted that, apart from proprietary trading, there are no activities
that are standard categorised as ‘non-core’. Activities that are sometimes
labelled as ‘non-core’ are: credit swap activities133, structured investment activi-
ties134, leasing135, factoring/forfeiting136, infrastructure finance137, real estate
activities138, shipping financing and aircraft financing.
These activities have been mentioned as ‘non-core activities’, but the deci-
sions usually do not explain in detail why these activities are non-core. How-
ever, there are a few decisions that elaborate upon the non-core nature of certain
activities. For instance, in the Restructuring Decision on HSH Nordbank, the
Commission mentioned that several business segments of HSH Nordbank, such
as shipping financing and aircraft financing, were cyclical and volatile in
nature.139 The Commission considered the relative importance of shipping
131. This is the case in: KA, OVAG, Dexia, CCB, NordLB, Sparkasse KolnBonn, SachsenLB,
HSH Nordbank, BayernLB, ATE, MPS, CGD, BPI, BCP.
132. In the Proposal for a Regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit
institutions, proprietary trading is defined as follows: “proprietary trading” means using own
capital or borrowed money to take positions in any type of transaction to purchase, sell or
otherwise acquire or dispose of any financial instrument or commodities for the sole purpose
of making a profit for own account, and without any connection to actual or anticipated client
activity or for the purpose of hedging the entity’s risk as result of actual or anticipated client
activity, through the use of desks, units, divisions or individual traders specifically dedicated
to such position taking and profit making, including through dedicated web-based proprie-
tary trading platforms.
133. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 94.
134. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 94.
135. Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), SA.32554, 3 September 2013, para. 120; NLB, para.
43.
136. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 43. This was also
mentioned as a compensatory measure (see para. 58 and 166).
137. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG (OVAG), SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 98.
138. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG (OVAG), SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 98.
139. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 223-224. In footnote 70 of the HSH
Nordbank-decision, the Commission explained the terms ‘cyclical’ and ‘volatile’. “Cycli-
cal activities are activities whose performance is closely linked to the economic cycle.
Volatile activities are activities which show large differences in performance from one
period to another.”
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and transport financing as problematic.140 The Commission therefore welcomed
the fact that pursuant to the restructuring plan, HSH Nordbank would end its
aircraft financing activities.
International activities
Many banks operate internationally. The domestic market is usually the core
market of the bank. This is reflected in the restructuring plans that provide for
a re-focus on the domestic market of the bank. This means that some of the
bank’s foreign subsidiaries are to be divested.
To give an example, in August 2013, Alpha Bank – a Greek bank – sold its
(unprofitable) subsidiary in Ukraine.141 Likewise, OVAG’s difficulties were
attributable to its exposure to Central and Eastern European countries
(CEE).142 The divestments of these activities therefore contributed to OVAG’s
viability. In contrast to OVAG, the Belgian bank KBC did not divest its activi-
ties in the CEE countries.143 This illustrates that non-core activities are different
for each bank.
Bancassurance
Many banking groups pursue several kinds of activities. Some of them are not
only active in banking, but they also have insurance activities. The combina-
tion of banking and insurance within one group is known as ‘bancassurance’.
By combining banking and insurance, economies of scope can be achieved.
Selling insurance products through the banking retail channel might result in
cost economies of scope.144 In addition, banks that have acquired information
about their customers (for instance information regarding their creditwor-
thiness) can sometimes reuse that information by selling other financial products
to those customers.145
In the Dutch context, the two prime examples of the bancassurance-model were
ING and SNS REAAL. ING was the mother holding company that controlled
100% of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V. The restructuring plan
of ING envisaged that ING would only pursue banking activities, while the
insurance activities would be divested over time.146 Similarly, the bankinsu-
rance holding company SNS REAAL had to divest its insurance subsidiary.
140. In the Opening Decision (HSH Nordbank, C29/2009, 22 October 2009, para. 50), the
Commission had already indicated that the importance of the shipping activities for HSH
Nordbank was problematic for its return to viability.
141. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 278.
142. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG (OVAG), 19 September 2012, para. 98.
143. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 148.
144. Elsas, Hackethal & Holzhäuser 2010, p. 1.
145. Elsas, Hackethal & Holzhäuser 2010, p. 1.
146. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 49.
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The Commission noted that “that divestment will simplify the business model of
the remaining entity. For instance, as a result of the insurance divestment the
double leverage will disappear”.147 Thus, there are two reasons in favour of
divesting the insurance subsidiary. In the first place, this divestment simplifies
the organizational structure and business model of the remaining entity. In the
second place, this eliminates the double leverage. A double leverage means that
the mother holding company uses debt as equity capital in its subsidiaries.
Other cases that feature the divestment of the insurance activities are CGD148,
IL&P149 and NKBM.150 Conversely, the Belgian insurance group Ethias com-
mitted to divest its banking subsidiary Ethias Banque. This divestment was
consistent with the aim of restructuring to refocus on Ethias’ core insurance
activities.151
It is important to point out that the divestment of the insurance division is not
always a viability-measure. This can be illustrated by the case of Bank of
Ireland.152 Bank of Ireland provided life insurance and pensions in Ireland
through New Ireland Assurance Company (NIAC), operating through the
branch banking network. Originally, the restructuring plan of Bank of Ireland
147. SNS REAAL, SA.36598, 19 December 2013, para. 80.
148. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), SA.35062, 24 July 2013. The restructuring plan of
Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) envisaged the sale of CGD’s insurance activities (“Caixa
Seguros”). This sale was part of the deleveraging of CGD’s balance sheet. It was further
provided that Caixa Seguros would be restructured in order to improve its marketability. In
recital 90, the decision mentions that the divestment of Caixa Seguros would contribute to
the bank’s restoration of viability, but it is not clearly explained why.
149. PTSB, SA.33442, 9 April 2015. Irish Life & Permanent Group Holdings (now called
Permanent TSB, “PTSB”), sold its life assurance business Irish Life in June 2012. In the
final decision of 4 April 2015, the sale of Irish Life was considered as one of the
restructuring measures already implemented by PTSB.
150. NKBM, SA.35709, 18 December 2013. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM) was a
universal bank which was active in banking and insurance. The insurance activities
accounted for 11,7% of NKBM’s assets. The restructuring plan of NKBM provided for a
significant reduction of NKBM’s non-core activities; this encompassed the sale of
NKBM’s insurance activities.
151. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 122.
152. Similarly, in the decisions on Alpha Bank, Eurobank and RBS, the (potential) divestment
of the insurance activities was also approached from an own contribution perspective
– rather than from a viability-perspective. RBS was a large banking group which also
included an insurance division (RBS Insurance), which RBS committed to divest. See:
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), 14 December 2009, para. 68, 93, 215 and 250. In the
decision on Alpha Bank, the Commission established that Alpha Bank sold its insurance
activities in 2007. When assessing the own contribution of the bank, the Commission
considered that Alpha Bank had no significant activity in that market which could be sold
to generate resources. Also in the decision on Eurobank (SA.34825, 29 April 2014, para.
388), it was mentioned in the context of the bank’s own contribution, that the bank had
given the commitment that it would sell its large and profitable insurance subsidiary.
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envisaged that it would divest its life assurance business (NIAC).153 It is
noteworthy that this divestment was not mentioned as a viability-measure, but
rather as an own contribution-measure and compensatory measure. In recital
214 of the 2010 Restructuring Decision, the Commission held that the divest-
ment of NIAC would contribute to compliance with point 24 of the Restruc-
turing Communication, which requires that banks should first use their own
resources to finance restructuring (by, for instance, the sale of assets).154 The
fact that Bank of Ireland would exit the Irish insurance market was also
mentioned in the assessment of the compensatory measures. The divestment
of NIAC would result in a reduction of Bank of Ireland’s balance sheet and of
Bank of Ireland’s market presence. 155
Bank of Ireland faced difficulties to meet its commitment to divest NIAC
within the deadline period.156 The Irish authorities therefore requested to
replace the NIAC measure with other measures. In the Amendment Decision,
the Commission considered the proposed replacement measures to be ade-
quate “as they pursue the same objective as the NIAC measure, which is the
limitation of the distortion of competition”.157 This recital clearly illustrates
that the divestment of the insurance division is treated as a compensatory
measure – and thus not as a viability-measure. Moreover, the Commission
considered that divesting NIAC would even undermine BOI’s ability to return
to profitability in the short term, because NIAC was a profitable subsidiary.158
Pursuant to this Amendment Decision, Bank of Ireland could pursue its bancas-
surance model.159
The Commission is thus not adamantly opposed to the bancassurance model.
This is reflected by the fact that the Commission did not require a divestment
of the insurance division in every bank State aid case. Indeed, there were some
banking groups that were allowed to retain their bancassurance model. KBC is
such a banking group. The Commission explicitly indicated that it considered
that KBC’s business strategy, which consisted of retail activities combined with
153. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 55-57.
154. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 214.
155. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 248.
156. In 2011, the Commission adopted a second Restructuring Decision on Bank of Ireland. In
this decision (SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 182), the deadline for the divestment of
NIAC was extended by one year (in view of the difficult situation in the Irish markets and
the lack of appetite for corporate acquisitions). Bank of Ireland.
157. Bank of Ireland, SA.36784, 9 July 2013, para. 46.
158. Bank of Ireland, SA.36784, 9 July 2013, para. 41.
159. Bank of Ireland’s Annual Report indicated the following: “In July 2013, the European Com-
mission agreed to amend our EU approved Restructuring Plan so that we could retain New
Ireland Assurance Company plc (NIAC) but imposed replacement substitution measures.
NIAC is the number two provider in the life, pensions and investment market in Ireland, part
of our very strong bancassurance model.” 2013 Annual Report of Bank of Ireland, p. 9.
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cross-selling of insurance products in KBC’s core markets, was a viable busi-
ness model.160 Similarly, the restructuring plan of Lloyds Banking Group (LBG)
did not envisage the divestment of the insurance division. This is somewhat
surprising, because another British bank – namely Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS) – had to divest its insurance division. The decision on LBG did not
explain why LBG was allowed to retain its insurance division.
11.8.3.2 How are the non-core activities discontinued?
With respect to this question, it can be observed that non-core activities are
either run-off or sold. To that end, several banks have set up an internal reso-
lution division (“non-core unit”). The assets allocated to this non-core unit will
be run down. Several names are used for this non-core unit: Legacy Unit, inter-
nal resolution division, internal winding-up segment, wind-down entity or
“Abbaugesellschaft”. A winding-up segment is not legally separated, but it is
to be managed as a segment in its own right with separate accounting in the
sense of its own reporting procedure.161 The rationale of setting up a non-core
unit is explained in the following recital from the decision on Nova Ljubljanska
banka: “That separation will also allow it to implement a more specialised
approach to running off the bank’s non-core business and to manage its non-
performing assets so as to maximise recovery value”.162
With respect to the question how activities are discontinued, it can be concluded
that it does not really matter if activities are divested or run down. For the via-
bility-assessment, the central element is that the bank withdraws from certain
activities.
The Amendment Decision in the case of KBC is illustrative of the fact that
from a viability-perspective, it does not really matter if activities are divested
or wound-down.163 In 2011, the Belgian State and KBC requested the Com-
mission to change certain measures of the restructuring plan approved by the
Commission in the Restructuring Decision. In particular, KBC proposed to
wind-down Romstal instead of divesting it. In the Amendment Decision164 ,
the Commission recalled that the divestment of Romstal was proposed by
KBC in the context of the rationalisation of it business and a focus on its core
160. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 148.
161. Österreichische Volksbanken-AG (OVAG), SA.31883, 19 September 2012, annex point 2.
162. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 135.
163. From the perspective of competition, this may be different. For instance, in the Amendment
Decision on Commerzbank (N244/2009, 30 March 2012, para. 29), the Commission noted
the following: “as the existing business put into run-down mode is not transferred to a com-
petitor, the new commitment does not immediately free up as much market share as a sale
of Eurohypo would have”.
164. KBC, SA.29833, 27 July 2011, para. 66-72.
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markets. The Commission concluded that the wind-down of Romstal instead
of its divestment would lead to the same result as envisaged in the Restruc-
turing Decision.
The importance of withdrawing from activities is also reflected by the fact that
restructuring plans that are based on an expansion of activities are not accepted
by the Commission. This can be illustrated by the Opening Decisions in the
cases of Parex banka and Anglo Irish Bank. The Commission noted that the
initial restructuring plan for Parex banka seemed to be built on an expanding
business strategy for all lending segments.165 Moreover, the plan did not pro-
vide for abandoning or significant reduction of more risky activities.166 This
was one of the reasons for opening the formal investigation procedure. The
original restructuring plan for Anglo Irish Bank envisaged a split-up into a
New Bank and Old Bank. The New Bank would engage in new activities. The
Commission, however, had doubts regarding these diversification activities.
The Commission noted that Anglo was at that moment not active on these mar-
kets and that Anglo therefore lacked the required expertise.167 These two exam-
ples underline the importance that the Commission attaches to the focus on
core activities.
11.8.4 Concluding remarks
Most restructuring plans of banks (in the C-context) include a re-focus on the
bank’s core activities. This refocus on the bank’s core activities – and the sub-
sequent disposal of the bank’s non-core activities – is always viewed posi-
tively by the Commission, because it contributes to the restoration of long-term
viability.
The present section has shown that there is no uniform definition of ‘non-core
activities’. The exact interpretation of ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ is different for each
bank. Apart from the fact that it usually treats proprietary trading as a non-core
activity, the Commission does not impose a uniform business model on the
banks. In other words: banks and Member States have some flexibility in
designing the business model of the bank. I welcome the fact that the Commis-
sion does not dictate which bank activities should be labelled as core and non-
core. Indeed, it is not for the Commission – as a State aid control authority – to
determine the business model of the bank.
165. Parex banka, C26/2009, 15 September 2010, para. 98.
166. According to the decision, lending to high net worth individuals in CIS countries is con-
sidered to be a risky activity.
167. Anglo Irish Bank, SA.32504, 31 March 2010, para. 117.
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11.9 Impaired assets
* The fact that the bank participates in an Asset Protection Scheme or has
transferred impaired assets to an Asset Management Company.
11.9.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
The transfer of impaired assets to an Asset Management Company (AMC) is a
State aid measure.168 At the same time, it is a measure that contributes to the
restoration of the viability of the beneficiary bank. Indeed, as a result of the
transfer, the beneficiary bank will be relieved of its impaired assets.169 Hence,
from a viability-perspective, the Commission thus welcomes the fact that the
impaired assets are transferred to an AMC. The same holds true for other asset
relief measures, such as an Asset Protection Scheme or the creation of a bad
bank.
11.9.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
Since the Commission applies the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC) to
all cases that are characterised by asset relief measures, the decisions thus explic-
itly mention the fact that the bank benefited from asset relief measures. Con-
versely, there are no decisions in which the Commission explicitly mentioned
that the bank did not benefit from asset relief measures. So the Commission
always mentions the presence of the characteristic if the characteristic is
present170, whereas the Commission does not mention the absence of the
characteristic if the characteristic is not present.171 The omission to mention
this absence does not amount to an inconsistency, because it is obvious that the
omission means that the relevant characteristic is not present in the case: if the
relevant characteristic (i.e. an asset relief measure) would be present, then it is
not in question that the Commission would assess this asset relief measure under
the State aid rules and thus mention the presence of the relevant characteristic in
the decision.
168. The transfer of impaired assets needs to comply to the conditions of the Impaired Assets
Communication. In chapter 9, the Impaired Assets Communication was discussed.
169. Furthermore, transferring impaired assets to a State-sponsored SPV results in a reduction
of the beneficiary bank’s balance sheet and RWA. Since it reduces the bank’s RWA, the
capital ratio of the bank will improve.
170. This corresponds to “situation P/M” of the matrix.
171. This corresponds to “situation A/O” of the matrix.
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11.9.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
It can be observed that – in addition to assessing the compatibility of an asset
relief measure on the basis of the IAC-criteria – the Commission stresses the
viability-aspect of an asset relief measure. For instance, in the decision on KBC,
the Commission pointed out that the value markdowns on KBC’s synthetic
CDO portfolio were the main cause of the bank’s difficulties.172 Consequently,
the restructuring plan of KBC had to address the problems of KBC’s impaired
assets.
Similarly, in the decision on Bank of Ireland, the Commission recalled that
“loans to the real estate sector were at the source of the principal uncertainties
in relation to the asset quality and potential impairments” and that “the transfer
of those assets to NAMA would allow a stable activity of the bank without
uncertainties regarding potential impairments in the portfolio”.173
Likewise, in the decisions on the Spanish banks, the Commission con-
sidered that “the segregation and transfer of the assets and loans related to the
real estate development sector to the AMC is an adequate response to the high
concentrations of the Bank’s balance sheet on the real estate development sec-
tor and level of non-performing assets, and its past expansion outside its core
retail banking business and historical core regions”.174
These are just a few examples, but the pattern is clear: asset relief measures
are not only assessed as State aid measures, but also as viability-measures.
Non-performing loans (NPL’s)
A very specific form of impaired assets are non-performing loans (NPL’s).
Several beneficiary banks had large portfolios of NPL’s. This was especially
the case for the Greek and Cypriot banks.175 This is not surprising, given the
fact that the Greek and Cypriot economies were in recession. As a consequence
of a recession, the ability of the households and businesses to repay their
loans will be impaired. This, in turn, will result in higher loan losses for the
banks (increase in the stock of NPL’s and lower recovery from the existing
NPL’s.176
The problem of a large portfolio of NPL’s can obviously be solved by
transferring some of the NPL’s to an Asset Management Company. Sometimes,
a different solution is chosen: in several cases, a special unit was created within
the bank in order to optimise the monitoring and management of problematic
172. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 144.
173. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 190.
174. Catalunya Banc, SA.33735, 28 November 2012, para. 165.
175. NPL’s also mentioned in: the Slovenian banks Abanka, NLB, NKBM; the Spanish banks
Cajatres, CCM.
176. Cooperative Bank of Peloponnese, 17 December 2015, para. 7.
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loans.177 The creation of such a unit is welcomed by the Commission. The
Commission also notes positively that that the resources of that unit will be
further reinforced through the redeployment of staff from other functions
whereby the group currentlymaintains spare capacity.178 Interestingly, inCyprus,
a new legal framework was put in place – as part of the MoU conditionality –
to facilitate the seizing and pledging of collateral.179
11.9.4 Concluding remarks
This section has shown that impaired asset measures are consistently taken
into account by the Commission in its assessment of the bank’s return to long-
term viability. It should be kept in mind, however, that dealing with impaired
assets only means that an existing problem is addressed. The creation of
impaired assets in the future should also be prevented. In that regard, it is
noteworthy that in addition to indicating how existing NPL’s will be managed,
several restructuring plans focus on preventing the origination of NPL’s. This
concerns (credit) risk management180, which was discussed in section 11.5.
11.10 Sale of an ailing bank to another financial institution
* The fact that the acquiring bank has a strong financial position.
* The fact that the acquiring bank is much larger than the ailing bank.
* The fact that the acquiring bank has a good track record in extracting syner-
gies.
* The fact that only the good parts of the ailing bank are transferred to the
acquiring bank.
11.10.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
In several cases, the beneficiary bank does not continue as a standalone entity.
Instead, the bank is taken over by another bank. For this type of situation, I
have coined the term “T-context” (or “S/T/W-context” if only the good parts
of the bank are taken over). Point 17 of the Restructuring Communication
specifies that “the sale of an ailing bank to another financial institution can
contribute to the restoration of long-term viability, if the purchaser is viable
177. CCB, Alpha Bank, Eurobank, NBG, MPS. Also the Irish banks AIB/EBS and IL&P
(PTSB) strengthened their credit management by creating a Financial Solution Group and
the Mortgage Arrears Resolution Strategy (MARS) rollout.
178. Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), SA.43367, 18 December 2015, para. 87.
179. Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), SA.43367, 18 December 2015, para. 88.
180. In that regard, sometimes the term “reduction of credit delinquency” is used. See, for
instance: Banco Comercial Português (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 37-iv.
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and capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank, and may help to restore
market confidence”.181 Point 17 further specifies that the acquiring bank should
demonstrate that the integrated entity will be viable.182
The central requirement is thus that the acquiring bank is viable and capable of
absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank. The conclusion that this requirement is
met, is usually based on i) the fact that the acquiring bank has a strong financial
position, ii) the fact that the acquiring bank is much larger than the ailing bank,
iii) the fact that the acquiring bank has a good track record in extracting syn-
ergies, and iv) the fact that only the good parts of the ailing bank are transferred
to the acquiring bank. These four circumstances are thus relevant characteristics.
11.10.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these four
characteristics?
The acquiring bank should be viable and capable of absorbing the ailing bank.
This is a central requirement which should be met in every case in the T-context
and S/T/W-context. The characteristics of the case are used by the Commission
to substantiate the conclusion that this central requirement is met. The previous
subsection introduced four relevant characteristics in that regard. These charac-
teristics do not necessarily have to be present in every case. For instance, in the
decision on Cajatres (which was taken over by Ibercaja), there was no mention
of a track record or experience in integrating companies. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission concluded that Ibercaja (which acquired Cajatres) satisfied the requi-
rement of point 17 of the Restructuring Communication. This illustrates that
the acquiring bank does not have to score positive on all aspects; it suffices that
some of the four relevant characteristics are present.
181. In the decision on ATE (SA.35460, 3 May 2013, para. 61), the Commission considered
that the necessity of the requirement (that the acquiring bank is capable of absorbing the
transfer of the ailing bank) is in particular relevant in Greece, where the Memorandum of
Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) has also indicated that some consolidation would
be good for the widely dispersed banking.
182. Points 18-21 of the Restructuring Communication concern other aspects of the sale of a bank.
Point 18 stipulates that a transparent and open tender procedure ensures equal opportunities
to potential bidders. Point 19 concerns merger control issues. Point 20 concerns the ques-
tion whether the sale of a bank may involve aid to the acquiring bank. Point 21 concerns the
alternative of an orderly winding-up.
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11.10.3 How are these relevant characteristics elaborated in the decisions?
11.10.3.1 Financial position of the acquiring bank
In order for an acquiring bank to be considered viable, its financial position
should be sound. The financial position of a bank has many aspects: the bank’s
liquidity position, its solvency, the quality of its credit portfolio, its profitability
and its efficiency ratio. Hence, all these aspects generally figure in the Commis-
sion decisions. For instance, in its decisional practice, the Commission took into
account the quality of the acquiring bank’s credit portfolio. Regarding this
relevant aspect, the Commission has noted positively that the level of non-
performing loans (NPL’s) of the acquiring bank was “in line with the sector’s
average”183, or “well below the sector’s average”.184 By the same token, the
Commission noted positively that the level of provisioning on NPL’s was “well
above the sector’s average”.185
A strong liquidity position is a relevant aspect, because a strong liquidity posi-
tion means that the acquiring bank can absorb the taken over bank’s funding
profile. It should be pointed out that this characteristic is used as an argument
to support the conclusion that the acquiring bank is viable and capable of
absorbing the ailing bank. There are cases in which this characteristic is not
present. Notwithstanding the absence of this relevant characteristic, there may
be other circumstances that justify the conclusion that the integrated entity will
be viable in the long run. For instance, the Commission noted that the liquidity
profile submitted by Banco Sabadell (which acquired Banco CAM) and by
BBVA (which acquired UNNIM Banc) exhibited a significant reliance on ECB
refinancing facilities. However, the Commission noted that most Spanish
banking institutions exhibit such a reliance.186
In some decisions, the Commission referred to the bank’s rating. For instance,
in its decision on Fortis, the Commission mentioned that BNP Paribas (which
acquired part of Fortis) had been rated AA+ by S&P.187 The Commission noted
positively that this rating reflected the acquiring bank’s financial soundness.
It should be pointed out that there are several ailing banks which were taken
over by banks that were also in need of State aid. This occurred in Greece where
all the large Greek domestic banks had received State aid and were subject to
restructuring. Since subsidiaries of foreign groups did not have interest in
183. AB Ukio bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 73.
184. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 169.
185. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 130.
186. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 138; UNNIM Banc, SA.33733, 25 July 2012,
para. 154.
187. Fortis, NN42/2008, 3 December 2008, para. 83.
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acquiring the ailing banks in Greece, the Commission exceptionally accepted
that beneficiary banks could take over the ailing banks.188 The impact of the
acquisition on the Commission’s assessment of the beneficiary bank’s restruc-
turing will be discussed in section 11.11.
11.10.3.2 Size of the acquiring bank
The relative size of the acquiring bank (in relation to the size of the bank that is
taken over) is a relevant characteristic: the larger the acquiring bank, the more
capable it is to absorb the transfer of the ailing bank. Therefore, in many deci-
sions the relative size of the acquiring bank was taken into account.
The relevance of the integration into a larger bank is illustrated by the Open-
ing Decision on Nea Proton Bank. In that decision, the Commission noted that
“if the bank was integrated in a larger and solid bank, it would probably give
more confidence to depositors and increase the range of services offered to
them, such that the bank would not have to continue offering interest rates on
deposits which are significantly above the rate offered by most competitors”.189
In most cases, the acquiring bank was much larger than the ailing bank. For
instance, Banco de Valencia was taken over by CaixaBank. The Commission
noted that CaixaBank was much larger than Banco de Valencia. In terms of total
assets, the ratio exceeded 1:15. The Commission therefore considered that the
impact of the acquisition of Banco de Valencia on CaixaBanks’ accounts and
prudential position was limited.190 This consideration can be found in many
other decisions. The exact ratio is, however, not the same. For instance, in the
case of Banco Gallego, the ratio exceeded 1:37. An even higher ratio can be
found in the decision on the transfer of Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC) to
ICCREA: the Commission noted that ICCREA was 50 times larger than the
transferred activities in terms of total assets.191
It is possible that the acquiring bank is not larger than the ailing bank. It can
even occur that the acquiring bank is much smaller than the ailing bank that it
takes over. For instance, Eik Banki Foroya was taken over by TF Holding.
The Commission observed that the assets bought by TF Holding were about
five times higher than the total assets held by TF Holding.192 So the transferred
business was absorbed into a smaller bank. However, the Commission noted
that there were several measures to ensure the viability of the transferred busi-
ness within the acquiring bank. The Commission noted that the fact that the
188. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 49.
189. Nea Proton Bank, SA.34488, 26 July 2012, para. 69.
190. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 163.
191. Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), SA.41924, 2 July 2015, para. 74.
192. Eik banki, SA.31945, 6 June 2011, para. 38.
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FSC retained 30% of Eik Banki Foroya’s equity shares contributed to the long-
term viability of the bank.193 The fact that the State remained a shareholder
stabilised shareholding and ensured that one shareholder would be a large entity.
Another example is the case of AB Ukio bankas. The assets and liabilities
of Siauliu bank (i.e. the acquiring bank) had almost doubled following the
takeover of assets and liabilities from Ukio bank. The Commission did not con-
sider this to be an impediment to Siauliu bank’s ability to manage the business
of the combined banks. This was explained by the fact that the transferred assets
were dominated by liquid assets, which would not present any management
issues to Siauliu bank.194
These examples illustrate that the size of the acquiring bank is a relevant – but
not decisive – factor in the assessment of the acquiring bank’s viability and
capability of absorbing the transfer.
11.10.3.3 Experience of the acquiring bank and synergies
The Commission welcomes the fact that the acquiring bank has experience in
integrating companies. For instance, Banco CAMwas acquired by Banco Saba-
dell. When assessing the long-term viability, the Commission noted that Banco
Sabadell had a “consistent and favourable track record in buying external retail
banking entities and through successful integration, extracting foreseen syner-
gies”.195 Banco Gallego was another bank taken over by Banco Sabadell. Again
the Commission noted that Banco Sabadell had a favourable track record.196
Likewise, in the case of the Greek bank ATE, the Commission looked favour-
ably at the fact that the acquiring bank (Piraeus Bank) had experience in inte-
grating companies.197 In the decision, this track record was substantiated by
referring to the many activities that were successfully integrated by Piraeus
Bank.198 Furthermore, the Commission took positive note of the fact that Piraeus
Bank had developed a very detailed integration plan.199
193. Eik banki, SA.31945, 6 June 2011, para. 38.
194. AB Ukio bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 40.
195. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 128.
196. Banco Gallego, SA.36500, 25 July 2013, para. 116.
197. ATE, SA.35460, 3 May 2013, para. 63.
198. They are listed in footnote 17 of the Decision: “In 1998, Piraeus Bank absorbed the activities
of Chase Manhattan Greece, took over a controlling interest in the Macedonia-Thrace Bank
and acquired Credit Lyonnais Hellas. One year later in 1999, Piraeus Bank acquired
Xiosbank and absorbed the activities of National Westminster Bank Greece. In June 2000,
Piraeus Bank integrated its three commercial banks in Greece (Piraeus Bank, Macedonia-
Thrace Bank and Xiosbank). Finally, in 2002, Piraeus Bank acquired ETBAbank.”
199. ATE, SA.35460, 3 May 2013, para. 63.
RESTORING LONG-TERM VIABILITY
347
A favourable track record in extracting synergies is thus a relevant characte-
ristic. But also apart from this track record, synergies can be achieved. In many
decisions, the Commission noted that the takeover and subsequent integration
of the ailing bank into the acquiring bank would lead to important synergies.
For instance, in the decision on AB Ukio Bankas, it was mentioned that accord-
ing to the integration plan, the combined entity would reap the benefits of syn-
ergies.200
It is noteworthy that the synergies are not really specified. The most detailed
explanations can be found in the decision on ATE. The decision mentions
cost synergies (through branch and staff reductions and IT-integration), funding
synergies and revenue synergies.201 In addition, the Commission noted that the
integration would improve the deposit mix and rebalance the loan book.202
11.10.3.4 S/T/W-context
A very decisive argument is the fact that only the good parts of the ailing bank
are transferred to the acquiring bank. This argument mainly applies in the S/T/
W-context, when a bank is split-up into a good bank (to be transferred) and a
bad bank (to be wound-down).
The Amagerbanken-case illustrates that the Commission is satisfied that
the integrated entity will be viable, if only the good parts of the ailing bank are
transferred to the acquiring bank.203
The same consideration can be found in the Dunfermline-decision. The Com-
mission observed that the Dunfermline business transferred to Nationwide was
a viable business: the Transfer Package consisted of good quality assets and
a good funding position (loan to deposit ratio of 45%).204 In addition, since
the impaired assets stayed with Rump Dunfermline, the Dunfermline business
transferred to Nationwide was cleansed of its impaired assets.205
In the case of Fionia Bank, the Commission noted that only the viable, less
risky parts were transferred to Nordea. The Commission underlined this by
referring to the fact that Nordea had explicitly selected the parts according to
their risk profile and that Nordea had purchased only the parts where there was
no evidence of impairment.206
200. AB Ukio bankas, SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 74.
201. ATE, SA.35460, 3 May 2013, para. 35.
202. On a standalone basis, Piraeus Bank’s loan portfolio contained 71% business loans, 20%
residential loans and 9% consumer loans. After the integration, the corresponding figures
would pro forma be 62% business loans, 28% residential loans and 9% consumer loans.
(ATE, SA.35460, 3 May 2013, para. 36).
203. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 104.
204. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 100.
205. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 101.
206. Fionia Bank, N560/2009, 25 October 2010, para. 73.
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11.10.4 Concluding remarks
As explained in the subsection 11.10.1, the acquiring bank should be viable
and capable of absorbing the ailing bank. This is a central requirement which
should be met in every case in the T-context and S/T/W-context. Accordingly,
the Commission always assesses in these cases whether the acquiring bank is
viable and capable of absorbing the ailing bank. The conclusion that this
requirement is met, is usually based on i) the fact that the acquiring bank has
a strong financial position, ii) the fact that the acquiring bank is much larger
than the ailing bank, iii) the fact that the acquiring bank has a good track record
in extracting synergies, and iv) the fact that only the good parts of the ailing bank
are transferred to the acquiring bank.
11.11 Acquisition of other banks by a beneficiary bank
The previous section focussed on the take-over of a beneficiary bank; the current
section focusses on the acquisition by a beneficiary bank. This situation is
quite rare: bank that received State aid are usually not allowed to take over other
banks – as will be discussed in chapter 13 in the context of the acquisition ban.
The situation of a beneficiary bank acquiring another bank only occurred in
the Greek context. There are four large banks in Greece, and each of these four
large banks acquired some smaller banks.207
The Commission assessed whether these acquisitions were compatible with
the Restructuring Communication. This assessment concerned the effect of the
acquisitions on: i) the viability of the bank, ii) the aid amount needed by the
bank, and iii) competition. Any acquisition is thus assessed from three perspec-
tives. The first perspective (i.e. effect on viability) is discussed in this section,
whereas the other two perspectives will be covered in section 13.9.
207. Pireaus Bank acquired the ATE Transferred Activities, Geniki, the Cypriot Transferred
Activities and MBG. In 2015, Pireaus Bank acquired Panellinia Bank. Alpha Bank acquired
Emporiki Bank, three Cooperative Banks, and Citibank Greece. Eurobank acquired New TT
Bank and Nea Proton Bank. National Bank of Greece (NBG) acquired FB Bank, three
Cooperative Banks and Probank.
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With respect to the effect of the acquisition on the long-term viability of the
bank, the relevant criterion is that the acquisition would enhance – or at least not
endanger – the long-term viability of the acquiring bank. In the context of that
assessment, the Commission took into account the following circumstances:
– Through the acquisition, the acquiring bank would enhance its deposit
gathering franchise and capabilities.
– There were synergies (in terms of central functions, IT services and
operating expenses) (or in the form of personnel reduction, branch closures
and reduced overhead costs).
– The acquisition can have a positive effect on the liquidity position, if the bank
acquires more deposits than net loans. This was the case with the acquisition
of Emporiki Bank by Alpha Bank: the LTD-ratio of Emporiki Bank was
around 115%, well below Alpha Bank’s very high LTD-ratio.208
– The acquisition can have a positive effect on the capital adequacy ratio of
the acquiring bank.209
– The acquisition can give the acquiring bank the opportunity to enhance its
revenues by broadening its client base in several geographic areas.210
– The acquiring bank acquired the other bank’s loans at fair value, and not at
book value. That factor limits the risk of future impairments.211
It should be noted that some of the banks that were taken over by the beneficiary
bank, had also benefited from State aid. In other words: the acquiring bank and
the transferred bank were both beneficiaries from State aid. In this situation, the
viability-assessment had to be performed twice. On the one hand, the viability of
the transferred activities had to be assessed. This assessment was based on the
characteristics that were outlined in the previous section. On the other hand, it
had to be assessed whether the acquisition endangered the viability of the acquir-
ing bank. This assessment was based on the characteristics discussed in the
current section.
208. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 224.
209. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 225.
210. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 237.
211. Panellinia Bank, SA.41503, 16 April 2015, para. 96.
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11.12 Assumptions underlying the restructuring plan
* The fact that the assumptions (on which the financial projections are based)
are reasonable.
11.12.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
The Restructuring Communication provides that the restructuring plan should
demonstrate how the bank will restore its long-term viability without State
aid as soon as possible. In particular, the restructuring plan should demonstrate
that the bank will be able to generate appropriate return on equity, while covering
all costs of its normal operations and complying with the relevant regulatory
requirements. In order to demonstrate the return to viability, the restructuring
plan should contain financial forecasts/projections on the expected revenues,
costs, impairments, profits and capital position. The expected results of the
restructuring need to be demonstrated under a base case scenario and a stress case
scenario.212 The financial projections under both scenarios are based on
assumptions, and it is important that those assumptions are reliable or reasona-
ble.213 Particularly with respect to the stress test macroeconomic assumptions,
the Commission has considered that these assumptions should be sufficiently
severe to be considered to be a stress scenario.214
Hence, in its decisional practice, the Commission verifies whether the
financial projections used in the restructuring plan are based on reasonable
underlying macroeconomic assumptions.
11.12.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
It can be observed that the Commission has consistently checked whether the
assumptions were reasonable. In other words: the presence of this relevant
characteristic is always mentioned in the decisions. This can be explained by the
fact that the current relevant characteristic – unlike most of the other relevant
characteristics of this chapter – has to be present in every case: in every case, the
assumptions and projections have to be reasonable.
212. Restructuring Communication, point 13. The bank should be able to withstand a stress
scenario. This means that the bank will comply with the relevant regulatory requirements
even in a stress scenario.
213. Other terms that are used, are: “credible”, “plausible”, “sufficiently pessimistic”, “prudent
and conservative”.
214. Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), N428/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 146.
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11.12.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
In the final decisions, the Commission always concluded that the assumptions
were reasonable. In that regard, the following observation can be made: the
assumptions themselves are usually not shown in the decisions.215 Only the
conclusion that the assumptions are reasonable – and the considerations to
substantiate that conclusion – figure in the decisions. The most commonly used
considerations are discussed below.
A commonly used consideration is that the assumptions were provided by (or
reviewed/verified/validated by) the financial supervisory authority. For instance,
in the decision on Ethias, the Commission noted that the assumptions under-
lying the stress case scenario were provided by the CBFA (i.e. the Belgian reg-
ulator: Commission Bancaire, Financière et des Assurances).216 Likewise, in the
decision on FIB, the Commission positively noted that the assumptions retained
for the restructuring plan were coming from the Bulgarian National Bank and
presented sufficient level of prudence and conservatism.217
Another consideration can be found in the case of the Cooperative Central
Bank (CCB). In this case, the macro-economic assumptions were in line with
the macro-economic forecasts used for the Economic Adjustment Programme
for Cyprus as agreed between Cyprus and the Commission, the ECB and the
IMF.218
Considerations that support the conclusion that the assumptions are not rea-
sonable can be found in the Opening Decisions. For instance, in the Opening
Decision on BayernLB, the Commission expressed its doubts on the assump-
tions. “The Commission notes that economic forecasts have deteriorated in a
significant manner in recent weeks and the provided forecasts by the bank are
therefore outdated. While the bank has foreseen such a possibility by using
higher risk provisioning than needed in a base case scenario, the Commission
has doubts whether this is sufficient for making up for the deteriorating eco-
nomic forecasts”.219
215. An exception is the Restructuring Decision on MPS. This decision dedicates an entire
section (3.1) to the assumptions.
216. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 125.
217. First Investment Bank (FIB), SA.39854, 25 November 2014, para. 126.
218. Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 116.
219. BayernLB, N254/2009, 12 May 2009, para. 89. In the Restructuring Decision on BayernLB
(SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 171-175), a detailed discussion can be found on the
assumptions and projections.
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Likewise, in the Opening Decision on Parex banka, the Commission con-
sidered that the restructuring plan seemed to be depending on rather optimistic
assumptions as to future operating conditions.220 The Commission had doubts
on the assumptions on the bank’s penetration in different market segments.221
11.12.4 Concluding remarks
The restructuring plan should be based on assumptions that are reasonable (see
subsection 11.12.1). As set out in subsection 11.12.2, the Commission has con-
sistently checked whether the assumptions were reasonable. Although the Com-
mission expressed its doubts in several Opening Decisions, in the Restructuring
Decisions, the Commission always concluded that the assumptions underlying
the restructuring plan were reasonable (see subsection 11.12.3).
11.13 Conclusion
In each bank State aid case, the Commission assesses whether the restructur-
ing plan will ensure that the long-term viability of the beneficiary bank will be
restored. The characteristics that are relevant to that assessment were identified
and discussed in the present chapter. What are the key findings and what are
their implications for the Commission on the one hand and the Member States
and beneficiary banks on the other hand?
11.13.1 Key findings
One of the key findings is that there are many decisions that do not mention
the relevant characteristic. For instance, section 11.2 revealed that there only 23
Commission decisions (of in total 90 cases) that mention that the senior man-
agement of the bank has been replaced. And as set out in section 11.5, the fact
that the restructuring plan provides for an improvement of the bank’s risk
management is welcomed by the Commission and is thus a relevant characte-
ristic. Nonetheless, there are 50 decisions (of in total 90 cases) that do not
mention risk management issues.
How to interpret this finding? As set out in the present chapter, there are several
interpretations. In the first place, the omission to mention the relevant characte-
ristic in several decisions can mean that the Commission did not take into
account the relevant characteristics in these cases. This would be clearly incon-
sistent.
220. Parex banka, C26/2009, 29 July 2009, para. 63.
221. Parex banka, C26/2009, 29 July 2009, para. 64.
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In the second place, the omission to mention the relevant characteristic in
several decisions can mean that the relevant characteristic is not present in these
cases. This can be elucidated by the following matrix (which was introduced
in section 11.2.2.2 of this chapter).
Is the relevant characteristic present?
Present Not present
Does the decision
mention whether the
relevant characteris-
tic is present?
m
en
tio
ne
d The decision mentions that
the relevant characteristic is
present.
The decision mentions that
the relevant characteristic is
absent.
Present/Mentioned Absent/Mentioned
“situation P/M” “situation A/M”
N
ot
m
en
tio
ne
d The decision omits to
mention that the relevant
characteristic is present.
The decision omits to
mention that the relevant
characteristic is absent.
Present/Omitted Absent/Omitted
“situation P/O” “situation A/O”
The omission to mention the absence of the relevant characteristic corresponds
to situation A/O. Can this situation be justified? This question essentially con-
sists of two questions. Firstly, can the absence of the relevant characteristic be
justified? And secondly, can the omission to mention the absence of the rele-
vant characteristic be justified?
With respect to the first question, the present chapter has shown that some
relevant characteristics do not have to be present in each and every case. Further-
more, even relevant characteristics that should always be present can be absent
if there is a justification. Thus, the absence of a relevant characteristic can be
justified.
With respect to the second question, I am of the opinion that the omission to
mention the absence of the relevant characteristic can only be justified when
it is obvious that the omission means that the relevant characteristic is not
present in the case. Whether this is obvious depends on whether one expects
the relevant characteristic to be present. In that regard, the distinction between
the relevant characteristics that always have to be present (and whose absence
has to be justified) and the relevant characteristics that do not have to be present
in each and every case, is important. An example of the first type of relevant
characteristic is the fact that the bank’s senior management has been replaced.
A management change is in principle required (in particular by point 37 of the
2013 Banking Communication). If there is no such management change, then
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one would expect that the decision clarifies why this relevant characteristic is
not present in the case (i.e. why a replacement of senior management is not
needed in that case).
An example of the second type of relevant characteristic is the fact that
the bank has committed to take measures to improve its corporate governance
framework. Such measures only have to be taken when the bank experienced
corporate governance problems. Consequently, one does not expect corporate
governance measures to be present in every case. This could justify that the
absence of this relevant characteristic is not mentioned in every decision.
11.13.2 Implications for the Commission
Another key finding of this chapter is that relevant characteristics are sometimes
only mentioned in the description-part of the decision. To give an example, the
decision on the Belgian bank KBC indicated that KBC had committed to
develop a sustainable remuneration policy. To that end, the incentive schemes
would be linked to long-term value creation taking account of risk and restricting
the potential for ‘rewards for failure’. This commitment is clearly a relevant
characteristic. As explained in section 11.4, the Commission views favourably
remuneration restrictions. One would expect that the commitment of KBC to
develop a sustainable remuneration policy would be taken into account by the
Commission in its assessment of the restoration of long-term viability. However,
there is no mention of this commitment in the assessment-part of the decision.
This commitment is only mentioned in two places in the decision: in the descrip-
tion-part and in the annex containing a list of behavioural commitments.
In my opinion, it would be better if the relevant characteristics are men-
tioned in the assessment-part of the decision. Admittedly, mentioning the rel-
evant characteristics in the description-part of the decision does not exclude
the possibility that they have been taken into account by the Commission in its
assessment of the compatibility of the State aid. Nevertheless, mentioning the
relevant characteristics in the assessment-part of the decision makes it explicit
that they have been taken into account in the compatibility-assessment.
11.13.3 Implications for the Member States and beneficiary banks
How can a Member State in a future bank State aid case convince the Com-
mission that the beneficiary bank will return to long-term viability?
Point 11 of the Restructuring Communication stipulates that the restructuring
plan should provide information on – amongst other – the business model of
the beneficiary bank, its organisational structure, funding, corporate governance,
risk management and the remuneration incentive structure. These elements
corresponds to the relevant characteristics discussed in the present chapter. The
analysis of the decisional practice reveals that these elements are taken into
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account by the Commission. Indeed, the present chapter has shown that the
Commission notes positively the fact that the corporate governance framework,
risk management, remuneration policy, funding and operational efficiency of the
bank will be improved.
The implications for the Member States and beneficiary banks are thus rela-
tively straightforward. They should either stress that the restructuring plan
includes measures to improve the corporate governance, risk management,
remuneration policy, funding and operational efficiency, or stress that the bank
did not experience problems on these aspects.
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Chapter 12. Burden-sharing
12.1 Introduction
The Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan is based on three pillars.
This chapter focuses on the second pillar. The second pillar of the Restructuring
Communication requires that the restructuring costs and the amount of State
aid are limited to the minimum necessary, and that there is a sufficient own con-
tribution by the beneficiary bank. This own contribution is also referred to as
‘burden-sharing’: the State (and ultimately the taxpayers) should not bear the
burden alone. Instead, the State on the one hand and the beneficiary bank (and its
shareholders) on the other hand should each shoulder an appropriate share of the
burden.1
12.1.1 Why an own contribution?
The own contribution-requirement serves three objectives. The first objective of
the own contribution is to address moral hazard. A disadvantage of granting
State aid is that the beneficiary banks do not have to bear the negative conse-
quences of their actions. If banks know that they will be rescued by the State
when they experience serious financial difficulties, then they may be inclined to
take more risk (than they would have taken if they could not count on State aid).
So the prospect of State aid might lead to moral hazard. To address this problem
of moral hazard, the Restructuring Communication requires that the beneficiary
bank should provide an appropriate own contribution to the restructuring costs.2
1. The phrase “must each shoulder an appropriate share of the burden” was used by the
Commission in one of its decisions (Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 104).
2. Point 22 of the Restructuring Communication. As the Commission explained in HRE, 18 July
2011, para. 114, it follows from point 22 that the objective of burden-sharing is twofold: to
limit distortions of competition and to address moral hazard. The 2014 R&R-guidelines
explicitly indicate that “the notion of burden-sharing has been introduced, inter alia, to better
address the issue of moral hazard” (point 11). In the Crisis Communications, limiting moral
hazard is mentioned as an objective of the burden-sharing requirement. By contrast, Gilliams
(2016, p. 24) argues that while limiting moral hazard is a desirable outcome of the burden-
sharing requirement, it should not be an objective of the burden-sharing requirement.
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An own contribution is “necessary to ensure that rescued banks bear adequate
responsibility for the consequence of their past behaviour and to create
appropriate incentives for their future behaviour”.3
The second objective of the own contribution is that it ensures that restructur-
ing aid is limited to the minimum necessary.4 Full burden-sharing by sharehol-
ders and subordinated debt holders contributes to ensuring that the aid is kept to
the minimum.5 In other words: requiring shareholders and other investors to
bear part of the burden ensures that the burden for the State (and thus ultimately
the taxpayer) is minimised.
Although it is not mentioned in the Restructuring Communication, a third
objective of the own contribution can be found in the 2004 R&R-guidelines.
Point 7 of these guidelines indicates that the own contribution demonstrates that
“the markets (owners, creditors) believe in the feasibility of the return to viability
within a reasonable time period”.
12.1.2 Overlap and interaction
There is some overlap between the second pillar (burden-sharing) and the third
pillar (limiting competition distortions) of the Restructuring Communication.
This is illustrated nicely by the following recital:
“The Restructuring Communication requires that the restructuring plan pro-
poses measures limiting distortions of competition and ensuring a compe-
titive banking sector. In that context, the plan should also address moral
hazard issues and ensure that State aid is not used to fund anti-competitive
behaviour”.6 [Italics mine, REvL]
The notion that State aid may not be used to fund anti-competitive behaviour is
mentioned in point 23 of the Restructuring Communication. Point 23 elaborates
the own contribution-requirement and explains that restructuring aid should be
limited to covering costs which are necessary for the restoration of viability. This
3. Point 22 of the Restructuring Communication. This consideration is reprised in several
decisions. See, for instance: Dexia, C9/2009, 26 February 2010, para. 199.
4. In that regard, the burden-sharing requirement has been called a “corollary” of the principle of
the limitation of the aid to the minimum. See, inter alia: Kommunalkredit Austria (KA),
SA.32745, 31 March 2011, para. 84; ATE, N429/2010, 23 May 2011, para. 79.
5. SA.33757, 9 December 2011, para. 66.
6. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 160. The same recital can be found in other
decisions, such as: Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para.
228; Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), N428/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 175.
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means that State aid may only be used for the rescue and restructuring of the
bank; it may not be used to finance anti-competitive behaviour. The exact same
notion can be found in a different place in the Restructuring Communication:
points 39-45 indicate that State aid may not be used to the detriment of non-
aided competitors. These points therefore introduce measures to limit competi-
tion distortions. One of these measure is the acquisition ban. This compensatory
measure as well as the overlap between points 23 and 39-45 will be discussed
in-depth in section 13.10.
In the same vein, moral hazard is not only an important issue in the context of
burden-sharing; it also appears in the context of limiting competition distortions.
The issue of moral hazard is mentioned in the section on the own contribution
(see point 22 of the Restructuring Communication) and in the section on the
competition distortions (see point 29). Of great importance is the fact that a low
degree of burden-sharing can be compensated by a high degree of restructuring.
This follows from points 25 (in the context of the own contribution) and 31 (in
the context of competition distortions). This means that there is not only an over-
lap, but there is also some interaction between burden-sharing and compensa-
tory measures.
12.1.3 Structure of this chapter
The second pillar of the Restructuring Communication provides that (i) both the
restructuring costs and the amount of aid should be limited and (ii) a significant
own contribution is necessary. It should be noted that (i) and (ii) cannot be
completely separated.7 In fact, they are related: the higher the own contribution
of the bank, the smaller the amount of aid needed. Burden-sharing thus
contributes to a limitation of the amount of aid.
Which factors – other than burden-sharing – ensure that the aid is limited to the
minimum necessary? Section 12.2 provides an answer to this question. It should
be noted that the fact that the bank pays an adequate remuneration to the State
is also relevant in this regard. Indeed, as set out in section 8.6, the remuneration
that the beneficiary bank pays to the State constitutes an own contribution by
the bank. Thus, the fact that the bank pays an adequate remuneration is not only
relevant to the assessment of the proportionality of the State aid measure, it
is also relevant to the assessment of the own contribution. The relevance of this
relevant characteristic thus transcends the first stage of the compatibility-
assessment – this was one of the conclusions of chapter 8. Notwithstanding
the relevance of the remuneration to the assessment of the own contribution, it
will not be discussed any further in the present chapter, for the simple reason that
this relevant characteristic was already extensively discussed in section 8.6.
7. In most cases, (i) and (ii) are addressed in the same section of the decision.
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The main part of this chapter is devoted to burden-sharing. Section 12.3 con-
cerns burden-sharing by the bank itself, while sections 12.4 to 12.8 concern
burden-sharing by those who invested in the bank. How can burden-sharing be
achieved? And how has the Commission assessed whether there was sufficient
burden-sharing in the bank State aid cases and which characteristics were
relevant to that assessment? These are the questions that will be addressed in this
chapter.
12.2 Comparison with alternatives
* The fact that the chosen rescue/restructuring is the least costly alternative.
12.2.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
As set out in section 6.8, this PhD-study distinguishes between several con-
texts. The C-context means that the beneficiary bank continues as a standalone
entity. The T-context means that the bank is taken over by another bank. The
W-context means that the bank will be wound down. The S/T/W-context means
that the bank is split-up into a bad bank (to be wound-down) and a good bank
(to be sold). The S/C/W-context means that the bank is split-up into a bad bank
(to be wound down) and a good bank (that continues to exist as a standalone
entity).
These different contexts illustrate that the rescue and restructuring of banks
can take place in many ways. There is no standard way of rescuing a failing
bank. If the bank is likely to become viable again, then the bank will be restruc-
tured in such a way that it can continue as a standalone entity. If, on the contrary,
there are no prospects that the bank can return to viability, one of the other sce-
narios will be chosen: either a sale to another bank, a break-up of the bank or a
complete wind-down.
So there are alternative scenarios. Whichever scenario is chosen, it should be
the least costly alternative. This follows from point 23 of the Restructuring
Communication which stipulates that any restructuring or liquidation aid
should be limited to the minimum necessary. To this end, Member States
should analyse and compare different scenarios when rescuing and restruc-
turing a failing bank. Furthermore, Member States should demonstrate that the
alternative that they have chosen is the least costly one. This also follows from
point 9 of the Restructuring Communication which stipulates that the restruc-
turing plan should include a comparison with alternative options.
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12.2.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The fact that the chosen restructuring is the least costly alternative is a rele-
vant characteristic that should be present in every case. Consequently, the
Commission should assess in every bank State aid case whether this relevant
characteristic is present. Surprisingly, not every decision mentions this rele-
vant characteristic. In fact, there are only a few decisions that explicitly men-
tion that the chosen scenario is the least costly one.
12.2.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The way in which this relevant characteristic is elaborated differs among the
decisions. In that regard, it should be kept in mind that the scenario analysis
is performed by the Member State and only reviewed by the Commission. The
restructuring plans are therefore much more detailed than the decisions. In the
decisions, the details of the scenario analysis are only mentioned to the extent
that they are relevant in that particular case.
In addition, it is useful to point out that the comparison with alternatives can
appear at different places in the Commission decisions: in the description of the
restructuring plan and in the assessment of the second pillar (burden-sharing).
To give an example: many Spanish banks were taken-over by other banks
in Spain. In that regard, the Commission noted that the Spanish authorities
had worked out liquidation and resolution scenarios built on different assump-
tions.8 The scenarios and underlying assumptions were described in the
description-part of the decisions. In the assessment-part, the Commission con-
cluded that since the costs in the orderly winding-down scenario would be
higher, the amount of aid could be deemed limited to the minimum neces-
sary.9
12.2.4 Concluding remarks
In some decisions, the Commission explicitly welcomed the fact that the Mem-
ber State has performed a scenario analysis and that the chosen scenario is the
least costly one; while in many other decisions, this relevant characteristic is not
mentioned. In my opinion, this is inconsistent. However, it should be pointed
out that it is in the Member State’s own interest that the chosen alternative is the
least costly one. Thus, even though some decisions do not explicitly indicate
whether the chosen alternative is the least costly one, it is nonetheless likely that
the relevant characteristic is present in those cases (i.e. that the chosen alternative
is the least costly one).
8. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 180.
9. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 185.
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12.3 Own contribution of the beneficiary bank: sale of assets
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is divesting (profitable non-core) sub-
sidiaries.
12.3.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
In section 11.8, it was explained that many beneficiary banks divested non-core
activities. Divestments are not only relevant for the return to viability, they
are also relevant for another reason: they constitute an own contribution of the
beneficiary bank. Pursuant to point 24 of the Restructuring Communication,
the bank should use its own resources to finance restructuring.10 This can be
achieved selling assets. Many decisions contain the standard consideration that
“the divestments of profitable non-core subsidiaries will generate proceeds,
which can be used to finance the restructuring costs”.11 The fact that the
beneficiary bank is divesting subsidiaries is thus a relevant characteristic.12
12.3.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The standard consideration that the beneficiary bank is divesting profitable
non-core subsidiaries is only found in decisions in the C-context. The term
“divestment of subsidiaries” is not used in the other contexts. Nevertheless,
banks in the other contexts are using own resources to finance the restructur-
ing. Indeed, in the S/T/W-context, the beneficiary bank is split into a bad bank
(to be wound-down) and a good bank (to be sold). The sale of the beneficiary
bank’s sound parts (i.e. the good bank) constitutes an own contribution of the
beneficiary bank to its restructuring. Several decisions in the S/T/W-context
explicitly refer to point 24 of the Restructuring Communication (which
requires the bank to use its own resources to finance restructuring).13 By the
10. Unlike the R&R-guidelines, the Crisis Communications do not require an own contribu-
tion of 50%. See also: WestLB, C43/2008, 12 May 2009, para. 78-79.
11. OVAG, SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 113; NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para.
152; Sparkasse KolnBonn, C32/2009, 29 September 2010, para. 89; Monte dei Paschi di
Siena (MPS), SA.36175, 27 November 2013, para. 144; CatalunyaBanc, SA.33735,
28 November 2012, para. 174.
12. In the decision on Commerzbank, the Commission explained that the sale of assets would
lead to a reduction of the bank’s RWA and to an increase of the bank’s own funds (in case
the assets are sold at a price exceeding their book value). Both these effects improve the
capital ratios. See: Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 106.
13. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 127; Fionia Bank, N560/2009,
25 January 2010, para. 103-104.
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same token, in the T-context andW-context, all of the beneficiary bank’s assets –
thus not only the non-core activities – are sold or wound-down. This also
constitutes an own contribution of the bank.14
To sum up, the very specific fact that the bank is divesting subsidiaries is only
found in decisions in the C-context, while the more general observation that
the bank is using own resources to finance the restructuring can be found in
almost any decision. An overview of these decisions is provided in the table in
Annex XII.
Remarkably, the decision on the Austrian bank BAWAG does not mention
whether the bank is divesting activities in order to comply with point 24 of the
Restructuring Communication (which requires the bank to use its own resources
to finance restructuring). Even more remarkable is the observation that the
decision indicates that “as part of the measures to limit distortions of competi-
tion, BAWAG will divest its 10% holding in the Hungarian MKB BANK”.15
The decision further indicates that MKB BANK is a profit-making bank. In my
opinion, the divestment of its holding in MKB BANK is not only a compensa-
tory measure; it would also qualify as an own contribution of BAWAG. Hence,
the divestment should have been mentioned in the decision as an own contri-
bution by the beneficiary bank. The omission to mention this divestments as
an own contribution constitutes an inconsistency (since in almost every other
decision, the Commission explicitly welcomes divestments as an own contribu-
tion). Nevertheless, since the Commission concluded that the restructuring plan
included a sufficient own contribution, this inconsistency did not lead to an
unfair treatment of BAWAG.
12.3.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
In some decisions, it is clearly mentioned which entities are divested16, whereas
in some other decisions, the entities to be divested are only referred to as
“profitable non-core subsidiaries”. Another observation is that the decisions
14. This can be illustrated by the following recital: “In the present case, Dexia Group’s own
contribution to its restructuring is maximised in that all its assets are earmarked for sale or
run-off management, and profits from the sales will all go into Dexia’s orderly resolution.”
See: Dexia, SA.33760, 28 November 2012, para. 616.
15. BAWAG, N261/2010, 30 June 2010, para. 104.
16. For instance, the decision on OVAG (SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 113) indicates
that “the restructuring costs are financed by proceeds from the divestments of stakes in
profitable non-core entities (RZB, retail subsidiaries in Austria (already implemented in
2009-2010), VBLI)”. Another example is Dexia, C9/2009, 26 February 2010, para. 206.
The restructuring plan of LBBW also envisaged the sale of units which were important for
its business model; in other words: core activities. This made the Commission conclude
that LBBW was making an important contribution to the restructuring costs. See: LBBW,
15 December 2009, para. 96.
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usually do not explain why these entities were chosen to be divested. In essence,
the only important feature of these divestments is that they generate proceeds –
there is thus no need to discuss other features.
In most decisions, the fact that the bank has made divestments is thus not very
elaborated. The decisions only dwell on this relevant characteristic if the
possibilities for burden-sharing are limited (see subsection 12.3.3.1), or if the
divestment is not accepted as an own contribution (see subsection 12.3.3.2).
12.3.3.1 Limited possibilities for burden-sharing
Sometimes, the possibilities for burden-sharing are limited. This can be the
case if there are just no subsidiaries to divest, or if divesting those subsidiaries
would endanger the bank’s viability. An example of the first situation can be
found in the case of the (Cypriot) Cooperative Central Bank (CCB):
“Since the CCIs do not engage in international businesses and do not carry
out sizable non-banking activities, there was no option for more divest-
ments outside core Cypriot banking operations”.17
Other examples of a limited possibility to downsize are the cases of ATE, T
Bank and Commerzbank. In the decision on T Bank, the Commission noted that
T Bank was a very small bank: “It owned no stand-alone subsidiaries or business
of sufficient size to be sold separately to contribute to the cost of the restruc-
turing”.18 Similarly, in the decision on the Greek bank ATE, the Commission
considered that “in view of the fact that ATE is mainly a retail bank that has no
large bond portfolios to reduce but a medium-sized balance sheet consisting
mainly of loans, the present downsizing is significant”.19 In the decision on
Commerzbank, the Commission noted that “Commerzbank is not in a position
to sell off further assets to reinforce its capital base in the short term without
jeopardising its survival in the long term”.20
12.3.3.2 Divestments that are not accepted as an own contribution measure
There are some cases in which the divestments were not accepted as an own
contribution.21 One of these cases is the case of Nova Ljubljanska banka
(NLB). In the Opening Decision in the case of NLB, the Commission expressed
its doubts as to the own contribution by NLB. NLB planned to divest several
17. CCB, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 149.
18. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 52.
19. ATE, N429/2010, 23 May 2011, para. 86.
20. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 106.
21. See also: IKB, C10/2008, 21 October 2008, para. 105.
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subsidiaries. However, most of these subsidiaries were not profitable. The Com-
mission considered that the divestment of non-profitable activities did not
qualify as own contribution. According to the Commission, the divestment of
these subsidiaries was rather a step necessary to ensure the return to viability.22
Thus, divestments can only be considered as an own contribution when they
generate proceeds. This was not the case with the impaired assets that Hypo
Real Estate (HRE) had transferred to FMS-WertManagement. The Commis-
sion noted that the transfer effectively cut the balance sheet of HRE in half.
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that the transfer could not be con-
sidered as an own contribution, since the price that HRE received, exceeded the
real economic value (REV) of the assets. The Commission explicitly held that
the transfer had not created “any accounting surplus that could have contributed
to the financing of the restructuring costs”.23
12.3.3.3 Intermezzo: the different purposes of divestments
The previous subsection illustrated that divestments do not always serve the
same purpose. In that regard, it should be recalled that there are three restruc-
turing objectives: i) restoration of long-term viability, ii) burden-sharing/own
contribution, and iii) minimising competition distortions. Sometimes, a divest-
ment is aimed specifically at one of the three objectives; and sometimes, a
divestment serves several purposes.
The case of Ethias is a prime example of the first situation. Ethias committed
to three divestments: i) Ethias Banque, ii) BelRe, and iii) Nateus. With respect to
Ethias Banque, the Commission noted firstly that Ethias Banque was histori-
cally loss-making, and secondly that the divestment was consistent with the aim
of refocussing on Ethias insurance activities.24 This divestment purely served
the objective of restoring the viability of Ethias. With respect to BelRe, the Com-
mission noted that, since the estimated market price of BelRe was significantly
above its book value, the sale should free additional capital, which could be used
to cover restructuring costs.25 With respect to Nateus, this divestment was aimed
at increasing competition. The Commission noted that it was a divestment in the
core market of Ethias, where the size of Nateus in terms of market share was
sufficient to give a new competitor an opportunity to enter the market.26 So in
the decision on Ethias, a sharp distinction was made between the divestments in
terms of purpose.
22. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), 2 July 2012, para. 100.
23. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 18 July 2011, para. 118.
24. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 122.
25. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 132.
26. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 139-140.
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By contrast, it is also possible that the same divestment serves three objectives.
This can be illustrated by the case of Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN). In the
context of the viability-assessment, the decision mentions that BMN would
divest the large majority of its equity stakes and subsidiaries.27 In the context of
the burden-sharing assessment, the decision mentions that “the restructuring
costs are also partly borne by the future proceeds from the divestments of sub-
sidiaries and equity stakes in non-core entities, as set out in the Term Sheet and
recalled below in recital (155)”.28 Recital 155 discusses the balance sheet reduc-
tion and can be found in the context of the assessment of the compensatory
measures.
There are also bank State aid cases in which it is not clear whether the divest-
ments serve the same purpose or several purposes. In these cases, the decisions
do not clarify whether the divestments that are needed for viability-purposes are
the same divestments that are needed for burden-sharing purposes or that are
needed as compensatory measure.
The way in which the divestments are elaborated in the decisions depends to
some extent on the purpose of the divestment. Divestments that are needed for
viability-purposes have a certain rationale: these divestments concern non-
core activities or loss-making activities. Divestments that are meant as an own
contribution are not really elaborated in the decisions. In essence, the only
important feature of these divestments is that they generate proceeds. So there
is no need to discuss other features. By contrast, divestments that are meant as
a compensatory measures are discussed in more detail. As will be explained in
section 13.5, this is especially true for divestments that are aimed at creating a
new competitor.
12.3.4 Concluding remarks
The divestment of profitable subsidiaries – or more general: the sale of assets –
by the beneficiary bank is a relevant characteristic, because it constitutes an own
contribution of the bank. Indeed, such divestments generate proceeds which can
be used to finance the restructuring costs. This section has shown that there are
some cases in which the Commission did not accept the divestments as an own
contribution (see subsection 12.3.3.2). This illustrates that the Commission
explicitly assesses the presence of this relevant characteristic.
27. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 136.
28. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 149.
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12.4 Burden-sharing by those who invested in the bank
12.4.1 “Those who invested in the bank”
The principle of burden-sharing requires that the restructuring costs should not
only be borne by the State but also by those who invested in the bank. Who are
the persons or entities that have invested in the bank? Essentially, there are three
categories: i) shareholders of the bank, ii) hybrid capital holders and sub-
ordinated debt holders; and iii) senior creditors.
While there are many different types of securities (such as preference shares
and CoCo’s), the Commission does not really make a distinction between hybrid
capital and subordinated debt. Instead, they are usually bracketed together.29 For
instance, the decision on Alpha Bank speaks of “subordinated and hybrid
debt”30, the decision on Banco Mare Nostrum speaks of “hybrid and subor-
dinated debt”31 and the decision on NLB speaks of “hybrid capital holders and
subordinated debt holders”.32 Burden-sharing by these investors is usually
achieved in the same way, so it makes sense to treat them as one category.
Admittedly, the CRR sets out a detailed distinction between Common Equity
Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital. From a regulatory perspective, it
is important to clearly distinguish between these different types of capital. By
contrast, from a State aid control perspective, such a distinction is less important,
because burden-sharing is required by all of these investors.
However, since burden-sharing by shareholders is achieved in a different
way than burden-sharing by hybrid and subordinated debt holders, it is useful
to make a distinction between these two. Burden-sharing by shareholders will
be discussed in section 12.5, while burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
will be discussed in section 12.6.
Burden-sharing by senior creditors is not required under State aid rules – but
it sometimes takes place. This will be discussed in section 12.7.
12.4.2 From bail-out to bail-in
Before discussing the different forms of burden-sharing, it is useful to point out
that there is a transition from “bail-out” to “bail-in”. As explained in chapter 4
of this PhD-study, the BRRD introduced the bail-in tool, according to which
shareholders and (unsecured33) creditors have to fully contribute to the bank’s
29. Dübel (2013a, p. VI) also remarked that hybrid capital and subordinated debt are often
lumped in one category.
30. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 115.
31. Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 150.
32. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 150.
33. Recital 70 of the BRRD stipulates that it is not appropriate to apply the bail-in tool to
claims in so far as they are secured, collateralised or otherwise guaranteed.
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resolution. One of the general principles governing resolution is that creditors
of the bank under resolution have to bear losses after the shareholders (in accord-
ance with the order of priority of their claims under normal insolvency procee-
dings).34 All creditors have to bear losses, unless they are excluded from the
scope of the bail-in tool by Art. 44(2) or (3) BRRD.
One of the developments in the run-up to the BRRD that is worth mentioning
is the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme for Spain. The Memorandum
of Understanding on Financial Sector Policy Conditionality (MoU) of 20 July
2012 included several principles regarding burden-sharing.35 Pursuant to point
17 of the MoU, the Spanish authorities would require burden-sharing measures
from hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders. To this end,
subordinated liability exercises (SLE’s) would be implemented. Point 18 of
the MoU provided that the Spanish authorities would adopt the necessary legis-
lation to allow for mandatory SLE’s if the required burden-sharing was not
achieved on a voluntary basis. This legislation consisted of Real Decreto-ley 24/
2012 de 31 agosto (‘Royal Decree Law 24/2012’) and the subsequent Ley 9/
2012 de 14 noviembre. This legislation has been referred to as “the Spanish bail-
in tool”.36 To some extent, this legislation was in line with the proposal for the
BRRD (“en linea con la propuesta de directiva”).37 This illustrates that already
before its adoption, the BRRD had an impact on the burden-sharing required by
Member States.38
The proposal for the BRRD had an impact on the Commission State aid control:
to some extent, the 2013 Banking Communication anticipated on the BRRD.
The 2013 Banking Communication explicitly requires a maximum contribution
from shareholders, hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders.
However, unlike the BRRD, the 2013 Banking Communication does not require
a contribution from senior debt holders.39
34. Art. 34(1)(b) BRRD.
35. Many decisions referred to this MoU. See, for instance, Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28
November 2012, para. 72: “In accordance with the MoU and Royal Decree Law 24/2012,
prior to benefiting from State aid, aided banks must conduct burden-sharing exercises on
existing shareholders, and on holders of preference shares and subordinated (both
perpetual and dated) debt instruments so as to, inter alia, maximise the loss-absorption
capacity of the aided bank.”
36. Linklaters 12 September 2012.
37. However, unlike the BRRD, the Royal Decree Law 24/2012 did not require a contribution
from senior debt holders.
38. When Spain implemented the BRRD, Ley 9/2012 was repealed.
39. Point 42 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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The 2013 Banking Communication thus introduced clear requirements for
burden-sharing. Previously, point 24 of the Restructuring Communication indi-
cated that it was “not appropriate to fix thresholds concerning burden-sharing
ex ante in the context of the current systemic crisis”. The absence of ex ante
thresholds resulted in “diverging approaches to burden-sharing across Mem-
ber States”, as the Commission observed in the 2013 Banking Communication.
This, in turn, resulted in divergent funding costs for banks and would risk
undermining the level playing field. For that reason, the Commission decided to
raise the minimum requirements for burden-sharing.
Broadly speaking, the Commission’s approach toward burden-sharing is cha-
racterised by an increasing strictness. In that regard, it is worth stressing that an
evolving policy does not mean that the principle of equal treatment is violated.
As explained in section 6.7.3, I am of the opinion that the principle of equal
treatment allows for policy changes.
12.5 Burden-sharing by shareholders
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is nationalised.
* The fact that the bank’s shareholders are diluted.
* The fact that the bank’s shareholders participate in a capital raising exercise.
* The fact that the bank’s shareholders remain at the bad bank or the bank in
liquidation.
* The fact that the bank’s equity is completely written-down.
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to a dividend ban.
12.5.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
The above-mentioned relevant characteristics constitute the various ways in
which burden-sharing by shareholders can be achieved. As will be explained in
the following subsections, a bank can be nationalised; the bank’s shareholders
can be diluted; they can contribute to a capital raising exercise; they can be left in
the ‘bad bank’ or bank in liquidation (in case of a split-up of the bank); or they
can be completely written-down. In addition, burden-sharing can be enhanced
by a dividend ban.
The fact that there are different types of burden-sharing by shareholders raises
the question which type of burden-sharing by shareholders is most common.
The answer to this question is provided by the table in Annex VIII, which gives
an overview of the burden-sharing by shareholders in the bank State aid cases.
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12.5.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these relevant
characteristics?
In principle, burden-sharing by shareholders is always required. This means
that one of the forms of burden-sharing should be present. In other words: the
shareholders should either be expropriated in the context of a nationalisation, be
written-down, be diluted, participate in a capital raise or remain at the bank in
liquidation. Since burden-sharing by shareholders is in principle always requi-
red, the Commission should always assess whether one of these types of burden-
sharing is present.
It is worth stressing that the Commission should not only assess whether there
is burden-sharing; it should also assess whether the burden-sharing is sufficient.
The assessment whether there is sufficient burden-sharing depends on the exact
modalities of the burden-sharing. For instance, the fact that the shareholders of a
nationalised bank receive a compensation makes the burden-sharing less
burdensome (than a nationalisation without any compensation).
In addition, there are various types of burden-sharing which can to a certain
extent be considered as alternatives. This raises the following question: are these
types of burden-sharing equivalent to each other? In other words: are they
equally burdensome? The answer to this question depends on the exact modal-
ities of the burden-sharing. Given the importance of the precise modalities of the
burden-sharing, the various types of burden-sharing are discussed in-depth in the
following subsection.
12.5.3 How are these relevant characteristics elaborated in the decisions?
12.5.3.1 Nationalisation
One of the most extreme types of burden-sharing by shareholders is the
nationalisation of the bank. The nationalisation of an ailing bank excludes the
shareholders from receiving the benefit of any State aid.40 As a result, moral
hazard is minimised, because the shareholders bear the consequences of the
bank’s failure. In one of its decisions, the Commission literately indicated that in
the cases of Northern Rock and Hypo Real Estate, burden-sharing was achieved
by nationalisation.41
40. Bradford & Bingley, N194/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 55.
41. WestLB, C40/2009, 20 December 2011, para. 186.
CHAPTER 12
370
How can a bank be nationalised? It can be achieved by a transfer of the shares to
the State or by a write-down of the shares. An example of the former is the case
of Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA). In this case, the shareholders of HGAA
sold their shares to the Austrian State for the symbolic price of one euro.42 This
nationalisation was based on the Austrian law for remedying a serious dis-
turbance in Austria’s economy (FinStaG) and it followed intense negotiations
between HGAA’s shareholders and the Austrian State.43
In the case of Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), the State recapitalisa-
tion was combined with the requirement that NKBM would write-down in full
its shareholders’ equity (and outstanding subordinated debt). To that end, the
Bank of Slovenia adopted on 18 December 2013 a decision on extraordinary
measures.44 Pursuant to this decision, NKBM was required to write down all
of its qualified liabilities.45 NKBM’s shares (totalling EUR 143.225.000) were
cancelled; this was reflected in an increase in the share premium by the
same amount.46 As a result, NKBM’s share capital was reduced to zero. But
on the same day as the write-off, the Slovenian State subscribed to 10.000.000
newly issued shares of NKBM, thereby increasing the Bank’s share capital by
EUR 150.000.000.47 Thus, after this recapitalisation, the Slovenian State
became the sole shareholder of NKBM.
Nationalisation can also be achieved by diluting the shareholders. This can be
illustrated by the case of Hypo Real Estate (HRE) which was taken into public
ownership in 2009. This nationalisation was the result of several capital injec-
tions (which diluted the shareholders)48 and a squeeze-out49 of minority share-
holders. Dilution will be discussed further in subsection 12.5.3.2.
The fact that a bank is nationalised is highly relevant. However, this fact, in
itself, does not convey sufficient information regarding burden-sharing by share-
holders. An essential question in that regard is whether the shareholders have
received a compensation. The amount of compensation determines how bur-
densome the nationalisation is to shareholders.
42. Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), SA.32554, 3 September 2013, para. 35.
43. Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), N698/2009, 23 December 2009, para. 28.
44. Based on the Slovenian Banking Act.
45. The summary of the Decision on extraordinary measures imposed on NKBM is
reproduced in the 2013 annual report of NKBM (page 29).
46. 2013 Annual report, page 228. In addition, NKBM’s subordinated financial instruments
(totalling EUR 89.540.000) were written off; this lead to an increase of the NKBM’s income
by the same amount.
47. 2013 Annual report, page 228.
48. On 30 March 2009, a capital injection of EUR 60 million took place; SoFFin bought 20
million new HRE shares at their nominal value of EUR 3 per share. In June 2009, another
capital injection took place (amounting to EUR 2,96 billion). As a result of these capital
injections, SoFFin reached a capital participation of 90%.
49. A squeeze-out means that the minority shareholders are obliged to sell their shares to the
majority shareholder.
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In some cases, there is a compensation for the shareholders of the natio-
nalised bank. For instance, in the case of Northern Rock, the shareholders
received a compensation. However, this compensation was based on a valuation
of the shares on the assumption that no State aid would be granted. Conse-
quently, the compensation was likely to be close to zero.50
In most51 decisions on nationalised banks, the Commission welcomed the
fact that the beneficiary bank’s shareholders had lost control of the bank and all
the financial stakes therein without any compensation.
12.5.3.2 Dilution
Dilution means that the ownership percentage of the current shareholders is
reduced as a result of an issue of additional shares to which the current share-
holders have not subscribed. Dilution can result in a loss of control by the
current shareholders. Dilution is thus a form of burden-sharing by the sharehol-
ders of a beneficiary bank.
An illustration of dilution
Dilution can be illustrated by one of the bank State aid cases. For instance, the
Restructuring Decision on the Irish bank PTSB indicates that the shareholders
of PTSB had been heavily diluted, since the Irish State holds 99,2% of PTSB
as a result of the capital injection of EUR 2,3 billion.52
More detailed information can be found in the 2011 Annual Report. In this
Annual Report, it is indicated that the issue price was EUR 0,06345 per share;
in total, 36.249.014.972 ordinary shares were placed.53 The number of issued
shares multiplied by the issue price corresponds to the amount of the capital
injection (36.249.014.972*0,06345 = 2,3 billion). Since the issue price (of
EUR 0,06345 per share) was higher than the nominal value of each share (EUR
0,031), the capital injection included a share premium of 0,03245 per share.
Thus, of the 2,3 billion recapitalisation, EUR 1,123 billion (= 36.249.014.972
* 0,031) was recorded in share capital and EUR 1,131 billion was recorded in
share premium after costs (which amounted to EUR 46 million).
Originally, there were 276.782.351 ordinary shares. Following the capital
injection, there were 36.525.797.323 ordinary shares, of which the Irish State
held 36.249.014.972 ordinary shares. This corresponds to 99,2% of the share
capital.54
50. Northern Rock, C14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 149.
51. There are a few exceptions. For instance, in the case of KA, the shareholders received
participation certificates (which could be considered as a form of compensation). A full
overview is provided in the table in Annex VIII.
52. IL&P, SA.33442, 9 April 2015, para. 85.
53. See Annual Report 2011, page 157.
54. 36.249.014.972/36.525.797.323 = 0,992422 = 99,2%.
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The Commission noted positively that the chosen purchase price per share
resulted in a high level of dilution.55 NB: the level of dilution is related to the
height of the issue price. The higher the issue price, the lower the number of
shares obtained by the State, and thus the lower the level of dilution.
No dilution
It has to be pointed out that dilution of shareholders can only occur if the State
aid is granted through a recapitalisation in the form of shares. Obviously, if
the State aid only consists of a guarantee or an impaired asset measure, then
there is obviously no question of dilution. But also if the State aid consists of
hybrid securities, then there is no dilution. Issuing hybrid securities does not
affect the share capital. Only if common shares are issued, dilution can occur.
For instance, in 2009, OVAG benefited from a EUR 1 billion recapitalisation:
the Austrian State subscribed to participation certificates (Partizipations-
scheine).56 These participation certificates are treated as Tier-1 capital57, but
they do not constitute shares. Consequently, the existing shareholders of OVAG
were not diluted by the 2009 recapitalisation.58
Dilution related to a future capital increase
In some cases, dilution was related to a future capital increase. This can be
illustrated by the case of ING. This bank was recapitalised in the form of Core
Tier 1 securities. Since these securities were not ordinary shares, the existing
shareholders of ING were not diluted by the recapitalisation. However, the
restructuring plan contained a capital raising exercise: ING would have to raise
EUR 5 billion via a share offering. This capital increase would result in a
dilution of the existing shareholders.59
The same reasoning can be found in the decision on the viability plan of
SNS REAAL. In 2008, SNS REAAL was recapitalised in the form of Core
Tier 1 securities. In September 2009, SNS REAAL raised EUR 135 million in
new capital. This capital increase was used to partially repay the State aid. In
the 2010 Restructuring Decision on SNS REAAL, the Commission conside-
red that the shareholders were sufficiently diluted by the EUR 135 million
capital increase (equivalent to 10% of shares).60
55. IL&P (PTSB), SA.33311, 20 July 2011, para. 81.
56. OVAG, SA.31883, 9 December 2011, para. 23.
57. Participation certificates do not carry voting rights, but they do carry a preferential dividend
and a conversion option.
58. By contrast, in 2012, a capital increase by EUR 250 million took place, which resulted in a
dilution of shareholders. See Decision of 19 September 2012, para. 23.
59. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 136; ING, SA.28855, 11 May 2012, para. 193.
60. SNS REAAL, N371/2009, 28 January 2010, para. 77.
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Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (“MPS”) was recapitalised in the form of
‘Monti-bonds’ (in the decision referred to as ‘new instruments’). These ‘new
instruments’ are hybrid capital instruments. The restructuring plan of MPS
included an accelerated repayment schedule with respect to the ‘new instru-
ments’. To that end, MPS intended to increase its capital by at least EUR 2,5
billion.61 This capital increase would significantly dilute the existing sharehol-
ders. If the capital increase would not be successful, then the ‘new instruments’
would be converted into normal shares. This conversion would also result in the
dilution of existing shareholders.62
The case of the Portuguese bank Banif provides another example of such a
conversion mechanism. The recapitalisation of Banif took place in the form of
‘special shares’ (of which some had full voting rights and some only limited
voting rights) and CoCo’s. The special shares with limited voting rights and the
CoCo’s were subject to a mandatory conversion mechanism.63 If EUR 450
million of private capital would not be raised by 30 June 2013 or if the CoCo’s
were not repaid within the stipulated timeframe, all the outstanding CoCo’s
would be converted into shares with full voting rights. This would lead to
dilution of the existing shareholders.64
Level of dilution
Does the level of dilution matter? Before the introduction of the 2013 Banking
Communication, the Commission did not set an ex ante threshold for burden-
sharing. Nevertheless, in a few cases in the pre-2013 Banking Communication
era, the Commission expressed it doubts whether burden-sharing by sharehol-
ders was sufficient.
61. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), SA.36175, 27 November 2013, para. 57.
62. The same mechanism can be found in the case of Cajatres (para. 153): “In case of no repay-
ment, the CoCos will automatically convert into equity and will trigger a new notification to
the Commission.”
63. Banif, SA.34662, 21 January 2013, para. 38.
64. However, in its Opening Decision on Banif, the Commission observed that this mandatory
conversion mechanism was not complied with by Banif. The repayment schedule of the
CoCo’s was not followed by Banif. This would have to trigger the conversion of the
outstanding CoCo’s, but Banif did not take steps to convert the CoCo’s. The Commission
therefore had doubts whether the dilution of the shareholders had reached the full extent
envisaged by the Rescue Decision. See: Banif, SA.36123, 24 July 2015, para. 89. Eventually,
this Opening Decision was revoked by the decision of 21 December 2015. In December
2015, Banif was put into resolution (in accordance with the BRRD), which led to adequate
burden-sharing.
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In that regard, the case of HSH Nordbank is a very important case.65 In this case,
the Commission considered that there was insufficient dilution by the minority
shareholders. There was a recapitalisation of EUR 3 billion.
▪ In total, 157.894.737 shares were issued at an issue price of EUR 19 per
share. (EUR 3000 million / EUR 19 = 157.894.737 shares)
▪ The nominal value per share is EUR 1066 , so 157.894.737 shares means an
increase of the share capital by around EUR 1579 million. This is exactly
the difference between the share capital in 2008 and 2009 (see table).
▪ The issue price per share is EUR 19, whereas the nominal value is EUR 10.
This means that the premium per share is EUR 9. The premium is added to the
capital reserve67, so there is an increase of EUR 1421 million (=157.894.737
* EUR 9). This is exactly the difference between the capital reserve in 2008
and 2009 (see table).
▪ The recapitalisation of EUR 3 billion thus leads to an increase of the share
capital by EUR 1579 million and an increase of the capital reserve by EUR
1421 million. (1579+1421=3000)
Equity 2009 2008 Difference
Share capital EUR 2460 million EUR 881 million EUR 1579 million
(=2460-881)
Capital reserve EUR 1509 million EUR 88 million EUR 1421 million
(=1509-88)
In 2008, the minority shareholders had a stake of 25,67%. The share capital
in 2008 was EUR 881 million. In other words: there stake was (0,2567*881=)
EUR 226.152.700. In 2009, their stake of EUR 226.152.700 as compared to the
EUR 2460 million share capital was only 9,19% (i.e. 226.152.700 / 2460
million).
It should be recalled that the level of dilution is related to the height of the
issue price. The higher the issue price, the lower the number of shares obtained
by the State, and thus the lower the level of dilution. For instance, if the issue
price would have been EUR 10 (instead of EUR 19), then the share capital
would have increased by EUR 3000 million (instead of EUR 1579) and would
have been EUR 3881 million (instead of EUR 2460 million). In that case, the
shareholdings of the minority shareholders would have been diluted to
(226.152.700/3881 million =) 5,83% (instead of 9,19%).
65. Also in the case of WestLB and BayernLB, the Commission had doubts whether burden-
sharing was sufficient. Eventually, these doubts had been allayed. Another case is the case
of BayernLB. See: WestLB, 22 December 2009, para. 77; WestLB, 20 December 2011,
para. 196-199; BayernLB, 12 May 2009, para. 99-102.
66. Annual report 2009 HSH Nordbank, p. 167.
67. Annual report 2009 HSH Nordbank, p. 167.
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In its Opening Decision on HSH Nordbank, the Commission considered that
the issue price was too high and that consequently, the minority shareholders
benefited disproportionately by not being completely diluted.68 However, in the
final decision, the Commission took into account several additional burden-
sharing measures. The EUR 500 million lump sum payment in shares would
dilute the stakes held by the minority shareholders.69
Also in the case of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the Commission was of the
opinion that there was insufficient dilution, because the issue price of the B
shares was above the share price of RBS. Consequently, the B shares had a less
dilutive effect than a standard ordinary share issuance or rights issue. This would
go against the concept of burden sharing. However, since the B shares included
some hybrid-like features, the Commission concluded that these features
compensated for the less dilutive effects.70
Of crucial importance is the 2013 Banking Communication which requires
full burden-sharing by shareholders: point 41 stipulates that losses are first
absorbed by equity. This would point at a dilution level of 100%. However, as
is illustrated by the decision on the Cooperative Central Bank (CCB), an
almost complete dilution – thus not a complete dilution – can under circum-
stances also be accepted by the Commission. The State aid to CCB was
assessed under the 2013 Banking Communication. Cyprus acquired 99% of
the shares and voting rights of the CCB. Its existing shareholders, the CCIs,
were almost completely diluted and left with 1%.71 The Commission first
considered that the State would normally be entitled to 100% of CCB’s shares.
However, the July 2013 strategy – agreed between Cyprus and the programme
partners within the Framework of the Economic Adjustment Programme for
Cyprus – envisaged that the old owners (i.e. the CCIs) would have a minimum
level of participation in order to preserve some of the cooperative characteris-
tics.72 Therefore, the Commission accepted the 1% shareholding of the his-
torical owners.73
68. HSH Nordbank, C29/2009, 22 October 2009, para. 72.
69. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 259.
70. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 140.
71. CCB, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 139.
72. CCB, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 35.
73. CCB, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, para. 142. Also in the cases of the four large Greek
banks, an almost complete dilution was accepted by the Commission. See: Piraeus Bank,
29 November 2015, para. 128.
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12.5.3.3 Capital raising exercise
When shareholders participate in a capital raising exercise, then they are not
diluted (or less diluted – depending on the percentage of participation). For
instance, in the case of the Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU), there was
no mention of dilution, because the member credit unions contributed to the
capital increase of LCCU.74 Participating in a capital raising exercise consti-
tutes burden-sharing by shareholders. In one of its decisions, the Commission
noted that “as the shareholders have injected capital into the bank pro rata to
their respective shareholding, the burdens are at least equitably distributed
among the groups of shareholders”.75
The fact that shareholders are diluted and the fact that shareholders participate
in the capital raising exercise are counterparts: either the shareholders participate
in the capital raising exercise by purchasing newly issued share pro rate to their
current stake, or they do not participate in the capital raising exercise, resulting
in a dilution of their shareholding.76
The fact that shareholders participate in the capital raising exercise is rele-
vant as regards burden-sharing, while the fact that the bank conducted a capital
raising exercise is also relevant from another perspective: it ensures that the aid
amount is limited to the minimum. Indeed, in some decisions, the Commission
noted positively that the beneficiary bank had, prior to receiving State aid,
conducted a capital raising exercise. For instance, in June 2008, prior to the State
support, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) conducted a capital raising exercise.77
In December 2008, RBS conducted another capital raising exercise. The State
participated in the capital raising exercise, but it only purchased the shares
not subscribed by the market. This was noted positively by the Commission,
because it ensured that alternative financing could not be found on the market.78
Similarly, in the decision on Banco Comercial Português (BCP), the
Commission noted positively that 14% of the capital shortfall was provided
by private investors.79 In 2012, BCP not only issued CoCo’s subscribed by the
Portuguese State, BCP also issued ordinary shares. These shares were offered
to the current shareholders of BCP for subscription through the exercise of their
pre-emptive subscription rights.80 The issuance of ordinary shares diminished
the State’s recapitalisation to 86% of the identified total capital shortfall.
74. Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU), SA.34208, 26 September 2012, para. 11 and 53.
75. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 97.
76. See the decision on Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 160: “Incumbent
shareholders had to provide fresh capital to finance the restructuring costs, or significantly
diluted in the capital raise.”
77. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 211.
78. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 212.
79. Banco Comercial Português (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 110.
80. Banco Comercial Português (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 25.
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12.5.3.4 Remaining at the bad bank or bank in liquidation
Remaining at the bad bank or bank in liquidation is a form of burden-sharing
that only occurs in the S/T/W-context or S/C/W-context. In these contexts, the
bank is split-up into a bad bank and a good bank. The good bank is usually
transferred to another bank, while the bad bank is wound-down. The S/T/W-
context also comprises the situation in which all the good parts of the bank are
transferred to a large viable bank, while the remainder is put into liquidation.
In these cases, the shareholders (and subordinated debt holders) remain at the
bad bank or bank in liquidation. This constitutes burden-sharing, as is nicely
explained in the following recital:
“The shareholders and subordinated debt holders are not transferred and
remain in the entity in liquidation. They will be entitled to proceeds from the
liquidation only if the proceeds are sufficient to repay first the Resolution
Scheme, which has a priority claim over the other creditors. Knowing that
there are no more assets in T Bank, it is very likely that the shareholders and
subordinated debt holders will not get back their investments”.81
There is thus burden-sharing by shareholders, hybrid capital holders and subor-
dinated debt holders if they are not taken over by the acquiring bank. Is this form
of burden-sharing equivalent to the other forms of burden-sharing? In other
words: how burdensome is remaining at the bad bank or bank in liquidation for
shareholders?
This depends on the quantity and quality of the residual assets. For instance,
in the decision on Panellinia Bank, the Commission considered “that suffi-
cient burden-sharing was achieved since the shareholders are entitled to pro-
ceeds from the liquidation only if the proceeds are sufficient to repay first the
Resolution Fund, which has a large priority claim over other creditors.
Therefore, given the scarcity of the residual assets in the Bank after the purchase
and assumption, the shareholders are unlikely to get their investment back”.82
In addition, several cases were characterised by a so-called ‘earn-out mech-
anism’. Such a case is the case of Amagerbanken (a Danish bank), which was
wound-down under the Danish winding-up scheme.83 All assets and some lia-
bilities of the Danish bank Amagerbanken (“Old Bank”) were transferred to
“New Bank”. This “New Bank” was merely a bridge bank: the good parts of
New Bank were taken over by Bank Nordik. All shareholders and subordinated
81. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 51.
82. Panellinia Bank, SA.41503, 16 April 2015, para. 84.
83. Other cases are the case of Fionia Bank and of Roskilde Bank.
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debtholders of Amagerbanken remained at Old Bank. The conditional trans-
fer agreement contained an earn-out mechanism: if the winding-down of the
remainder of the New Bank generated a profit, that profit was to be distributed as
follows: First, repayment to the FSC of all aid received, including an annual
interest payment of 10%. Second, any remaining proceeds from the liquidation
of the remainder of the New Bank were to be distributed among the bankruptcy
estate’s creditors and subsequently the shareholders.84 The Commission,
however, noted that such a prospect was very unlikely in view of the assessment
of the value of the assets transferred to the New Bank.85
It can be concluded that the fact that the shareholders remain at the bad bank or
bank in liquidation usually amounts to full burden-sharing. In that sense, it is
equivalent to a nationalisation (without any compensation), a complete dilution
or a full write-down.
12.5.3.5 Write-down
As discussed in subsection 12.5.3.1, nationalisation can be achieved by a write-
down: the shares are cancelled, while the State simultaneously injects new
capital in the bank. There are also a few bank State aid cases in which the shares
were cancelled, but without the State subscribing to newly issued shares. In
the table in annex VIII, these cases are categorised under the heading “write-
down”, while the bank State aid cases in which the shares were written-down
in the context of a nationalisation are categorised under the heading “nation-
alisation”.
The case of Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg may serve as an example of a case
categorised as a “write-down”. Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg was a subsidiary
of the Icelandic banking group Kaupthing Bank. This is a case in the S/T/W-
context: the bank’s activities in Belgium and Luxembourg were taken over by
other banks, while all other assets were transferred to a SPV. As regards burden-
sharing, the Commission noted the following:
“The restructuring plan provides that the Bank’s shareholder (that is to say
the Icelandic parent company) must reduce its capital in the Bank to zero,
with the result that it ceases to be a shareholder without receiving any com-
pensation. To that degree, the Bank’s shareholder will have participated in
the costs by absorbing the losses to the maximum extent of its capital”.86
[Italics mine, REvL]
84. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 57.
85. Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 125.
86. Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, N344/2009, 9 July 2009, para. 72.
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12.5.3.6 Dividend ban
Interestingly, there are cases in which there is no mention of nationalisation,
write-down, dilution, participation in a capital raise or remaining at the bank in
liquidation. This was the case in FIB, CIF, KBC, FIH and Liberbank. It would,
however, be wrong to assume that this would mean that there is no burden-
sharing in these cases: these cases were characterised by a dividend ban. This
behavioural restriction entails that the bank will not pay any dividends (during
the restructuring period). Although a dividend ban constitutes burden-shar-
ing by shareholders, it is far more limited than the other forms of burden-shar-
ing, such as nationalisation or dilution. Indeed, not receiving any dividends
during a couple of years is far less burdensome than being required to transfer
one’s share to the State in the context of a nationalisation. In this sense, a
dividend ban is not equivalent to the other forms of burden-sharing.
NB: This burden-sharing measure will be discussed in detail in section 12.8.
12.5.3.7 Consistent application of the burden-sharing principle?
The principle of equal treatment requires that the burden-sharing principle
should be applied consistently. If the Commission accepts in one case a lower
level of burden-sharing than in other cases, then this amounts to an inconsistency
(provided there is no justification for the lower level of burden-sharing). This
raises the following questions: Firstly, does the Commission require a mini-
mum level of burden-sharing? Secondly, can the same level of burden-sharing be
attained by the different types of burden-sharing? And thirdly, can a lower level
of burden-sharing be justified?
As regards the first question, it should be recalled that the 2013 Banking
Communication requires full burden-sharing by shareholders. In the period
before the adoption of this Communication, there were no ex ante thresholds
for burden-sharing. Nevertheless, the Commission required that burden-sharing
was ‘appropriate’.87 In some decisions, the Commission speaks of ‘proper’ bur-
den-sharing.88
As regards the second question, it should be noted that the exact level of burden-
sharing depends on the modalities of the burden-sharing measures. In that
regard, the previous subsections have shown that a nationalisation without any
compensation, a complete (or almost complete) dilution or remaining at the bank
in liquidation are equivalent to each other in terms of how burdensome these
burden-sharing measures are.
87. Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA), SA.32554, 3 September 2013, para. 126; BayernLB,
SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 202.
88. Eurobank, SA.43363, 26 November 2015, para. 97.
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As regards the third question, it should be pointed out that there can be a jus-
tification for the limited burden-sharing. For instance, in the case of First
Investment Bank (FIB), there was – apart from a dividend ban – no burden-
sharing by shareholders. This was justified by the fact that FIB did not have a
capital shortfall.89 FIB only benefited from liquidity support.
Another case is the case of Crédit Immobilier de France (CIF). The Commis-
sion explicitly held that CIF constituted a special case (“un cas bien particu-
lier”). CIF was dependent on wholesale financing. Due to a downgrade, CIF
experienced significant refinancing problems. Nevertheless, CIF was still a
solvent institution when it was liquidated in 2013.90 This justified a moderation
of the burden-sharing principle (“eu égard à cette particularité du CIF, il con-
vient de tempérer exceptionnellement le principe d’une contribution propre des
actionnaires”).91
The justification of the limited burden-sharing means that the limited bur-
den-sharing in some cases does not amount to an inconstant application of the
burden-sharing principle. However, no justification can be found in the deci-
sions on KBC, FIH and Liberbank.
12.5.4 Impact of the BRRD
The BRRD is based on the principle that the shareholders of the bank under
resolution should bear first losses.92 This principle thus requires full burden-
sharing by shareholders. It should be stressed that this principle is only
applicable when a bank is put into resolution. If a State aid measure does
not trigger resolution, then Art. 34(1)(a) BRRD is not applicable. This does,
however, not mean that there can be less burden-sharing in such a case, because
point 41 of the 2013 Banking Communication also requires that losses are first
absorbed by equity. In fact, point 41 of the 2013 Banking Communication and
Art. 34(1)(a) BRRD both require full burden-sharing by shareholders. Thus, as
regards burden-sharing by shareholders, the State aid control framework and the
recovery and resolution-framework are consistent with each other.
89. First Investment Bank (FIB), SA.39854, 25 November 2014, para. 108.
90. Annual report CIF Euromortgage 2013, p. 10: “Unlike other government assistance requests
that the European Commission had processed, there was no need from the outset either to
recapitalize Crédit Immobilier de France or to guarantee its assets, because its shareholders’
equity was largely sufficient to cover severe stress scenarios. Only the Group’s funding
model, based exclusively on recourse to the financial markets, necessitated recourse to a State
guarantee in order to ensure that Crédit Immobilier de France could continue to secure
funding for its future needs.”
91. Crédit Immobilier de France (CIF), SA.37029, 27 November 2013, para. 99-100.
92. This principle is laid down in Art. 34(1)(a) BRRD.
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As explained in section 4.4.4, in the bank State aid decisions that were taken
after the adoption of the BRRD, the Commission assessed whether the aid
measures violated intrinsically linked provision of the BRRD. As regards bur-
den-sharing by shareholders, the intrinsically linked provision is Art. 34(1)(a)
BRRD. Therefore, in the decisions on CCB, Panellinia Bank, MKB Bank and
Banif – i.e. the decisions taken after the adoption of the BRRD – the Commis-
sion assessed whether the aid measure was in line with Art. 34(1)(a) BRRD.
To give an example, in its decision on Panellinia Bank93 , the Commission
noted that the equity of Panellinia Bank was not transferred to the acquiring
bank, but left in the liquidated entity. Therefore, the shareholders were fully
wiped out and would suffer 100% losses.94 Consequently, the resolution
measure was in line with Art. 34(1) BRRD.
It should be recalled that in the case of CCB (discussed in subsection
12.5.3.2), there was only a 99% dilution. However, the fact that there was only
a 99% dilution (and not a 100% dilution) did not prevent the Commission from
concluding that the provisions of the aid measure were in line with Art. 34(1)(a)
BRRD.95 This case illustrates that the State aid control framework and the
recovery and resolution-framework are consistent with each other.
12.5.5 Concluding remarks
This section has discussed the various types of burden-sharing by shareholders.
Whether these types are equivalent to each other (in terms of how burdensome
they are) depends on the exact modalities of the burden-sharing measures. In that
regard, it should be noted that the 2013 Banking Communication has contrib-
uted greatly to a consistent application of the burden-sharing principle (see
subsection 12.5.3.7). From that viewpoint, I welcome the adoption of the 2013
Banking Communication.
12.6 Burden-sharing by hybrid and subordinated debt holders
* The fact that the beneficiary bank conducted a liability management exercise
(LME).
* The fact that the subordinated debt is completely written-down.
* The fact that subordinated debt holders are not transferred to the acquiring
bank, but remain in the bad bank or the entity in liquidation.
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to a coupon ban.
93. This case was discussed in subsection 12.5.3.4.
94. Panellinia Bank, SA.41503, 16 April 2015, para. 113.
95. CCB, SA.43367, 18 December 2015, para. 122.
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12.6.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
Burden-sharing is not only required by the bank’s shareholders, also the bank’s
creditors have to participate in the bank’s restructuring (and/or resolution). This
is sometimes referred to as “creditor participation”. It should be noted that not
all creditors have to participate; burden-sharing is usually only required by the
subordinated creditors. This changed with the introduction of the bail-in tool in
the BRRD. Burden-sharing by senior creditors will be discussed in section 12.7.
Just as burden-sharing by shareholders can be achieved in different ways,
burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders can be achieved in different ways:
in some cases, a liability management exercise (LME) was conducted; in
some cases, the subordinated debt was completely written-down; in some cases
involving a transfer of the ailing bank to a larger, viable bank, the subordinated
debt remained at the bank in liquidation. In addition, in many cases, a coupon
ban was imposed on the bank.
The above-mentioned relevant characteristics constitute the various ways in
which burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders can be achieved.
12.6.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these relevant
characteristics?
In every bank State aid case, the Commission assesses whether the burden-
sharing requirement is met. This assessment involves assessing whether one of
the various types of burden-sharing is present; in other words: assessing if
there is a LME, write-down, coupon ban or (in case of a split-up) a non-transfer
of the debt instruments to the good bank. An overview of which bank State aid
case is characterised by which form of burden-sharing is provided in the table in
Annex IX.
It should be noted that there are some decisions in which it is not clearly
recognised that a certain type of burden-sharing occurred: the decision on the
Belgian bank KBC does not clearly mention whether KBC conducted a liability
management exercise (LME). In the assessment of burden-sharing, the Commis-
sion noted that because of the coupon ban, “subordinated debt holders will
receive limited remuneration and thus contribute to the restructuring”.96 This
implies that the coupon ban is the only form of burden-sharing by subordinated
debt holders. However, in the description-part of the decision, it was indicated
that KBC “intends to buy, as it has already done in recent months, hybrids at
below par value, thus generating a profit that boosts core capital”.97 This repur-
chase programme for hybrid loans corresponds to a LME. In the 2009 Annual
96. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 166.
97. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 60.
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Report of KBC, more information can be found on this repurchase programme
for hybrid loans.98 Thus, KBC conducted a LME, but this was not explicitly
taken into account by the Commission in its assessment of the burden-sharing by
subordinated debt holders.
In addition, the various types of burden-sharing are not equally burden-
some. This will be discussed in the following subsection.
12.6.3 How are these relevant characteristics elaborated in the decisions?
12.6.3.1 Liability management exercise (LME)
A liability management exercise (LME) means that a bank offers to buy back
certain debt instruments, or to convert certain debt instruments into equity.99
The debt instruments are normally bought back at a discount. Hence, a LME
serves as burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders. The fact that the ben-
eficiary bank performed a liability management exercise is thus relevant in the
context of burden-sharing.
In every LME, three values are of importance: i) the market value of the debt
instruments, ii) the nominal value of the debt instruments, and iii) the price at
which the debt instruments are bought back. The buyback price will usually be
set between the market value and the nominal value. The fact that the buy-
back price is lower than the nominal value means that there is a discount (or
‘haircut’). This results in a capital gain for the bank. A buyback price which is
higher than the market value means that there is a premium on top of the market
value; this encourages investors to participate in the LME.100
Regarding terminology, it should be pointed out that the term “LME” is not
always used; a LME can go by many names. A LME usually concerns sub-
ordinated debt. Consequently, a LME is usually referred to as “subordinated
98. “Towards the end of the year, KBC decided to buy back a number of outstanding hybrid
issues (see table). This repurchase transaction was concluded on 13 October 2009, with 70%
of the nominal value being paid in each instance. In total, approximately 72% of the
outstanding amount of the relevant hybrid loans was repurchased for a total nominal amount
of 1.1 billion euros. KBC paid for the transaction using its available cash. The repurchase
programme had a positive impact of 0.1 billion euros (after tax) on the results, and a positive
effect of 0.19% on the group’s core tier-1 ratio.” (KBC 2009 Annual Report, p. 14.)
99. Footnote 30 of the AIB decision gives a definition of a LME and remarks that a LME can
also take the form of a reduction in the face value of the debt or an early redemption at
other than face value.
100. There are some cases (such as the case of Anglo) in which the buyback price or conversion
price is below the market value. Investors would normally not accept such an offer, but in the
case of Anglo the ‘exit consent’ served as an inducement for investors to participate in the
LME.
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liability exercise (SLE)”. Sometimes, the terms “debt buyback” or “debt repur-
chase” are used; and in the case of a conversion, the specific terms “Debt for
Equity Offer” or “exchange offer”may be used. In this section, the term “LME”
will be used.
How is the fact that the bank has conducted a LME taken into account by the
Commission? Consider the following recital:
“The Bank’s subordinated debt holders have contributed to paying for the
restructuring costs of the Bank. The Bank performed several liability man-
agement exercises in order to generate capital. The total amount of liabilities
exchanged amounted to EUR 748 million, with a capital gain of EUR 565
million, as described in recitals (122) and (123)”.101
This recital is from the decision on Eurobank.102 The above-cited recital forms
part of the assessment on burden-sharing. The assessment seems quite succinct,
since the cited recital consists of only three sentences. However, it refers to
recitals 122 and 123, which provide a description of the LME’s conducted by
Eurobank. These recitals read as follows:
“In February 2012 the Bank offered to buy back hybrid instruments from
private investors at a price between 40% and 50% of their nominal value.
That buy-back price was determined on the basis of the market value of the
instruments and contained a premium of not more than ten percentage
points, which was added to encourage investors to participate in the buy-
back. The offer was accepted for almost 50% of the instruments’ total
nominal value which, after taking the costs of the transaction into considera-
tion, left the Bank with a profit of EUR 248 million.
In May 2013 the Bank announced another liability management exer-
cise. The Bank offered debt holders the opportunity to convert their lower
tier one and lower tier two securities, with an outstanding amount of EUR
662million, into ordinary shares, at par. The conversion price was set so as to
equal the subscription price paid by the HFSF in the Spring 2013 recapita-
lisation. The acceptance rate was 48%. Since the lower tier one and lower
tier two bond holders converted their securities into lower subordinated
instruments with no cash consideration, the capital raised reached EUR 317
million.
101. Eurobank, SA.34825, 29 April 2014, para. 393.
102. This decision is one of the four Restructuring Decisions that were taken in 2014 with respect
to the four largest Greek Banks. In chronological order, these decisions were Eurobank
(29 April 2014), Alpha Bank (9 July 2014), Piraeus Bank (23 July 2014) and National Bank
of Greece (23 July 2014). An interesting feature of these decisions is that they are structured
in the same way and contain similar considerations.
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As a result of the two buy backs, the stock of subordinated and hybrid
debt decreased from EUR 1 045 million at 31 December 2011 to EUR 283
million at 31 December 2013.”
As is indicated by these recitals, Eurobank has conducted several LME’s.
Each LME-transaction has its own modalities. Information on these modali-
ties can be found in the above-cited recitals. The first modality is the form in
which the LME takes place: the 2012 LME were Tender Offers (i.e. debt
buyback), while the 2013 LME was an Exchange Offer (i.e. a conversion).
Secondly, the types of securities that are subject to the LME are mentioned.
For instance, the LME conducted in 2013 concerned lower tier one and lower
tier two securities. More detailed information is not given in the Decision.
This information can sometimes be found on the website of the bank.103 Thirdly,
some information is provided on the price at which the securities are bought
back. In the above-cited recitals, it is indicated that the price is based on the
market value and that it included a premium (of not more than 10%). Further-
more, the securities are bought back at a discount to the nominal value. This
discount (or haircut) creates a capital gain. Fourthly, the acceptance rate is
mentioned. Finally, the capital gain resulting from the LME is indicated.
Voluntary LME’s
Participation in a LME can be mandatory or voluntary. The LME’s performed
by the Irish Banks were voluntary. However, there was a strong incentive
for investors to participate. In that regard, it has been remarked that the Credit
Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010104 served as a threat to subordinated
debt holders to accept the LME offer.105 This is also visible in the statement
of the Minister for Finance of 31 March 2011: “If these LMEs fail to deliver
the expected Core Tier 1 capital gains to each of the banks, the Government
will take whatever steps are necessary under the Credit Institutions (Stabilisa-
tion) Act 2010 or otherwise to ensure that burden sharing is achieved. Any fur-
ther action, after investors have had an opportunity to take part in these LMEs,
will result in severe measures being taken in respect of the subordinated lia-
bilities”.
And even before this statement of the Minister, there was a strong induce-
ment for investors to participate in the LME. This is illustrated by the case of
Anglo-Irish Bank.106 Anglo conducted LME’s in August 2009 and December
103. The Restructuring Decision on Alpha Bank even mentions the corresponding link (in
footnote 76 and 77).
104. Pursuant to the MoU, Ireland would implement legislation concerning burden-sharing by
subordinated debt holders. Consequently, the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010
was adopted.
105. Murphy 2013, p. 272.
106. Anglo/INBS, SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 168 and footnote 64. See also: Dübel 2013a,
p. 15.
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2010.107 The October 2010 SME took place through an exchange offer:
the creditors were invited to exchange their securities into senior notes. The
exchange ratio was 0,2. In other words: for each euro note exchanged, they
would receive 20 eurocents of the new senior notes. With respect to the LME,
the technique of the “exit consent” was used. This means that the LME included
a condition: investors participating in the LME had to vote in favour of an
extraordinary resolution. This extraordinary resolution gave Anglo the right to
redeem the still outstanding securities concerned at a price of 1 eurocent for
every thousand euro. This effectively amounted in an expropriation of the inves-
tors that did not participate in the LME. Unsurprisingly, the acceptance rate
of the LME was high (92%).108 To conclude, although the LME was voluntary,
the technique of the exit consent served as an incentive for creditors to partic-
ipate in the LME.
Minimum level of burden-sharing
Does the Commission require a minimum level of burden-sharing? The deci-
sions on the LME’s conducted by the Spanish banks are important in this
regard. In the decisions on Banco de Valencia, BFA, Banco CEISS, NCG,
Catalunya Banc, Banco Gallego, the Commission noted positively that the
commitments regarding burden-sharing of hybrid instruments went beyond
the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication.109 In these decisions,
the Commission explained that it would consider a cash buyback of hybrid
securities at market price plus a 10%-premium to fulfil the requirements of the
Restructuring Communication.110 The LME’s performed by the Spanish banks
were structured as follows.111 First, the hybrid and subordinated debt securi-
ties112 were bought back at their net present value. This resulted in an immediate
capital gain for the bank, since the debt instruments were bought back at a sig-
nificant discount (‘haircut’) from the nominal value of the instruments. Second,
107. Anglo/INBS, SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 168.
108. One of the investors, Assenagon, did not participate in the LME. Assenagon claimed that
the LME was unlawful and it started legal proceedings. On 27 July 2012, the High Court
of Justice of England and Wales (Chancery Division) rendered its judgment. Justice Briggs
concluded that the exchange offer and exit consent process carried out by Anglo Irish was
unlawful.
109. Banco de Valencia, SA.34053, 28 November 2012, para. 178.
110. BFA Group, SA.35253, 28 November 2012, para. 201. A similar consideration can be found
in the Banco de Valencia-decision (para. 178): The Commission considers an exchange of
hybrid capital instruments at market price plus a premium into cash to fulfil the requirement
of the Restructuring Communication.
111. BFA Group, SA.35253, 28 November 2012, para. 95-106.
112. With respect to dated subordinated debt, there were specific provisions: dated subordinated
debt holders would be afforded the opportunity to convert into a more senior debt instrument,
in addition to the possibility to also convert into ordinary shares.
BURDEN-SHARING
387
the proceeds of the buyback of the debt instruments would automatically take
the form of ordinary shares (or other equity-equivalent instruments) of the
bank.113 Consequently, there would be no cash outflow. The conversion into
core capital would further reduce the capital needs of the bank.
It should be pointed out that the Commission almost never dismissed a LME
as insufficient. Only in the case of Bank of Ireland, the Commission explicitly
mentioned that the discount was too low. Bank of Ireland conducted several
liability management exercises.114 With respect to most capital instruments,
Bank of Ireland complied with the Commission’s policy. However, in one
instance, the discount at which a certain capital instrument was bought back by
Bank of Ireland was actually too low.115 The Commission concluded that this
particular transaction resulted in insufficient burden-sharing – which should be
reflected in the depth of restructuring. The Commission added that “in doing so,
account should nevertheless be taken of the isolated nature and limited size of
the transaction in question as compared to the significantly more numerous
times for significantly larger amounts in which Bank of Ireland fully complied
with the Commission’s policy”.116 This is the only decision in which the Com-
mission explicitly declared that a LME resulted in insufficient burden-sharing.
It illustrates that the Commission does require a minimum discount – and thus
a minimum level of burden-sharing.
12.6.3.2 Write-down
A full write-down of subordinated debt occurred in the bank State aid cases
that were assessed on the basis of the 2013 Banking Communication. This
Communication requires full burden-sharing by shareholders and subordina-
ted debt holders.117 With respect to the subordinated debt holders, the 2013
Banking Communication stipulates that the liability management exercises
should in principle be 100% capital generating (in case of a capital shortfall
which cannot be overcome in full).118
113. Interestingly, the SLE in the case of Cajatres (20 December 2012, para. 64) was set up
differently: subordinated debt instruments were converted into senior debt instruments. In
the case of Banco Gallego (25 July 2013, para. 60), the proceeds of the buyback would
take the form of ordinary shares of Banco Sabadell or a more senior debt instrument of
Banco Gallego.
114. The annual report of Bank of Ireland contains detailed information about the SLE.
115. Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 161-163.
116. Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 163.
117. Point 41 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
118. Point 35 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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This type of burden-sharing can be illustrated by the cases of the following
five Slovenian banks: Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), Nova Kreditna
Banka Maribor (NKBM), Abanka, Probanka and Factor Banka.119 With respect
to these banks, the Bank of Slovenia adopted on 18 December 2013 a decision
on extraordinary measures.120 Pursuant to this decision, these banks were
required to write down all of the qualified liabilities. For instance, NKBM’s sub-
ordinated financial instruments (totalling EUR 89.540.000) were written down;
this led to an increase of NKBM’s income by the same amount.121 In its decision
on NKBM, the Commission noted that “the State capital injections will only be
implemented after the complete implementation of the wipe-out of the sub-
ordinated debt holders. That sequence ensures that all existing subordinated debt
holders have to fully contribute to the restructuring costs of the bank prior to the
State stepping in”.122
12.6.3.3 Remaining at the bad bank or bank in liquidation
In some cases, the bank is split-up into a bad bank and a good bank. The good
bank is usually transferred to another bank, while the bad bank is wound-down
or liquidated under normal liquidation procedures. In these cases, the sharehol-
ders and subordinated debt holders usually remain at the bad bank or bank in liq-
uidation.
How burdensome is remaining at the bad bank for subordinated debt hold-
ers? This depends on the financial situation of the bad bank. Furthermore, it
depends on the ranking of the subordinated debt holders. To give an example, in
the decision on Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), the Commission noted that
“while the subordinated debt holders are in principle entitled to the proceeds
from the liquidation, the FDGCC has first claim on repayment of the cost of
the intervention before other creditors will be served”.123 The Commission con-
cluded that it was not very likely that the subordinated debt holders would
benefit from the proceeds of the liquidation.124
In the case of the Portuguese bank Banif, the ‘sale of business tool’ and
the ‘asset separation tool’ were applied: Banif was split-up into a clean bank
(to be sold) and a remaining bank (to be wound-down), while a separate asset
119. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 135; Nova
Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 154.
120. Based on the Slovenian Banking Act.
121. The summary of the Decision on extraordinary measures imposed on NKBM is
reproduced in the 2013 annual report of NKBM (page 29).
122. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 135.
123. Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), SA.41924, 2 July 2015, para. 71.
124. Banca Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), SA.41924, 2 July 2015, para. 71.
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bundle had been carved out in resolution into an Asset Management Com-
pany. In addition, the bail-in tool – which under the Portuguese implementa-
tion law of the BRRD was already applicable in 2015 – was applied.125 All
subordinated creditors of the bank would be left in the Remaining Bank,
subordinated to the claims of the resolution authority on the remaining
assets so that they would effectively absorb losses.126 The Commission con-
cluded that as a result, subordinated debt holders have contributed to the max-
imum extent possible, thereby satisfying the burden-sharing requirement.127
This form of burden-sharing was not always possible. For instance, in the
decision on Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), the Commission noted that
due to legal constraints, subordinated debt holders had to be transferred to the
acquiring bank (Banco Liberta).128 Nevertheless, in most cases in the S/T/W-
context, the subordinated debt was not transferred, thus ensuring burden-
sharing by subordinated debt holders.
12.6.3.4 Coupon ban
Many beneficiary banks were subject to a coupon ban. This constitutes burden-
sharing by hybrid and subordinated debt holders. Usually, a coupon ban is
imposed in combination with another form of burden-sharing.
In some cases, there is no coupon ban, but this can be explained by the fact
that because of the LME there is no subordinated debt left. For instance, in its
decision on National Bank of Greece (NBG), the Commission observed that
as a consequence of the conversion, NBG had no outstanding hybrid capital
and subordinated debt instruments held by private investors. The Commission
therefore accepted the termination of the commitment not to pay coupon and
not to repurchase such instruments. The Commission considered that those
commitments were no longer necessary to ensure burden-sharing by historical
subordinated debt instruments, since such instruments no longer existed.129
125. Banif, SA.43977, 21 December 2015, para. 131.
126. Banif, SA.43977, 21 December 2015, para. 87 and 142.
127. Banif, SA.43977, 21 December 2015, para. 144.
128. Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 71 and 194. However, in
order to ensure burden-sharing, Banco Liberta would not exercise any call options during the
period it enjoyed financial support from the FGD (the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund), i.e.
for a period of five years through the guarantee on the impaired asset portfolio. See also:
BPN, 24 October 2011, para. 112-114; BPN, 27 March 2012, para. 239-244.
129. National Bank of Greece (NBG), SA.43365, 4 December 2015, para. 140. The same
consideration can be found in Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 164.
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In some cases, there appears to be full burden-sharing by subordinated debt
holders. However, at the same time, a coupon ban is imposed. How can this be
explained? The case of SNS REAAL can serve as an illustration. On 1 February
2013, SNS REAAL was nationalised and all subordinated debt holders were
expropriated. Only the subordinated bonds issued by SRLEV (a subsidiary of
SNS REAAL) were not expropriated. As a result, these subordinated securities
still existed and were affected by the coupon ban.130
It should be noted that in several cases, the coupon ban was the only form of
burden-sharing by hybrid and subordinated debt holders.131 Since the coupon
ban is less burdensome than a LME or full write-down, the fact that there are
some cases in which the Commission accepted the coupon ban as the only bur-
den-sharing measure raises the question whether the Commission has consis-
tently applied the burden-sharing principle. This question will be addressed in
the next subsection.
12.6.3.5 Consistent application of the burden-sharing principle?
The principle of equal treatment requires that burden-sharing by subordinated
debt holders is interpreted consistently by the Commission. The 2013 Banking
Communication contributed greatly to a consistent application of the burden-
sharing principle, since it raised the minimum requirements for burden-sharing.
By contrast, in the pre-2013 Banking Communication era, several indications
can be found that point at an inconsistent application of the burden-sharing prin-
ciple. This inconsistency can occur at two levels.
In the first place, the previous subsections have shown that there are different
types of burden-sharing measures (i.e. LME, full write-down, remaining at the
bank in liquidation, coupon ban). These different types are not equally bur-
densome. This is most evident with respect to the coupon ban. As discussed in
the previous subsection, there are some cases in which the Commission accepted
the coupon ban as the only burden-sharing measure. That situation was put to an
end by the 2013 Banking Communication.
In the second place, it should be recalled that the level of burden-sharing
depends on the modalities of the burden-sharing measure. However, it can be
observed that the modalities are not always taken into account in the burden-
sharing assessment. This can be illustrated by contrasting the decision on
130. See the press release of SNS REAAL of 28 March 2013, ‘SRLEV postpones coupon
payment at the request of the EU’.
131. An overview of these cases is provided in the table in Annex IX.
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Eurobank with the decision on Piraeus Bank. The assessment of the LME in the
case of Piraeus Bank is almost similar to that of Eurobank. However, the
description of the LME indicates that the cases differ on some of the aspects
of the LME. For instance, recital 123 of the Eurobank-decision indicates that
the acceptance rate of the 2013 LME was 48%. Piraeus Bank, only achieved
an acceptance rate of 20% when it conducted a LME in 2013.132 So there is a
difference, but this difference did not lead to a different conclusion: in both
decisions, the Commission concluded that there was sufficient burden-sharing
by the subordinated debt holders. Admittedly, the acceptance rate is not the only
aspect of a LME and the conclusion was based on all the LME-transac-
tions performed by the bank. Nonetheless, the fact that the difference on this
aspect of the LME did not lead to a different conclusion, raises the question
whether the approach of the Commission towards burden-sharing by means of a
LME was consistent.
In the 2013 Banking Communication era, burden-sharing by subordinated debt
holders is in principle always required. A low level of burden-sharing is thus
no longer allowed. Nevertheless, there can be a justification for a low level (or
absence) of burden-sharing.133 In that regard, it should be noted that in a few
cases, there was no burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders: in the case of
CCB andMKBBank, there was no LME or any other form of burden-sharing by
subordinated debt holders. This can, however, be explained by the simple fact
that there were no outstanding subordinated debt instruments in these cases. The
absence of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders in these cases does
therefore not amount to an inconsistency.
Another justification can be found in the decision of 26 November 2015 on
Alpha Bank. The background of that case was as follows: the comprehensive
assessment conducted in the context of the SSM revealed a capital shortfall.
Alpha Bank would try to raise capital from private investors, while the Hellenic
Financial Stability Fund (“HFSF”) would act as a backstop. Effectively, this
backstop was an underwriting commitment (i.e. a commitment to provide the
amount of capital needed to cover the capital shortfall in case it was not pro-
vided by private investors). In that context, Greece made the commitment to
bail-in subordinated creditors before any capital support would have been
132. Piraeus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 134.
133. See also SNS REAAL, SA.36598, 19 December 2013, para. 92: “Taking into account the
genesis of measure A2, the specificities of this case (cfr separate legal entities with their
own capital position) and in particular that commitment related to capital transfers, the
Commission can accept that in the case at hand the increased burden-sharing requirements
of the 2013 Banking Communication do not apply for the hybrid debt-holders of REAAL
Insurance.”
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actually paid out to the bank by the HFSF. In the end, Alpha Bank successfully
raised enough private capital to cover the capital shortfall determined by the
comprehensive assessment. Consequently, the bail-in of the subordinated debt
did not take place.
The underwriting by the HFSF constituted State aid, but the burden-sharing by
subordinated debt holders would only take place in case of a recapitalisation
by the HFSF. In that regard, the Commission considered on the basis of point
45 of the 2013 Banking Communication that disproportionate results would
follow if the bail-in of subordinated debt and hybrid capital had to occur already
at the moment of the underwriting commitment. The commitment by Greece
to bail-in subordinated creditors before any capital support would have been
actually paid out to the bank is therefore sufficient to ensure proper burden-
sharing.134
It is noteworthy that in the decision on Alpha Bank, the Commission referred
to point 45 of the 2013 Banking Communication. Point 45 provides for an
exception to the burden-sharing requirements (laid down in points 43 and 44).
This exception can be made when burden-sharing would endanger financial
stability or lead to disproportionate results. Point 45 further explains that this
exception could cover cases where the aid amount is small in comparison to the
bank’s RWA and the capital shortfall has been reduced significantly in particular
through capital raising measures.135
When there is no justification for a low level (or even a total absence) of bur-
den-sharing, the Commission will not authorise the State aid. This can be illus-
trated by the case of Banca Tercas. In this case, the subordinated debt was not
converted nor written-down. The parties claimed that “the option of bailing-in
the subordinated debt was not legally feasible under the then applicable Italian
legislation and that debt can be written down only in case of compulsory admin-
istrative liquidation”.136 The Commission did not accept this argument. The
Commission concluded that the subordinated creditors had not contributed to
the maximum extent possible.137 In other words: the burden-sharing require-
ment was not met. Moreover, Italy did not submit a restructuring plan for Banca
Tercas. As a result, the State aid was incompatible and the Commission ordered
the recovery of the aid.
134. Alpha Bank, SA.43366, 26 November 2015, para. 96. See also: Eurobank, SA.34825,
29 April 2014, para. 400, and Eurobank, SA.43363, 26 November 2015, para. 97.
135. For an application of point 45 of the 2013 Banking Communication, see: Banco CEISS,
SA.36249, 12 March 2014, para. 102-104; Alpha Bank, SA.43366, 26 November 2015,
para. 96.
136. Banca Tercas, SA.39451, 23 December 2015, para. 203.
137. Banca Tercas, SA.39451, 23 December 2015, para. 207.
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To conclude, in the 2013 Banking Communication era, burden-sharing by
subordinated debt holders is in principle always required. Authorising State
aid without requiring proper burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders would
thus be inconsistent. However, as illustrated by the case of Alpha Bank, there is
no inconsistency if there is a justification for a low level of burden-sharing.
12.6.4 Impact BRRD
Art. 34(1)(b) BRRD requires that creditors of the bank under resolution
should bear losses after the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority
of their claims under normal insolvency proceedings. In other words: it requires
full burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders. As regards burden-sharing by
subordinated debt holders, the State aid control framework and the recovery and
resolution-framework are consistent with each other.
Point 46 of the 2013 Banking Communication stipulates that the ‘no creditor
worse off-principle’ should be adhered to. This means that subordinated
creditors should not receive less in economic terms than what their instrument
would have been worth if no State aid were to be granted. The ‘no creditor worse
off-principle’ is also enshrined in Art. 34(1)(g) BRRD and Art. 15(1)(g) SRM-
Regulation. Thus, also with respect to the safeguards for creditors, the State aid
control framework and the recovery and resolution-framework are consistent
with each other.
12.6.5 Concluding remarks
Section 12.5 already highlighted the relevance of the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication for the burden-sharing by shareholders. The 2013 Banking Commu-
nication is equally relevant for the burden-sharing by subordinated debt
holders. Indeed, this Communication establishes clear burden-sharing require-
ments. For that reason, a distinction can be made between the period after the
adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication and the pre-2013 Banking
Communication era. While in the pre-2013 Banking Communication era, sev-
eral indications can be found that point at an inconsistent application of the
burden-sharing principle, there are no such inconsistencies in the period after
the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication (see subsection 12.6.3.5).
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12.7 Burden-sharing by senior creditors
12.7.1 A relevant characteristic?
The Crisis Communications do not require burden-sharing by senior creditors.
Accordingly, most bank State aid cases are characterised by an absence of
burden-sharing by senior creditors. But there are a few notable exceptions:
The case of Amagerbanken
Amagerbanken was a Danish bank. Amagerbanken was wound-up under the
Danish winding-up scheme.138 Under this scheme, the FSC would create a
subsidiary bank (New Bank139) that would acquire the assets of the failing bank
(Old Bank). New Bank would also take over the unsubordinated liabilities for
an amount equal to the value of the assets, on a pro-rata basis. This means that
shareholders and subordinated debt holders were left behind at the Old Bank.
Senior creditors were protected though not fully, since they were taken over at a
haircut (depending on the value of the assets).
Accordingly, in the case of Amagerbanken, equity and subordinated liabili-
ties were not transferred to the New Bank, but remained in Amagerbanken.
Guaranteed liabilities were taken over at their nominal value, while unguaran-
teed liabilities were provisionally transferred at the level of 58,8% of their nom-
inal value. This means a haircut of 41,2%.140
The haircut for senior creditors of Amagerbanken had a significant
impact on the funding costs of Danish banks. Because of the haircut for senior
creditors, Moody’s downgraded several Danish banks.141 This lead to funding
problems for some Danish banks. In its decision of 9 December 2011, the Com-
mission observed that “as a consequence of the application of the winding-up
scheme in several cases senior creditors have taken losses which is unique in
the European Union and which has increased the Danish bank’s funding
costs”.142
138. This scheme was approved by the Commission on 30 September 2010 (case N407/2010).
The aid to Amagerbanken was notified for individual assessment, because of the size of
Amagerbanken (the balance sheet exceeded the threshold of EUR 3 billion).
139. New Bank is in fact a bridge bank. It will cease its activities within a limited time-frame: it
will not grant any new loans. Instead, it will actively seek to dispose assets and liabilities.
This minimises competition distortions.
140. The initial percentage was 58,8%. However, as a result of the final valuation of the assets,
the compensation to creditors was increased to 84,4% (resulting in a haircut of 15,6%).
141. Denmark – Guarantee for merging banks, SA.34227, 17 February 2012, para. 6.
142. Denmark – Prolongation of the winding-up scheme and Extension of the Compensation
scheme to Model I and Model II, SA.33575, 9 December 2011, para. 35.
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In 2011, Denmark introduced the compensation-scheme, in addition to the
winding-up scheme. Under the compensation-scheme, senior creditors did not
suffer losses. In its decision from August 2011, the Commission considered
this to be acceptable, since the burden-sharing requirement of the Restructur-
ing Communication did not extend to senior creditors.143
Consequently, there is an important difference between Amagerbanken
(which was wound-down under the original scheme) and Fionia Bank. In the
latter case, there was no burden-sharing by senior creditors, since only equity
and subordinated debt remained at Old Fionia.
The case of Anglo Irish Bank
Although there was no burden-sharing by senior creditors in the case of
Anglo Irish Bank, such a burden-sharing was contemplated by the Irish
authorities. However, the ECB advised the Irish State to not bail-in the senior
debt.144 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland explains the choice
to spare the senior creditors:
“For legal reasons, but also to avoid contagion to other parts of the financial
system both in Ireland and elsewhere in the euro area, the measures agreed
with the Irish authorities do not include steps that would affect senior debt
holders”.145
The question of burden-sharing by senior creditors was briefly addressed by the
Commission in its decision on Anglo Irish Bank. In the decision, the Commis-
sion considered that it was legitimate to assess whether burden-sharing by senior
creditors could not be achieved. However, the Commission went on to consider
that it “had not received any detailed proposal on how to make the senior cred-
itors participate in the burden-sharing without increasing the cost of the resolu-
tion for the State”.146
In the literature, it has been remarked that the approach to burden-sharing by
bank creditors has evolved over time.147 In the early stages of the financial
crisis, governments were very cautious not to scare off bank creditors. The case
of Anglo Irish Bank illustrates that in 2011, burden-sharing by senior creditors
was deemed too risky.
143. Amendment of the Danish winding-up scheme for credit institutions, SA.33001, 1 August
2011, para. 83.
144. Lenihan 2012; Honohan 2013, p. 15; Schoenmaker 2015, p. 11.
145. The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, point 39.
146. Anglo/INBS, SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 170.
147. Micossi, Bruzzone & Carmassi 2013, p. 9. See also: N. Veron and G.B. Wolff, ‘From
supervision to resolution: Next steps on the road to European banking union’, p. 6.
CHAPTER 12
396
The case of Cyprus
In the context of an Economic Adjustment Programme, Cyprus received finan-
cial assistance from the EU-IMF. The euro area countries agreed to a package
of financial assistance of up to EUR 10 billion for Cyprus.148 This rescue pack-
age was agreed upon on 25 March 2013.149 An important feature of the rescue
package for Cyprus was that to some extent depositorswere included in the bail-
in.
The Programme provided for a reform of the Cypriot banking sector:
• Bank of Cyprus (“Trapeza Kyprou”) was recapitalised through the bail-in
of shareholders and creditors of the bank and through the conversion of
47,5% of uninsured deposits (i.e. deposits above EUR 100.000) into equity.
• Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) was split-up into an entity in liquidation and
a good part which was transferred to Bank of Cyprus. All uninsured depos-
its (i.e. deposits below EUR 100.000) remained at the entity in liquidation,
while the insured deposits were transferred to Bank of Cyprus.
• NB: Since the bail-in was sufficient, no programme money was used to
recapitalise Laiki or Bank of Cyprus.
• Hellenic bank was able to raise private capital. Consequently, this bank did
not need State aid.
• CCB/CCI received State aid, which was financed by programme money.150
The uninsured depositors of Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki)
were bailed in. By contrast, there was no bail-in of depositors of CCB and
Hellenic Bank.
The rescue package thus included burden-sharing by uninsured depositors
(i.e. above EUR 100.000). Interestingly, the initial rescue package even included
burden-sharing by small depositors: the initial rescue package proposed a
levy of 6,75% on insured deposits (below EUR 100.000) and a levy of 9,9%
on uninsured deposits (above EUR 100.000). The initial rescue package was
however rejected by the Cypriot Parliament.
In the literature, it has been remarked that the initial rescue package showed
“the political willingness on the part of the eurogroup to make savers bleed for
their choice of a particular bank, or even banking system”.151 However, it has
148. The ESM would finance up to EUR 9 billion and the IMF around EUR 1 billion.
149. On 24 April 2013, an Economic Adjustment Programme was agreed between Cyprus and
the Troika (Commission, ECB and IMF). On 25 April 2013, the Council adopted Decision
2013/236/EU. This Council Decision contained the main elements of the macroeconomic
adjustment programme to be implemented by Cyprus. On 26 April 2013, a Memorandum
of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (MoU) was signed by Cyprus
and the Commission (acting on behalf of the ESM). This MoU set out the policy condi-
tionality of the rescue package.
150. See: State aid case SA.35334.
151. Smits, 2014, p. 150. Avgouleas & Goodhart (2015, p. 16) remark that “the aim to penalize
Russian creditors of Cypriot banks might have played a significant role in the way that
‘rescue’ was structured”.
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also been noted that the bail-in of small depositors in the initial rescue package
“was later regretted for its potentially disruptive impact on depositor confi-
dence throughout the Union, and numerous official statements tried to assure
that it would not happen again”.152
12.7.2 Impact of the 2013 Banking Communication?
The 2013 Banking Communication does not require burden-sharing by senior
creditors. Nevertheless, some cases that were assessed under the 2013 Banking
Communication are characterised by burden-sharing by senior creditors. For
instance, in the decision on National Bank of Greece (NBG), the Commission
noted the following:
“The contribution of both the hybrid capital and subordinated debt hold-
ers, and that of the senior unsecured debt holders, was already partially
achieved with the 2015 LME. The results of 2015 LME ended with
participation rates of respectively […] %, […] % and […] % for senior
bonds, junior bonds and hybrid securities, generating EUR 717 million of
capital. With regard to the contribution obtained from the senior creditors,
the 2015 LME exceeded the minimum level burden-sharing sought for State
aid purposes, which does not require contributions of senior unsecured debt
holders”.153 [Italics mine, REvL]
Even though this case is characterised by burden-sharing by senior creditors,
the Commission underlines that contributions of senior unsecured debt holders
are not required (by the 2013 Banking Communication).
In several other cases assessed under the 2013 Banking Communication,
there was no burden-sharing by senior creditors. For instance, in the decision on
the Slovenian bank Probanka, the Commission noted as follows:
“According to the orderly winding down plan, the main objective of the
Bank’s orderly winding down is to repay all ordinary creditors (excluding
subordinated ones) so as to maintain the trust of the public in the stability
of the financial system. For that purpose, the Bank will ensure that repay-
ments of contractually agreed amounts are made to all ordinary creditors
(excluding subordinated ones) on maturity”.154 [Italics mine, REvL]
152. Micossi, Bruzzone and Carmassi 2013, p. 10.
153. National Bank of Greece (NBG), SA.43365, 4 December 2015, para. 138.
154. Probanka, SA.37642, 18 December 2013, para. 18. See also: Facto Banka, SA.37643,
18 December 2013, para. 17.
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These recitals illustrate that burden-sharing by senior creditors is not a regular
feature of cases assessed under the 2013 Banking Communication. Thus, this
Communication did not have an impact on burden-sharing by senior creditors.
By contrast, the BRRD had a huge impact – as will be set out in the next
subsection.
12.7.3 Impact BRRD
The importance of the BRRD cannot be overstated. The BRRD introduces the
bail-in tool, and unlike the 2013 Banking Communication, the BRRD does not
exempt senior creditors. On the contrary, under the BRRD, all creditors have
to bear losses, unless they are excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool by
Art. 44(2) or (3) BRRD. Pursuant to Art. 44(2)(a) BRRD, covered deposits are
excluded from the scope of the bail-in.
12.8 Coupon and dividend ban
12.8.1 The modalities of the coupon and dividend ban
As explained in sections 12.5 and 12.6, Member States usually commit that
the beneficiary bank shall not to pay any dividends and coupons or exercise
calls on subordinated debt instruments and hybrid capital instruments dur-
ing the restructuring period. This commitment is regarded favourably by the
Commission, because it ensures burden-sharing by the shareholders, hybrid
capital holders and subordinated debt holders of the bank. Since the coupon
ban and the dividend ban are usually bracketed together in the decisions155,
these bans will be analysed together in the present section. In particular, the
present section will zoom in on how the coupon and dividend ban is elaborated
in the decisions. To that end, the modalities of the coupon and dividend ban will
be analysed. These modalities concern the duration of the coupon and dividend
ban (see subsection 12.8.1.1), the limitations of the coupon and dividend ban
(see subsection 12.8.1.2) and the exceptions to the coupon and dividend ban (see
subsection 12.8.1.3).
155. For instance, the coupon and dividend ban in the decision on BES was formulated as
follows: “The Bridge Bank and the Bad Bank will not pay any coupons on hybrid capital
instruments or dividends on own funds instruments and subordinated debt instruments.”
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12.8.1.1 Duration of the coupon and dividend ban
As a general rule, the coupon and dividend ban applies throughout the
restructuring period.156 It is sometimes stipulated that the coupon and dividend
will cease to apply when the State’s shareholding in the bank has been fully
divested. For instance, the coupon ban in the case of CCB/CCI was applied for
the entire period during which Cyprus participated in the ownership structure of
the CCB.157
In some cases, the duration of the coupon ban is conditional upon the fulfil-
ment of the LME. For instance, one of the commitments in the case of Banco
CEISS was that “until the burden sharing measures provided for in section 7 of
this Term Sheet will have been implemented BANCO CEISS will not make any
payments to holders of preference shares and subordinated debt instruments
in so far as those payments are not owed on the basis of a contract or the law.”
The burden-sharing measures mentioned in this commitment relate to the LME.
The same commitment can be found in other Spanish cases, such as NCG, BFA
Bankia, Catalunya Banc, Banco Mare Nostrum and Liberbank.
Also in the W-context, the duration of the coupon and dividend ban is
related to the fulfilment of the burden-sharing measures. For instance, in the
case of Probanka, the burden-sharing measures entailed that the shareholders
and subordinated debt holders would be fully wiped out.158 The coupon and
dividend ban entailed that Probanka would not make any dividend and coupon
payments until the burden-sharing measures have been fully implemented.159
Sometimes, the duration of the dividend/coupon ban is determined by specific
circumstances. For instance, in the case of ABN AMRO, the Commission
considered that in approximately two years’ time, ABN AMRO Group should
have restored its viability. Against that background, a hybrid coupon and hybrid
call ban of 2 years seemed to provide appropriate burden-sharing from the
bank’s capital holders.160
The coupon ban in the case of Bank of Ireland applied from 1 February 2010
to 31 January 2011. The final date had a specific reason: on 31 January 2011,
Bank of Ireland had to pay a coupon to the State on the State’s remaining pref-
erence shares. The Commission accepted that the coupon ban could not be
156. It is usually stipulated that all commitments apply during the restructuring period, except
where it is provided that they cease to apply at an earlier or later date.
157. CCB, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, annex, point 1.
158. Probanka, SA.37642, 18 December 2013, Annex D.
159. Probanka, SA.37642, 18 December 2013, Annex E.
160. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 315. Also in the case of RBS and LBG, the
duration of the coupon and dividend ban was 2 years.
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extended further without endangering the capital raising exercise, as outside
investors would not accept further dilution as would occur if the coupon on
the government preference shares were to be paid in common stock again.161
The dividend ban in the case of NordLB had a special feature: if the con-
tingent asset guarantee was activated, the duration of the dividend ban would be
extended for two years. The Commission noted that this ensured an incentive
structure for limiting the aid to the minimum.162
To recapitulate, the duration of the coupon and dividend ban can be: i) equal to
the restructuring period; ii) related to the fulfilment of the burden-sharing
measures; or iii) determined by specific circumstances.
12.8.1.2 Limitation of the coupon and dividend ban
The scope of the coupon and dividend ban is not unlimited. Indeed, there
are three limitations of the coupon and dividend ban. Firstly, the coupon and
dividend ban does not apply to newly issued securities. In that regard, it should
be noted that a coupon and dividend ban may compromise the bank’s ability to
raise fresh capital on the market. The Commission therefore accepts that the
coupon and dividend ban does not apply to newly issued securities, provided
any payment of coupons on such newly issued capital instruments will not
create a legal obligation to make any coupon payments on the bank’s existing
securities.163 This is explicitly recognised in point 26 of the Restructuring
Communication.164
Secondly, the coupon and dividend ban does not apply to securities where the
bank has no discretion to suspend coupon payment. The case of Ethias is
a nice illustration of this limitation. In this case, the Commission noted that the
hybrids issued by Ethias were not loss absorbing on a going concern basis. In
particular Ethias had no discretion to suspend coupon payment. The possibi-
lity of coupons deferral was conditional on the inability of Ethias to meet sol-
vency requirements in view of its annual audited accounts. As this condition has
not been fulfilled during the period since the aid measure was announced, Ethias
has not had discretion to defer coupon payments on its hybrids. As a result, the
criterion of burden sharing does not require Ethias to refrain from payments of
coupon payments on its hybrid instruments.165
161. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 217.
162. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 166.
163. See, for instance: Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013,
para. 44 and 140.
164. As regards the trade-off between the own contribution of subordinated debt holders on
the one hand and the refinancing capability of the bank on the other hand, see footnote 7 to
point 26. This footnote refers to points 33, 34 and 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
165. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 134.
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Thirdly, point 26 of the Restructuring Communication provides that a bank
should not use State aid to pay compensation for own resources if there are
insufficient profits. This implies that when a beneficiary bank makes profit,
coupon payments may be made again. For example, in the case of LBBW,
Germany had committed that financial instruments would only be serviced in
the next three years if no appropriation of reserves was necessary for this. The
Commission considered that this ensured that compensation for own resources
would only be made in the event of sufficient profits and that no State aid would
be used for payments to shareholders.166
12.8.1.3 Exceptions to the coupon and dividend ban
Exceptionally, the Commission can authorise dividend payments provided the
benefits of the dividend payment outweigh the disadvantages of such devia-
tion.167 If no authorisation is given, the payment would constitute a breach of
the dividend ban.
In the case of Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD), there was a breach of a dividend
ban. CGD had committed to a dividend ban. However, on 28 September 2012,
Caixa Geral Finance Limited (an affiliate of CGD) had paid out dividends
on perpetual non-cumulative preference shares in the amount of EUR 405.415.
Portugal argued that these payments were not dividends, but coupon payments
which may be paid if there is a legal obligation to do so. However, the Commis-
sion did not accept this argument and concluded that the breach of the dividend
ban constituted misuse of State aid. Consequently, the Commission opened the
formal investigation procedure for misuse of State aid pursuant to Article 16 of
the Procedural Regulation. In its decision of 24 July 2013, the Commission
held that the aid was not limited to the minimum necessary, because CGD
had paid out dividends in the amount of EUR 405.415. Consequently, the aid
amount exceeded the minimum necessary by an amount of EUR 405.415.
However, CGD committed to pay back to Portugal an amount of EUR 405.415.
Because of this commitment, the Commission concluded that the aid was limited
to the minimum necessary.168
Also in the case of Banco BPI – another Portuguese bank – there was a breach
of the dividend ban. In Jun 2012, BPI was recapitalised under the Portuguese
recapitalisation scheme in the form of CoCo’s (contingent convertible sub-
ordinated bonds). In August 2012, dividends on preference shares issued by
166. Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW), C17/2009, 15 December 2009, para. 98.
167. BPI, SA.35238, 24 July 2013, para. 84.
168. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), SA.35062, 24 July 2013, para. 83.
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BPI Capital Finance were paid without prior Commission authorisation. The
preference shares had some particular features: due to the terms and conditions
of the preference shares – namely the guarantee on those shares which pre-
vented any repurchase or redemption of parity obligations or junior obligations
until the date on which a fourth consecutive preferred dividend would have been
paid in full – BPI would not have been in the position to repurchase the CoCo’s
(i.e. to pay back the Portuguese State). This was acknowledged by the Commis-
sion. Nevertheless, the Commission considered that this element did not alter
its assessment that the dividend payment took place in contravention of the
dividend ban.169 However – just like in the case of CGD – the Commission took
note of the commitment by BPI to pay back to Portugal an amount equalling the
dividend payment (and therefore the amount by which the aid granted exceeded
the minimum necessary). Given that commitment, the aid was deemed to have
been limited to the minimum necessary.170
In the Restructuring Decision on ABN AMRO, a different approach can be
found. In this decision, the Commission acknowledged that dividends paid by
ABNAMROGroup to the State could trigger hybrid coupons. The Commission
considered that “a large dividend hints at restored viability and also helps to
keep potential excess capital in check, which helps to limit undue distortions of
competition”.171 Therefore, the Commission did not object to the payment of
a sizeable dividend to the State even though that payment could trigger hybrid
coupon payments.
A similar consideration can be found in the case of ING. ING had made
discretionary coupon payments in 2009 without any proper justification alt-
hough it was loss-making in 2008. The Commission considered that a coupon
ban should no longer be required in the case of ING provided that ING repayed
EUR 5 billion to the State before 31 January 2010. That exemption would
include the coupon payments of 8 and 15 December 2009. The Commission
clarified this as follows: “The early repayment of a significant part of the State
aid granted to the Netherlands addresses existing concerns of the Commission
that such coupon payments impede ING from achieving long-term viability
without State aid. If a bank is able to raise such a significant amount of capital
from the market and has a clear strategy in the medium-term, it should no longer
be restricted in the use of its capital if and where this does not threaten the
implementation of its restructuring plan”.172
169. BPI, SA.35238, 24 July 2013, para. 85.
170. BPI, SA.35238, 24 July 2013, para. 87.
171. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, footnote 123.
172. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 139. Reprised in: ING, 11 May 2012, para. 196.
Also reprised in: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), SA.36175, 27 November 2013,
para. 148.
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The case of ING is also interesting in the sense that there was a breach of
the call ban. In addition to making discretionary coupon payments, ING had
also exercise a call option on a lower Tier 2 bond. 173 With respect to the
exercise of the call option, the Commission noted that ING had not informed
the Commission of this and had thus not obtained Commission approval. The
Commission concluded that ING had violated point 26 of the Restructuring
Communication and that these “aggravating circumstances” had to be compen-
sated by additional measures mitigating distortions of competition.174
Similarly, Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM) had not complied with the
Commission’s policy on hybrid instruments as stipulated in point 26 of the
Restructuring Communication. Firstly, CCM made discretionary coupon pay-
ments on hybrid capital in 2009 although it was loss-making in 2008.175
Secondly, there were two buybacks of preference shares called at par value in
July and August 2009.176 The Commission noted that the coupon payment and
the two buybacks did not respect the principle embodied in point 26 and should
be compensated by a more in-depth restructuring.177
In the same vein, the Commission noted that the payment of coupons in
the case of Banco Português de Negócios (BPN) did not respect point 26 of
the Restructuring Communication and should be compensated for by a more
in-depth restructuring.178
The conclusion reached in the cases of CCM and BPN is in line with the
observation that was made in section 10.4: a lack of adequate own contribution
has to be compensated by far-reaching restructuring.
12.8.2 Concluding remarks
The present section has shown that the modalities of the coupon and divi-
dend ban may differ. Does this amount to an inconsistency? In my opinion, the
coupon and dividend ban should not be viewed in isolation. Indeed, the coupon
and dividend ban is usually imposed to enhance burden-sharing. In other words:
it is usually accompanied by one of the other forms of burden-sharing, such as
dilution (in case of shares) or a LME (in case of subordinated debt instruments).
173. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 79.
174. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 138 and 143.
175. Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 24.
176. Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 23.
177. Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM), NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 192.
178. Banco Português de Negócios (BPN), SA.26909, 27 March 2012, para. 241-244. The
Commission considered that, since BPN was being sold, a ban on calls until 31 December
2016 was necessary to provide a minimum level of burden-sharing from the bank’s capital
holders.
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12.9 Conclusion
In each bank State aid case, the Commission assesses whether the aid amount
is limited to the minimum and whether there is sufficient burden-sharing. The
characteristics that are relevant to that assessment were identified and discussed
in the present chapter. What are the key findings and what are their implications
for the Commission on the one hand and the Member States and beneficiary
banks on the other hand?
12.9.1 Key findings
Not all bank State aid cases are characterised by the same type of burden-
sharing, nor are they characterised by the same level of burden-sharing. Indeed,
as section 12.6 has shown, the subordinated creditors in some cases only faced a
coupon ban, while in other cases, the subordinated debt was completely written-
down. Does this amount to an inconsistency?
In my opinion, it does not amount to an inconsistency. In that regard, it should
be recalled that an evolving policy does not mean that the principle of equal
treatment is violated. As explained in section 6.7.3, I am of the opinion that
the principle of equal treatment allows for policy changes. One of the most
prominent policy changes was the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communica-
tion. This Communication established clear burden-sharing standards. In the
2013 Banking Communication, the Commission explicitly referred to the level
playing field. The Commission recognised that the absence of ex ante thresholds
for burden-sharing had resulted in “diverging approaches to burden-sharing
across Member States” and that this would risk undermining the level playing
field. For that reason, the Commission decided to raise the minimum require-
ments for burden-sharing. Thus, the 2013 Banking Communication has con-
tributed greatly to a consistent application of the burden-sharing principle. From
that viewpoint, I welcome the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication.
12.9.2 Implications for the Member States
There may be instances in which Member States wish to avoid burden-sharing
by certain investors. Italy is the prime example in that regard. The Italian bank
Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) experienced serious difficulties. A resolution
of MPS would likely entail bail-in of junior and senior creditors.179 Since many
creditors of Italian banks were families and small investors rather than profes-
sional investors, Italy wanted to avoid a bail-in of these investors. The wish to
179. IMF 2016 Article IV Report, p. 25.
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avoid a bail-in is driven by political reasons. In that regard, many newspapers
refer to the pensioner who committed suicide after he had lost most of his
savings, because the subordinated debt of Banca Etruria was ‘bailed in’.180
Can Member States avoid burden-sharing by certain investors? State aid to
an ailing bank will usually trigger the resolution of that bank. Consequently,
the State aid control framework and the recovery and resolution framework both
apply to these cases. Since the BRRD requires a bail-in (of at least 8%), the
burden-sharing requirement of the 2013 Banking Communication is auto-
matically fulfilled.
However, as explained in Chapter 4 of this PhD-study, the BRRD does not apply
to all bank State aid cases. Indeed, there are three exceptions in which State
aid does not trigger the resolution of the beneficiary bank. Nonetheless, the State
aid control framework still applies to these cases. Under the State aid control
framework (and in particular under the 2013 Banking Communication) burden-
sharing by shareholders and subordinated creditors is – in principle – always
required. The words “in principle” indicate that there is room for exceptions to
the burden-sharing requirement. Indeed, point 45 the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication provides that in exceptional circumstances, no burden-sharing measure
is required by the Commission.
In addition, as the CJEU held in case C-526/14 (Kotnik), “the adoption of a
communication such as the Banking Communication does not […] relieve the
Commission of its obligation to examine the specific exceptional circumstances
relied on by a Member State, in a particular case, for the purpose of requesting
the direct application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, and to provide reasons for
its refusal to grant such a request”.181 As the AG already rightfully pointed out
in his Opinion in case C-526/14 (Kotnik), burden-sharing does not appear in the
wording of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.182 Thus, when State aid is directly assessed
under Art. 107(3) TFEU (and thus outside the 2013 Banking Communication),
burden-sharing might be avoided. While this may be theoretically true, it should
180. In 2015, four small Italian banks (Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, Carife and Carichieti)
were put in resolution. These four banks had a combined market share of 1%. As part of the
resolution, four temporary bridge banks were created. All assets and some liabilities were
transferred to these bridge banks. Importantly, the equity and subordinated debt remained at
the ‘old’ bank. This constituted an own contribution by the shareholders and subordinated
debt holders.
181. C-526/14, point 41. The legal status of the Communications was discussed in section 3.4.3.
182. Opinion in case C-526/14, point 48.
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be recalled that since the adoption of the Crisis Framework, all bank State aid
cases were assessed on the basis of the Crisis Communications. In my view, the
Commission is not likely to assess bank State aid outside the 2013 Banking
Communication.183 Thus, in my opinion, the 2013 Banking Communication
should be considered as the decisive assessment framework.
To conclude, Member States cannot easily avoid the burden-sharing require-
ment.
12.9.3 Implications for the Commission
While there were diverging approaches to burden-sharing across Member States,
the 2013 Banking Communication put an end to this. Thus, by adopting the
2013 Banking Communication, the Commission has taken an important step
towards a consistent application of the burden-sharing principle.
183. Babis (2016) has the same view.
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Chapter 13. Limiting competition distortions
13.1 Introduction
The problematic aspect of State aid is that it may create distortions of competi-
tion. For this reason, the restructuring plan should contain compensatory
measures (i.e. measures to compensate for the distortions of competition)
– this is the third (and final) pillar of the restructuring plan. In the context of
this pillar, the Commission assesses whether the compensatory measures are
sufficient to mitigate the competition distortions. The characteristics relevant to
that assessment will be explored in the present chapter.
13.1.1 The need for compensatory measures
As was explained in chapter 2, distortions of competition can occur in several
ways. Firstly, State aid gives the beneficiary banks an unfair competitive
advantage over other banks which did not get State aid. Secondly, State aid
may lead to subsidy races between Member States. Thirdly, if a Member State
recapitalises banks which do otherwise not have access to capital (and would
subsequently have to leave the market), then State aid can frustrate the normal
market functioning. In addition, there is the concern of moral hazard: if banks
know or expect that they will be rescued, then they are more inclined to take
excessive risks. To compensate for those competition distortions, compensa-
tory measures are needed.
With respect to the need for compensatory measures, it is worthwhile to recall
that if a bank is rescued by means of State aid, rival banks usually benefit
from this. By contrast, if the fall of a non-financial firm results in its exit from
the market, then this is usually beneficial to its competitors. For financial firms
– and especially banks – this is different. Since the banking system is highly
interconnected, the fall of one bank might trigger the fall of other banks. Fur-
thermore, the fall of one bank might lead to a loss of confidence in the banking
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sector as a whole. By creating stability on the financial markets, the rescue of
a bank is thus beneficial to rival banks.1 In the literature, the question was raised
whether compensatory measures in favour of competitors were needed.2
This illustrates that the precise competitive impact of State aid to banks is not
crystal clear. Since the need for compensatory measures depends on the (extent
and existence of) competition distortions, a thorough analysis to the competi-
tion distortions seems warranted. In that regard, it has been remarked that “the
Commission has repeatedly refrained from checking whether a distortion of
competition was present”.3
At this point, it has to be stressed that the Restructuring Communication gives
some valuable guidance as to the compensatory measures. Points 28 to 45 of
the Restructuring Communication concern the third pillar of the restructuring
plan (i.e. measures to limit distortions of competition). Of particular relevance
is point 30, which stresses that the measures to limit the distortions of com-
petition should be tailor-made. In that regard, point 30 of the Restructuring Com-
munication stipulates that the nature and form of the compensatory measures
depends on two criteria.4 The first criterion is the amount of State aid and the
conditions and circumstances under which the State aid was granted. The second
criterion concerns the characteristics of the market(s) on which the beneficiary
bank operates.
Point 30 of the Restructuring Communication suggests that the competitive
impact of the State aid will be assessed by the Commission. Many Commis-
sion decisions refer to point 30 of the Restructuring Communication. How-
ever, the mere reference to point 30 does not mean that the analysis of the
competitive impact of the State aid is actually carried out. Does the Commis-
sion assume competition distortions or does it really analyse whether they
exist? And on the basis of which characteristics? This will be the focus of the
current chapter.5
1. This is observed by many scholars. See, for instance: Ahlborn & Piccinin 2010a, p. 58. See
also: Adler, Kavanagh & Ugryumov 2010, p. 69.
2. Lyons & Zhu 2012: “If rivals benefit from the preservation of the financial system, they do
not need a further benefit at the expense of consumers.” and “The collapse of a systemic
bank would have negative externalities on its rivals, and there is no justification for measures
that further benefit rivals by suppressing competition (e.g. requiring high prices or low
volumes of activity).”
3. Zimmer & Blaschczok 2011.
4. These two criteria are elaborated in points 31 and 32.
5. NB: one of the factors consistently taken into account by the Commission in its assessment
of the competitive impact of the aid is the remuneration that the beneficiary bank has to
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13.1.2 The relevant context
Account should be taken of the relevant context. This PhD-study distinguishes
between the C-context, the W-context, the T-context and the S/T/W-context.
The defining feature of the C-context is that the beneficiary bank continues
to exist as a standalone entity. In the other contexts, the beneficiary bank is
taken-over by another bank (T-context), split-up (S-context) or wound-down
(W-context). In these contexts, the bank disappears as a standalone entity. This
is a highly relevant aspect of these contexts. The Commission decisions in these
cases usually start the assessment of the competition distortions with the fol-
lowing consideration:
“The exit of a failed entity which engaged in excessive risk-taking is a clear
indication that moral hazard is addressed, in that commercial failure results
in liquidation. As a result, the distortion of competition resulting from the
State aid is greatly reduced”.6
This recital clearly illustrates that the disappearance of the bank as a standalone
entity is relevant from the viewpoint of addressing moral hazard. In addition,
the exit of the bank means that the beneficiary bank as such will disappear from
the market. As a result, the beneficiary bank as such will no longer distort
competition. With respect to the beneficiary bank’s activities, it is possible that
some of these activities are transferred to another bank. This is done through
an open and transparent tender. In that regard, the Commission usually notes as
follows:
“The sale of the Bank, as the beneficiary of the aid, to another market player
in the framework of an open sales process constitutes a form of mitigation
of potential distortions of competition. This process, which gives potentially
harmed competitors the possibility to assume this business, resembles to
some extent the “counterfactual” situation that would have occurred in the
absence of State aid, as a company in difficulty (or indeed in bankruptcy) will
pay to the State. The Commission has held that an adequate remuneration contributes to
limiting the distortion of competition resulting from the aid. This is thus a relevant char-
acteristic. However, since this characteristic was already discussed extensively in section 8.6,
it will not be discussed further in the present chapter.
6. This recital appeared in, inter alia: Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 125;
Bradford&Bingley, N194/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 56.
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normally often seek a potential buyer in the market or, failing to do so, would
be liquidated. As a result, the sale/resolution process in the present case con-
tributes significantly to limiting the distortions of competition resulting from
the aid”.7
To some extent, the fact that the bank disappears as a standalone entity is a
relevant characteristic. This is clearly illustrated by the aforementioned recitals.
However, it is not listed as a relevant characteristic, because it is inherent to the
context. Indeed, every beneficiary bank in the T-context, W-context or S-context
disappears as a standalone entity. By contrast, a bank in the C-context is – by
definition – not a bank that disappears as a standalone entity.
13.1.3 Structure of this chapter
In the context of the third pillar, the Commission assesses whether the com-
pensatory measures are sufficient to mitigate the competition distortions stem-
ming from the State aid. Whether the compensatory measures are sufficient to
mitigate the competition distortions depends essentially on two aspects. Firstly,
it depends on the type and nature of the compensatory measures. Secondly, it
depends on the competitive impact of the State aid (in other words: the need for
compensatory measures).
For this reason, the present chapter is divided into two parts. Part I discusses
the characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of the need for compensa-
tory measures, while Part II discusses the various compensatory measures. In
particular, the following compensatory measures will be discussed: market-
opening measures (see section 13.4), divestments (see section 13.5), balance
sheet reduction and other forms of downsizing (see sections 13.6 and 13.7),
growth limitation (see section 13.8), acquisition ban (see section 13.9), price
leadership ban and other pricing restrictions (see section 13.10), ban on aggres-
sive commercial practices (see section 13.11) and exit from State aid (see section
13.12). These compensatory measures can be considered as relevant characte-
ristics. For instance, the fact that the bank is subject to a price leadership ban
contributes to the conclusion that the distortions of competition are sufficiently
addressed.
7. This recital appeared in, inter alia: Catalunya Banc, SA.33735, 28 November 2012, para.
187; Novacaixagalicia (NCG) Banco, SA.33734, 28 November 2012, para. 186; Banco
CEISS, SA.34536, 20 December 2012, para. 166.
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Part I: Competitive impact
13.2 Competitive impact: amount of State aid
* The fact that the aid amount is very large. / The fact that the aid amount is
relatively low.
13.2.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
One of the most influential factors determining the extent of the compensatory
measures is the amount of State aid. The aid amount is often expressed in terms
of the bank’s risk-weighted assets (RWA). As a general rule, the higher the
aid amount (in terms of RWA), the higher the need for compensatory measures.
This general rule can be illustrated by the following recital of the Commission
decision on the Spanish banking group BFA8:
“The aid amount granted is equivalent to [20-30]% of the BFAGroup’s RWA
as of 31 December 2011. As the relative amount of aid to the beneficiary
is very large, significant measures are necessary in order to limit potential
distortions of competition”.9
Conversely, if the aid amount is low, then there is less need for compensatory
measures. This can also be illustrated by a recital of a Commission decision:
“The Commission recalls that CGD10 has received State aid in the form of
capital injections and CoCos in the amount of EUR 1 650 million. The aid
amount is equivalent to 2.3% of CGD’s Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) which
is comparatively low. As the CoCos are adequately remunerated, only mod-
erate measures are necessary to limit potential distortions of competition”.11
These considerations can be found in many decisions. The aid amount (in terms
of RWA) is thus clearly a decisive factor, which makes the fact that the aid
amount is very large and the fact that the aid amount is relatively low relevant
characteristics.
The underlying reasoning is as follows: the larger the aid amount, the larger
the distortions of competition, and the greater the need for compensatory
measures. This reasoning shows that there is an intermediate step between the
8. Banco Financiero y de Ahorro (BFA) and its banking subsidiary Bankia.
9. BFA, SA.35253, 28 November 2012, para. 205.
10. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) is a Portuguese banking group.
11. CGD, SA.35062, 24 July 2013, para. 89.
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aid amount and the need for compensatory measures (i.e. the competitive impact
or distortive effect of the State aid). However, this intermediate step is usually
not mentioned explicitly in the decisions.12 The emphasis is on the amount of
State aid rather than on the competitive impact of State aid. The decisions
create the impression of a direct link between the amount of State aid and the
need for compensatory measures, as is illustrated by the above-cited considera-
tion of the BFA-decision.
It should also be noted that these relevant characteristics are not mentioned
in relation to a specific compensatory measure, but usually in relation to com-
pensatory measures in general.13 However, in some cases, a relation between the
aid intensity and the balance sheet reduction seems to be implied. This will be
discussed in more detail in section 13.6.3.
13.2.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
In almost any Commission decision, the aid amount is indicated.14 However,
in some decisions, the amount of aid is only mentioned in the context of the
existence of State aid, rather than in relation to the need for compensatory
measures. For instance, the decision on IL&P15 indicates that the recapitalisa-
tion constituted nearly 18% of the bank’s RWA, but the Commission did
not refer to the aid amount when it assessed the measures limiting the distor-
tions of competition.16 Thus, in some cases, the (relative) amount of aid is not
explicitly used as an assessment criterion. However, the fact that in those
cases, the aid amount is not used to substantiate the need for compensatory
measures does not preclude the fact that it may have been used to assess the
need for compensatory measures. And given the fact that the aid amount is
– also intuitively – a very important assessment criterion, it is likely that the
Commission has used this criterion in every case.
12. The term “competitive impact” is used by the Commission in its decision on LCCU, para.
64 and 69. See also the Opening Decision in Anglo. The term “distortive effects of aid” is
used in SachsenLB, WestLB, IKB, HRE (24 July 2009, para. 64), BayernLB (12 May
2009, para. 93). A large aid amount reflects the size of failure of the bank in question, as
the Commission put it in the decision on Anglo/INBS (29 June 2011, para. 173).
13. This means that a direct relation between aid intensity and balance sheet reduction cannot
be established. See chapter 6.
14. See the table in Annex XII. The fourth column of this table indicates for each bank State
aid case whether the Restructuring Decision mentions the aid amount.
15. Irish Life & Permanent Group Holdings (IL&P) is nowadays called ‘Permanent TSB’.
16. IL&P, SA.33442, 9 April 2015, para. 60.
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13.2.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
It should be recalled that the amount of aid can be measured in absolute terms
as well as in relative terms. In the latter case, it is measured as a percentage
of the bank’s RWA (i.e. Risk Weighted Assets). It should also be recalled that
many bank State aid cases are characterised by various State aid measures. All
this means that the amount of aid can figure in three ways in the Commission
decisions: the absolute amount of aid; the relative amount of aid; and the total
amount of aid (in case the bank has benefited from more than one aid meas-
ure).
The absolute amount of aid
Sometimes, the exact amount of aid is difficult to establish. For instance, the
aid amount of asset relief measures has to be calculated. The quantification of
the aid element in an asset relief measure was discussed in chapter 9.
Also the quantification of the aid amount of recapitalisations is not
always straightforward. The case of Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) is a good
illustration of this. The Commission first recalled that the aid amount of a capi-
tal injection normally equals the nominal value of the recapitalisation. The Com-
mission then referred to the specific circumstances of the case: namely the
concrete features of the Seaview transaction (clear indication by investment
banks of their readiness to underwrite the whole issue independent of the State’s
participation; State’s participation on pari passu terms with private investors).
Consequently, the distortive effect of the recapitalisation was more limited than
in normal recapitalisations of companies in financial difficulties.17
With respect to the aid amount of a guarantee, it is established practice that
“as for companies in financial difficulty, if a bank is not able to raise sufficient
non-guaranteed debt to cover all its funding needs, the aid element of such
guarantees might go up to the level of their nominal value”.18
The total amount of aid
When a bank has benefited from various State aid measures, then the total
amount of aid has to be established. However, not all the aid amounts can be
added up: “The Commission recognises that it is not relevant to add together
the amounts of aid corresponding to recapitalisation with guarantees of liabilities
17. Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), N428/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 178.
18. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 175. See also: Dexia, C9/2009, 26 February
2010, para. 144-145; ING, 18 November 2009, para. 104; SachsenLB, 4 June 2008, para. 80.
This principle is also enshrined in point 4.1a of the ‘Commission Notice on the application
of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees’.
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as the two types of measures do not have the same effects of distortion of com-
petition”.19 The aid amount of guarantees is thus not taken into account for the
calculation of the amount of aid relative to the bank’s RWA in order to establish
whether an in-depth restructuring is necessary.20
The relative amount of aid
The aid amount of impaired asset measures and of capital injections are often
expressed in terms of the bank’s RWA.21 Usually, there are no problems in
establishing the bank’s RWA. However, in the case of Alpha Bank, the following
question arose. The aid measures were granted over the course of a one-year
period (fromApril 2012 until May 2013). During that period, the RWA of Alpha
Bank increased substantially (as a result of the acquisition of Emporiki Bank).
The question was therefore whether the RWA at the beginning of that period
or the RWA at the end of that period should be used (for the calculation of the
relative amount of aid). The Commission considered that “the fact that the Bank
acquired Emporiki Bank, well after March 2012, should not lead to a reduction
of the ratio “aid to RWA”. Indeed, the aid is not less distortive because the Bank
made an acquisition which increases its RWA”.22
13.2.4 Concluding remarks
In its decisional practice, the Commission has consistently taken into account
the (relative) amount of State aid (see subsection 13.2.2). This is in line with
point 31 of the Restructuring Communication which clearly establishes that
the amount of State aid is an assessment criterion.23
19. Dexia, C9/2009, 26 February 2010, para. 150.
20. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 175. See also: HSH Nordbank,
SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 215.
21. NB: It should be noted that the aid element of a guarantee is never expressed in terms of
RWA.
22. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 181.
23. As was discussed in section 10.2, the aid intensity was used as an indicator for the soundness
of the bank: if the aid was above 2% of the beneficiary bank’s RWA, then the bank was
considered to be distressed, and consequently, a restructuring plan had to be submitted. The
2%-threshold lost its relevance after the First Prolongation Communication. Nevertheless,
the aid intensity remained very relevant, since it was not only used as an indicator for the
soundness of the bank; as is explained in the present section, the relative aid amount is also
used as an indicator of the need for compensatory measures.
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13.3 Competitive impact: market position of the beneficiary bank
* The fact that the bank is one of the market leaders./The fact that the
beneficiary bank has a limited market presence.
* The fact that the market is concentrated./The fact that the market is
fragmented.
13.3.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
As a general rule, if the competitive impact of the State aid is low, then there is
less need for compensatory measures. Point 32 of the Restructuring Commu-
nication stipulates that the compensatory measures will be tailored to market
characteristics (such as: concentration levels, capacity constraints, and the
level of profitability, barriers to entry and to expansion). When analysing the
likely effects of State aid, the Commission takes into account the size and
importance of the beneficiary bank.
The market position of the beneficiary bank can be measured by its market
presence (in terms of market share). The fact that the beneficiary bank has a
limited market presence can be considered as a relevant characteristic, because
it is used as an indication that the distortions of competition are limited. Con-
sequently, the need for compensatory measures is reduced. By contrast, the fact
that the beneficiary bank is one of the market leaders underlines the need for
compensatory measures.
13.3.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these relevant
characteristics?
Consider the following recital from the decision on SNS REAAL:
“SNS REAAL is an important player on the Dutch banking and insurance
market. Until 2004, SNS Bank’s market share in mortgages (new produc-
tion) ranged between 5 and 8%. Between 2004 and 2008, it increased to
10%, but then from 2008 to 2011 it decreased to approximately 5% before
dropping still further to 2% in 2012. The market share in savings (volumes)
was approximately 10% in 2012. In the market segment of individual life,
REAAL Insurance had a market share of 18.3% (2012) and held the third-
largest book12. In the market segment of group life, the corresponding
figures are a market share of 10.9% (2012) and the fifth-largest book. In the
property and casualty market (“P&C”), REAAL is the eighth-largest player
with a market share of around 5%”.24
24. SNS REAAL, SA.36598, 19 December 2013, para. 10.
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This is a recital from the 2013 Restructuring Decision on SNS REAAL. Note
that the market position is mentioned and elaborated. However, this recital
is not mentioned in the assessment-part of the decision, but in the description-
part. Thus, the market position is only mentioned as a description of the
beneficiary bank; it is not mentioned as an indication of the competitive impact
of the State aid. The market position is thus not really used as an assessment
criterion. SNS REAAL is not the only decision that does not explicitly use
the market position as an assessment criterion. In fact, in several decisions, the
Commission did not explicitly take into account the market characteristics in its
assessment of the competitive impact of the aid.
It should be pointed out that many cases contain the commitment that the ben-
eficiary bank will reduce its market presence. This is also a relevant characte-
ristic – as will be explained in sections 13.6 and 13.7. However, it should be
stressed that it is not the same relevant characteristic as the one discussed in the
current section. The fact that the bank has a limited market presence is relevant,
because it gives information on the competition distortions. The fact that the
bank will reduce its market presence is relevant, because it is a compensatory
measure; it is a solution to the competition distortions.
To conclude, in some decisions, market presence is not mentioned as an indi-
cation of the competitive impact. Why do not all cases mention whether the bank
has a limited or large market presence? In many cases, the need for compensa-
tory measures follows from the fact that the banks have received State aid,
without taking into account the market position of the beneficiary bank. Dis-
tortions of competition are thus inferred from the very fact that banks received
State aid. But why do some cases mention the market position of the bank,
while other decisions do not? A possible explanation could be that the fact that
the bank has a limited market presence is a mitigating circumstance. A large
market share would amount to an aggravating circumstance. A normal market
share would be a neutral factor. It could therefore be argued that the market
presence should only be mentioned if it constitutes a mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
13.3.3 How are these relevant characteristics elaborated in the decisions?
The following recitals from the decision on Kommunalkredit Austria (KA) can
serve as an illustration of how the Commission takes into account the market
characteristics:
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“Regarding the size and the relative importance of the bank on its market
(para. 32 Restructuring Communication), the Commission notes that KA
was a relatively small market player, both in absolute and in relative terms,
and on its domestic market as well as abroad. Also, the bank is focused
only on public and infrastructure finance”.25
“As regard the characteristics of the market on which KA operates, the
Commission notes that the structure of the public finance and the project
finance market both in Austria and in Europe remains relatively fragmen-
ted. Given the small size of KA Neu and its limited market share on its
domestic market, let alone on the European market and on each national
market on which it intends to be present, the Commission deems the likely
effects on both the public finance and project finance markets to be rather
limited”.26 [Italics mine, REvL]
Several observations can be made on the basis of the above-mentioned recit-
als. Firstly, the Commission explicitly refers to point 32 of the Restructuring
Communication, which provides that the nature and form of compensatory
measures depend on the characteristics of the markets on which the beneficiary
bank will operate. Secondly, a link was made between the market characteris-
tics and the competitive impact of the aid. Thirdly, the Commission identified
the relevant market (i.e. public finance and project finance). In addition, the
Commission made a distinction between the national market and the European
market. Furthermore, the Commission also mentioned that the relevant market
was relatively fragmented.
To what extent is the above-mentioned recital of the decision on KA illus-
trative of the Commission’s approach with respect to the market characteristics?
This PhD-study has analysed all the Commission decisions to find out how the
market position of the beneficiary bank has been taken into account by the Com-
mission. This analysis yields the following results:
With respect to the first observation: point 32 of the Restructuring Com-
munication
It should be noted that the Commission does not always refer in every deci-
sion to point 32 of the Restructuring Communication. This is, however, not sig-
nificant. The crucial question is not whether the Commission refers to point 32;
instead the crucial question is whether the Commission actually applies point
32.
25. Kommunalkredit Austria (KA), SA.32745, 31 March 2011, para. 95.
26. Kommunalkredit Austria (KA), SA.32745, 31 March 2011, para. 104.
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With respect to the second observation: competitive impact
It should be noted that in several decisions, a link was explicitly made between
the market presence of the beneficiary bank and the competitive impact of the
State aid (and the subsequent need for compensatory measures). For instance, in
the decision on the Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU), the Commission
considered that, since LCCU had a limited market presence, the competitive
impact of the State aid was limited and that there was thus less need for com-
pensatory measures.27
Conversely, in some decisions, the Commission held that the beneficiary
bank was one of the market leaders. To give an example, in the decision on RBS,
the Commission considered that the aid allowed the bank to keep its leading
position.28 Consequently, measures were necessary in order to remedy this
distortion of competition created by the aid.
The link between the market position of the bank and the need for com-
pensatory measures explains the relevance of the market position. In that regard,
it should be noted that this link is not always made explicit in every decision.
Indeed, subsection 13.3.2 discussed that there are decisions that do not mention
the market position of the beneficiary banks in relation to the competitive impact
of the aid (or in relation to the need for compensatory measures).
With respect to the third observation: market characteristics
The decision on KA is one of the decisions that really elaborates the market
characteristics. The market characteristics can be elaborated on the basis of
the following aspects: i) the identification of the relevant product market,
ii) the identification of the relevant geographic market, iii) the concentration
level of the market, and iv) other market characteristics, such as entry barriers
and switching costs.
As regards the first aspect, it should be noted that the bank State aid decisions
do not give much information on the identification of the relevant product
market. This stands in sharp contrast to the detailed analysis of the relevant
product market in one of the other fields of EU competition law: merger con-
trol.29
In the decision on KA, the Commission made a distinction between the national
market and the European market. The relevance of the geographic market
also appears in some other decisions. For instance, Bank of Ireland was one of
the market leaders in Ireland. But Bank of Ireland had only a limited market
27. Lithuanian Central Credit Union (LCCU), SA.34208, 26 September 2012, para. 69.
28. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 241.
29. See also: J. Fingleton, F. Ruane and V. Ryan, ‘Market Definition and State aid Control’,
1999.
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share in the UK. The run-off of the UK loan portfolios was therefore sufficient
to address competition distortions. This illustrates the importance of how the
relevant geographical market is defined. In the decision on Dunfermline, a
distinction was made between the UK market and part of that market (i.e. the
market in Scotland). In some decisions, the Commission took into account
the fact that the beneficiary bank mainly operated regionally. This was the case
with several Danish banks30 and Spanish banks. For instance, the Commission
noted that Banco CAM had a limited market presence in the national market,
but a very strong regional presence.31 Notwithstanding the fact that the relevant
geographic market is mentioned quite prominently in these decisions, there are
many decisions that do not clearly identify the relevant geographic market.
Besides market presence, there are other market characteristics. One of them
is the fact that the market is concentrated. Indeed, in several decisions, the
Commission mentioned that the relevant market was concentrated. Conversely,
in the decision on KA, the Commission mentioned that the relevant market
was fragmented. An interesting observation is that the fact that the market is
concentrated is often32 mentioned in combination with the fact that the ben-
eficiary bank is one of the leading market players.33 Another observation is that
only a few decisions mention whether the relevant market is concentrated or
fragmented.
The other market characteristics identified in point 32 of the Restructuring
Communication, such as switching rates and entry barriers, are usually not
mentioned in the decisions.34 It can be concluded that in many decisions, the
analysis of the market characteristics is limited to an analysis of the market
shares of the bank.
30. Fionia Bank, N560/2009, 25 October 2010, para. 85.
31. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 166.
32. See the decisions on ING, LBG and RBS.
33. See, for instance, the following recital from the decision on ING: “The Commission has
identified such market conditions in particular in the Netherlands where the retail banking
market is highly concentrated and ING is one of the leading players able to maintain its high
market share with the help of State aid.” (ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 144).
34. The decision on RBS (N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 241) is one of the few decisions
that mentions switching rates. The decision on Dexia (C9/2009, 26 February 2010, para. 210)
is one of the few decisions that mentions entry barriers.
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13.3.4 Concluding remarks
An inconsistency can occur at two levels. In the first place, there is an incon-
sistency when the Commission does not always apply the market position of
the bank as a criterion to assess the competitive impact of the aid. In the second
place, there is an inconsistency when the Commission does not elaborate the
market position in a consistent manner.
As regards the first level, subsection 13.3.2 set out that almost all decisions
mention the market position of the beneficiary bank. In that regard, a distinction
should be made between the decisions that mention the market position as a
description of the beneficiary bank and the decisions that mention the market
position as a criterion to assess the competitive impact of the aid. Only the latter
decisions can be categorised as decisions in which the Commission took
into account the market position in its assessment. The finding that the market
position is not always used as an assessment criterion points at an inconsistency.
As regards the second level, subsection 13.3.3 set out that the market characte-
ristics are not always elaborated to the same extent. Some decisions contain
more detailed information than other decisions.
Thus, the main finding is that at both levels, there is an inconsistency. What are
the implications of this finding? It might be useful to recall that in its Restruc-
turing Communication, the Commission provides that the compensatory
measures will be “tailored to market characteristics”.35 In my opinion, the
Commission should ‘practice what it preaches’ and should thus take into
account the market characteristics in its assessment of the compensatory
measures.
35. Point 32 of the Restructuring Communication.
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Part II: Compensatory measures
13.4 Market-opening measures
* The fact that the beneficiary bank will implement market-opening measures.
13.4.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Beneficiary banks should take compensatory measures (i.e. measures to com-
pensate for the competition distortions). There are different types of compensa-
tory measures. Market-opening measures are a type of compensatory measure.
The fact that the beneficiary bank will implement market-opening measures is
thus a relevant characteristic.
The relevance of market-opening measures is also recognised in the Restruc-
turing Communication. Point 33 of the Restructuring Communication stresses
that the Commission will view positively measures that help to ensure that
national markets remain open and contestable. An open and contestable market
means that potential competitors can easily enter the market. Such markets are
characterised by low entry barriers.
13.4.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The analysis of the decisional practice reveals that there are not many cases
that are characterised by market-opening measures. In fact, these measures can
only be found in the cases of the Irish banks.36
In Ireland, seven financial institutions received State aid (Bank of Ireland,
Anglo/INBS, AIB/EBS, Quinn Insurance, IL&P), while only the restructuring
plans of Bank of Ireland, AIB/EBS and IL&P contained market-opening
measures. There are no market-opening measures in the cases of Anglo/INBS
and Quinn Insurance. This could be explained by the fact that Bank of Ireland,
AIB/EBS and IL&P continued their economic activities (i.e. C-context),
whereas Anglo/INBS and Quinn Insurance were wound-down (i.e. W-context).
It should be pointed out that market-opening measures only appear in the
cases on the Irish banks. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that ben-
eficiary banks in other Member States committed to reduce their activities in
36. In that regard, Franchoo, Baeten & Solek (2015, p. 613) remark that – apart from Ireland –
the Member States have been “less than creative”.
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their home market, while the Irish banks benefiting from State aid did not reduce
their activities in Ireland. The balance sheet reductions in the case of Bank of
Ireland concerned mainly the UK and international markets.37
13.4.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The restructuring plan of Bank of Ireland38, of AIB/EBS39 and of IL&P40
provided for two market-opening measures. These banks would offer a so-called
Service Package41 and a Customer Mobility Package42 to new entrants or to
small43 banks already active in Ireland.
In addition to the market-opening measures undertaken by the beneficiary
banks, the Irish State committed to take several measures to improve competi-
tion on the Irish markets.44 For instance, the Irish State committed to enhance
customer mobility. These commitments were noted positively by the Commis-
sion.
All these measures stimulate new entry on the Irish banking market and hence
limit the distortions of competition caused by the State aid. These measures
were especially important in the Irish markets, because the Irish banking market
was seriously affected by the financial crisis. As a result of the crisis, Irish banks
reduced their balance sheets and some even retrenched from the market.45
37. Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 179. See also para. 175: “There is still
no sign that foreign competitors, whether incumbent or new, are willing to increase their
presence in the Irish market in the short-term. When assessing the measures addressing
distortion of competition associated to the restructuring of Bank of Ireland, the Commission
has therefore to take into consideration the lack of potential investors on the short-term, and
the retrenching of several foreign banks from Ireland.”
38. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 254.
39. AIB/EBS, SA.29786, 7 May 2014, para. 127-130.
40. IL&P, SA.33442, 9 April 2015, para. 92.
41. The Service Package was aimed at reducing the cost of entry or the cost of expansion, because
the services have to be offered on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. It is specified
that the services are provided at incremental costs.
42. The Customer Mobility Package was aimed at reducing the costs of customer acquisition.
Pursuant to the Customer Mobility Package, competitors may contact the customers of
Bank of Ireland, AIB/EBS and IL&P and present them with alternative products for their
current accounts or their credit card products. The Commission noted that this customer
approach was more targeted and less costly than general advertising measures.
43. ‘Small’ was defined as a market share below 15%. See: Bank of Ireland, N546/2009,
15 July 2010, para. 137.
44. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 257-274; Bank of Ireland, SA.33443,
20 December 2011, para. 192.
45. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 245.
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13.4.4 Concluding remarks
Compensatory measures are needed in every bank State aid case. Never-
theless, the total package of compensatory measures does not have to be the
same in each case. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that market-opening
measures only appear in a few cases. It is thus not a very common compensatory
measure.
13.5 Divestments: creation of a new competitor
* The fact that the divestment is aimed at creating a new competitor.
13.5.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
(Almost) all restructuring plans contain structural remedies, such as divest-
ments. Restructuring plans are aimed at three pillars, and this is reflected by
the fact that divestments can have three different purposes. Sometimes, banks
are required to divest certain loss-making activities or activities that are no
longer part of their core business. These divestments are aimed at restoring
viability (i.e. the first pillar). In section 12.3, it was explained that divestments
of profitable non-core subsidiaries constitute an own contribution of the bank
(i.e. the second pillar). Divestments can also be aimed at increasing competi-
tion on the market (i.e. the third pillar). Those divestments are discussed in the
present section.
Some divestments are specifically aimed at increasing competition on the
market by introducing a challenger or by reinforcing a small existing player.
To give an example: the restructuring plan of ING envisaged a large number of
divestments.46 One of these divestments consisted of the carve-out of WUH/
Interadvies.47 The decision on ING specified that this carved-out new company
should be a viable standalone player on the Dutch retail banking market.48 In
other words: this divestment was aimed at creating a new competitor on the
Dutch banking market.
46. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 57.
47. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 55 and 85. WUH/Interadvies was an ING business
unit under the umbrella of Nationale Nederlanden Insurance unit and comprised Westland
Utrecht Hypotheekbank, Westland Utrecht Effectenbank and Nationale Nederlanden Hypo-
theekbedrijf, Nationale Nederlanden Financiele Diensten.
48. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 85.
LIMITING COMPETITION DISTORTIONS
425
13.5.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
A key observation is that although many bank State aid cases are characterised
by divestments, only in a few cases, the divestment is specifically aimed at
creating a new competitor. Indeed, only in the cases of KBC, ING, LBG, RBS,
Ethias, Bank of Ireland and Parex banka, the divestments were aimed at creating
a new competitor.49
How can the absence of the relevant characteristic in so many cases be
explained? One feature that the Restructuring Decisions on KBC, ING, LBG,
RBS, Ethias, Bank of Ireland and Parex banka have in common is that they
were all adopted in 2009 and 2010. Decisions that were adopted in later years do
not include this type of divestment. This could indicate a change of approach.
This, in turn, could explain why this type of divestment does not figure in every
restructuring decision. It should, however, be remarked that the Commission
never explicitly recognised a change of approach with respect to this type of
divestment.
While there may be valid reasons to change the approach towards this
specific type of divestment, changing the approach without a clear explanation
points at an inconsistency.
13.5.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
Several observations can be made. First of all, the Commission usually refers to
the market characteristics. For instance, in the decision on ING, the Commis-
sion considered that the carve-out of WUH/Interadvies should be able to add
competition in the highly concentrated retail banking market in the Netherlands.
The Commission also took into account the fact that ING was one of the market
leaders.50 These two market characteristics reinforce the need for compensatory
measures such as the divestment.
Second, the divestment business should constitute an attractive target. For
instance, in the decision on the Belgian bank KBC, the Commission pointed out
that Centea and Fidea – i.e. the entities that KBC had to divest –were “attractive
targets for competitors wishing to enter the Belgian market, because Centea
and Fidea have a well-established brand name and distribution networks”.51
49. It should be pointed out that this type of divestment was mentioned in some other
decisions. This was the case with Anglo Irish Bank, EBS and Dunfermline. For instance,
in the Opening Decision on Anglo Irish Bank (31 March 2010, para. 141), the Commission
observed that Anglo Irish Bank had not considered any divestment or structural measure in
Ireland that could facilitate entry or expansion of a competitor.
50. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 144-145.
51. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 176.
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Similarly, in the decision on Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the Commission
considered the Rainbow Business – i.e. the entity that RBS had to divest – to be
“a sufficiently attractive target for some competitors wishing to enter the UK
market or expand their presence there”.52
The third observation concerns the feasibility of creating a viable standalone
entity. It is of importance that the divested entity should be a viable standalone
entity. In the decision on Dunfermline, the Commission remarked that
Dunfermline was very small, since it had less than 40 branches. Consequently,
the Commission concluded that it did not seem likely that a viable entity could
be divested from it.53 So the fact that the beneficiary bank is very small has a
negative impact on the feasibility of creating a new competitor. In the decision
on KBC, the Commission noted that Centea and Fidea were relatively easy to
separate from KBC’s Belgian business unit.54 The fact that the divestment
business is relatively easy to separate has a positive impact on the feasibility of
creating a viable standalone entity.55
The fourth observation concerns the divestment-related commitments. This
observation merits some further discussion: see subsections 13.5.3.1 to 13.5.3.3.
13.5.3.1 Value preservation commitments
It usually takes some time before the divestment is achieved. In fact, it can
even take years. In the meantime, the divestment business should remain viable.
This follows from the very logic of this type of divestments; which is aimed
at creating a new competitor. The divestment business should thus not be
hollowed out by the beneficiary bank. Many decisions in which the divestment
is specifically aimed at creating a new competitor therefore contain several
divestment-related commitments to ensure that the divestment business remains
viable, marketable and competitive. These commitments are sometimes referred
to as ‘value preservation commitments’.
One of the commitments is the appointment of a Hold Separate Manager. The
divestment business has to be managed as a distinct and saleable entity. This is
why in many cases a Hold Separate Manager is appointed for the divestment
business. In many decisions, it is specified that the hold separate manager can be
the current CEO of the divestment business.
52. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 244.
53. Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 129.
54. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 173.
55. This characteristic could have been elaborated by other characteristics (that explain why it is
easy to separate), but this is not done in the Commission decisions.
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Another commitment concerns the employees of the divestment business.
For instance, Ethias committed to encourage all key personnel56 to remain
with the divestment business.57 Sometimes this commitment is not formulated
as an obligation, but as a prohibition: RBS committed that it would not actively
target employees working within the divestment business to transfer to RBS.
The value preservation commitment can also concern the clients of the
divestment business. This commitment entails that the beneficiary bank has to
refrain from actively soliciting clients of the divestment business.
A very general value preservation commitment is the commitment not to
carry out any act that might have a significant adverse impact on the value,
management or competitiveness of the divestment businesses. Sometimes this
commitment is formulated as follows: “LBG shall carry on the Divestment
Business as a going concern in the ordinary and usual course as carried on prior
to the Relevant Date”.
Most decisions in which the divestment is specifically aimed at creating a new
competitor contain the same value preservation commitments. Nevertheless,
there are some (minor) differences. For instance, the commitment related to
targeting the clients of the divestment business only appears in a few decisions.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the commitments are not always formu-
lated in the same way.58 Notwithstanding those small variations, the cases do not
really differ on the value preservation commitments.
13.5.3.2 Purchaser requirements
In some cases, there are requirements that have to be met by the purchaser of
the divestment business. This can be illustrated by the decision on Royal Bank
of Scotland (RBS). This bank committed to divest the Rainbow Business. The
purchaser of the Rainbow Business had to meet the requirements listed in
recital 99 of the decision. In the assessment-part of the decision, the Commission
elaborated two of the purchaser requirements. The Commission noted posi-
tively that there was a special commitment that the buyer’s share in the SME
market might not exceed 14%59 after the purchase of the divested entity.60 The
56. In the Annex of the Decision, ‘key personnel’ is defined as “all personnel necessary to
maintain the viability and competitiveness of the divestment business”.
57. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, annex point 40. NB: not only with respect to Nateus, but
also with respect to Ethias Banque and BelRe.
58. Sometimes they are formulated as a positive obligation (for instance the commitment to
encourage employees to remain with the divestment business) and sometimes as a negative
obligation (for instance, to not target the employees of the divestment business).
59. The Commission indicated that this percentage of 14% was the result of an analysis by the
Office of Fair Trading (OFT).
60. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 246.
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rationale of this commitment was to prevent that the divestment would not
result in the strengthening of another leading market player. The condition that
the buyer had to be vetted by the FSAwas also noted positively. The Commis-
sion welcomed these purchaser requirements, since these requirements would
ensure “that the planned divestment of the Rainbow Business would lead to
increased competition on the concentrated UK banking sector by introducing a
challenger or reinforcing a small existing player”.61
The purchaser requirements that appear in the other decisions are not always
expressed in the same terms as in the decision on RBS, but they more or less
amount to the same. Most of these decisions contain the condition that the
purchaser of the divestment business should be independent of and uncon-
nected to the beneficiary bank. The ATE-decision mentions that “the notion of
independence follows from the rationale of a compensatory measure, which
requires a bank to dispose of an asset and not to sell it to a connected entity like a
subsidiary or shareholder (independence is not hampered by a very small inter-
connection that does not give the other party a significant influence)”.62 The
RBS-decision even contained an elaboration of ‘independent and unconnected’.
The condition that the purchaser must have the financial resources, proven
expertise and incentive to maintain and develop the Divestment Business can
also be found in many decisions. The RBS-decision included the condition
that the capability of the purchaser to develop the divestment business should
be analysed by the financial supervisory authority.
Some decisions contain the requirement that the purchaser “must neither be
likely to create prima facie competition concerns nor give rise to a risk that the
implementation of the commitments will be delayed”.63
The only purchaser requirement that does not typically figure in every deci-
sion is the requirement that market share may not exceed x%. It should be
recalled that the decision on RBS included the requirement that the market
share of the purchaser would not be higher than 14%. This specific purchaser
requirement only appeared in the decision on RBS, LBG and KBC. The other
decisions containing purchaser requirements do not include this specific pur-
chaser requirement. In the LBG-decision, the requirement was formulated in
similar terms as in the RBS-decision. The KBC-decision contained purchaser
requirements with respect to Centea and Fidea.64 These subsidiaries may not be
61. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 246.
62. ATE, N429/2010, 23 May 2011, annex point 10.
63. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, annex 2.5.
64. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 85.
LIMITING COMPETITION DISTORTIONS
429
bought by a bank with a post-acquisition market share of greater than […]%.
The case of KBC is somewhat special, since the market share ceiling is the only
purchaser requirement; the other purchaser requirements are not mentioned in
the KBC-decision.
In my opinion, the relevance of most of these purchaser requirements is quite
limited. To some extent, they are self-evident. The condition that the purcha-
ser should be independent and unconnected to the beneficiary bank follows
from the very logic of creating a new competitor. The condition that the financial
supervisory authority should verify that the purchaser has the “financial
resources, proven expertise and incentive to maintain and develop the Divest-
ment Business” also does not contribute much. The existing financial regula-
tions already provide that acquisitions of financial institutions should be
authorised by the relevant financial supervisory authority. Only the condition
that the market share of the purchaser must not exceed x% has real relevance.
13.5.3.3 An inconsistency?
As explained above, there is a link between divestment-related commitments
and divestments aimed at creating a new competitor. However, this link is not
consistently made in the decisions.
The decisions on RBS, LBG, KBC, Ethias, ING, Bank of Ireland, Parex,
LBBW, Sparkasse KölnBonn, ATE contain value-preservation commitments.65
With the exception of LBBW, all these cases are also characterised by purchaser
requirements.66 Most of these cases are characterised by divestments aimed at
creating a new competitor. So the fact that these cases contain value-preservation
commitments and purchaser requirements makes sense.
However, there are also divestment-related commitments in the cases of
LBBW, Sparkasse KölnBonn and ATE. This is somewhat peculiar, because
the divestments in these cases were not specifically aimed at creating a new
competitor. For instance, the restructuring plan for LBBW envisaged that
LBBW would divest a large number of subsidiaries. In the Restructuring Deci-
sion, it is not clearly mentioned whether those divestments were aimed at
65. RBS, para. 102-103 and 245; LBG, para. 189; KBC, para. 86; Ethias, annex point 40-45;
ING, 18 November 2009, para. 147; Bank of Ireland, 15 July 2010, para. 147; Parex
banka, 15 September 2010, para. 74-75; LBBW, para. 103; Sparkasse KölnBonn, annex
section C; ATE, 23 May 2011, annex section C.
66. RBS, para. 99; LBG, para. 105; KBC, annex xxiii; Ethias, annex 2.5; ING; Bank of Ireland,
15 July 2010, para. 146; Parex banka; Sparkasse KölnBonn, annex section D; ATE, 23 May
2011, annex section D.
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creating challenger banks. However, one of the commitments was “to ensure
that the value of the units to be sold would not be affected by the fact that
customers or staff would be lured away from these units”.67 This seems to be a
value preservation commitment. This is somewhat surprising, because the
divestment was not specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
Another case featuring divestment-related commitments is the case of Spar-
kasse KölnBonn. Section C of the Annex of the Restructuring Decision contains
divestment-related commitments. However, the rationale of these divestment-
related commitments cannot be found in the assessment-part of the decision. The
same observation can be made with respect to ATE (2011). While the annex of
a Commission decision constitutes an integral part of the decision68, one would
expect that the rationale of commitments enshrined in the annex can be found
in the recitals of the decision. However, in the case of Sparkasse KölnBonn
and ATE (2011), the divestment-related commitments enshrined in the annex of
the decisions cannot be linked to the recitals of the decision. In my opinion, this
is incoherent.
In addition to being incoherent, the fact that this link is missing in these
decisions amounts to an inconsistency, since the decisions on RBS, LBG, KBC,
Ethias, ING, Bank of Ireland and Parex do contain a link between divestment-
related commitments and divestments aimed at creating a new competitor.
And even with respect to the cases in which the divestment was aimed at
creating a new competitor, the link between this type of divestment and the
divestment-related commitments is not consistently made. For instance, the
purchaser requirements in the case of RBS only concerned the Rainbow Busi-
ness. This makes sense, since only the divestment of the Rainbow Business
was aimed at creating a new competitor, whereas the other divestments had
other purposes (i.e. own contribution of the bank). By contrast, the purchaser
requirements in the case of Ethias concern the divestment of Ethias banque,
Nateus Group and Belré, while only the divestment of Nateus Group was aimed
at creating a new competitor.
Thus, the main finding is that in some cases, the divestment-related commit-
ments apply to all divestments, whereas in some other cases, the divestment-
related commitments only apply to the divestments that are specifically aimed at
creating a new competitor. This finding points at an inconsistency.
67. LBBW, 15 December 2009, para. 103.
68. NordLB, 25 July 2012, para. 88; OVAG, 19 September 2012, para. 71.
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13.5.4 Amendments
In total, seven banks committed to divest or carve out a subsidiary in order to
create a new competitor. It is noteworthy that in six of these seven cases,
the divestment proved to be quite difficult to achieve within the stipulated
timeframe.69 With respect to these six cases, the Commission accepted amend-
ments. In particular, the divestment deadline was extended in four cases (RBS,
LBG, Parex banka and KBC), while in two cases (Bank of Ireland and ING), the
divestment-commitment was changed.
In the cases of RBS, LBG, Parex banka and KBC, the Commission extended
the divestment deadline.70 The case of RBSmight serve as an illustration. Under
the original restructuring plan, RBS had committed to divest the Rainbow
Business. However, RBS was unable to complete this divestment before the
deadline of 31 December 2013. The UK State therefore requested the Commis-
sion to extend the divestment deadline. The Commission noted that RBS had
genuinely tried to divest the Rainbow Business within the stipulated time-
frame.71 The Commission called this “a positive element in [its] assessment”.72
In the case of Bank of Ireland, the divestment-commitment was superseded
by more recent events. Under the first restructuring plan, Bank of Ireland
planned to divest its Irish broker mortgage business (ICS). The Commission
remarked that “ICS is an attractive acquisition for a bank willing to set up a new
business in Ireland, or willing to expand its existing business”.73 Under the
second restructuring plan of Bank of Ireland, the commitment to divest ICS was
changed dramatically: the divestment of ICS was no longer deemed appro-
priate.74 Bank of Ireland faced deposit outflows, which made the divestment
of ICS contradictory with the goal of ensuring the long-term viability of Bank
of Ireland.
ING had committed to divest WUH/Interadvies. ING had contacted many
market parties, but there was no real interest in WUH/Interadvies.75 Therefore,
the Netherlands proposed to amend the commitment to divest WUH/Interadvies.
ING would integrate parts of WUH/Interadvies with Nationale Nederlanden
69. Only Ethias succeeded in divesting its subsidiary Nateus within the agreed timeframe.
70. KBC, MC11/2009, 16 December 2010, para. 37-49.
71. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), SA.38304, 9 April 2014, para. 84.
72. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), SA.38304, 9 April 2014, para. 86.
73. Bank of Ireland, N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 251.
74. Bank of Ireland, SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 183.
75. ING, SA.29832, 16 November 2012, para. 25.
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Bank (NN Bank)76 and divest that integrated entity as part of ING Insurance
Europe.77 In the 2012 Restructuring Decision, the Commission accepted the
amendment of the divestment-commitment.78
13.5.5 Concluding remarks
While almost every bank State aid case is characterised by divestments, not
all divestments are specifically aimed at creating a new competitor. Indeed, as
set out in the present section, only in the cases of KBC, ING, LBG, RBS,
Ethias, Bank of Ireland and Parex banka, the divestments were aimed at crea-
ting a new competitor. Why only in these cases? Why are the other bank State
aid cases not characterised by this type of divestment? Remarkably, the Com-
mission did not clarify why this type of divestment was not needed in all cases.
While there may be valid reasons to change the approach towards this specific
type of divestment, changing the approach without a clear explanation points at
an inconsistency.
Subsection 13.5.4 discussed the amendment decisions in the cases that were
characterised by divestments aimed at creating a new competitor. These
amendment decisions illustrate that this type of divestment is not very easy to
implement. This raises questions as to its effectiveness. From this viewpoint,
it might be a good thing that this type of divestment is no longer required by the
Commission.
Needless to say that downsizing is still an essential element of the restruc-
turing plan; this particular restructuring measure will be set out in detail in the
next section.
13.6 Downsizing (I): balance sheet reduction
* The fact that the restructuring plan provides for a reduction of the balance
sheet size of the beneficiary bank.
13.6.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
Downsizing is aimed at reducing the market presence of the beneficiary bank.
It is a compensatory measure; i.e. a measure to limit distortions of competi-
tion caused by the State aid. Downsizing can be measured in several ways: a
bank can downsize in terms of balance sheet size, scope of activities, branch
76. NN Bank was the recently established banking division of Nationale Nederlanden.
77. ING, SA.29832, 16 November 2012, para. 5.
78. ING, SA.29832, 16 November 2012, para. 194.
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network (“geographical footprint”) and staff. Downsizing in terms of balance
sheet size will be discussed in the current section, while section 13.7 will
discuss downsizing in terms of branch and staff reduction.
It should be recalled that the divestments discussed in section 13.5 were
specifically aimed at creating a new competitor on the market (“challenger
bank”). The divestments discussed in the current section have a more general
objective: namely reducing the market presence of the beneficiary bank.
13.6.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The concept of the relevant context is particularly relevant here. The balance
sheet reduction is a very important compensatory measure for banks that
continue to exist as a standalone entity (i.e. the C-context). The other contexts
are also characterised by downsizing. However, this downsizing takes a diffe-
rent form. In the S/T/W-context and in the S/C/W-context, the bank is split-up.
The split-up of the bank obviously results in the downsizing of the bank, but
this downsizing is not achieved by a balance sheet reduction.79 In the T-context,
the (majority of the) bank’s activities are transferred to another bank. In this
context, downsizing can be relevant. However, this mainly concerns downsizing
of the territorial presence through a reduction of the branch network.80 This will
be discussed in section 13.7. Finally, the winding-down of a beneficiary bank
is the most extreme form of downsizing. Thus, in the W-context, the bank will
eventually exit the market. In other words: the market presence of the bene-
ficiary bank will be reduced to zero.
The table in Annex XII gives an overview of the banks that were subject to
downsizing in the form of a balance sheet reduction. As can be seen, most cases
in the C-context are characterised by a balance sheet reduction. In three cases,
however, structural remedies were not needed: the Hungarian bank FHB, the
Lithuanian LCCU and the Bulgarian bank FIB. So there is no balance sheet
reduction in these three cases, but there is a justification.
I am of the opinion that the principle of equal treatment does not require
that there is a balance sheet reduction in each and every case. However, it does
require that the Commission takes, in each and every case, the balance sheet
79. Nevertheless, the balance sheet reduction is sometimes mentioned in cases in the S/C/W-
context: in the decision on Kommunalkredit Austria (SA.32745, 31 March 2011, para. 96),
the Commission mentioned that the restructuring plan included a significant downsizing of
the bank: the balance sheet total would be reduced by more than 60%.
80. NB: sometimes it takes the form of a reduction of the scope of activities. See Amagerbanken
and Eik banki.
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reduction into consideration when assessing the compatibility of the State aid.
There was a justification for the absence of a balance sheet reduction in the cases
of FHB, LCCU and FIB. The fact that this justification is mentioned in these
three decisions illustrates that the Commission has always taken into account
the current relevant characteristic.
To conclude, there is therefore nothing that would indicate that the Commission
has not consistently taken into account this relevant characteristic.
13.6.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
With respect to the elaboration of the balance sheet reduction, the following
questions are of importance. Firstly, is the percentage of the balance sheet
reduction always mentioned in combination with the relative aid amount?
Secondly, does it matter how the balance sheet reduction is achieved (i.e. does
it matter which activities are divested)? Thirdly, are there circumstances
that justify a lower degree of downsizing? Fourthly, does it matter if certain
divestments are needed from a viability-perspective? And finally, does the
timeframe of the divestments matter? These five questions will be addressed
in the following five subsections.
13.6.3.1 The relevance of the aid intensity
To some extent, the balance sheet reduction is related to the relative amount
of State aid: one would expect that the larger the relative amount of aid, the
larger the balance sheet reduction.81 It should, however, be kept in mind
that the competition distortions are not only influenced by the amount of aid,
but also by other factors such as the market presence. Furthermore, the balance
sheet reduction is not the only compensatory measure. All this raises the fol-
lowing question: is the percentage of the balance sheet reduction always
mentioned in combination with the relative aid amount?
On the basis of the analysis of the decisional practice, the following obser-
vations can be made.
In the first place, there are decisions that show the following pattern.82 Firstly,
the aid amount (as a percentage of the bank’s RWA) is mentioned. Secondly, it
is concluded that the aid amount must be reflected in the compensatory mea-
sures. Thirdly, the compensatory measures are discussed, one of which is the
81. To some extent, the compensatory measures are related to the competitive impact of the
aid. Nevertheless, some compensatory measures are always required by the Commission,
irrespective of the precise competitive impact. The prime example is the acquisition ban.
This compensatory measure is always required (in cases in the C-context).
82. The Restructuring Decision on MPS (SA.36175, 27 November 2013, para. 152-155) is a
good example.
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balance sheet reduction. So there is some relation between the percentage of
the balance sheet reduction and the aid amount, but it is not a direct relation
(since the balance sheet reduction is only one of the compensatory measures).
In the second place, there are decisions in which the percentage of balance
sheet reduction was explicitly mentioned in combination with the aid amount.
For instance, in the Restructuring Decision on HSH Nordbank, the Commis-
sion noted that “the reduction of HSH by more than half83 is appropriate,
given the distortions of competition stemming from the large amount of aid
received”.84 Another example is the Opening Decision on HRE, in which the
Commission expressed its view that it expected additional measures: the
Commission considered that the balance sheet reduction of 25% in the case of
HRE seemed insufficient in view of the aid amount.85
In the third place, there are decisions in which the percentage of the balance
sheet reduction was not mentioned at all. For instance, the decision on IL&P
indicates that the bank will reduce the size of its balance sheet to a level of EUR
[20-30] billion, but a specific percentage is not mentioned.
To conclude, the decisional practice does not show a consistent picture of the
relation between the aid amount and the balance sheet reduction.
13.6.3.2 The percentage of the balance sheet reduction
In some decisions, the emphasis is on the way how the balance sheet reduction
is achieved (i.e. which activities are divested), while in other decisions,
the emphasis is on the percentage of the balance sheet reduction. This raises
the question what is more important: the percentage or the divestments? Is the
main goal of downsizing that a certain percentage is reached? Or that certain
83. Pursuant to the restructuring plan, HSH Nordbank would reduce its balance sheet by 61%
by the end of 2014 compared to 2008.
84. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 266.
85. Hypo Real Estate (HRE), C15/2009, 24 July 2009, para. 66. Sometimes, there is a difference
between the Opening Decision and the Restructuring Decision. For instance, in the Opening
Decision on EBS, “the Commission criticised that the proposed balance sheet reduction was
far less substantial than the Commission would normally have expected from a bank having
received such a high amount of aid, both in absolute terms and in terms of risk weighted
assets” (AIB/EBS, 7 May 2014, para. 91). The Opening Decision thus stressed the relation
between the aid amount and the balance sheet reduction. However, in the Restructuring
Decision on AIB/EBS, the Commission did not mention the balance sheet reduction in its
assessment of the compensatory measures. The case was characterised by a balance sheet
reduction, but this was only mentioned in the context of the viability.
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activities are divested? In other words: is reaching a certain percentage of the
balance sheet reduction the main goal of the divestments or the consequence
of the divestments?86
In many decisions, the percentage of the balance sheet reduction is mentioned
explicitly. For instance, in the decision on ATE, a very specific percentage
was mentioned: the balance sheet size had to be reduced by (at least) 25,7%.
The restructuring plan provided that the balance sheet size amounts could be
corrected (for instance, for foreign exchange movements).87 This illustrates that
in the decision on ATE, the emphasis is really on the percentage of the balance
sheet reduction.88
By contrast, in many decisions, the emphasis seems to be on the on the type of
activities to be divested rather than the percentage of the balance sheet reduction.
This conclusion is based on three observations.
The first observation is of a linguistic nature. In some decisions, the percentage
of the balance sheet reduction seems to be the consequence of the restructuring
measures. For instance, in the decision on NordLB, the Commission held as
follows: “As a consequence of the implementation of the restructuring measures,
NORD/LB will reduce its total balance sheet between 2011 and 2016 by around
15%”.89 Similarly, in its decision on Commerzbank, the Commission noted that
“these measures will result in a lasting reduction in its balance sheet total by
approximately 45%”.90
Secondly, in some decisions, there is a geographical focus. For instance, with
respect to the Spanish banks that were split into a core unit and non-core unit,
the downsizing of the core unit (and the subsequent reduction of the market
presence of the core unit) was viewed positively by the Commission, because
the Commission considered that the competition distortions would be most
86. To some extent, this question is related to the question discussed in the previous subsection: if
the percentage of the balance sheet reduction is directly related to the relative aid amount,
then the emphasis is on the percentage rather than on the activities to be divested.
87. ATE, N429/2010, 23 May 2011, annex point 15.
88. The same provision can be found in the decision on BayernLB (SA.28487, 5 February
2013, annex point 5): “any overrun with respect to this sum will be disregarded in so far as
it is due to a decrease in the EUR/USD exchange rate below the rate referred to in the
second sentence of point 4.”
89. NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 165. A similar consideration can be found in the
decision on Sparkasse KölnBonn (para. 97). See also Parex banka, C26/2009, 15 September
2010, para. 152.
90. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 112.
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significant in the core region of the bank. This implies that the emphasis is on
the type of activities to be divested rather than the percentage of the balance
sheet reduction.
The decisions on the four large Greek banks do not mention a percentage
of the balance sheet reduction. An important element of those cases is that
the restructuring plans did not envisage any downsizing of the balance sheet in
Greece. This was justified by the fact that the difficulties of these four Greek
banks were mainly caused by external factors. The downsizing only concerned
the international activities of the Greek banks.91 This implies that the emphasis
is on the type of activities to be divested rather than the percentage of the balance
sheet reduction.
Thirdly, some decisions contain the commitment that the bank will withdraw
from certain activities. This constitutes downsizing in terms of the scope of acti-
vities. This commitment is often mentioned separately from the commitment
to reduce the size of the balance sheet. However, abandoning certain activities
will normally result in a reduction of the balance sheet size. Thus, in my opinion,
the discontinuation of certain activities contributes to the balance sheet reduc-
tion. Furthermore, a reduction of the scope of activities implies that the emphasis
is on the type of activities to be divested rather than the percentage of the balance
sheet reduction.
The core unit of Catalunya Banc would focus exclusively on retail, SME,
corporate and public sector banking and would exit the market in all other
banking segments.92 The commitment to abandon certain activities is someti-
mes formulated as a commitment not to engage in certain activities. For instance,
the restructuring plan of Catalunya Banc envisaged that the activities of the core
unit of Catalunya Banc would be restricted: the core unit of Catalunya Banc
would not engage in any new business during the restructuring period in the
areas of real estate development, wholesale activities and loans outside its core
region.93
91. In that regard, it should be recalled that the deleveraging of the international activities was
also a viability-measure.
92. Catalunya Banc, SA.33735, 28 November 2012, para. 184.
93. Catalunya Banc, SA.33735, 28 November 2012, annex point 5.3.4. The same restrictions
can be found in BFA/Bankia (para. 212), Banco CEISS (para. 164). Other examples of
banks that committed to abandon several activities are CCI/CCB (that committed not to
engage in foreign markets or in new in-house activities such as the creation of insurance
products or structured products) and BayernLB (that committed that it would abandon several
activities, such as shipping and aviation).
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To conclude, the percentage of the balance sheet reduction and the type of
activities to be divested are both important. They do not have to exclude each
other. It can be argued that in the first place, certain activities are chosen to be
divested; and that in the second place, it is checked whether these divestments
achieve a percentage that is sufficient (as compared to the relative aid amount).94
13.6.3.3 Limited possibilities for downsizing
The 2015 restructuring plans of Eurobank, Alpha Bank, Pireaus Bank and
National Bank of Greece (NBG) did not envisage any downsizing of the loans
to households and businesses in Greece. In its decisions on these banks, the
Commission noted that these four large banks accounted for more than 95% of
the market and that “it would have adverse macro-economic effects to accept
commitments from the Member State concerned regarding each of them to
reduce their lending to the Greek economy”.95 The Commission therefore
exceptionally accepted a lower degree of downsizing. These cases illustrate that
the Commission takes into account that too much downsizing of the beneficiary
bank may produce negative effects on the economy of the Member State. The
effect on the real economy can thus be used as a justification for a lower degree
of downsizing.
Another case in which the Commission took into account the effects of the
restructuring on the real economy, was KBC. Pursuant to its restructuring plan,
KBC would not withdraw from its CEE-R markets and Ireland. The Commis-
sion approved this, because “it could be damaging to financial stability in these
countries and lending to the real economy if KBC was required to further reduce
its presence in the region”.96 The fact that further restructuring could be dama-
ging to financial stability could thus be a reason for the Commission not to
require further restructuring.
It should be stressed that taking into account the effect of downsizing on the
real economy can also result in the conclusion that there is absolutely no reason
to lower the downsizing requirement. For instance, in the decision on Sparkasse
KolnBonn, the Commission noted that the reduction of the bank’s presence in
certain customer segments affected mainly large entities and that those entities
generally have access to the capital market. The Commission therefore con-
sidered “the risk of negative impact on the real economy of this measure to be
negligible”.97
94. This concerns the relation between the aid amount and the percentage of the balance sheet
reduction (which was discussed in the previous subsection).
95. Eurobank, SA.43363, 26 November 2015, para. 117.
96. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 177.
97. Sparkasse KolnBonn, C32/2009, 29 September 2010, para. 96.
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In my opinion, the Commission should be applauded for taking into account
the fact that too much downsizing of the bank might produce negative effects
on the economy of the Member State. Indeed, the very purpose of State aid to
banks is to preserve financial stability. Requiring too much downsizing might
contravene that objective.
13.6.3.4 Divestments needed for viability-reasons
To what extent can the divestments needed from a viability-perspective be
considered as a compensatory measure? This question especially arises when
the balance sheet reduction results from the disposal of loss-making subsidiaries
or of low quality assets (or even impaired assets).98
One of the cases in which the Commission did not accept divestments as a
compensatory measure is the case of OVAG. In the Opening Decision on
OVAG, the Commission welcomed the significant reduction in size by OVAG.
The reduction amounted to [60-75%] in terms of balance sheet size and to
[60-75%] in terms of RWA. Although these percentages indicate a very signi-
ficant reduction in size, the Commission noted that these percentage included
the divestment of KA.99 The Commission noted that the divestment of KA
by OVAG was rather a measure to improve OVAG’s viability.100 This was due
to the fact that KA had many problems, so the divestment of KA actually con-
tributed to the stabilisation of OVAG. Hence, the divestment of KA could not be
considered as a measure to limit the distortions of competition.101
Thus, the disposal of loss-making subsidiaries is not accepted as a compensa-
tory measure. In the same vein, the disposal of impaired assets contributes to the
restoration of long-term viability of the bank. It can therefore be considered as a
viability-measure. It can less easily be considered as a compensatory measure.
13.6.3.5 Other modalities: timeframe
The timeframe of the divestments is of importance. It is viewed positively
when the Member State can provide a detailed timeline for the planned
divestments.102 This can be illustrated by the Opening Decision on BayernLB,
98. Point 12 of the Restructuring Communication (in the section on the return to long-term
viability) explicitly provides that restructuring requires a withdrawal from activities which
would remain structurally loss-making in the medium term.
99. OVAG had sold its stake in KA for the nominal amount of EUR 1.
100. OVAG, SA.31883, 9 December 2011, para. 73.
101. OVAG, SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 125.
102. See, for instance: NordLB, SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 162; Sparkasse KolnBonn, C32/
2009, 29 September 2010, para. 95.
CHAPTER 13
440
in which the Commission noted that it had only been provided with target dates
but with no firm commitments that the entities would be sold at the end of
the restructuring period. The Commission therefore concluded that, at that
stage, there was an uncertainty on the timing of the implementation of the com-
pensatory measures, which shed doubts as to their effectiveness to mitigate
distortions of competition.103
In the W-context, the timeframe of the downsizing is of great importance. A
bank that is being wound-down will eventually exit the market, but not
immediately. The duration of the winding-down period is therefore of impor-
tance.104 The timeframe of the balance sheet reduction has an impact on how
long the competition distortions remain. A rapid balance sheet reduction is thus
welcomed by the Commission. For instance, in the decision on the Slovenian
Probanka (December 2013), the Commission noted that “more than half of the
Bank’s balance sheet reduction will already occur by 31 December 2014”.105
13.6.4 Concluding remarks
Although it has already been set out in several places in this PhD-study, it might
nonetheless be worthwhile to stress the following: an inconsistency can occur
at two levels. In the first place, there is an inconsistency when the Commission
does not assess in every case whether the restructuring plan provides for a
balance sheet reduction. In the second place, there is an inconsistency when the
Commission does not take into account the differences in the modalities of the
balance sheet reduction. As set out in subsection 13.6.2, there is no inconsis-
tency on the first level.
By contrast, subsection 13.6.3 has shown that the balance sheet reduction is
elaborated inconsistently. Firstly, the percentage of the balance sheet reduction
is not always mentioned in combination with the relative aid amount. Secondly,
in some decisions, the emphasis is on the way how the balance sheet reduction
is achieved (i.e. which activities are divested), while in other decisions, the
emphasis is on the percentage of the balance sheet reduction.
103. BayernLB, N254/2009, 12 May 2009, para. 97. The same consideration can be found in
the Opening Decision on HSH Nordbank (C29/2009, 22 October 2009, para. 79).
104. It should, however, be recalled that a bank in a winding-down process is subject to certain
restrictions.
105. Probanka, SA.37642, 18 December 2013, para. 60.
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13.7 Downsizing (II): reduction of branches and staff
* The fact that the bank will reduce the number of branches.
* The fact that the bank will reduce the number of employees.
13.7.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
Many restructuring plans include the commitment to reduce the market pre-
sence of the beneficiary bank. This can be achieved by reducing the number
of branches and the number of employees. Several decisions indicate that in
parallel to the balance sheet reduction, the bank will shrink in terms of branches
and headcount.106 From this perspective, the reduction of the number of
branches and employees is a compensatory measure (i.e. a measure to limit dis-
tortions of competition).
It should, however, be noted that the reduction of the number of branches
and employees is not purely a compensatory measure; it is also a viability-mea-
sure and an own contribution-measure. The reduction of the number of branches
is sometimes referred to as an ‘optimization of the branch network’.107 It can be
a way to increase operational efficiency. In this sense, it is a cost-cutting mea-
sure (which improves the profitability – and thus the viability – of the bank).108
At the same time, it constitutes an own contribution from the bank.
In the same vein, a reduction of the number of employees results in a
reduction of the labour costs. In this sense, it is a cost-cutting measure, and
thus a viability-measure and an own contribution measure. In the sense that a
reduction of the number of employees contributes to reducing the market pre-
sence of the bank, it is a compensatory measure.
13.7.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these relevant
characteristics?
Banks in the W-context are obviously characterised by downsizing. Most banks
in the C-context committed to reduce the number of branches and employees.
With respect to banks in the C-context, it is noteworthy that many core units
were subject to these types of downsizing. This is illustrated by the cases of
the Spanish banks in 2012. Many Spanish banks were downsized by means of
a split up into a core unit and a non-core unit. A further downsizing (of the core
unit) was achieved by the commitment in the restructuring plan that the number
of branches and staff of the core unit would be reduced. The same holds true
for the Portuguese banks (such as BPI).
106. See, for instance: Catalunya Banc, SA.33735, 28 November 2012, para. 181.
107. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), SA.35062, 24 July 2013, para. 30.
108. See, for instance: Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 109 and 274; BPI, SA.35238,
24 July 2013, para. 68.
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Banks in the T-context are sometimes subject to a downsizing of their
territorial presence. This is illustrated by the case of Banco Gallego, which was
taken over by Banco Sabadell. The restructuring plan envisaged a downsizing of
the territorial presence of combined entity:
“The Commission notes that one of the main provisions of the Restruc-
turing Plan is the downsizing of the territorial presence of combined entity.
The Commission considers that the downsizing planned by the Restruc-
turing Plan is more than adequate since at least [10-20]% of the legacy
network of Banco Gallego will be phased out. The Commission also takes
note of the fact that the total number of employees of the former Banco
Gallego will be reduced by at least [10-20]%”.109
In some cases in the T-context (and S/T/W-context), there is no downsizing
of the territorial presence. This was the case with T Bank, Fionia Bank and
Dunfermline. The Commission took into account the fact that these are
small banks. When the transferred activities are very small, the Commission
considers that the distortions of competition caused by the aid to the economic
activities are limited.110 In those cases, there is a justification for not requiring
a reduction of the branch network of the transferred activities.
13.7.3 How are these relevant characteristics elaborated in the decisions?
The decisions usually indicate the percentage by which the number of branches
and employees will be reduced. It is however not indicated whether that per-
centage is considered satisfactory. This stands in sharp contrast to the relevant
characteristic discussed in the previous section: the balance sheet reduction.
Indeed, as set out in that section, the percentage of the balance sheet reduction is
quite important.
13.7.4 Concluding remarks
As set out in the present section, the Commission usually notes positively that
the beneficiary bank will reduce the number of branches and employees.
However, the Commission does not take particular note of the exact modali-
ties of this relevant characteristic. This finding is in line with one of the main
findings of this PhD-study: with respect to several relevant characteristics, the
Commission notes positively that a case is characterised by a relevant characte-
ristic, without taking into account the modalities of that relevant characteristic.
109. Banco Gallego, SA.36500, 25 July 2013, para. 141. Also the cases of Banco de Valencia
(para. 194), UNNIM Banc (para. 183) and Cajatres (para. 163-164) are characterised by a
downsizing of the territorial presence.
110. T Bank, SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 56; Dunfermline, NN19/2009, 25 January 2010,
para. 129-130. See also: LCCU, SA.34208, 26 September 2012, para. 64.
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13.8 Growth limitation
* The fact that the restructuring plan provides for a growth limitation.
13.8.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
A growth limitation usually takes the form of a cap on new lending and on new
deposits. A growth limitation is less far-reaching than downsizing. Downsizing
reduces the bank’s market presence, whereas a cap only limits the possibility
for the bank to expand its market presence.
Point 32 of the Restructuring Communication provides that divestments
may sometimes generate adverse consequences, in which case the limitation of
organic growth may be preferred to divestments.111
13.8.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
Three observations can be made. First of all, there are not many cases that
include a growth limitation. This can be explained by the fact that many cases
are already characterised by divestments and balance sheet reductions.
The case of HSH Nordbank is one of the few cases that features a growth res-
triction. The Commission welcomed the commitment that the global market
share of HSH Nordbank in new shipping business would not exceed [<8]%
during the entire restructuring plan.112 In addition, HSH would undertake not
to be among the top 3 ship-financing providers with the highest annual volume
of new businesses.113 It should be noted that this commitment concerned
markets in which HSH Nordbank had acquired strong market positions and
that HSH Nordbank had a leading position on the market for ship financing.
Interestingly, HSH Nordbank was also subject to a far-reaching balance sheet
reduction. So the growth limitations did not substitute – in the spirit of point 32
of the Restructuring Communication – the divestments.
Other examples of cases including a growth limitation are the cases of Parex
banka and Northern Rock. The restructuring plan of Parex banka provided for
a split into a newly established bank named Citadele banka (the “good bank”)
111. Since point 32 speaks of “organic growth”, it might be useful to clarify this term. Organic
growth can be contrasted with inorganic growth. Inorganic growth is due to mergers and
acquisitions, whereas organic growth is generated by an increased output (which, in the case
of banks, means increased lending).
112. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 269 and Annex 4.9.
113. HSH Nordbank, SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 269 and Annex 4.9.
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and Parex banka (the “bad bank”). This case thus concerned a bank in the
S/C/W-context. One of the commitments of Citadele banka was a cap on new
lending and deposits.114 Similarly, BankCo – the ‘good bank’ resulting from
the split-up of Northern Rock – committed to cap new lending and to cap its
retail deposit balances.115 The growth restriction in these cases were commit-
ments regarding the remaining good bank (Citadele and BankCo respectively).
These cases are thus characterised by downsizing (because the banks were
split into a good bank and a bad bank) and growth limitations (to which the
good bank had to comply).
A second observation is that the decisions only mention the growth limitation
if such a growth limitation is present in the case; it is not mentioned if it
is absent. The only exception is the Restructuring Decision on ING. This
decision specified that ING would not have a restriction on organic growth of
the balance sheet of its businesses.116 By contrast, ING was restricted in its
non-organic growth: ING was subject to an acquisition ban.
A third observation is that the distinction between a reduction and a limitation
is not always made clear in the decisions. This can be illustrated by the decisions
on the Slovenian banks Abanka, Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM) and
Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB). Abanka would ensure that the RWAwould be
capped according to the schedule included in the restructuring plan.117 This
schedule is not visible in the decision, because it was treated as confidential
information. Since the scheme is not visible, it cannot be established whether
the cap constitutes a limitation of the RWA or a reduction of the RWA. A cap
above the current level constitutes a growth limitation, while a cap below the
current level constitutes a reduction. Interestingly, the restructuring plans of
NKBM and NLB (two other Slovenian banks) use the words reduction instead
of cap: “The reduction of NLB’s market presence in loans to the corporate
sectors of construction, transport and financial holdings is achieved thanks to
the yearly limitations on RWA in those sectors”.118 The confusing use of the
terms ‘cap’, ‘limitation’ and ‘reduction’ makes it difficult to establish exactly
how many cases are characterised by growth limitations.
114. Pursuant to the Amendment Decision of 10 August 2012, the caps on lending were amended
so as to allow carrying forward unused lending allowances from previous years to the
following years.
115. Northern Rock, C14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 29-ii and iii. See also para. 129.
116. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 82.
117. Abanka, SA.38228, 13 August 2014, annex point 6.
118. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 48 and
annex point 4b; Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 165.
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13.8.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
The cases discussed in the previous subsection already provide an illustration
of how this relevant characteristic is elaborated. As set out in that subsection,
the picture that emerges from the analysis of the Commission decisions is a bit
vague.
13.8.4 Concluding remarks
The presence of growth limitations is noted positively by the Commission,
because it restricts the bank’s ability to expand on the market. It is thus a relevant
characteristic. It is, however, difficult to establish whether the Commission has
consistently taken into account this relevant characteristic.
The growth limitations discussed in the present section concerned restric-
tions on organic growth of the bank. The restrictions on inorganic growth
(i.e. acquisition bans) are far more common – this will be discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
13.9 Acquisition ban
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to an acquisition ban.
13.9.1 Why is this a relevant characteristic?
The acquisition ban119 is an important behavioural restriction that is imposed
on many beneficiary banks. Roughly speaking, an acquisition ban means that
the beneficiary bank shall not acquire any stake in any undertaking.
A restructuring plan is based on three pillars and the acquisition ban is impor-
tant for two of these pillars: i.e. the second pillar (own contribution) and the third
pillar (minimizing competition distortions). That the acquisition ban is important
for two pillars if reflected by the fact that the acquisition ban is mentioned in
two different places in the Restructuring Communication.
In the context of the second pillar, point 23 of the Restructuring Communica-
tion provides that the restructuring aid should be limited to covering costs which
are necessary for the restoration of viability. In this context, the Commission
welcomes acquisition bans. The Commission considers that an acquisition ban
119. Sometimes referred to as “restriction of external growth”. See for instance: HSH Nordbank,
SA.29338, 20 September 2011, annex point 5.
CHAPTER 13
446
“gives additional assurance that the restructuring plan and costs will be focused
on restoring the viability of the core existing activities and that the bank will not
use its own resources or the State support for external growth”. This considera-
tion – in these exact wordings – can be found in many decisions.120
In the context of the third pillar, point 40 of the Restructuring Communica-
tion provides that State aid should not be used for the acquisition of competing
businesses. In many decisions, the Commission considered that the acquisition
ban prevented the beneficiary bank from using the State aid to purchase com-
petitors or to grow externally at the expense of other financial institutions.121
Another formulation is: “the acquisition ban ensures that the State aid will
not be used to take over competitors, but that it will instead serve its intended
purpose, namely to restore the beneficiary bank’s viability”.122 In one of its
decisions, the Commission underlined that the acquisition ban prevents the bank
from growing inorganically.123
13.9.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account this relevant
characteristic?
The analysis of the Commission decisions reveals the following pattern. In all
the cases in which the beneficiary bank continued to exist as a standalone
entity (i.e. the C-context), an acquisition ban was imposed. Acquisition bans
also appear in the W-context: a bank in a winding-down process is in prin-
ciple not allowed to engage in new activities; in the same vein, the bank will
not be authorised to acquire (or take participations in) other firms.124 By con-
trast, acquisition bans are usually not imposed in the T-context and S/T/W-
context.
120. This consideration appeared in, inter alia: Bank of Ireland, 15 July 2010, para. 208; Bank
of Ireland, 20 December 2011, para. 156; Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), 14 December
2009, para. 207; HGAA, 3 September 2013, para. 153; Lloyds Banking Group (LBG),
18 November 2009, para. 157.
121. This consideration appeared in, inter alia: Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), N428/2009,
18 November 2009, para. 192; Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), N422/2009, 14 December
2009, para. 251.
122. Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 117; Caixa Geral de
Depósitos (CGD), SA.35062, 24 July 2013, para. 91.
123. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 111. The decision on ING (C10/2009,
18 November 2009, para. 148) contained an interesting extra consideration: “The
Netherlands has also committed to an acquisition ban preventing ING from acquiring
attractive businesses which will be likely brought to the market due to the general restruc-
turing of financial firms and the overall sector. This prevents the non-organic growth of ING
and allows other firms not having received State aid to purchase such businesses.”
124. See, for instance: Anglo/INBS, SA.32504, 29 June 2011, para. 177.
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The fact that the Commission does not require an acquisition ban in every case,
raises the following question: does the Commission explain in its decisions why
an acquisition ban is needed in a particular case?
In many decisions, the Commission did not dwell on the need for an acquisition
ban. For instance, in the decision on Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), the
Commission only considered that “it welcomes an acquisition ban, which
ensures that the State aid will not be used to take over competitors, but that it
will instead serve its intended purpose, namely to restore CGD’s viability”.125
Although this explain the ratio of the acquisition ban, it does not explain why
an acquisition ban was needed in that particular case.
Only a very few decisions contain a consideration regarding the importance
of an acquisition ban in that particular case. For instance, in the decision on
Abanka, the Commission noted that the acquisition ban was “of particular
importance in view of the high capital ratio maintained by Abanka during the
restructuring period to sustain a stress situation”.126 However, it could be argued
that a detailed explanation (as to why an acquisition ban is needed in a particular
case) would not be necessary, because requiring an acquisition ban is standard
practice in the C-context.
This is confirmed by a decision (in the C-context) in which the Commission
explained why the absence of an acquisition ban was justified. The ‘Restruc-
turing and stabilisation scheme for the Credit Union Sector in Ireland’ did not
include an acquisition ban. The Commission considered that in the exceptional
case of the Irish credit unions, an acquisition ban was not required.127
If acquisitions are necessary for the restoration of long-term viability of
the bank, then this might constitute a justification for not requiring an acqui-
sition ban. This can be illustrated – a contrario – by the decision on ABN
AMRO. In this decision, the Commission considered that acquisitions were
not needed for the return to viability.128 As a result, an acquisition ban did not
go against the return to viability.129
In the T-context and in the S/T/W-context, the absence of an acquisition ban
seems to be standard practice. This would seem to indicate that the relevant con-
text could explain the absence of the acquisition ban. To some extent, this makes
125. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), SA.35062, 24 July 2013, para. 91.
126. Abanka, SA.38228, 13 August 2014, para. 155. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM),
SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para 149.
127. SA.36262, 16 October 2014, para. 74.
128. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 313.
129. The same consideration can be found in Banco Portugues de Negocios (BPN), SA.26909,
27 March 2012, para. 236.
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sense. In the T-context and S/T/W-context, the activities of the ailing bank are
transferred to a larger, viable bank. An acquisition ban would make it very
unattractive for a potential acquiring bank to acquire the activities of the ailing
bank.130 This could explain the absence of an acquisition ban in the T-context
and S/T/W-context. This is confirmed by the fact that the acquisition ban in the
case of Catalunya Banc applied until the date of the integration of the bank with
BBVA.131
Although an acquisition ban is absent in cases in the T-context and S/T/W-
context, the Commission does not explain in its decisions why an acquisi-
tion ban is not needed in these cases. This is in sharp contrast with the decision
on the ‘Restructuring and stabilisation scheme for the Credit Union Sector in
Ireland’ in which the Commission considered that due to exceptional circum-
stances, an acquisition ban was not required.
Interestingly, there are two cases in the T-context that feature an acquisition
ban.132 This was the case in Banco CAM and BPN.133 It is unclear why an
acquisition ban was needed in those cases, whereas it is absent in other cases
in the T-context.
To conclude, most decisions fit within the general pattern (that acquisition bans
are present in the C-context, W-context and S/W/C-context; and absent in the
T-context and S/T/W-context). In that regard, the Commission approach can be
considered consistent. However, the principle of equal treatment requires not
only that the Commission consistently assesses whether an acquisition ban is
present, it also requires that the acquisition ban is elaborated in a consistent
manner. This concerns the modalities of the acquisition ban, which will be
discussed in the following subsection.
13.9.3 How is this relevant characteristic elaborated in the decisions?
As regards the modalities of the acquisition ban, a distinction can be made
between the duration of the acquisition ban (see subsection 13.9.3.1), the scope
of the acquisition ban (see subsection 13.9.3.2) and the exemptions to the
acquisition ban (see subsection 13.9.3.3).
130. This view is also expressed by Franchoo, Baeten & Baker (2016, p. 487).
131. Catalunya Banc, SA.39402, 17 December 2014, annex 6.1.
132. In addition, there is one case in the S/T/W-context that features an acquisition ban: Banif,
which was split-up into a Clean Bank and a Remaining Bank. Interestingly, the acquisition
ban applied to the Clean Bank (which was taken over by another bank), but only in case it
was managed as a stand-alone unit. See: Banif, SA.43977, 21 December 2015, Annex I
point 14.
133. Banco CAM, SA.34255, 30 May 2012, para. 171 and annex point ix; BPN, para. 91, 236
and 269. The acquisition ban in the case of Banco CAM entailed that the combined entity
(consisting of Banco Sabadell – Banco CAM) would not carry out any non-organic growth
in the core regions of Banco CAM. The acquisition ban thus had a limited geographic
scope, because acquisitions outside Banco CAM’s core regions were still allowed.
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13.9.3.1 Duration of the acquisition ban
In most cases, the acquisition ban applies for the duration of the restructuring
period (which is usually 3 years). In some decisions, it is provided that the
restructuring period ends on the date at which the State aid has been repaid in
full. While there are thus some differences in the duration of the acquisition
ban, the differences in the scope and exemptions are much more poignant.
13.9.3.2 Scope of the acquisition ban
Most acquisition bans entail that the beneficiary bank shall not acquire any stake
in any undertaking. Two elements are of importance here: “any stake” and “any
undertaking”.
With respect to the element of “any undertaking”, it should be pointed out that,
while most acquisition bans prohibit the acquisition of stakes in any underta-
king, there are some acquisition bans that only concern the acquisition of
financial undertakings. The scope of those acquisition bans is thus somewhat
limited.
Also with respect to the element of “any stake”, the scope of the acquisition
ban can differ. In most cases, the beneficiary bank is prohibited from acquiring
any stake. But in some cases, the beneficiary bank may acquire small stakes.
For instance, Ethias committed not to acquire more than 5% of the capital
of other credit institutions or investment firms.134 The acquisition bans in the
cases of Fortis and KBC are quite remarkable, since these banks were refrai-
ned from acquiring control, as defined by the EC Merger Regulation135 , of
other financial institutions.
13.9.3.3 Exemptions to the acquisition ban
The restructuring plan may allow for certain exemptions to the acquisition
ban. In that regard, it should be noted that point 47(f) of the 2013 Banking Com-
munication provides for three exemptions to the acquisition ban. Although point
47 of the 2013 Banking Communication introduces measures preventing the
outflow of funds prior to a restructuring decision, these three exemptions also
appear in many restructuring decisions.
134. Similarly, ATE would refrain from acquisitions of stakes in any other undertaking of more
than 5%.
135. Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings.
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The acquisition ban imposed on the National Bank of Greece (NBG) may
serve as an illustration. The modalities of the acquisition ban can be found in
the annex of the Restructuring Decision. The acquisition ban with its exem-
ptions is formulated as follows:
“Acquisition ban: The Hellenic Republic commits that the Bank shall not
acquire any stake in any undertaking, be it an asset or share transfer. That
ban on acquisitions covers both undertaking which have the legal form of a
company and any package of assets which forms a business.
i. Exemption requiring Commission’s prior approval: Notwithstanding that
prohibition, the Bank may, after obtaining the Commission’s approval,
and, where appropriate, on a proposal of the HFSF, acquire businesses
and undertakings if it is in exceptional circumstances necessary to restore
financial stability or to ensure effective competition.
ii. Exemption not requiring Commission’s prior approval: The Bank may
acquire stakes in undertakings provided that:
a. The purchase price paid by the Bank for any acquisition is less than
[[…]%] of the balance sheet size of the Bank at the Effective Date of
the Commitments; and
b. The cumulative purchase prices paid by the Bank for all such acqui-
sitions starting with the Effective Date of the Commitments until the
end of the restructuring period, is less than [[…]%] of the balance
sheet size of the Bank at the Effective Date of the Commitments.
iii. Activities not falling under the acquisition ban: The acquisition ban
shall not cover acquisitions that take place in the ordinary course of the
banking business in the management of existing claims towards ailing
firms.”
The first exemption
The first exemption recognises the fact that there may be situations in which
an acquisition may be highly desirable. This exemption makes the ban more
flexible, because it allows the Commission to grant an exemption in case of
exceptional circumstances. It could, however, be asked whether the Commission
is the right authority to judge on these matters. Would a financial supervisory
authority not be better placed to judge on the issue of financial stability?
This exemption was actually applied in several Greek banking cases. As set
out in section 11.11, each of the four large Greek banks136 acquired some smal-
ler banks. The Commission assessed whether these acquisitions were compa-
tible with the Restructuring Communication. This assessment concerned the
effect of the acquisitions i) on the viability of the bank, ii) on the aid amount
needed by the bank, and iii) on competition.
136. i.e. Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank, Eurobank and NBG.
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With respect to the effect of the acquisitions on the amount of aid needed
by the bank, the reasoning of the Commission was as follows. The Commis-
sion first recalled that point 23 of the Restructuring Communication required
that State aid should not be used for the acquisition of other companies but
merely to cover restructuring costs which are necessary to restore the viability
of the bank. The Commission then remarked that, although the acquisition had
positive implications for the bank’s viability, the acquisition was not essential
for the bank’s viability. However, the Commission went on to consider that the
purchase price was very low. The purchase price was therefore not financed
through State aid. That fact also implies that the payment of the purchase price
did not create any capital need for the acquiring bank.137
With respect to the assessment of the distortive effects of the acquisition on
competition, points 39-41 of the Restructuring Communication are of impor-
tance. The structure of these points is as follows: points 39 and 40 contain a pro-
hibition, whereas point 41 contains an exemption to this prohibition.138 In
particular, point 41 provides that in exceptional circumstances, acquisitions may
be authorised by the Commission where they are part of a consolidation process
necessary to restore financial stability or to ensure effective competition.
An illustration of those exceptional circumstances can be found in the deci-
sions on Alpha Bank, Eurobank, Piraeus Bank and NBG.139 In these decisions,
the following exceptional circumstances were mentioned:
• The Bank of Greece considered the three Cooperative Banks not to be viable.
The acquisition could therefore be considered to be part of a consolidation
process.
• No non-aided bidder submitted any valid bid to acquire the assets and lia-
bilities of the three Cooperative Banks, and the only other bid came from a
bank which had received even more aid. This circumstance led to the con-
clusion that there was no crowding-out of non-aided investors. This under-
lines the Commission’s intention to ensure that the acquisition process
respects the principle of equal opportunities.140
• The purchase price paid for Citibank Greece was extremely low and Alpha
Bank raised a large amount of private capital.141 This circumstance led to
the conclusion that no aid was used to finance the acquisition.
• The size of the acquired assets and liabilities was small, and did not change
the market structure.
137. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 227.
138. Point 39 stipulates that State aid should not be used to the detriment of non-aided
competitors. Point 40 stipulates that banks should not use State aid for the acquisition of
competing businesses.
139. See also Panellinia Bank, SA.41503, 16 April 2015, para. 91-110.
140. See point 41 of the Restructuring Communication.
141. Alpha Bank, SA.34823, 9 July 2014, para. 257.
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It should be noted that the exceptional circumstances are not cumulative criteria.
For instance, the fact that the bank raised a large amount of private capital was
not present in every case.
The second exemption
The second exemption concerns relatively insignificant acquisitions. Those
acquisitions are exempted without requiring the Commission’s prior approval.
This makes sense, because if the Commission would have to investigate those
acquisitions, then this leads to extra administrative costs (which would probably
not outweigh the benefits of the investigation).
It is useful to point out that there is a relation between this second exception
and the scope of the acquisition ban: if the acquisition ban is very limited
in scope (such as in the case of Fortis and KBC), there is less need to make an
exemption for small acquisitions.
The third exemption
The third exemption142 concerns acquisitions that belong, in terms of the
management of existing obligations of customers in financial difficulty, to a
bank’s normal ongoing business.143 This concerns shareholdings managed or
acquired in the course of the bank’s normal business operations in connection
with non-performing loans or similar banking operations.144 In one of its
decisions, the Commission explained the rationale of this exemption: “When
banks are faced with bad loans in their loan portfolio, the restructuring of those
loans sometimes requires solutions such as converting debt into equity. Those
situations are considered to be normal banking practice and are not covered by
the acquisition ban”.145
Other exemptions
In addition to the three main exemptions, there are some other exemptions to
the acquisition ban. In several cases, disposals and restructuringwithin the group
do not fall under the acquisition ban.146 Also the take-up of capital increases by
the beneficiary bank in its current holdings pro rata to its current participation
is sometimes excluded from the acquisition ban.147
142. Regarding the term “exemption”, it could be argued that acquisitions that take place in the
ordinary course of the banking business are not an exemption to the acquisition ban, but
rather activities that do not fall under the scope of the acquisition ban. For instance, in
Alpha Bank, annex point 28, the first two exception to the acquisition ban are listed under
the heading “exemptions” while the third exception is mentioned under the heading
“activities not falling under the acquisition ban”.
143. See, for instance: OVAG.
144. See, for instance: HGAA.
145. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 April 2011, footnote 120.
146. This was the case in: Commerzbank, HRE, Abanka, NKBM, NLB.
147. This was the case in: BAWAG, ATE.
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Consistent application?
The table in Annex X gives an overview of all the cases that are characterised
by the commitment to comply to an acquisition ban. In addition, the table shows
the scope of the acquisition ban and the exemptions to the acquisition ban. The
table shows an interesting picture: the three exemptions are not included in every
case. Of the 57 decisions that imposed an acquisition ban, 23 of them did not
include the first exemption. The second and third exemption were missing in 22
respectively 21 cases.
The general picture that emerges is that an acquisition ban is standard prac-
tice, whilst the exact modalities of the acquisition ban are deviating. It should
be noted that the modalities of the acquisition ban are usually to be found in the
annex of the decision. The exemptions to the acquisition ban are thus not men-
tioned in the recitals of the decision. Consequently, any explanation as to the
reason why certain exemptions are (or are not) included, is completely lacking in
the Commission decisions.
It is worth stressing that the picture would be completely different if only the
decisions taken after the 2013 Banking Communication are included in the
analysis (thus excluding the decisions that were taken before the 2013 Banking
Communication). Indeed, point 47(f) of the 2013 Banking Communication pro-
vides for the three main exemptions. As a result, nowadays, every acquisition
ban includes the three main exemptions.
13.9.4 Concluding remarks
The relevance of the acquisition ban was set out in subsection 13.9.1. Requiring
an acquisition ban is standard practice of the Commission. Apart from a few
outliers148, there is no inconsistency in that regard (see subsection 13.9.2).
With respect to the elaboration of the acquisition ban, subsection 13.9.3 has
shown that the modalities of the acquisition ban differ among the cases.
Nevertheless, in every case that was characterised by an acquisition ban, the
Commission welcomed the fact that there was an acquisition ban, even though
the scope of the acquisition ban and the exemptions to the acquisition ban were
different. In my view, the principle of equal treatment does not require that all
the modalities of the acquisition ban should be the same in each case. However,
it does require that the Commission should take into account the relevant
differences between the cases. Thus, if cases differ on the modalities, then one
would expect that these differences are taken into account by the Commission.
In particular, one would expect some kind of justification or explanation why
the scope of the acquisition ban is different or why some exemptions are not
included. Such explanation is not given by the Commission in its decisional
148. i.e. the cases of Banco CAM and BPN.
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practice. Most decisions only mention that the Commission welcomes the acqui-
sition ban, without taking into account the different modalities of the acquisition
ban.
Thus, the fact that the bank is subject to an acquisition ban is a relevant
characteristic, but this relevant characteristic is not consistently elaborated in
the decisions. However, the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication put
an end to this inconsistency.
13.10 Price leadership ban and other pricing restrictions
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to a price leadership ban.
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to other pricing restrictions.
13.10.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
Pricing restrictions prevent the bank from using State aid for anti-competitive
market conduct.149 The imposition of such restrictions is in line with point 44 of
the Restructuring Communication which provides that State aid should not be
used to offer terms which cannot be matched by competitors which did not
receive State aid.
One of the most striking pricing restrictions is the price leadership ban.
This ban clearly restricts the bank in its pricing behaviour, since it prohibits
the bank from acting as price leader. There are also other pricing restrictions,
such as the commitment to not issue loans with a return of less than x%. In this
PhD-study, the pricing restrictions other than the price leadership ban are referred
to as ‘other pricing restrictions’.
13.10.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these relevant
characteristics?
The analysis of the Commission decisions reveals that of all the bank State
aid cases, only in 13 cases a price leadership ban was imposed.150 In most of the
other bank State aid cases, the beneficiary bank was subject to other pricing
restrictions. The table in Annex XI gives an overview of the cases that are
characterised by a price leadership ban or other pricing restrictions.
149. Pricing restrictions can concern both deposit-taking and the granting of loans and credit.
150. The following banks were subject to a price leadership ban: Fortis, Commerzbank, Northern
Rock (with respect to BankCo), ING, KBC, LBBW, Aegon, Sparkasse KölnBonn, ABN
AMRO, OVAG (with respect to Livebank), Hypo Tirol, DMA (Dexia), FIH.
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What is most striking, is that there are only 16 decisions in which the Com-
mission assessed the need for a price leadership ban: in 13 cases, a price lead-
ership ban was imposed; while in 3 cases, a price leadership ban was
contemplated.151 Why only in these 16 cases?
As to the question why a price leadership ban was needed, most of the 16 deci-
sions contain some very general considerations. These considerations usually
entail that the price leadership ban prevents the bank from growing at the
expense of its rivals152, or that it ensures that the aid is not used to finance a
pricing strategy which cannot be met by other market players competing on their
own merits153 and that it ensures that the bank can only attract new customers
on the strength of the quality of the products and services it offers.154 In some
decisions, a more specific reason for the price leadership ban can be found.
These will be discussed below.
Aggressive commercial behaviour
The decision on AEGON contained some interesting considerations with
respect to the price leadership ban. The Commission noted that AEGON had
been one of the price leaders on the Dutch mortgage and savings market in the
period after the capital injection by the State. The Commission also observed
that AEGON increased its market share in mortgages throughout 2009. The
Commission considers that past pricing practice of AEGON amounted to
aggressive commercial behaviour. Against this background, the Commission
considered that a price leadership ban seemed to be an appropriate measure to
avoid in the future distortions of competition on the Dutch mortgage and savings
markets.155
The argument concerning the (aggressive) market behaviour of the beneficiary
bank was also used in the Opening Decision in the case of Proton Bank. Since
Proton Bank was a very small bank, the distortions of competition could be
considered as limited. However, the market behaviour of Proton Bank was
characterised by offering interest rates on deposits which were much higher than
the interest rates offered by most competitors. The Commission therefore took
the view that a price leadership ban had to be contemplated.156
151. A price leadership ban was contemplated in the Opening Decisions on TT Hellenic Postbank
and Nea Proton Bank. Eventually, both banks were taken over by Eurobank. See: Eurobank,
29 April 2014, para. 155 and 397. See also: TT Hellenic Postbank, 6 May 2013, para. 107;
Nea Proton Bank, 26 July 2012, para. 83.
152. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 111.
153. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 144.
154. Commerzbank, N244/2009, 7 May 2009, para. 111.
155. Aegon, N372/2009, 17 August 2010, para. 116.
156. Nea Proton Bank, SA.34488, 26 July 2012, para. 83. In the end, this was overtaken by events,
as Proton Bank was taken over by Eurobank. See also: TT Hellenic Postbank, SA.31155,
6 May 2013, para. 107.
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Other specific circumstances of the case
Another decision that contained some interesting considerations was the deci-
sion on the Austrian OVAG. The price leadership ban of OVAG was due to the
specific circumstances of that case. As touched upon in section 11.6.3.2, OVAG
was heavily reliant on wholesale funding. The acquisition of Livebank by
OVAG gave OVAG access to EUR 470 million of retail funding. The Commis-
sion noted positively that the acquisition reduced OVAG’s past reliance on
wholesale funding.157 However, in order to prevent that State aid would be used
to fund anti-competitive behaviour, a price leadership ban was deemed neces-
sary. In footnote 64 of the decision, the Commission added that Livebank
was the only part of OVAG’s business that was taking deposits. Hence, the price
leadership ban was only necessary with respect to that market segment and not
to other markets.
The price leadership ban in the case of the Danish bank FIH had a very specific
background. The Commission noted that “FIH intended to aggressively enter
the internet retail deposit market by pursuing a ‘price leadership’ role. That entry
into the internet retail deposit market was a core component of FIH’s strategy to
address its funding problems”.158 In the Opening Decision, the Commission
expressed its doubts. Denmark therefore provided a commitment that FIH would
adhere to a price leadership ban for deposits if the market share of FIH exceeded
5%. The Commission welcomed this commitment, because it allowed FIH to
further improve its funding position by raising deposits on the market while at
the same time establishing a threshold preventing excessive practices.159
Structural remedies
An interesting aspect of the price leadership ban of the Belgian bank KBC
was that it did not apply to Belgium. As set out in section 13.5, KBC had
committed to divest Centea and Fidea. The Commission concluded that these
were structural remedies which would lead to improved competition on the
Belgian market.160 The Commission considered that a price leadership ban
may not be necessary in markets where significant pro-competitive structural
commitments have been provided.161 Thus, to some extent, structural measures
and behavioural restrictions are ‘communicating vessels’. In this context, it
should be stressed that the structural remedies in the case of KBC were pro-
competitive. Centea and Fidea were to be divested with the aim of creating
challenger banks.
157. OVAG, SA.31883, 19 September 2012, para. 48 and 103.
158. FIH, SA.34445, 11 March 2014, para. 33.
159. FIH, SA.34445, 11 March 2014, para. 137.
160. KBC, C18/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 181.
161. See also: point 44 of the Restructuring Communication.
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Other pricing restrictions
Sometimes, an outright price leadership ban can give rise to implementation
problems. This was the case with Ethias, an insurance company. The Com-
mission noted that insurance products are standardised only to a limited extent
and that a price leadership ban would be too difficult to implement.162 A price
leadership ban was therefore not imposed. However, Ethias was subject to a
different type of pricing restriction.163
Can the absence of the price leadership ban be justified by the presence of
other pricing restrictions? This is only the case if the price leadership ban and the
other pricing restrictions are alternatives (or substitutes) to each other. Whether
this is the case depends on the way how the price leadership ban and the other
pricing restrictions are elaborated. To that end, the modalities of the price
leadership ban are discussed in subsection 13.10.3, while the other pricing
restrictions are set out in subsection 13.10.4.
13.10.3 How is the price leadership ban elaborated in the decisions?
The price leadership ban in the case of ING may serve as an illustration of how
a price leadership ban can be formulated:
“Without prior authorization of the Commission, ING will not offer more
favourable prices on standardized ING products (on markets as defined
below) than its three best priced direct competitors with respect to EU-
markets in which ING has a market share of more than 5%”.164
The price leadership ban in the case of ING also illustrates the various modalities
of a price leadership ban. The modalities concern the relevant market (“stan-
dardized ING products”) and a threshold (“market share of more than 5%”).
Another modality of great importance is the standard of comparison (“its three
best priced direct competitors”).
Not all price leadership bans are formulated in this way. On the contrary, in each
case, they are formulated differently: the specific modalities of the price lead-
ership ban differ among the 13 cases in which the price leadership ban was
imposed.
162. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 144.
163. Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010, para. 144. See Ethias, N256/2009, 20 May 2010,
footnote 10.
164. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 84.
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Relevant market
This modality is sometimes elaborated. This can be illustrated by the case of
KBC. As set out in subsection 13.10.2, the price leadership ban in the case of
KBC did not apply to the Belgian market. This was explained by the fact that
significant pro-competitive structural commitments had been provided: KBC
would divest Centea and Fidea, which would lead to improved competition
on the Belgian market.
Threshold
A price leadership ban is usually limited to markets where the bank has a sig-
nificant presence (i.e. at least 5%). However, the Commission imposed a price
leadership ban on ING Direct Europe, regardless of its market share. According
to the Commission, this was justified because it had received information alleg-
ing that ING Direct Europe had engaged in aggressive commercial behav-
iour.165
Standard of comparison
The finding that the modalities differ among the bank State aid cases is most
notable with respect to the standard of comparison. Some price leadership bans
stipulate that the bank may not offer more favourable rates than its cheapest
or best priced) competitors166, and some price leadership bans stipulate that the
bank may not offer more favourable rates than its largest competitors167 .
Sometimes, it is a combination (“the best priced competitor among the top 10
market players”).168 In addition, the number of competitors that are included in
the standard of comparison differs.
Given these differences, one would expect that the Commission decisions
provide some explanation as to why a certain standard of comparison is chosen.
This is, however, not the case. The Commission decisions do contain some con-
siderations with respect to the question why a price leadership ban was needed,
but the standard of comparison is usually not elaborated in the decisions.
Consistent application?
In the section that discussed the acquisition ban, it was remarked that the Com-
mission should take into account the different modalities of the acquisition
ban. In the same vein, the Commission should take into account the different
modalities of the price leadership ban. To some extent, this is done by the Com-
mission. Indeed, the decisions usually contain some explanation regarding the
relevant market and the threshold. However, the standard of comparison is not
165. ING, C10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 5 and 150.
166. This is the case for Commerzbank, ING, AEGON, Livebank, Hypo Tirol.
167. This is the case for ABN AMRO, Fortis.
168. This is the case for LBBW, Sparkasse KölnBonn, KBC.
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explained in the decisions. As shown in the present section, the price leadership
bans differ with respect to the standard of comparison.169 Not taking into
account these differences would – in my opinion – amount to an inconsistency.
What are the implications of this finding? Normally I would expect the Com-
mission to take action in order to remedy an inconsistency. However, since
it appears that the Commission no longer requires a price leadership ban, the
finding that the Commission did not take into account certain differences in
the modalities, has lost its relevance for future cases. In that regard, it should be
recalled that – even though the method of this PhD-study is backward-looking –
its ultimate aim is forward-looking.
13.10.4 How are the other pricing restrictions elaborated in the decisions?
The price leadership ban was imposed in only 13 cases. However, most of the
other bank State aid cases are characterised by other pricing restrictions. For
instance, Dexia, KA Neu and HRE committed that they would not issue new
loans with a risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC) of less than 10%.170 This
minimum pricing on new loans prevented those banks from applying rates
which were below market rates.
In the same vein, the Slovenian banks Abanka, NKBM and NLB also com-
mitted to pricing restrictions. These banks committed to price their loans in such
a way that they would achieve a return on equity (RoE) of at least […]% on each
client relationship. As a result, Abanka, NKBM and NLB would refrain from
providing excessively advantageous conditions to their clients. The Commission
noted that this pricing commitment would not only contribute to the restoration
of viability, but also to limiting competition distortions.171
Not only beneficiary banks that continue as a standalone entity (C-context)
have to respect some behavioural constraints, also banks that are in the process
of being wound-down (W-context) sometimes have to comply with certain
behavioural restrictions. In that regard, point 75 of the 2013 Banking Commu-
nication stipulates that the pricing policy of banks to be wound-down must be
designed to encourage customers to find more attractive alternatives.172 The
169. This has also been remarked in the literature. Lyons & Zhu performed a case study in which
they examined the cases of Northern Rock, WestLB, Fortis and Lloyds Banking Group. With
respect to the compensatory measures, Lyons & Zhu (2013, p. 62 and 64) concluded that the
behavioural measures on pricing were imposed without a clear pattern.
170. Dexia, 26 February 2010, para. 212; KA, 31 March 2011, para. 34; HRE, 18 July 2011,
para. 129.
171. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), 18 December 2013, para. 167; Abanka, 13 August 2014,
para. 153; Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), 18 December 2013, para. 147 (and 104).
172. For instance, Factor Banka and Probanka are two Slovenian banks that were wound-down.
In accordance with point 75 of the 2013 Banking Communication, they committed that
their prices would be aimed at encouraging customers to find more attractive alternatives.
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pricing restrictions can also be found in decisions taken before the adoption of
the 2013 Banking Communication. For instance, under the Danish winding-up
scheme, the bank would have to pursue a pricing policy designed to encourage
customers to find more attractive alternatives.173
A key observation is that these pricing restrictions are formulated differently.
Some decisions refer to the RAROC, whilst others refer to the RoE. Sometimes,
the pricing restrictions are formulated as a commitment to lend at sufficiently
high margins174 or as a commitment not to price deposits above market average
or to grant loans below market average.175
13.10.5 Concluding remarks
The relevance of the price leadership ban was explained in subsection 13.10.1.
As regards the elaboration of the price leadership ban, subsection 13.10.3 dis-
cussed that the modalities of the price leadership ban often differ. This is not
problematic, as long as the Commission takes into account the differences in
modalities. To some extent, the Commission has done this. However, with
respect to the standard of comparison, an explanation as to why a specific stand-
ard of comparison was chosen, was completely lacking.
An even greater issue is the fact that the price leadership ban only appears in
a handful of cases (see subsection 13.10.2). Can the absence of a price leader-
ship ban be explained by the fact that the bank is subject to the other pricing
restrictions? In my view, this question should be answered in the negative,
because there is an important difference between the price leadership ban and
the other pricing restrictions. The price leadership ban is exclusively aimed at
This was specified as follows: “(i) the level of the interest rate/fee paid by the Bank to
customers should be below the average of the market and (ii) the level of the interest rate/
fee paid by customers to the Bank should be above the average of the market. Not more
than 10% of products offered by the Bank (in nominal amount) will deviate from this rule.”
173. SA.33757, 9 December 2011, para. 72. This was specified as follows: the interest rates on
loans should be within the top 10% band of the interest rates charged by the 30 largest
Danish banks, while the interest rates on deposits should be within the bottom 10% ban of
the rates offered by the 30 largest Danish banks. In the decision of 28 June 2011
(SA.33001), this is formulated as follows: the interest rates for loans should be placed
above the 90%-quantile and the interest rates on deposits should be below the 10%-
quantile. In the case of Fionia Bank and Amagerbanken, the Rump Bank respectively the
New Bank had to comply with this pricing policy. Fionia Bank, N560/2009, 25 October
2010, para. 31-34; Amagerbanken, SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 59. See also:
Roskilde Bank, NN52/2010, 24 May 2011 (amendment decision), para. 44.
174. ATE, N429/2010, 23 May 2011, para. 87.
175. Banco Espírito Santo (BES), SA.39250, 3 August 2014, para. 46; CCB, SA.35334,
24 February 2014, para. 166 and annex point 38.
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limiting competition distortions, while the other pricing restrictions are also
aimed at restoring the long-term viability of the bank. Thus, the price leadership
ban and the other pricing restrictions are therefore not substitutes. This means
that the absence of a price leadership ban cannot be explained by the mere fact
that the bank is subject to the other pricing restrictions.
The price leadership ban is one of the most contentious behavioural restric-
tions. This compensatory measure has been heavily criticised in the literature.
From this viewpoint, it might be a good thing that the Commission no longer
requires a price leadership ban.
There are some cases in which there are no pricing restrictions at all. However,
these cases are often characterised by a ban on aggressive commercial practices.
To some extent, this ban is related to a pricing restriction, because this ban
affects the pricing behaviour of the bank – depending on how this ban is inter-
preted. This behavioural restriction will be discussed in more detail in the fol-
lowing section.
13.11 Ban on aggressive commercial practices/strategies
* The fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to a ban on aggressive commercial
practices/strategies.
13.11.1 Inconsistent use of these terms?
In many cases, beneficiary banks have committed not to engage in ‘aggressive
commercial practices’ or ‘aggressive commercial strategies’. There is a lot of
vagueness regarding the use of those terms. Sometimes, they are used as
synonyms; sometimes they are used as two distinct notions.
Point 47 of the 2013 Banking Communication requires that certain banks “(e)
must not engage in aggressive commercial practices”, and “(g) must refrain
from advertising referring to State support and from employing any aggressive
commercial strategies which would not take place without the support of
the Member State”. The ‘practices’ and ‘strategies’ are mentioned in separate
subparagraphs of point 47, which would imply that there is a difference between
‘practices’ and ‘strategies’.
The ban on aggressive commercial practices is not the same as an advertise-
ment ban. This can be illustrated by recital 188 of the Restructuring Decision
on Catalunya Banc, which mentions the advertisement ban and the ban on
aggressive commercial practices as two separate behavioural restrictions.
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In several other Commission decisions, the terms ‘practices’ and ‘strategies’ are
used interchangeably. This can be illustrated by the decision on Nova Ljubl-
janska banka (NLB). In this decision, the Commission noted that “Slovenia
also committed to a coupon ban, an acquisition ban and a ban on advertising and
aggressive commercial practices”.176 So in the considerations of the decision,
the term ‘practices’ is used. Nevertheless, the annex speaks about ‘strategies’.
Under the heading “bans on advertising and aggressive commercial strategies”,
Slovenia committed “to impose a ban on advertising related to the state support
to NLB and to the state ownership in NLB (or to any competitive advantages
arising in any way from the aid to NLB or the state ownership in NLB) and to
prevent NLB from employing any aggressive commercial strategies which
would not be pursued without state support (advertisement ban)”.177
To conclude, there is a lot of vagueness surrounding the terms ‘aggressive com-
mercial strategies’. To compound on that vagueness, there are a few decisions
that use even other terms. For instance, FHB committed that it would not follow
any aggressive business strategy.178 In the decision on MPS ‘aggressive pricing
strategy’ and ‘aggressive commercial strategy’ are used as synonyms.179
13.11.2 A price leadership ban in disguise?
In addition, it is not entirely clear what is understood by “aggressive commercial
practices”. This notion is not defined or explained. Only in the decisions on the
Spanish banks, the notion of “aggressive commercial practices” is elaborated:
“Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN) shall avoid engaging in aggressive com-
mercial practices throughout the duration of the Restructuring Period. To
that end, BMN shall make sure that the nominal interest rate offered to cli-
ents on its products must be less attractive than the average of the most com-
petitive rates offered on analogous products by the five main non-aided
competitors within the geographical area where BMN operates in the core
regions. To this end, BMN will operate in conformity with the restrictions
approved by the Board of the FROB on 22 December 2010”.180 [Italics
mine, REvL]
176. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 158. See also para.
169.
177. Nova Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, annex 12.1.
178. FHB, C37/2010, 22 February 2012, para. 92.
179. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), SA.36175, 27 November 2013, para. 74 and 156.
180. Banco Mare Nostrum, SA.35488, 20 December 2012, annex point 7.6. See also: Catalunya
Banc, 28 November 2012, annex point 7.6; BFA Bankia, 28 November 2012, annex point
7.6;; NCG, 28 November 2012, annex point 7.2. NB: the ban on commercial aggressive
practices is not specified in the decision on Liberbank.
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This description of the ban on aggressive commercial practices resembles the
description of the price leadership ban. This would imply that these two
behavioural restrictions are the same. However, this is in sharp contrast with
the decisions that include a price leadership ban as well as a ban on aggressive
commercial practices.181
13.11.3 Concluding remarks
The present section has shown that there is much vagueness regarding the ban
on aggressive commercial practices and/or strategies. In my opinion, this should
be clarified by the Commission.
13.12 Exit from State aid
* The fact that the beneficiary bank pays back the State aid (as quickly as
possible).
* The fact that the Member State commits to reprivatize the beneficiary bank.
13.12.1 Why are these characteristics relevant?
It is perhaps fitting that the final relevant characteristic discussed in this chapter
(and in this PhD-study) is about exit from State aid. Exit from State aid means
that the beneficiary bank should not remain dependent on State support. This is
relevant for two reasons. In the first place, beneficiary banks should return to
long-term viability. Long-term viability means that the bank is able to survive
without State support. In the second place, as long as the bank enjoys State
support, there is a distortion of competition. It is therefore welcomed by the
Commission if the beneficiary bank can present a clear exit strategy.
How to achieve an exit from State aid? The exit strategy depends on the type
of State aid measure. Exit from a guarantee simply ends when the guarantee
expires. Exit from State aid in the form of preference shares, CoCo’s or other
(hybrid) debt instruments is achieved when the beneficiary bank fully repays
the aid amount.182 The fact that the beneficiary bank pays back the State aid (as
quickly as possible) is thus a relevant characteristic.
181. See, for instance: FIH, SA.34445, 11 March 2014, para. 137.
182. Another option is that the bank pays a remuneration for the aid that is completely in line
with normal market conditions. See point 14 of the Restructuring Communication.
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Repayment of State aid is not the only way of exit from State aid. Indeed, if State
aid is granted not in the form of debt instruments, but in the form of ordinary
shares, then this aid cannot be repaid by the bank.183 During the financial crisis,
several Member States decided to nationalise failing banks. The aim of the
nationalisation was to rescue the bank; the intention was not to hold the shares
in the bank indefinitely. At some point in time, the bank will be brought back to
the market. The fact that the Member State has committed to reprivatize the
beneficiary bank can be found in several cases. This commitment is viewed
positively by the Commission. However, it should be kept in mind that the
TFEU takes a neutral position towards private and State property.184 Member
States are thus not obliged to reprivatize the bank.
The relevance of reprivatisation is illustrated by the following recital from the
decision on ABN AMRO:
“Moreover, given the repeated and massive intervention of the Dutch State
in favour of Fortis Bank S.A., FBN and ABN Amro N, the public, and
depositors in particular, might consider that the State will intervene again
if further difficulties occur. Consumers might perceive the new entity ABN
Amro Group to be a very safe bank, which might make it easier for the group
to collect deposits. The Dutch government apparently wants to end this dis-
tortion of competition by selling the group to private investors as soon as this
is practically feasible”.185 [Italics mine, REvL]
This recital illustrates that it may be easier for a bank in State ownership to
attract retail deposits, because depositors are aware that the bank is State-
supported. Reprivatisation will end this distortion of competition. Reprivatisa-
tion may be relevant for two other reasons. Firstly, it will allow the Member
State to recover (part of) the funds invested in the beneficiary bank.186 Fur-
thermore, as set out in section 11.3.3.2, the Commission does not always
welcome State involvement in the bank’s management. From that viewpoint,
the commitment to reprivatize the bank will be noted favourably by the Com-
mission. To give an example: the Slovenian State became sole shareholder
of Abanka, NKBM and NLB as a result of the capital injections. Slovenia
183. This was explicitly recognised by the Commission in its decision on ABN AMRO, C11/
2009, 5 April 2011, para. 312: “While part of the aid has already been redeemed, some
measures (in particular measures Z and C) cannot be redeemed by the bank due to the form in
which they were granted (i.e. not in the form of a hybrid debt instrument).”
184. This principle is enshrined in Art. 345 TFEU (previously Art. 295 EC).
185. ABN AMRO, C11/2009, 5 February 2010, para. 139. See also: Northern Rock, C14/2008,
28 October 2009, para. 162.
186. This reason was explicitly mentioned in the decision on HRE (C15/2009, 18 July 2011,
para. 131).
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committed to divest (part of) its shareholdings in these banks. This commitment
was welcomed by the Commission, because the divestment would reduce the
external influence in the banks’ management and business activities.187
13.12.2 Has the Commission consistently taken into account these relevant
characteristics?
The strategy to exit from State aid is usually mentioned in the bank State
aid decisions, although the Commission does not frequently use the term “exit
strategy”; more often, the specific terms ‘reprivatisation’ and ‘repayment’ are
used.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the exit strategy is not always mentioned in
the same part of the decision. In some decisions, it is mentioned in the descrip-
tion of the restructuring plan; while in some other decisions, it is mentioned
in the assessment of whether the aid is limited to the minimum (i.e. the second
pillar). There are also decisions in which the exit strategy is addressed in
the context of competition distortions (i.e. the third pillar). In some decisions, the
exit from State aid is mentioned twice. For instance, in the decision on BPI, the
Commission noted that “such repayment of the aid ensures that the aid is limited
to the minimum necessary”188 and that “BPI has already repaid more than one-
third of the total aid amount which is an important contribution to limit potential
distortions of competition”.189
13.12.3 How are these relevant characteristics elaborated in the decisions?
13.12.3.1 Reprivatisation
When the Member State has nationalised the bank, the exit from State aid is
achieved by a reprivatisation. A reprivatisation can be conducted in different
ways. In that regard, Member States usually commit to sell the bank in an open
and transparent tender.190 There are a few cases in which the Member State
committed that the bank would be listed.191
187. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM), SA.35709, 18 December 2013, para. 107 (in the
section “strengthening the corporate governance framework”), and annex 12; Nova
Ljubljanska banka (NLB), SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 131.
188. BPI, SA.35238, 24 July 2013, para. 89.
189. BPI, SA.35238, 24 July 2013, para. 92.
190. See, for instance: Kommunalkredit Austria (KA), SA.32745, 31 March 2011, para. 34b
and annex B.
191. See, for instance: Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN), SA.35488, 20 December 2012, para. 142.
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One of the most important modalities of a reprivatisation is the timeframe.
In some cases, the Member State committed to reprivatize the bank before a
certain date. In other words: there is a clear timeframe in these cases.192 By
contrast, in the case of SNS REAAL, the Dutch State did not commit to rep-
rivatize the bank within a certain timeframe. Rather, the Dutch State committed
to regularly test the market conditions to reprivatize the bank.
The reprivatisation of the beneficiary bank is thus not always structured in the
same way. However, it should be recalled that Member States are not obliged
to reprivatize the beneficiary bank. As a corollary, Member States are not
obliged to reprivatize the bank in a specific way. They have thus some flexibility
in choosing how they reprivatize the bank.
13.12.3.2 Repayment of State aid
When the bank has been granted support in the form of preference shares,
CoCo’s or other (hybrid) debt instruments, the exit is achieved by repayment
of these instruments. In that regard, three remarks are in order.
In the first place, it should be recalled that the Commission welcomes exit
incentives. As discussed in section 8.7, a step-up clause in the remuneration may
induce the bank to pay back capital to the State as quickly as possible. Exit
incentives thus contribute to an early repayment.
In the second place, the Commission welcomes a clear repayment schedule.193
This can be illustrated by the case of Banco Comercial Português (BCP). This
bank had committed to a “rigorous” repayment schedule of the CoCo’s, which
was noted favourably by the Commission.194
In the third place, the Commission welcomes an early repayment of the State
aid. This can be illustrated by the case of FHB (a Hungarian bank). FHB was
recapitalised by the Hungarian State on 23 March 2009. On 19 February 2010,
192. The implications of a strict timeframe can be illustrated by the case of KA. Austria had
committed to sell all the KA Neu shares before a specific date. The privatisation of KA
Neu failed within the stipulated timeframe. Consequently, KA Neu was put in run-off.
193. Point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication requires a timetable for redemption of
State participation.
194. Banco Comercial Português (BCP), SA.34724, 30 August 2013, para. 106. The repayment
mechanism in the case of BCP was combined with a contingent divestment. BCP committed
to divest its Polish subsidiary if it did not repay by 31 December 2016 a substantial amount of
the State aid. This commitment was noted favourably by the Commission.
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the capital injected by the State was already repaid. This early repayment of
State aid was viewed favourably by the Commission.195 FHB also benefited
from a State loan. At the time of the Restructuring Decision, FHB had already
paid back four instalments of the loan, a fact which was noted favourably by
the Commission.196 The early repayment – together with the fact that FHB had
a small market share in the retail and corporate deposits market – led the Com-
mission to conclude that the distortions of competition were limited.197
To conclude, exit incentives, a clear repayment schedule or an early repay-
ment are noted positively by the Commission, because these factors ensure an
exit from State aid.
13.12.4 Concluding remarks
This section has shown that the exit strategy is not always structured in the same
way. However, it should be stressed that it is for the Member State and
beneficiary bank to develop an exit strategy; the Commission only assesses
whether there is a clear exit strategy. The important thing is that the Member
State can demonstrate a convincing exit strategy.
13.13 Conclusion
In each bank State aid case, the Commission assesses whether the compensatory
measures are sufficient to mitigate possible distortions of competition. The
characteristics that are relevant to that assessment were identified and discussed
in the present chapter. What are the main findings and what are their implications
for the Commission on the one hand and the Member States and beneficiary
banks on the other hand?
13.13.1 Key findings
The key findings concern the relevant context and the inconsistencies.
The relevant context
The Commission assesses whether the compensatory measures are sufficient
to mitigate possible distortions of competition. As set out in the present chap-
ter, the starting point of this assessment is the relevant context. The Commission
does not use the term ‘context’, but it does take into account the fact that the
bank is being wound-down (W-context), taken over by another bank (T-context)
195. FHB, C37/2010, 22 February 2012, para. 79, 82 and 94.
196. FHB, C37/2010, 22 February 2012, para. 84.
197. FHB, C37/2010, 22 February 2012, para. 94.
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or split-up (S-context). In these contexts, the beneficiary bank disappears as a
standalone entity. This is considered by the Commission as a significant
compensatory measure.
Inconsistencies
This chapter has found several inconsistencies in the Commission’s decisional
practice. The most conspicuous ones will be highlighted below.
In the first place, the present chapter has shown that two compensatory measures
were required by the Commission in the early bank State aid cases. The Com-
mission required a specific type of divestment, namely a divestment aimed at
creating a new competitor. Furthermore, the Commission required that the
beneficiary bank would be subject to a price leadership ban. As explained in
sections 13.5 and 13.10, these two compensatory measures do not appear in later
bank State aid cases. Does this constitute a change of approach? This could have
been better explained or clarified by the Commission.
In the second place, the present chapter has shown that the balance sheet
reduction is elaborated inconsistently. Firstly, the percentage of the balance sheet
reduction is not always mentioned in combination with the relative aid amount.
Secondly, in some decisions, the emphasis is on the way how the balance sheet
reduction is achieved (i.e. which activities are divested), while in other deci-
sions, the emphasis is on the percentage of the balance sheet reduction.
In the third place, the Commission did not always take into account the modal-
ities of some behavioural restrictions. For instance, the present chapter has
highlighted that the Commission always welcomed an acquisition ban, without
taking into account the modalities of the acquisition ban –which, in my opinion,
amounts to an inconsistency.
13.13.2 Implications for the Commission
This chapter has found several inconsistencies in the Commission’s decisional
practice. Thus, at some points, action should be undertaken by the Commission.
As regards several relevant characteristics, action is already undertaken by the
Commission. Especially the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication put
an end to several inconsistencies.
13.13.3 Implications for the Member States and beneficiary banks
In future bank State aid cases, what can Member States and beneficiary banks
expect from the Commission when submitting the restructuring plan? How to
anticipate the Commission’s assessment of the compensatory measures?
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Competitive impact
Intuitively, the relative aid amount is one of the most important factors deter-
mining the extent to which compensatory measures are needed. This chap-
ter has shown that the aid intensity is indeed a highly relevant characteristic.
However, there are various compensatory measures and one cannot determine,
on the sole basis of the aid amount, which compensatory measures are needed.
In addition, there is no one-to-one relation between the relative aid amount
and the extent of downsizing.
To some extent, the compensatory measures are related to the competitive
impact of the aid. Nevertheless, some compensatory measures are always
required by the Commission, irrespective of the precise competitive impact.
The prime example is the acquisition ban. This compensatory measure is always
required in cases in the C-context.
Some flexibility
Importantly, Member States have flexibility in deciding how they want to rescue
and restructure the bank: by winding-down the bank (W-context), by breaking-
up the bank (S-context), by transferring the bank to another bank (T-context) or
by allowing the bank to continue as a standalone entity (C-context). It should be
noted that the Commission does not impose one of the contexts.
To some extent, the compensatory measures are ‘communicating vessels’. The
more structural remedies, the less the need for behavioural restrictions. For
instance, the price leadership ban in the case of KBC did not apply to the Belgian
market, because KBC had committed to divest Centea and Fidea. In addition, the
Commission takes into account the degree of burden-sharing.
As a result, Member States and beneficiary banks have some flexibility in
choosing which compensatory measures they want to include in the restructur-
ing plan. For instance, as set out in section 13.4, market-opening measures are
not always required by the Commission.
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Chapter 14. Conclusion
14.1 The aim of this PhD-study
Some beneficiary banks felt unjustly treated by the Commission. As explained
in chapter 1, there is some doubt whether the principle of equal treatment is
respected by the Commission in its bank State aid decisions. This doubt is
caused by a lack of clarity. The aim of this PhD-study is to tackle this problem by
providing some clarity. In other words: the purpose of this PhD-study is to find a
way in which it can be assessed whether a bank State aid decision complies with
the principle of equal treatment. The corresponding central research question is
thus as follows:
How to assess whether a bank State aid decision complies with the principle
of equal treatment?
The aim of this PhD-study is to provide a framework which can be used to estab-
lish whether a bank State aid decision complies with the principle of equal
treatment. As explained in chapter 6, this framework effectively consists of a list
of relevant characteristics. In each bank State aid case, the Commission should
take into account these relevant characteristics. Indeed, when these relevant
characteristics are consistently taken into account by the Commission, then the
decisional practice of the Commission complies with the principle of equal
treatment. Thus, the only way of assessing whether a bank State aid decision
complies with the principle of equal treatment is by checking whether the rele-
vant characteristics are taken into account by the Commission. The list of rele-
vant characteristics can serve as a ‘check list’, which can be used by the
Commission as well as by the Member State and beneficiary bank.
While the aim of this PhD-study is forward-looking (i.e. providing a framework
which can be used for future cases), the analysis is backward-looking (i.e.
analysing previous bank State aid cases). The analysis of the previous decisional
practice is relevant for future cases. In the first place, the list of the relevant char-
acteristics is formed on the basis of the analysis of the decisional practice. In
the second place, the analysis of the Commission decisions may reveal certain
shortcomings in the decisional practice. Indeed, the analysis of the decisional
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practice has revealed that there are several relevant characteristics that are not
consistently taken into account by the Commission. In future cases, extra atten-
tion should be paid to these relevant characteristics.
14.2 Key findings
14.2.1 The relevant context
One of the conclusions of this PhD-study is that the context matters. This PhD-
study distinguishes between the following contexts: in the C-context, the ben-
eficiary bank continues to exist as a standalone entity; in the W-context, the
beneficiary bank is wound-down; in the T-context, the beneficiary bank is taken-
over by another bank; in the S/C/W-context, the beneficiary bank is split-up in
a good and bad part; and in the S/T/W-context, the beneficiary bank is split-up
in a good part – which is transferred to another bank – and a bad part – which is
wound-down.
It should be stressed that categorising bank State aid cases on the basis of the
relevant context is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means to an end. The com-
patibility-assessment ultimately depends on the relevant characteristics. In that
regard, the context is relevant, because it may have an impact on the relevant
characteristics. The exact relevance differs per context, as will be explained
below.
Relevance of the W-context
The defining feature of the W-context is that the beneficiary bank will be
wound-down. Consequently, the beneficiary bank will eventually disappear
from the market. This greatly limits the distortions of competition stemming
from the State aid. Indeed, when the bank has exited the market, it can no longer
distort competition on that market. Therefore, as discussed in section 13.1.2, the
fact that the beneficiary bank will eventually disappear from the market is the
starting point of the Commission’s assessment of the compensatory measures.
Since the bank in the W-context will be wound-down, the restructuring
measures in this context are not aimed at the restoration of the long-term via-
bility of the bank. Accordingly, most of the characteristics that are relevant to
the viability-assessment are less relevant in theW-context. Nevertheless, to some
extent these characteristics may still be relevant, since the bank will eventually
leave the market rather than immediately. In the meantime, some viability-
measures might be useful.
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Relevance of the T-context
The defining feature of the T-context is that the beneficiary bank’s activities
are transferred to the acquiring bank (and subsequently integrated into the
acquiring bank). Since the transferred activities constitute an economic con-
tinuity, the Commission assesses how the transfer and subsequent integration
of these activities contributes to the restoration of their viability. As discussed in
section 11.10, the relevant criterion is that the acquiring bank should be viable
and capable of absorbing the transfer of the ailing bank. In essence, the main
reason to sell the beneficiary bank to a larger bank is to restore the viability of the
beneficiary bank. Thus, the viability-elements (such as corporate governance,
operation efficiency and funding) are assessed from the viewpoint of the take-
over and subsequent integration into the acquiring bank.
Even though the transferred activities are considered to be an economic con-
tinuity, the beneficiary bank itself will cease to exist as a standalone entity. This
is noted positively by the Commission, because this limits competition distor-
tions.
Relevance of the S-context
The defining feature of the S-context is that the beneficiary bank is split-up
in a ‘good’ part and a ‘bad’ part. This has important implications for the burden-
sharing. As discussed in sections 12.5.3.4 and 12.6.3.2, in the S-context, the
shareholders and subordinated debt holders usually remain at the ‘bad’ part of
the bank. In this way, burden-sharing by shareholders and subordinated debt
holders is ‘automatically’ achieved.
The S-context is also relevant with respect to the limitation of competition
distortions, because the split-up of the bank means that the bank will cease to
exist as a standalone entity. This is noted positively by the Commission (just like
the exit of the bank is noted positively in the W-context and T-context).
Relevance of the C-context
The defining feature of the C-context is that the beneficiary bank continues to
exist as a standalone entity. This differentiates the C-context from the other
contexts discussed above. Since the beneficiary bank in the C-context does not
cease to exist as a standalone entity, compensatory measures (such as downsi-
zing) are very important in this context. For this reason, the balance sheet reduc-
tion figures prominently in the C-context.
14.2.2 Inconsistency on the first level
It should be recalled that an inconsistency can occur at two levels. The first
level concerns the question whether the Commission has consistently assessed
whether the relevant characteristics are present in the case at hand. The second
level concerns the way how the relevant characteristics are elaborated in the
decisions.
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The analysis of the decisional practice has revealed several inconsistencies on
the first level. Indeed, there are several relevant characteristics that are not
taken into account in every case. One would expect the relevant characteristics
to be present in every case, or one would expect a justification (or at least an
explanation) why a relevant characteristic is not present in the case at hand.
This can be illustrated by the relevant characteristic that was discussed in sec-
tion 11.2: the fact that the senior management of the beneficiary bank has been
replaced. Since the replacement of the senior management can be considered
as the norm1, one would expect that every decision mentions whether the senior
management has been replaced: the Commission either welcomes the replace-
ment of the bank’s senior management or it explains why such a replacement
would not be appropriate in the case at hand. In other words: one would expect
the Commission to mention the relevant characteristic in the decision. As
explained in section 11.2, there are 23 decisions (of in total 90 cases) that
indicate whether the senior management has been replaced, so there are 67
decisions that do not mention this relevant characteristic. In my opinion, this
omission to mention whether the senior management has been replaced, amounts
to an inconsistency.
Two compensatory measures are worth mentioning: i) the divestment aimed
at creating a new competitor, and ii) the price leadership ban. These two com-
pensatory measures were required by the Commission in the early bank
State aid cases. However, as explained in chapter 13, these two compensatory
measures do not appear in later bank State aid cases. Does this constitute a
hange of approach? This could have been better explained or clarified by the
Commission.
14.2.3 Inconsistency on the second level
One of the aims of the analysis of the decisional practice was to find out in how
many cases a relevant characteristic is taken into account. In some instances,
counting the number of cases (in which a relevant characteristic is taken into
account) is less valuable. It should be recalled that there can be an inconsistency
at two levels. Accordingly, even if a certain relevant characteristic is taken
into account in every bank State aid case, there can still be an inconsistency on
a deeper level. This is the case when the ‘characteristics’ of the relevant char-
acteristic are not consistently taken into account – in the terminology of this
PhD-study: when the relevant characteristic is not elaborated in a consistent
1. That the replacement of the senior management can be considered as the norm is
confirmed by point 37 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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manner.2 For some relevant characteristics, the emphasis is therefore on the
question how a certain relevant characteristic is elaborated rather than on the
question in how many cases it was taken into account.
To give an example: the fact that the beneficiary bank is subject to an acquisi-
tion ban is a relevant characteristic.3 The acquisition ban has several modalities,
such as the duration of the ban, its scope and its exceptions. Until the adoption
of the 2013 Banking Communication, the modalities of the acquisition ban
differed among the cases. Nevertheless, in every case that was characterised by
an acquisition ban, the Commission welcomed the fact that there was an acqui-
sition ban, even though the scope of the acquisition ban and the exemptions
to the acquisition ban were different.
In my view, the principle of equal treatment does not require that all the
modalities of the acquisition ban should be the same in each case. However, it
does require that the Commission should take into account the relevant dif-
ferences between the cases. Thus, if cases differ on the modalities, then one
would expect that these differences are taken into account by the Commission.
In particular, one would expect some kind of justification or explanation why
the scope of the acquisition ban is different or why some exemptions are not
included. Such explanation is not given by the Commission in its decisional
practice. Most decisions only mention that the Commission welcomes the acqui-
sition ban, without taking into account the different modalities of the acquisi-
tion ban. This amounts to an inconsistency. It should, however, be recalled that
this inconsistency was put to an end by the adoption of the 2013 Banking Com-
munication. Indeed, this Communication provides for an acquisition ban with
uniform modalities.
Although the inconsistency with respect to the acquisition ban was put to
an end, it is illustrative of the finding that the Commission did not always draw
conclusions from differences in modalities.
14.3 Implications
The previous section summarised the key findings of this PhD-study. What
conclusions can be drawn from these findings? And what are their implications
for the Commission, Member States and banks?
2. In section 6.7.3, I explained that the term “characteristics of the relevant characteristic”
might be confusing, For that reason, I used the term “the elaboration of the relevant char-
acteristic”.
3. This relevant characteristic was discussed in section 13.9.
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14.3.1 Interpreting the findings: has the Commission favoured certain
banks?
This PhD-study found several inconsistencies in the decisional practice of
the Commission. It is worthwhile to find out if these findings can provide an
answer to the question whether the Commission has favoured certain banks.
Although this is not the research question of this PhD-study, it nonetheless is
an intriguing one.
Chapter 6 already touched upon this question. As set out in that chapter, a
bank is treated favourably when the restructuring plan is less far-reaching than
it should be (on the basis of the distortive effects of the State aid). In popular
terms: a bank is treated favourably when it is ‘punished’ less than it deserves. In
that regard, it should be recalled that it is not possible to determine how severe
a bank is ‘punished’ by the Commission. In addition, it is not possible to deter-
mine how damaging the State aid is. There is thus no easy way of finding out
if the Commission has favoured certain banks. For that reason, it is valuable to
see if this question can be answered by interpreting the inconsistencies in the
Commission decisions found by this PhD-study.
As shown in this PhD-study, there are several decisions in which the Commis-
sion did not mention whether the case was characterised by the relevant char-
acteristic. For instance, there are many decisions in which the Commission did
not mention whether the senior management of the bank was replaced. This
could mean that the relevant characteristic is not present in these cases; in other
words: that the senior management was not replaced. The failure to take this
into account is favourable to the bank in question. Indeed, as discussed in
section 3.5.2, the ‘typical’ outcome of the compatibility-assessment is that the
State aid – in light of the restructuring plan – is compatible and thus approved
by the Commission. If this outcome is reached irrespective of the restructuring
measures, then this is unfavourable to the banks that are confronted with far-
reaching restructuring measures.
The next step would be to find out if a certain pattern can be discerned. In
other words: are there banks in respect to which the Commission consistently
failed to assess whether the case was characterised by certain relevant characte-
ristics? If this would be the case, then these banks would have been treated
favourably by the Commission.
However, this approach cannot provide a clear answer to the question whether
the Commission has favoured certain banks. In the first place, the analysis of
the bank State aid decisions did not reveal a pattern of cases in which the Com-
mission omitted to mention the relevant characteristic.
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In the second place, the omission to mention the relevant characteristic does
not necessarily mean that the relevant characteristic is not present in the case
at hand. Indeed, as explained in section 11.2, the omission to mention the
relevant characteristic – such as the replacement of the bank’s senior manage-
ment – could mean two things: i) the senior management was not replaced;
ii) the senior management was replaced, but the Commission failed to take this
into account. In situation (i), the Commission favoured the bank, since it did
not draw any conclusions from the fact that the senior management of the bank
was not replaced. By contrast, in situation (ii), the Commission did not take into
account the replacement of the senior management, whilst it normally welcomes
such a replacement.
Thus, it cannot be established whether the omission to mention the relevant
characteristic was favourable to the bank in question or not. Consequently, even
if there were a pattern of cases in which the Commission failed to mention
the relevant characteristic, this does not have to mean that these banks were
favoured by the Commission.
In the third place, even if the inconsistencies would turn out to be favourable
to certain banks, then this does not have to mean that the Commission had
the intention to favour these banks. Indeed, the inconsistencies found in this
PhD-study can be explained in two ways: either the Commission has been
somewhat negligent, or the Commission has deliberately not taken into account
the relevant characteristics in certain cases. Deliberately not taking into account
relevant characteristics would suggest that the Commission has intentionally
favoured certain banks. This implies that there are other factors at play. How-
ever, as set out in section 6.7, this PhD-study focusses on the characteristics
that are mentioned in the decisions. Relevant characteristics that are not men-
tioned in the decisions, fall outside the scope of the analysis performed in this
PhD-study. This PhD-study does thus not provide an answer to the question
whether the inconsistencies are due to negligence or to intention.
For these three reasons, it cannot be ascertained – on the basis of the analysis
conducted in this PhD-study – whether the Commission has favoured certain
banks. However, it cannot be excluded either. Indeed, as long as there are incon-
sistencies in the decisional practice, it cannot be excluded that the Commission
has favoured certain banks. This finding should have implications for the Com-
mission, as will be discussed below.
14.3.2 Implications for the Commission
In my opinion, the fact that it cannot be excluded that the Commission has
favoured certain banks, is problematic for the Commission. Indeed, the mere
impression that the Commission has treated some banks unfairly could be
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detrimental to the public support for the Commission’s State aid control. For
that reason, the Commission should be concerned with avoiding the impres-
sion that it has treated banks unfairly. The best way to avoid creating such an
impression is by treating State aid cases consistently.
In that regard, it should be recalled that the Commission has shown that it is
concerned with treating cases consistently. As discussed in section 6.7.3, the
Commission explicitly refers to other cases in order to demonstrate that the
decision is in line with its previous decisional practice. This illustrates that
the Commission is concerned with treating cases consistently.
As submitted in this PhD-study, the only way in which bank State aid cases can
be treated consistently, is by using the ‘relevant-characteristics approach’. In the
first place, the Commission should asses in every bank State aid case whether
the relevant characteristics are present in that case. In other words: the relevant
characteristics should be consistently used as assessment criteria. In the second
place, the relevant characteristics should be elaborated in a consistent manner.
14.3.3 Implications for the Member States and beneficiary banks
How are the key findings of this PhD-study relevant to the Member States
and beneficiary banks? Can they use the findings to challenge the decisions?
As touched upon in chapter 5, an action for annulment can only be brought
within a strict time-limit. So this PhD-study has no implications for previous
bank State aid cases. However, it is relevant for future cases: the list of relevant
characteristics can be used in future cases to assess if the decision complies
with the principle of equal treatment.
In that regard, it should be recalled that this PhD-study distinguished between
three stages: anticipating the “treatment”, negotiating the “treatment” and chal-
lenging the “treatment”. Chapter 5 made some important observations on the
third stage. Chapter 5 showed that there are relatively few Member States and
banks who challenge the Commission decision before the Court by bringing
an action for annulment. Another finding is that only a fraction of these actions
for annulment was successful. I would therefore recommend that Member States
and beneficiary banks focus their attention and efforts on the first and second
stage. In other words: they should bear in mind the relevant characteristics
when drafting the restructuring plan (‘anticipating the treatment’). In the second
stage, during the negotiations with the Commission, they could stress the
presence of certain relevant characteristics in the case at hand.
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Final remarks
This PhD-study began with the observation that there is a lack of clarity as to
whether bank State aid decisions comply with the principle of equal treatment.
As set out in chapter 1, this lack of clarity is due to the fact that it cannot easily be
established whether a decision complies with the principle of equal treatment.
With this PhD-study – which provides a framework that can be used to assess
whether a decision is in line with the principle of equal treatment – I hope to
have contributed to providing some clarity.
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Summary
This PhD-study examined the decisional practice of the Commission on State
aid to banks.
Chapter 1 introduced the main research question and the aim of this PhD-
study. There is some doubt whether the principle of equal treatment is
respected by the Commission in its bank State aid decisions. This doubt is
caused by a lack of clarity. The aim of this PhD-study is to tackle this problem
by providing some clarity. In other words: the aim of this PhD-study is to pro-
vide a framework which can be used to establish whether a bank State aid
decision complies with the principle of equal treatment.
Chapter 2 provided a basic background of the concepts ‘State aid’ and ‘State
aid control’. There may be valid reasons to grant State aid, but State aid can
also be harmful. In principle, State aid is prohibited, but it can – in certain
instances – be authorised (“declared compatible”) by the Commission.
Chapter 3 focussed on State aid to banks. During the financial crisis, granting
State aid to banks was necessary; not just to rescue one bank, but to rescue the
entire financial system. This follows from the fact that bank failure is contagious.
In addition, banks are essential to the economy. For these two reasons, granting
State aid to banks may be justified. This was recognised by the Commission,
which adopted the so-called Crisis Framework (consisting of the Crisis Com-
munications). In the Crisis Communications, the Commission gave guidance.
Chapter 4 discussed the bank resolution framework, consisting of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mecha-
nism (SRM)-Regulation. The main message of Chapter 4 is that – notwithstan-
ding the introduction of the BRRD, SRM and DRI – State aid to banks remains
relevant, the State aid control framework remains relevant and this PhD-study
remains relevant.
Chapter 5 provided an overview of the case-law on bank State aid. In
addition, this chapter discussed how the Court of Justice EU (“CJEU”) has
interpreted the principle of equal treatment. The main findings of this chapter
can be summarised as follows. In the first place, most bank State aid decisions
are not challenged before the CJEU. In the second place, the principle of equal
treatment is interpreted very narrowly by the CJEU.
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Chapter 6 delved into the question how the principle of equal treatment can
be applied to bank State aid cases. In that regard, the CJEU-definition and the
Aristotelian formula were discussed. However, I am of the opinion that the
CJEU-definition is unsatisfactory and that the Aristotelian formula is unfeasi-
ble. I therefore propose a different approach towards the principle of equal
treatment: the ‘relevant-characteristics approach’. In each bank State aid case,
the Commission should take into account these relevant characteristics. Indeed,
when these relevant characteristics are consistently taken into account by the
Commission, then the decisional practice of the Commission complies with the
principle of equal treatment.
Chapter 7 discussed the preliminary steps in the Commission’s assessment.
The first preliminary step is the question whether the aid measures consti-
tute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The second pre-
liminary step is to establish whether the compatibility of the aid measure has
to be assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The essential criterion in
that respect is the systemic importance of the bank. However, since the Com-
mission takes the view that in the situation of a financial crisis, every bank that
collapses can create a serious disturbance, every bank is considered to have
systemic importance. Consequently, the (implicit) assessment criterion ‘syste-
mic importance’ is always met.
Chapter 8 discussed characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of
whether the State aid is “appropriate”, “necessary” and “proportionate”. This
concerns the first stage of the compatibility-assessment: State aid can only be
declared compatible when it is “appropriate”, “necessary” and “proportionate”.
In this stage of the compatibility-assessment, the Commission was quite leni-
ent: in none of the cases, the Commission concluded that the State aid was not
appropriate, necessary or proportionate.
Chapter 9 discussed characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of the
compatibility of impaired assets measures. These measures have to be compati-
ble with the principles of the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). In that
regard, the IAC sets out the following criteria for the compatibility of asset relief
measures: i) eligibility of assets, ii) transparency and disclosure, iii) management
of assets, iv) valuation, and v) burden-sharing and remuneration. In every case
that involved asset relief measures, the Commission applied the five IAC-
criteria. Interestingly, there were several asset relief measures that did not meet
the IAC-criteria. However, these asset relief measures were still approved by
the Commission, because the non-compliance with the IAC-criteria was com-
pensated for by far-reaching restructuring.
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Chapter 10 discussed characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of
whether far-reaching restructuring is required. The degree of restructuring
depends primarily on i) the aid amount, and ii) the question whether the bank’s
difficulties were caused by endogenous problems or by external factors. The
fact that the aid amount is high (or the opposite: that it is low) and the fact that
the bank’s difficulties were caused by endogenous problems (or the opposite:
caused by external factors) are thus relevant characteristics.
Chapter 11 discussed characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of the
first restructuring objective: long-term viability. In every Restructuring Deci-
sion, the Commission assesses whether the restructuring plan ensures that the
beneficiary bank will return to long-term viability. In that regard, the Commis-
sion notes positively the fact that the corporate governance framework, risk
management, remuneration policy, funding and operational efficiency of the
bank will be improved.
Chapter 12 discussed characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of
the second restructuring objective: burden-sharing. Burden-sharing means that
the bank and its capital holders should contribute to the restructuring as much
as possible with their own resources. Burden-sharing by shareholders can be
achieved in various ways: for instance by diluting the shareholders in the con-
text of a recapitalisation, or by expropriating the shareholders in the context
of a nationalisation of the bank. Also burden-sharing by subordinated debt
holders can be achieved in various ways. Not all bank State aid cases are char-
acterised by the same type of burden-sharing, nor are they characterised by the
same level of burden-sharing. However, the 2013 Banking Communication
raised the minimum requirements for burden-sharing. By doing so, it contribu-
ted greatly to a consistent application of the burden-sharing principle.
Chapter 13 discussed characteristics that are relevant to the assessment of
the third restructuring objective: minimising competition distortions. The
problematic aspect of State aid is that it may create distortions of competition.
For this reason, the restructuring plan should contain compensatory measures
(i.e. measures to compensate for the distortions of competition). The Commis-
sion assesses whether the compensatory measures are sufficient to mitigate
the competition distortions stemming from the State aid. This depends essen-
tially on two aspects: i) the competitive impact of the State aid; and ii) the
type and nature of the compensatory measures.
Chapter 14 presented the conclusions of my research. The aim of this PhD-
study is to provide a framework which can be used to establish whether a bank
State aid decision complies with the principle of equal treatment. This frame-
work effectively consists of a list of relevant characteristics. As submitted in
this PhD-study, the only way in which bank State aid cases can be treated
SUMMARY
483
consistently, is by using the ‘relevant-characteristics approach’. In the first place,
the Commission should asses in every bank State aid case whether the relevant
characteristics are present in that case. In other words: the relevant characteris-
tics should be consistently used as assessment criteria. In the second place, the
relevant characteristics should be elaborated in a consistent manner.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift is de beschikkingspraktijk van de Commissie op het gebied
van staatssteun aan banken onderzocht.
In Hoofdstuk 1 werd de aanleiding voor dit onderzoek uiteengezet. Er is enige
onduidelijkheid of het gelijkheidsbeginsel wel door de Commissie in acht is
genomen in diens staatssteunbeschikkingen. Het doel van mijn onderzoek is om
deze onduidelijkheid weg te nemen. Met andere woorden: het doel van mijn
onderzoek is om tot een analysekader te komen op basis waarvan kan worden
vastgesteld of een staatssteunbeschikking in lijn is met het gelijkheidsbeginsel.
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd de achtergrond van het concept ‘staatssteun’ belicht. Aan
de ene kant verstoort staatssteun de concurrentieverhoudingen op de markt
en daarmee het ‘gelijke speelveld’. Aan de andere kant kunnen er gegronde
redenen zijn om staatssteun te verlenen. In beginsel is staatssteun verboden.
De Commissie kan de staatssteun evenwel “verenigbaar verklaren met de interne
markt”, oftewel goedkeuren.
Hoofdstuk 3 richtte zich op staatssteun aan banken. Tijdens de financiële cri-
sis was staatssteun aan banken noodzakelijk – niet alleen om afzonderlijke
banken te redden, maar om de gehele bankensector overeind te houden. Banken
zijn namelijk zodanig met elkaar verweven dat de val van een bank als een
dominosteen kan werken. De financiële stabiliteit vormt een rechtvaardiging om
staatssteun te verlenen aan banken. De Commissie erkende dat staatssteun aan
banken noodzakelijk en heeft daarom de zogenoemde ‘crisismededelingen’
vastgesteld. In deze mededelingen heeft de Commissie aangegeven hoe zij de
staatssteun aan banken zou gaan beoordelen.
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd een beschrijving gegeven van de nieuwe regelgeving
die voorziet in de afwikkeling (“resolutie”) van banken. Ondanks deze nieuwe
regelgeving blijft staatssteun aan banken relevant.
In Hoofdstuk 5 werd een overzicht gegeven van de jurisprudentie van het
Hof van Justitie EU op het gebied van staatssteun aan banken. Tevens werd
uiteengezet hoe het Hof van Justitie het gelijkheidsbeginsel invult. In dit
hoofdstuk kwam ik tot twee belangrijke conclusies. Ten eerste zijn er maar wei-
nig staatssteunzaken aan het Hof van Justitie voorgelegd. En ten tweede heeft
het Hof van Justitie het gelijkheidsbeginsel op een – mijns inziens – zeer
beperkte wijze ingevuld.
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Hoofdstuk 6 richtte zich op de vraag hoe het gelijkheidsbeginsel kan worden
toegepast in staatssteunzaken. In dat kader werden de Aristotelische gelijk-
heidsformule en de invulling die het Hof van Justitie geeft aan het gelijkheidsbe-
ginsel besproken. Aan beide benaderingen kleven naar mijn mening haken en
ogen: de invulling van het Hof van Justitie vind ik te beperkt en de Aristo-
telische gelijkheidsformule acht ik praktisch niet toepasbaar in staatssteunzaken.
Daarom kom ik met een eigen benadering: de ‘relevante karakteristieken
benadering’. Naar mijn mening vereist het gelijkheidsbeginsel dat de Commissie
in elke staatssteunzaak de relevante karakteristieken in aanmerking neemt.
Hoofdstuk 7 zag op de voorfase in de beoordeling van staatssteunmaatregelen
door de Commissie. In deze voorfase staan twee vragen centraal. Is er sprake
van staatssteun in de zin van artikel 107, lid 1, VWEU? En – indien er sprake
is van staatssteun – dient de verenigbaarheid van de staatssteun beoordeeld
te worden op basis van artikel 107, lid 3, sub b, VWEU? Van groot belang bij
die laatste vraag is de systeemrelevantie van de bank. Er dient echter gecon-
stateerd te worden dat de Commissie van oordeel is dat in een crisissituatie
zowat elke bank systeemrelevant is. De systeemrelevantie is derhalve geen
onderscheidend criterium.
In Hoofdstuk 8 werden de omstandigheden (“relevante karakteristieken”)
besproken die relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de vraag of de staatssteun
“geschikt, noodzakelijk en evenredig” is. Waar de Commissie bij de beoordeling
van het herstructureringsplan tamelijk streng is, is de Commissie bij de beoor-
deling van de geschiktheid, noodzakelijkheid en evenredigheid van de steun
zeer soepel: in geen van de staatssteunzaken was de Commissie van oordeel dat
de steun niet geschikt, noodzakelijk en evenredig was.
In Hoofdstuk 9 werden de omstandigheden (“relevante karakteristieken”)
besproken die relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van maatregelen inzake
activaondersteuning. Deze maatregelen dienen te voldoen aan de criteria van
Mededeling van de Commissie betreffende de behandeling van aan een bijzon-
dere waardevermindering onderhevige activa in de communautaire banksec-
tor – beter bekend als de Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). In een paar
zaken was niet aan deze criteria voldaan. Dit werd echter gecompenseerd door
het feit dat er sprake was van een vergaande herstructurering.
In Hoofdstuk 10 werden de omstandigheden (“relevante karakteristieken”)
besproken die relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de vraag of vergaande
herstructurering noodzakelijk is. Het steunbedrag is daarbij een bepalende fac-
tor, evenals de vraag of de problemen van de bank te wijten zijn aan interne
of externe factoren.
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In Hoofdstuk 11 werden de omstandigheden (“relevante karakteristieken”)
besproken die relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de eerste pijler van het
herstructureringsplan: het herstel van de levensvatbaarheid van de bank. Het
bedrijfsmodel, de organisatiestructuur, de corporate governance, het risicobe-
heer, het beloningsbeleid en de financieringsstructuur zijn daarbij bepalende
factoren.
In Hoofdstuk 12 werden de omstandigheden (“relevante karakteristieken”)
besproken die relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de tweede pijler van het
herstructureringsplan: eigen bijdrage van de begunstigde onderneming (lasten-
deling). Dit houdt in dat de bank en haar aandeelhouders zo veel mogelijk uit
eigen middelen aan de herstructurering dienen bij te dragen. De mate van lasten-
deling is niet in elke zaak gelijk. De Bankenmededeling van 2013 verscherpt de
minimumeisen inzake lastendeling en leidt daardoor tot een consistente bena-
dering van lastendeling.
In Hoofdstuk 13 werden de omstandigheden (“relevante karakteristieken”)
besproken die relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de derde pijler van het her-
structureringsplan: het beperken van de mededingingsvervalsing. Staatssteun
kan op verschillende wijzen de mededinging vervalsen. Staatssteun kan daarom
alleen worden goedgekeurd indien er maatregelen worden genomen om de
mededingvervalsing te beperken, zoals een overnameverbod, een prijsleider-
schapsverbod en een balansreductie. In elke staatssteunzaak beoordeelt de
Commissie of deze maatregelen afdoende zijn.
In Hoofdstuk 14 werden de conclusies van mijn onderzoek uiteengezet. Het
doel van mijn onderzoek is om tot een analysekader te komen op basis waarvan
kan worden vastgesteld of een staatssteunbeschikking in lijn is met het gelijk-
heidsbeginsel. Dit analysekader bestaat in feite uit de relevante karakteris-
tieken. Naar mijn mening vereist het gelijkheidsbeginsel dat de Commissie
in elke staatssteunzaak deze relevante karakteristieken in aanmerking neemt.
Met andere woorden: de Commissie dient in elke zaak te onderzoeken of de
relevante karakteristieken aanwezig zijn.
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Annex I: Overview of the relevant characteristics
The following table provides an overview of the characteristics that are rel-
evant to the Commission’s assessment of bank State aid measures. This assess-
ment comprises various steps and the relevant characteristics are categorised
accordingly (see section 6.9.1). Chapters 8 to 13 of this PhD-study each focussed
on a specific step of the Commission’s assessment. In these chapters, the relevant
characteristics were identified and some inconsistencies were detected. The find-
ings are summarised in the following table.
Chapter 8: Appropriate, necessary and proportionate
First stage of the compatibility-assessment
- when the measure constitutes State aid,
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the compatibility-assessment,
- in case of a guarantee or recapitalisation:
Assessment of whether the State aid measure meets the (cumulative) criteria of appropriateness,
necessity and proportionality.
Characteristics relevant to
that assessment:
Consistency (I) Consistency (II)
Has the Commission
consistently taken into account
this relevant characteristic?
Is the relevant characteristic
elaborated in a consistent
manner?
* The fact that the
beneficiary bank has
systemic importance.
In every decision, the
Commission assessed whether
the bank had systemic relevance.
Thus, in that regard, there is no
inconsistency (see sections 7.6
and 8.2)
If one takes the view that all
banks have systemic relevance,
then the observation that the
Commission has consistently
held that the beneficiary bank
has systemic relevance, means
that there is no inconsistency. By
contrast, if one takes the view
that some banks are systemically
important while others are not,
then the approach of the
Commission amounts to an
inconsistency (see sections 7.6
and 8.2).
* The fact that the aid
measure strengthens
the bank and restores
market confidence.
The Commission easily arrived
at the conclusion that the aid is
appropriate (see section 8.3).
This relevant characteristic is
to a very large extent self-
explanatory. It would have been
very hard for the Commission to
be inconsistent (see section 8.3).
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* The fact that the
guarantee is limited
in time and scope.
The Commission consistently
assessed whether the guarantee
was limited in time and scope
(see section 8.4).
There were some exceptions
(for instance,when the guarantee
scheme included subordinated
debt). However, these exceptions
were justified. There are
therefore no indications of an
inconsistency (see section 8.4).
* The fact that beneficiary
bank has to pay an
adequate remuneration to
the State.
The Commission consistently
assessed whether the remunera-
tion was adequate (see section
8.6).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section 8.6).
* The fact that there are exit
incentives.
The Commission consistently
assessed whether there were
exit incentives.
In essence, all behavioural
constraints are to some extent
‘painful’ andmake it unattractive
for a bank to be dependent on
State aid over a long period.
* The fact that there are
behavioural restrictions
(in the rescue phase).
The Commission consistently
assessed whether there were
behavioural restrictions.
There are no indications of an
inconsistency.
Additional relevant characteristics in the context of a bank support scheme:
* The fact that the scheme
is targeted at solvent/
fundamentally sound
banks.
It is not applied consistently:
while the Commission notes
positively the fact that the
scheme is aimed at fundamen-
tally sound banks, it does not
note negatively the fact that the
scheme is open to all banks.
A consistent application would
require a uniform definition of
‘solvent’. However, the
decisions do not apply a uniform
definition of ‘solvent’.
* The fact that subsidiaries
of foreign banks are eligi-
ble for the scheme.
That the scheme should be
open for subsidiaries of foreign
banks, is a clear requirement to
which Member States have to
comply.
There are no indications of
an inconsistency.
* The fact that the bank
support scheme has a
maximum budget.
The Commission usually notes
that the scheme has a maximum
budget. There are no indicati-
ons of an inconsistency.
There are no indications of
an inconsistency.
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Chapter 9: IAC
First stage of the compatibility-assessment
- when the measure constitutes State aid,
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the compatibility-assessment,
- in case of an asset relief measure:
Assessment of whether the asset relief measure complies with the criteria of the Impaired
Assets Communication.
Characteristics relevant to
that assessment:
Consistency (I) Consistency (II)
Has the Commission
consistently taken into account
this relevant characteristic?
Is the relevant characteristic
elaborated in a consistent
manner?
* The fact that the measure
has the effect of relieving
the bank from its impaired
assets.
In every case, the Commission
should assess whether the IAC
is applicable.
* The fact that the
‘eligibility-criterion’
of the IAC has been met.
In all cases involving impaired
asset measures, the Commission
assessed whether the IAC-crite-
ria had been met. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency.
There are no indications of an
inconsistency.
* The fact that the
‘transparency and
disclosure-criterion’ of the
IAC has been met.
* The fact that the
‘management-criterion’
of the IAC has been met.
* The fact that the
‘valuation-criterion’
of the IAC has been met.
* The fact the
‘burden-sharing and
remuneration criterion’ of
the IAC has been met.
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Chapter 10: Need for in-depth restructuring
Intermediate step
- when the measure constitutes State aid,
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the compatibility-assessment,
- when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and proportionate/complies with the IAC-criteria:
Assessment of whether a restructuring plan is required for the beneficiary bank/assessment
whether far-reaching restructuring is needed.
Characteristics relevant to
that assessment:
Consistency (I) Consistency (II)
Has the Commission consisten-
tly taken into account this
relevant characteristic?
Is the relevant characteristic
elaborated in a consistent
manner?
* The fact that the
beneficiary bank is
fundamentally sound./
The fact that the beneficiary
bank is distressed.
The First Prolongation
Communication removed the
distinction between
fundamentally sound banks and
distressed banks. Until the
entry into force of this Commu-
nication, the Commission
consistently assessed whether
the beneficiary bank was funda-
mentally sound (see section
10.2.1).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency.
(*) The fact that the
remuneration is inadequate.
/The fact that the own
contribution is
inadequate.
The assessment whether the
remuneration is adequate
includes the assessment
whether an inadequate
remuneration should be
compensated for by far-reaching
restructuring.
There are no indications of an
inconsistency.
Indeed, in every case, the
Commission either concluded
that the remuneration was
adequate or concluded that the
low level of remuneration must
be compensated for by far-rea-
ching restructuring.
(*) The fact that the bank’s
difficulties are caused by
external factors./The fact
that the bank’s difficulties
are caused by internal
factors.
This relevant characteristic does
not necessarily have to be
mentioned in every decision,
since it is – in any event – taken
into account by the Commission
when it assesses whether the
restructuring plan meets the
three restructuring objectives.
There are no indications of an
inconsistency.
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Chapter 11: Viability
Second stage of the compatibility-assessment
- when the measure constitutes State aid,
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the compatibility-assessment,
- when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and proportionate / complies with the IAC-criteria,
- when a restructuring plan is required:
Assessment of whether the restructuring plan meets the restructuring objective of restoring
long-term viability.
Characteristics relevant to
that assessment:
Consistency (I) Consistency (II)
Has the Commission consisten-
tly taken into account this
relevant characteristic?
Is the relevant characteristic
elaborated in a consistent
manner?
* The fact that the senior
management of the
beneficiary bank has been
replaced.
This relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
There is no plausible explana-
tion for this omission to mention
this relevant characteristic. This
would indicate an inconsistency
(see section 11.2.2).
The decisional practice gives a
very varied picture of ‘senior
management’. Thus, the
elaboration of this relevant
characteristic could have been
more consistent (see section
11.2.3).
* The fact that the restruc-
turing plan provides for an
improvement of the bank’s
corporate governance
framework.
This relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
This can be explained by the fact
that this relevant characteristic
does not have to be present in
every case. In that regard, there
is no inconsistency (see section
11.3.2).
The way in which this relevant
characteristic is elaborated in
the decisions depends on the
nature of the corporate
governance problems. This is
not necessarily inconsistent
(see section 11.3.3).
* The fact that the restruc-
turing plan provides for an
improvement the bank’s
risk management.
This relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
This can be explained by the
fact that this relevant characte-
ristic does not have to be present
in every case. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency (see
section 11.4.2).
The way how risk management
is mentioned in the decisions
depends on the nature of the
risk management problems.
This is not necessarily
inconsistent (see section
11.4.3).
* The fact that the restruc-
turing plan contains
restrictions of the
remuneration of the
beneficiary bank’s
employees and managers.
This relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
However, prior to the 2013
Banking Communication, this
relevant characteristic did not
have to be present in every case.
In that regard, there is no
inconsistency (see section
11.5.2).
The modalities of the remunera-
tion restrictions were often
different per bank. The 2013
Banking Communication put
an end to this inconsistency
(see section 11.5.3).
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* The fact that the restruc-
turing plan provides for a
reduction of the bank’s
reliance on wholesale
funding.
This relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
There is no plausible explana-
tion for the omission to mention
this relevant characteristic. This
would indicate an inconsistency
(see section 11.6.2).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section
11.6.3).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank will focus on its
core activities (and thus
divest its non-core
activities).
The relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
This can be explained by the
relevant context. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency (see
section 11.7.2).
There is no uniform definition
of ‘non-core activities’. This is
not necessarily inconsistent
(see section 11.7.3).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank has implemen-
ted cost-cutting measures.
Cost-cutting measures are not
mentioned in every decision,
but this can be explained by
the relevant context. In that
regard, there is no inconsistency
(see section 11.8.2).
Although the extent of
cost-cutting is mentioned in
the decision, it is not explicitly
taken into account in the
assessment of the viability and
burden-sharing (see section
11.8.3).
* The fact that the bank
participates in an
Asset Protection Scheme or
has transferred impaired
assets to an Asset
Management Company.
The relevant characteristic is
not mentioned in every decision.
This can be explained by the
fact that this relevant characte-
ristic does not have to be present
in every case. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency (see
section 11.9.2).
There are no indications of
an inconsistency
(see section 11.9.3).
* The fact that the acquiring
bank has a strong financial
position.
These relevant characteristics
are only applicable in the
T-context and S/T/W-context.
In that regard, there is no incon-
sistency (see section 11.10.2).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section
11.10.3).
* The fact that the acquiring
bank is much larger than
the ailing bank.
* The fact that the acquiring
bank has a good track
record in extracting
synergies.
* The fact that only the
good parts of the ailing
bank are transferred
to the acquiring bank.
* The fact that the assump-
tions (on which the finan-
cial projections are based)
are reasonable.
The Commission has consisten-
tly checked whether the
assumptions were reasonable
(see section 11.12.2).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section
11.12.3).
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Chapter 12: Burden-sharing
Second stage of the compatibility-assessment
- when the measure constitutes State aid,
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the compatibility-assessment,
- when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and proportionate/complies with the IAC-criteria,
- when a restructuring plan is required:
Assessment of whether the restructuring plan meets the restructuring objective of
burden-sharing.
Characteristics relevant to
that assessment:
Consistency (I) Consistency (II)
Has the Commission consisten-
tly taken into account this
relevant characteristic?
Is the relevant characteristic
elaborated in a consistent
manner?
* The fact that the chosen
rescue/restructuring is the
least costly alternative.
There are only a few decisions
that explicitly mention that
the chosen scenario is the least
costly one (see section 12.2.2).
This is inconsistent, but not
problematic (see section 12.2.4).
Although elaborated in various
manners, there are no indicati-
ons of an inconsistency (see
section 12.2.3).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is divesting
(profitable non-core)
subsidiaries.
The more general observation
that the bank is using own
resources to finance the restruc-
turing can be found in almost
any decision. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency
(see section 12.3.2).
In most decisions, the fact that
the bank has made divestments
is not very elaborated (see
section 12.3.3).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is nationalised.
In principle, burden-sharing is
required in every bank State
aid case. Accordingly, in every
case, the Commission has
assessed whether there was
burden-sharing. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency
(see section 12.5.2).
Whether the different types of
burden-sharing are equivalent
to each other (in terms of how
burdensome they are) depends
on the exact modalities of the
burden-sharing measures (see
section 12.5.3.6).
* The fact that the bank’s
shareholders are diluted.
* The fact that the bank’s
shareholders participate in a
capital raising exercise.
* The fact that the bank’s
shareholders remain at the
bad bank or the bank in
liquidation.
* The fact that the bank’s
equity is completely
written-down.
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is subject to a
dividend ban.
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* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank conducted a
liability management
exercise (LME).
In principle, burden-sharing is
required in every bank State
aid case. Accordingly, in every
case, the Commission has asses-
sed whether there was burden-
sharing. In that regard, there is
no inconsistency (see section
12.6.2).
Whether the different types of
burden-sharing are equivalent
to each other (in terms of how
burdensome they are) depends
on the exact modalities of the
burden-sharing measures
(see section 12.6.3.4).
* The fact that the subordi-
nated debt is completely
written-down.
* The fact that subordina-
ted debt holders are not
transferred to the acqui-
ring bank, but remain in
the bad bank or the entity
in liquidation.
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is subject to a
coupon ban.
Chapter 13: Competition distortions
Second stage of the compatibility-assessment
- when the measure constitutes State aid,
- when Article 107(3)(b) TFEU forms the basis of the compatibility-assessment,
- when the State aid is appropriate, necessary and proportionate/complies with the IAC-criteria,
- when a restructuring plan is required:
Assessment of whether the restructuring plan meets the restructuring objective of minimising
competition distortions.
Characteristics relevant to
that assessment:
Consistency (I) Consistency (II)
Has the Commission consisten-
tly taken into account this rele-
vant characteristic?
Is the relevant characteristic
elaborated in a consistent
manner?
* The fact that the aid
amount is very large./The
fact that the aid amount is
relatively low.
In its decisional practice, the
Commission has consistently
taken into account the amount
of State aid (see section 13.2.2).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section
13.2.3).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank has a limited
market presence.
In several decisions, the market
position of the bank is not
mentioned as an indication of
the competitive impact. The
finding that the market position
is not always used as an assess-
ment criterion points at an
inconsistency (see section
13.3.2).
The market characteristics are
not always elaborated to the
same extent. Some decisions
contain more detailed informa-
tion than other decisions. This
would indicate an inconsis-
tency (see section 13.3.3).
* The fact that the bank is
one of the market leaders.
* The fact that the market is
concentrated.
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* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank will implement
market-opening
measures.
Market-opening measures only
appear in a few cases and are
thus not a very common com-
pensatory measure (see section
13.4.2).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section
13.4.3).
(*) The fact that the
divestment is aimed at
creating a new
competitor.
Only in a few cases, the divest-
ment was specifically aimed at
creating a new competitor.
Remarkably, the Commission
did not clarify why this type of
divestment was not needed in all
cases. While there may be valid
reasons to change the approach
towards this specific type of
divestment, changing the
approach without a clear
explanation points at an incon-
sistency (see section 13.5.2).
There is a link between divest-
ment-related commitments and
divestments aimed at creating a
new competitor. However, this
link is not consistently made in
the decisions (see section
13.5.3.3).
* The fact that restructuring
plan provides for a reduc-
tion of the balance sheet
size of the beneficiary
bank.
The more general observation
that the bank is subject to down-
sizing can be found in almost
any decision. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency
(see section 13.6.2).
The percentage of the balance
sheet reduction is not always
mentioned in combination with
the relative aid amount. This
would indicate an inconsistency
(see section 13.6.3).
* The fact that the bank
will reduce the number
of branches.
There are no indications of
an inconsistency (see section
13.7.2).
The Commission did not take
particular note of the exact
modalities of this relevant
characteristic. This would
indicate an inconsistency
(see section 13.7.3).
* The fact that the bank will
reduce the number of
employees.
* The fact that the restruc-
turing plan provides for a
growth limitation.
It is difficult to establish whether
the Commission has consisten-
tly taken into account this
relevant characteristic (see
section 13.8.2).
It is difficult to establish whether
the Commission has consistently
taken into account this relevant
characteristic (see section
13.8.3).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is subject to an
acquisition ban.
Most decisions fit within the
general pattern. In that regard,
there is no inconsistency
(see section 13.9.2).
Prior to the 2013 Banking
Communication, the
Commission did not take
particular note of the exact
modalities of the acquisition
ban. This is inconsistent
(see section 13.9.3).
ANNEXES
498
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is subject to a
price leadership ban.
Since the price leadership
ban and the other pricing
restrictions are not substitutes,
the absence of a price
leadership ban cannot be
explained by the mere fact
that the bank is subject to the
other pricing restrictions.
To some extent, the Commission
has taken into account the
modalities of the price
leadership ban. However, with
respect to the standard of
comparison, an explanation as
to why a specific standard of
comparison was chosen, was
completely lacking. This is
inconsistent (see section
13.10.3).
The finding that there are only
13 cases in which a price leader-
ship ban was imposed, would
seem to indicate an inconsis-
tency (see sections 13.10.2 and
13.10.5).
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is subject to
other pricing restrictions.
* The fact that the benefi-
ciary bank is subject to a
ban on aggressive
commercial practices/
strategies.
There is a lot of vagueness
regarding the use of these terms.
Sometimes, they are used as
synonyms; sometimes they are
used as two distinct notions (see
section 13.11.1).
There is a lot of vagueness regar-
ding the use of these terms.
Sometimes, they are used as
synonyms; sometimes they are
used as two distinct notions (see
section 13.11.1).
* The fact that the restruc-
turing plan includes a clear
repayments schedule./The
fact that the bank has alre-
ady repaid (part of) the aid.
Exit from State aid is relevant
in every case (irrespective of
the form of aid). Consequently,
the exit strategy should be
taken into account in every
case. There are no indications
of an inconsistency (see
section 13.12.2).
There are no indications of an
inconsistency (see section
13.12.3).
* The fact that the Member
State commits to repriva-
tize the beneficiary bank.
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Annex II: Number of bank State aid decisions
Member State Number of
decisions on bank
support schemes
Number of
decisions on
ad hoc bank State
aid cases
Number of
Restructuring
Decisions
Total number of
decisions
Austria 5 15 6 20
Belgium 0 26 5 26
Bulgaria 1 1 1 2
Croatia 1 0 0 1
Cyprus 10 4 2 14
Denmark 19 14 5 33
Finland 7 0 0 7
France 5 4 1 9
Germany 9 34 11 43
Greece 22 24 10 46
Hungary 21 2 2 23
Ireland 28 21 6 49
Italy 10 17 2 27
Latvia 4 9 2 13
Lithuania 6 3 2 9
Luxembourg 0 3 1 3
Netherlands 4 17 5 21
Poland 31 0 0 31
Portugal 32 11 6 43
Slovakia 1 0 6 1
Slovenia 8 12 0 20
Spain 15 26 13 41
Sweden 9 2 0 11
United Kingdom 11 9 5 20
Total 259 254 91 513
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Annex III: List of decisions on bank State aid cases
The following table provides a list of the decisions on bank State aid cases.1 As
the table clearly illustrates, almost every bank State aid case comprises sev-
eral decisions. For each decision, the following information is provided in the
table: the case number2, the date of the decision, the type of decision (see section
3.6.1) and the subject of the decision (as indicated in the decision itself). The
relevant context (see section 6.8) is indicated in the last column of the table.
Because of the special focus on the restructuring (see section 6.9.1), the
Restructuring Decisions are highlighted (in bold).
Austria
Bank Case
number
Date Type
of decision
Subject Context
Osterreichi-
sche
Volksbanken
(OVAG)
SA.31883 9 December
2011
Opening
decision
Restructuring of
Osterreichische
Volksbanken
OVAG SA.31883 19 September
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Osterreichische
Volksbanken
C
OVAG SA.31883 2 July 2015 Amendment
decision
On the State aid
which Austria
implemented and is
further planning to
implement for
ÖVAG and the
Volksbanken
Verbund and to
amend the decision
2013/298/EU
1. On its website, the Commission publishes an overview of decisions (and on-going in-depth
investigations) in the context of the financial crisis. This overview was updated regularly.
2. The case number can be used to find the bank State aid decisions on the website of the
Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/.
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Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
BAWAG N640/
2009
22 December
2009
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid (capital
injection and asset
guarantee) to
BAWAG
BAWAG N261/2010 30 June 2010 Restructuring
decision
Second3 restructu-
ring aid for
BAWAG
C
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Hypo Tirol
Bank
N241/
2009
17 June 2009 Rescue
decision
Aid measures
provided to Hypo
Tyrol Bank
Hypo Tirol
Bank
SA.34716 4 October
2012
Restructuring
decision
Rekapitalisierung
und Umstrukturie-
rung der Hypo
Tirol Bank
C
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Hypo Group
Alpe Adria
(HGAA)
N254/
2009
12 May 2009 Opening
decision
BayernLB and
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria *4
HGAA N698/
2009
23 December
2009
Prolongation
decision
BayernLB and
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria
HGAA C16/2009 22 June 2010 Prolongation
decision
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria
HGAA SA.32172 19 July 2011 Prolongation
decision
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria
HGAA SA.32554 5 December
2012
Prolongation
decision
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria
HGAA SA.32554 3 September
2013
Restructuring
decision
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria
S/C/W *5
3. On 27 June 2007, the Commission had adopted a Restructuring Decision on BAWAG
(case C50/2006). Since this decision concerned State aid granted before the financial crisis,
the first Restructuring Decision on BAWAG falls outside the scope of the analysis.
4. HGAA was a subsidiary of BayernLB.
5. HGAAwas split into (i) the Austrian bank (HBA), (ii) the SEE network and (iii) the wind-
down part.
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Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Kommunal-
kredit
Austria (KA)
SA.32745 31 March
2011
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Kommunalkredit
Austria
S/C/W *6
KA SA.32745 19 July 2013 Restructur-
ing decision
State support for
the run-off of
Kommunalkredit
Austria
W *7
Belgium
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
KBC N602/2008 18 December
2008
Rescue
decision
The Belgian Aid to
KBC
KBC C18/2009 30 June 2009 Opening
decision
Second recapitalisa-
tion and asset relief
for KBC
KBC C18/2009 18 November
2009
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
KBC
C
KBC MC11/
2009
16 December
2010
Amendment
decision
Extension of the
target date of certain
divestments by KBC
KBC SA.29833,
MC11/
2009
27 July 2011 Amendment
decision
Monitoring of KBC
– Replacement of
certain own contribu-
tion measures, change
to divestment of
Romstal and the
extension of the dead-
line for the divestment
KBL
KBC SA.29833,
MC11/
2009
22 December
2011
Amendment
decision
Monitoring of KBC
– Extension of the
target date of certain
divestments by KBC
and Amendment of
restructuring
commitments
KBC SA.29833 20 December
2012
Amendment
decision
Accelerated phasing-
out of the State
protection measure
and amendments to
the KBC’s restructur-
ing plan
6. KA was split into a good bank (KA Neu) and a bad bank (KA Finanz).
7. Since it was not possible to privatise KA, the bank was wound-down.
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Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Ethias NN57/2008 12 February
2009
Rescue
decision
Emergency aid for
Ethias
Ethias N256/2009 20 May 2010 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to Ethias
C
Ethias SA.30962 12 September
2011
Amendment
decision
Monitoring of the
implementation of the
decision of 20 May
2010 on the aid to
Ethias – Prolongation
of divestment dead-
line Ethias Banque
Ethias SA.30962 12 June 2014 Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan
of Ethias
Ethias SA.43306 23 October
2015
Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan of
Ethias – Approval of
issuance of additional
subordinated debt
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Dexia NN49/
2008,
NN50/
2008,
NN45/2008
19 November
2008
Rescue
decision
Emergency aid to
Dexia in the form of
a guarantee for bonds
and liquidity
assistance
Dexia C9/2009 13 March
2009
Opening
decision
Aid to Dexia in the
form of guarantees
for bonds and certain
assets, liquidity
assistance and a
capital increase
Dexia C9/2009 30 October
2009 *8
Prolongation
decision
Dexia
Dexia C9/2009 26 February
2010
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring
of Dexia
C
Dexia SA.33751 17 October
2011
Opening
decision
Rachat de Dexia
Banque Belgique par
l’Etat belge
Dexia SA.33760,
SA.33763,
SA.33764
21 December
2011
Opening
decision
Mesure additionnelle
au plan de restructu-
ration de Dexia
8. Not published on the Commission’s website.
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Dexia SA.33760,
SA.33763,
SA.33764
31 May
2012 (I)
Prolongation
decision
Additional measure
to restructuring of
Dexia
Dexia SA.33760,
SA.33763,
SA.33764
31 May
2012 (II)
Other Additional measure
to restructuring of
Dexia
Dexia SA.34440 25 July 2012 Rescue
decision
Sale of Dexia BIL *9
Dexia SA.34925 6 June 2012 Rescue
decision
Augmentation du
plafond de la garantie
temporaire
Dexia SA.34925 26 September
2012
Opening
decision
Deuxième prolonga-
tion de la garantie
temporaire sur
refinancement
de Dexia
Dexia SA.33760,
SA.33763,
SA.33764,
SA.30521,
SA.26653,
SA.34925,
SA.34927,
SA.34928
28 December
2012
Restructuring
decision
Aide d’Etat mise a
execution par
le Royaume de
Belgique, la
Republique
francaise et
le Grand-Duche de
Luxembourg
S/C/ T/
W *10
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Fortis N574/2008 19 November
2008
Rescue
decision
State guarantees for
Fortis Bank
Fortis NN42/2008
NN46/
2008,
NN53/2008
3 December
2008
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to Fortis Bank and
Fortis Bank
Luxembourg
S/C/T/
C *11
Fortis N255/
2009,
N274/2009
12 May 2009 Restructuring
decision
Additional aid for
Fortis Banque, Fortis
Banque Luxembourg
and Fortis holding
9. NB: no new aid.
10. Dexia was split-up (S). DBB/Belfius was purchased by the Belgian State (C). NEC/DMA
was purchased by the French State, the CDC and La Banque Postale (T) and set up as a
development bank. Dexia was wound-down (W).
11. The Fortis Group was split-up (S). Fortis Bank Nederland was purchased by the Dutch
State (C). Fortis Bank was sold by the Belgian State and eventually transferred to BNP
Paribas (T). The remaining parts of Fortis Group continued to exist as Ageas (C).
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Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Kaupthing
Bank
Luxembourg
N344/
2009,
N380/2009
9 July 2009* Restructuring
aid
Restructuring
aid for Kaupthing
Bank Luxembourg
S/T/
W*12
Bulgaria
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
First
Investment
Bank (FIB)
SA.39854 25 November
2014
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring plan
of First Investment
Bank (FIB)
C
Cyprus
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Cyprus
Popular Bank
SA.34827 13 September
2012
Rescue
decisions
Rescue recapitalisa-
tion of Cyprus
Popular Bank
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Cooperative
Credit Bank
(CCB)
SA.35334 24 February
2014
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and restructuring
of the Cooperative
Central Bank and
of the Cooperative
Credit Institutions
C
Cooperative
Central Bank
SA.43367 18 December
2015
Restructuring
decision
2015 Additional
restructuring aid to
the Cooperative
Central Bank
C
Cooperative
Central Bank
SA.45051 27 April 2016 Final valuation of the
Cooperative Central
Bank Ltd, Cyprus
12. The activities in Belgium were taken over by Crédit Agricole; the activities in Luxembourg
were taken over by the UK investment firm Blackfish Capital; all other assets were
transferred to a SPV.
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Denmark
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Amagerbanken SA.32634 6 June 2011 Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to
Amagerbanken
Amagerbanken SA.33485 25 January
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructur-
ing plan of
Amagerbanken
S/T/W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Eik Banki
(and Eik Bank
Denmark)
SA.31945 6 June 2011 Restructuring
decision
Aid for the
liquidation of
Eik Banki and
its subsidiary
Eik Bank
Denmark
S/T/W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Fionia Bank NN23/2009 20 May 2009 Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to
Fionia Bank
Fionia Bank N560/2009 25 October
2010
Restructuring
decision
Aid for the
liquidation
of Fionia Bank
S/T/W
Fionia Bank SA.33117 18 July 2011 Amendment
decision
Revised
commitments
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Roskilde Bank NN36/2008 31 July 2008 Rescue
decision
Roskilde Bank
Roskilde Bank NN39/2008 5 November
2008
Restructuring
decision
Aid for liquida-
tion of Roskilde
Bank
S/T/W
Roskilde Bank NN52/2010 24 May 2011 Amendment
decision
Amendments to
liquidation aid
to Roskilde
Bank
ANNEXES
507
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
FIH SA.34445 29 June 2012 Opening
decision
Transfer of
property-related
assets from
FIH to the FSC
FIH SA.34445 11 March
2014
Restructuring
decision
Transfer of
property-rela-
ted assets from
FIH to the FSC
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Vestjysk Bank/
Aarhus
Lokalbank
SA.34423 25 April 2012 Rescue
decision
Rescue decision
for the merger
of Vestjysk
Bank and
Aarhus
Lokalbank
Vestjysk Bank SA.34720 4 December
2015
Opening
decision
Aid for the
restructuring of
Vestjysk Bank
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Max Bank SA.33639 7 October
2011
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid for
Max Bank
Finland
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Kaupthing
Bank
NN2/2009 21 January
2009
Rescue
decision
State measure invol-
ving arrangements
with Kaupthing
Bank h.f, Finnish
Branch
ANNEXES
508
France
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banque
Populaire/
Caisse
d’Epargne
N249/2009 8 May 2009 Rescue
decision
Injection of capital
into the institution
to be created by
the merger of the
parent companies
of the Caisse
d’Épargne and
Banque Populaire
groups
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Crédit Immo-
bilier de
France (CIF)
SA.35389 21 February
2013
Rescue
decision
Aide au sauvetage du
Crédit Immobilier de
France
Crédit
Immobilier
SA.37075 14 August
2013
Rescue
decision
Prolongation de la
garantie temporaire
et augmentation de
son plafond maximal
Crédit
Immobilier
SA.37029 27 November
2013
Restructuring
decision
Aide à la liquidation
ordonnée du Crédit
Immobilier de
France
W
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Dexia See:
Belgium
Germany
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
BayernLB N615/2008 18 December
2008
Rescue
decision
State aid to
BayernLB
BayernLB N254/2009 12 May 2009* Opening
decision
BayernLB and Hypo
GroupAlpe Adria *13
BayernLB N698/2009 23 December
2009*
Prolongation
decision
BayernLB and
Hypo Group Alpe
Adria
BayernLB SA.28487 (25 July 2012)
5 February
2013
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
for BayernLB
C
13.
ANNEXES
509
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Com-
merzbank
N244/2009 7 May 2009 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring C
Commerzbank SA.34539 30 March
2012
Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan of
Commerbank
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Hypo Real
Estate (HRE)
N44/2008 2 October
2008
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid for Hypo
Real Estate
Hypo Real
Estate
N196/2009 7 May
2009 *14
Opening
decision
Hypo Real Estate
Hypo Real
Estate
C15/2009 24 July 2009 Opening
decision
Hypo Real Estate
Hypo Real
Estate
C15/2009,
N333/
2009,
N557/2009
13 November
2009
Prolongation
decision
Hypo Real Estate
– Extension of
formal investigation
procedure, and
temporary find capital
injections compatible
Hypo Real
Estate
N161/2010 19 May 2010 Rescue
decision
Further recapitalisa-
tion of HRE
Hypo Real
Estate
C15/2009,
N380/2010
24 September
2010
Prolongation
decision
Extension of scope
of formal investiga-
tion procedure,
winding-up institu-
tion, additional
SoFFin guarantees
for HRE
Hypo Real
Estate
C15/2009 18 July 2011 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring C
14. NB: only a press release available.
ANNEXES
510
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
HSH
Nordbank
N264/2009 29 May 2009 Rescue
decision
Rescue aid (recapita-
lisation and risk
shield)
HSH
Nordbank
C29/2009 22 October
2009
Opening
decision
HSH Nordbank
HSH
Nordbank
SA.29338 20 September
2011
Restructuring
decision
HSH Nordbank C
HSH
Nordbank
SA.29338 21 June 2013 Opening
decision
Increase of the
second-loss guaran-
tee for HSH
Nordbank
HSH
Nordbank
SA.44910 2 May
2016 *15
Restructuring
decision
Increase of the
second-loss guarantee
for HSH
Nordbank
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
IKB C10/2008 27 February
2008 *16
Opening
decision
IKB
IKB C10/2008 21 October
2008
Restructuring
decision
Umstrukturierung
der IKB
C *17
IKB N639/2008 22 December
2008
Rescue
decision
Guarantee for IKB
IKB N213/2009 15 May 2009 Amendment
decision
Amendment of
restructuring
decision C10/2008
IKB N400/2009 17 August
2009
Rescue
decision
Second liquidity gua-
rantee for IKB
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Landesbank
Baden-Wurt-
temberg
(LBBW)
C17/2009 30 June 2009 Opening
decision
Aid measures provi-
ded to LBBW
LBBW C17/2009 15 December
2009
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and asset relief for
LBBW
C
LBBW SA.30062,
SA.31773
9 December
2013
Amendment
decision
Amendment of
LBBW restructuring
plan
15. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
16. NB: only a press release available.
17. NB: This case is labelled as C, even though KfW’s shares in IKB were sold to Lone Star.
ANNEXES
511
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
NordLB NN34/2007 18 July 2007 Rescue
decision
Capital contributions
(no state aid)
NordLB N655/2008 22 December
2008
Rescue
decision
Secured guaranteed
medium-term note
programme
NordLB N655/2008 10 September
2009
Rescue
decision
Prolongation of
secured guaranteed
medium-term note
programme
NordLB SA.33571 22 December
2011
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to
NordLB
NordLB SA.34381 25 July 2012 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to NordLB
C
NordLB SA.34381 22 August
2013
Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan of
NordLB
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Sachsen LB C9/2008 27 February
2008
Opening
decision
Restructuring aid to
Sachsen LB
Sachsen LB C9/2008 4 June 2008 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to Sachsen LB
T *18
Sachsen LB See LBBW
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Sparkasse
KölnBonn
C32/2009 4 November
2009
Opening
decision
Sparkasse KölnBonn
Sparkasse
KölnBonn
C32/2009 29 September
2010
Restructuring
decision
Sparkasse KölnBonn C
Sparkasse
KölnBonn
SA.31646 30 March
2011
Amendment
decision
Sparkasse KölnBonn
divestments to the
City of Cologne
Sparkasse
KölnBonn
SA.31646 23 July 2013 Amendment
decision
Anderung des
Umstrukturi-
erungsplans
18. SachsenLB was sold to LBBW.
ANNEXES
512
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
WestLB NN19/2006 18 July 2007 Rescue
decision
Capital
contributions *19
WestLB NN25/2008 30 April 2008 Rescue
decision
Risk shield
WestLB C43/2008 1 October
2008
Opening
decision
The Commission
notified Germany of
its decision to initiate
the procedure laid
down in Article 88(2)
of the EC Treaty.
WestLB C43/2008 12 May 2009 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
WestLB *20
C
WestLB N531/2009 7 October
2009
Rescue
decision
Assumption of risk
for WestLB
WestLB C40/2009 22 December
2009
Opening
decision
Additional aid for
WestLB related to
spin-off of assets
WestLB N249/2010 22 June 2010 Prolongation
decision
Prolongation of
temporary authorisa-
tion of additional
aid for WestLB
related to spin-off
of assets
WestLB C40/2009,
C43/2008
20 December
2011
Restructuring
decision
Umstrukturierung W *21
19. The capital contributions did not constitute State aid.
20. NB: this decision was repealed by the decision of 20 December 2011.
21. The Verbundbank was carved out from WestLB and transferred to Helaba. The remaining
assets and liabilities of WestLB were transferred to the EAA (Erste Abwicklungsanstalt).
WestLB was rebranded SPM Bank and was merely a service provider to the EAA.
ANNEXES
513
Greece
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Alpha Bank SA.34823 27 July 2012 Opening
decision
Recapitalisation of
Alpha Bank by the
Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund
Alpha Bank SA.34823,
SA.36004,
SA.37965,
SA.37966,
SA.37967
9 July 2014 Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of Alpha Bank;
Resolution of
Cooperative Bank
of Western
Macedonia Bank,
Evia Cooperative
Bank and
Cooperative Bank
of Dodecanese
through a transfer
order to Alpha
Bank
C
Alpha Bank SA.43366 26 November
2015
Restructuring
decision
Amendment of the
restructuring plan
approved in 2014
and granting of
new aid to Alpha
Bank
C
ANNEXES
514
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
EFG
Eurobank
SA.34825 27 July 2012 Opening
decision
Recapitalisation of
EFG Eurobank by
the Hellenic
Financial Stability
Fund
Eurobank SA.34825,
SA.36006,
SA.34488,
SA.31155
29 April
2014*
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of Eurobank
Ergasias; Restruc-
turing aid to
Proton Bank
through creation
and capitalisation
of Nea Proton
Bank and additio-
nal recapitalisation
of New Proton
Bank; Resolution
of TT Hellenic
Postbank through
the creation of a
bridge bank
C
Eurobank SA.43363 26 November
2015
Restructuring
decision
Amendment of the
restructuring plan
approved in 2014
and granting of
new aid to
Eurobank
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Piraeus Bank SA.34122 28 December
2011
Rescue
decision
Second recapitalisa-
tion of Piraeus Bank
under the Greek
recapitalisation
scheme
Piraeus Bank SA.34826 27 July 2012 Opening
decision
Recapitalisation of
Piraeus Bank by the
Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund
Piraeus Bank SA.34826,
SA.36005
23 July 2014* Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Piraeus Bank
C
Piraeus Bank SA.43364 29 November
2015
Restructuring
decision
Amendment of the
restructuring plan
approved in 2014
and granting of
new aid to Piraeus
Bank
C
ANNEXES
515
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
National Bank
of Greece
(NBG)
SA.34824 27 July 2012 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
National Bank of
Greece by the
Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund
National
Bank of
Greece
SA.34824,
SA.36007,
SA.36658,
SA.37156,
SA.34534
23 July 2014 Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of NBG; Resolution
of First Business
Bank and Probank
through a transfer
order to NBG;
Resolution of
Cooperative Bank
of Lesvos-Limnos,
Cooperative Bank
of Achaia and
Cooperative Bank
of Lamia
C
National
Bank of
Greece
SA.43365 4 December
2015
Restructuring
decision
Amendment of the
restructuring plan
approved in 2014
and granting of
new aid to National
Bank of Greece
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
T Bank SA.34115 16 May 2012 Restructuring
decision
Resolution of T
Bank (through a
transfer order of
its assets and
liabilities to
Hellenic Postbank)
S/T/W
ANNEXES
516
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
TT Hellenic
Postbank
SA.31155 6 May 2013 Opening
decision
State aid to TT
Hellenic Postbank
through the creation
and the capitalisa-
tion of the bridge
bank New TT
Hellenic Postbank
TT Hellenic
Postbank
SA.34825,
SA.36006,
SA.34488,
SA.31155*
29 April
2014*
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of Eurobank
Ergasias; Restruc-
turing aid toProton
Bank through
creation and
capitalisation of
Nea Proton Bank
and additional
recapitalisation of
New Proton Bank;
Resolution of TT
Hellenic Postbank
through the
creation of a
bridge bank
S/T/W
ANNEXES
517
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Nea Proton
Bank
SA.34488 26 July 2012 Opening
decision
Aid to Nea Proton
Bank through
creation and capitali-
sation of Nea Proton
Bank, and initiation
of the formal
investigation
Nea Proton
Bank
SA.34825,
SA.36006,
SA.34488*,
SA.31155
29 April
2014*
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of Eurobank
Ergasias; Restruc-
turing aid to
Proton Bank
through creation
and capitalisation
of Nea Proton
Bank and additio-
nal recapitalisation
of New Proton
Bank; Resolution
of TT Hellenic
Postbank through
the creation of a
bridge bank
S/T/W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
ATE Bank N429/2010 23 May 2011 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
ATE
C
ATE Bank SA.35460 3 May 2013 Restructuring
decision
Liquidation aid for
ATE Bank
resolution
S/T/W
ATE Bank SA.34826,
SA.36005
23 July 2014* Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Piraeus Bank
*22
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Panellinia
Bank
SA.41503 16 April 2015 Restructuring
decision
Resolution of
Panellinia Bank
through a transfer
order to Piraeus
Bank
T
22. ATE was taken over by Pireaus Bank.
ANNEXES
518
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Cooperative
Bank of
Peloponnese
SA.43886 17 December
2015
Rescue
decision
Resolution of
Cooperative Bank
of Peloponnese *23
(T)
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Attica Bank SA.46558 7 October
2016
Rescue
decision
Liquidity support to
Attica Bank
Hungary
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
FHB Jelzalog-
bank Nyrt
SA.29608
(C37/2010)
24 January
2011
Opening
decision
Decision to initiate
the formal
investigation
procedure
FHB Jelza-
logbank Nyrt
SA.29608
(C37/2010)
22 February
2012
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation of
FHB Jelzalogbank
Nyrt
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Magyar
Kereskedelmi
Bank (MKB
Bank)
SA.40441 16 December
2015
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Magyar
Kereskedelmi Bank
C
Ireland
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Anglo Irish
Bank
N9/2009 14 January
2009
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
the Anglo Irish
Bank by the Irish
State
Anglo Irish
Bank
N61/2009 16 February
2009
Rescue
decision
Change of owners-
hip of Anglo
Anglo Irish
Bank
N356/2009 26 June 2009 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
Anglo by the Irish
State
Anglo Irish
Bank
NN12/2009,
C11/2010
31 March
2010
Opening
decision
Second recapitalisa-
tion of Anglo and
restructuring of
Anglo
23. NB: no new aid.
ANNEXES
519
Anglo Irish
Bank
NN35/2010 10 August
2010
Rescue
decision
Temporary approval
of the third recapita-
lisation in favour of
Anglo
Anglo Irish
Bank
SA.32057 21 December
2010
Rescue
decision
Temporary approval
of the fourth recapi-
talisation and
guarantee in respect
of certain liabilities
in favour of Anglo
Anglo Irish
Bank/Irish
Nationwide
Building
Society
SA.32504,
C11/2010
29 June
2011*
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Anglo/INBS
W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Irish Nation-
wide Building
Society
(INBS)
NN11/2010 30 March
2010
Rescue
decision
Rescue measure in
favour of INBS
INBS NN50/2010 21 December
2010
Rescue
decision
Second emergency
recapitalisation in
favour of INBS
Anglo/INBS SA.32504,
C11/2010
29 June
2011*
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Anglo/INBS
W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Allied Irish
Banks (AIB)
N241/2009 12 May 2009 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
AIB by the Irish
State
AIB N553/2010 21 December
2010
Rescue
decision
Second emergency
recapitalisation in
favour of AIB
AIB/EBS SA.33296 15 July 2011* Rescue
decision
Emergency recapi-
talisation in favour
of the merged entity
AIB/EBS
AIB/EBS SA.29786,
SA.33296,
SA.31891,
N241/2009,
N160/2010,
C25/2010
7 May 2014* Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
AIB/EBS
C
ANNEXES
520
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Educational
Building
Society (EBS)
N160/2010 2 June 2010 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
EBS
EBS C25/2010 11 October
2010
Opening
decision
Restructuring of
EBS
AIB/EBS SA.33296 15 July 2011* Rescue
decision
Emergency recapi-
talisation in favour
of the merged entity
AIB/EBS
AIB/EBS SA.29786,
SA.33296,
SA.31891,
N241/2009,
N160/2010,
C25/2010
7 May 2014* Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
AIB/EBS
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Bank of
Ireland
N149/2009 26 March
2009
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
BOI by the Irish
State
Bank of
Ireland
N546/2009 15 July 2010 Restructuring
decision
(first) restructuring
of BOI
C
Bank of
Ireland
SA.33216 11 July 2011 Rescue
decision
Second rescue of
BOI
Bank of
Ireland
SA.33443 20 December
2011
Restructuring
decision
Second restructur-
ing of BOI
C
Bank of
Ireland
SA.36784 9 July 2013 Amendment
decision
Amendment of
commitments
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Irish Life &
Permanent
Group
(Permanent
Trustee
Savings Bank
– PTSB)
SA.33311 20 July 2011 Rescue
decision
Rescue recapitalisa-
tion in favour of
IL&P
IL&P (PTSB) SA.33442 9 April 2015 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
IL&P
C
ANNEXES
521
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Quinn
Insurance
SA.33023 12 October
2011
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Quinn Insurance
Ltd through the
contribution of the
Insurance
Compensation
Fund
S/T/W
Italy
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banca Monte
dei Paschi di
Siena (MPS)
SA.35137 17 December
2012
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to
Monte dei Paschi
di Siena
S.p.A.
MPS SA.36175 27 November
2013
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
MPS
C
MPS SA.47081 16 December
2016 *24
- Request for
liquidity support
by
BMPS
MPS SA.47677 4 July
2017 *25
- New aid and
amended restruc-
turing plan of
Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banca
Romagna
Cooperativa
(BRC)
SA.41924 2 July 2015 Restructuring
decision
Resolution
(via liquidation)
ofBancaRomagna
Cooperativa
– Credito Coope-
rativo Centro e
Macerone –
Societa
Cooperativa
S/T/W
24. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
25. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
ANNEXES
522
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banca Tercas SA.39451 27 February
2015
Opening
decision
State support to
Banca Tercas
Banca Tercas SA.39451 23 December
2015
Recovery
decision
Aid to Banca
Tercas
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
BancaMarche,
Banca Etruria,
Carife and
Carichieti
SA.39543
SA.41134
SA.41925
SA.43547
22 November
2015 *26
- Resolution
BancaMarche,
Banca Etruria,
Carife and
Carichieti
SA.39543
SA.41134
SA.41925
SA.43547
29 April
2016 *27
- Resolution
BancaMarche,
Banca Etruria,
Carife and
Carichieti
SA.39543
SA.41134
SA.41925
SA.43547
7 October
2016 *28
- Resolution
BancaMarche,
Banca Etruria,
Carife and
Carichieti
SA.39543
SA.41134
SA.41925
SA.43547
30 April
2017 *29
- Resolution
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banca Popo-
lare di Vicenza
SA.47149 18 January
2017 *30
- Liquidity support
to Banca Popolare
di Vicenza
Banca Popo-
lare di Vicenza
SA.47940 12 April
2017 *31
- Additional liquidity
support to Banca
Popolare
di Vicenza
Banca Popo-
lare di Vicenza
SA.45664 25 June
2017 *32
- Orderly liquidation
of Banca Popolare
di Vicenza and
Veneto Banca –
Liquidation aid
26. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
27. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
28. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
29. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
30. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
31. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
32. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
ANNEXES
523
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Veneto Banca SA.47150 18 January
2017 *33
- Liquidity support
to Veneto Banca
Veneto Banca SA.47941 12 April
2017 *34
- Additional liquidity
support to
Veneto
Banca
Veneto Banca SA.45664 25 June
2017 *35
- Orderly liquidation
of Banca Popolare
di Vicenza and
Veneto Banca –
Liquidation aid
Latvia
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Parex banka NN68/2008 24 November
2008
Rescue
decision
Public support
measures to Parex
Banka
Parex banka NN3/2009 11 February
2009
Rescue
decision
Modifications to
the public support
measures to Parex
Parex banka N189/2009 11 May 2009 Rescue
decision
Modifications to
the public support
measures to Parex
Parex banka C26/2009 29 July 2009 Opening
decision
Restructuring aid
to Parex Banka
Parex banka C26/2009 15 September
2010
Restructur-
ing decision
Restructuring S/C/W
*36
Parex banka SA.34747 10 August
2012
Amendment
decision
Amendments to
Parex restructuring
plan
33. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
34. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
35. The public version of this decision is not (yet) available.
36. Parex banka was split into a newly established so-called ‘good bank’ (Citadele banka),
which would take over all core assets and some non-core assets, and a so-called ‘bad bank’
(Reverta).
ANNEXES
524
Parex banka SA.36612 16 April 2014 Opening
decision
Aid granted by
Latvia to Citadele
banka and AS
Reverta (formerly
known as AS Parex
banka) as well as
misuse of aid
Parex banka SA.36612 9 July 2014 Amendment/
Restructuring
decision
Aid granted by
Latvia to Citadele
banka and AS
Reverta (formerly
known as AS Parex
banka) as well as
misuse of aid
Bank Case
number
Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Latvia
Mortgage
and
Land Bank
(MLB)
NN60/2009 19 November
2009
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
the Mortgage and
Land Bank of
Latvia
Latvia
Mortgage
and
Land Bank
SA.30704 26 January
2012
Opening
decision
Additional aid
measures to the
Latvia Mortgage
and Land Bank
MLB
(commercial
segment)
SA.30704 17 July 2013 Restructuring
decision
Additional aid
measures to the
Latvia Mortgage
and Land Bank
S/T/W *37
MLB (devel-
opment
segment)
SA.36904 9 June 2015 Other MLB
development
segment and
creation of the Lat-
vian Single
Development
Institution
37. The commercial segment of MLB was sold in bundles.
ANNEXES
525
Lithuania
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Lithuania’s
Central Cre-
dit Unions
(LCCU)
SA.34208 26 September
2012
Restructuring
decision
Rescue and
restructuring of
Lithuanian Central
Credit Union
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
AB Ukio
Bankas
SA.36248 14 August
2013
Restructuring
decision
Liquidation aid for
the resolution of
AB Ukio Bankas
S/T/W
AB Ukio
Bankas
SA.38664 17 July 2014 Other Additional notifica-
tion to SA.36248
– Liquidation aid for
resolution of AB
Ukio Bankas
Luxembourg
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Kaupthing
Bank
Luxembourg
N344/2009,
N380/2009
9 July 2009* Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
for Kaupthing
Bank Luxembourg
S/T/W
*38
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Dexia BIL No State aid
Netherlands
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
ABN AMRO NN42/2008,
NN46/2008,
NN53/2008
3 December
2008
Restructuring
decisions
Restructuring aid to
Fortis Bank and
Fortis Bank
Luxembourg *39
ABN AMRO C11/2009 8 April 2009 Opening
decision
Alleged aid to Fortis
Bank Nederland and
the ABN earmarked
activities
38. The activities in Belgium were taken over by Crédit Agricole; the activities in Luxembourg
were taken over by the UK investment firm Blackfish Capital; all other assets were
transferred to a SPV.
39. NB: this decision did not cover the aid to Fortis Bank Nederland.
ANNEXES
526
ABN AMRO C11/2009 5 February
2010
Prolongation
decision
Extension of proce-
dure in State aid
case C11/2009
(Alleged aid to For-
tis Bank Nederland
and ABN Amro) to
cover the additional
recapitalisation
measures in favour
of Fortis Bank
Nederland and ABN
Amro and temporary
approval until
31 July 2010
ABN AMRO C11/2009 30 July 2010 Prolongation
decision
Prolongation of the
temporary approval
of additional State
support to Fortis
Bank Nederland and
ABN AMRO
ABN AMRO C11/2009 5 April 2011 Restructuring
decision
ABN AMRO
Group (created
following the
merger between
Fortis Bank
Nederland and
ABN AMRO N)
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
ING N528/2008 12 November
2008
Rescue
decision
Steun aan ING
Groep NV
ING C10/2009 31 March
2009
Opening
decision
Illiquid assets
back-up facility for
ING
ING C10/2009 15 September
2009 *40
Prolongation
decision
ING
ING N627/2009 17 November
2009
Other Revocation of
extension of
opening of formal
investigations and
prolongation of
temporary
authorisation of
illiquid assets
back-up facility for
ING
40. Only a press release available.
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ING C10/2009 18 November
2009
Restructuring
decision
ING’s Illiquid
Assets Back-Up
Facility and
Restructuring Plan
C
ING SA.28855 11 May 2012 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
ING SA.33305,
SA.29832
11 May 2012 Opening
decision
Renotification of
recapitalisation aid
to ING and
implementation of
the October 2009
restructuring
commitments
ING SA.33305,
SA.29832
16 November
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
ING
C
ING SA.29832 5 November
2013
Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan of
ING
ING SA.29832 11 December
2013
Other IABF Termination
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
SNS REAAL N611/2008 10 December
2008
Rescue
decision
Aid to SNS REAAL
SNS REAAL N371/2009 28 January
2010
Restructuring
decision
Viability plan SNS
REAAL
C
SNS REAAL SA.33303 19 December
2011
Other Renotification capi-
tal injection of SNS
REAAL
SNS REAAL SA.35382 22 February
2013
Rescue
decision
Rescue of SNS
REAAL
SNS REAAL SA.36598 19 December
2013
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
SNS REAAL
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Aegon N569/2008 27 November
2008
Rescue
decision
State aid to Aegon
Aegon N372/2009 17 August
2010
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to Aegon
C
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Portugal
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco Privado
Portugues
(BPP)
NN71/2008 13 March
2009
Rescue
decision
State aid to BPP
BPP C33/2009 10 November
2009
Opening
decision
Restructuring of
Banco Privado
Portugues
BPP C33/2009 20 July 2010 Recovery
decision
On the State aid
implemented by
Portugal in the form
of a State guarantee
to BPP
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Caixa Geral de
Depositos
(CGD)
SA.35062 18 July 2012 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
Caixa Geral de
Depositos
CGD SA.35062 18 December
2012
Opening
decision
Breach of a
dividend ban by
CGD. Misuse of
rescue aid
CGD SA.35062 24 July 2013 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
CGD
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
BPI SA.35238 24 July 2013 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
BPI
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco
Comercial
Portugues
(BCP)
SA.34724 30 August
2013
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
the BCP Group
C
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Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco Portu-
gues de Nego-
cios (BPN)
SA.26909 24 October
2011
Opening
decision
Nationalisation and
Restructuring of
Banco Portugues de
Negocios
BPN SA.26909 27 March
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Banco Portugues
de Negocios
T *41
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco
Espirito
Santo (BES)
SA.39250 3 August
2014
Restructuring
Decision
Resolution of
Banco Espirito
Santo
S/C/W
BES SA.43976 19 December
2015
Amendment
decision
Amendment of the
2014 Resolution for
Portuguese Banco
Espírito Santo
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banif SA.34662 21 January
2013
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
Banif (Banco
Internacional do
Funchal)
Banif SA.36123 24 July 2015 Opening
decision
Recapitalisation of
Banif
Banif SA.43977 21 December
2015
Restructuring
Decision
Resolution of Banif S/T/W
*42
41. As at 31 December 2011, the BPN was held by the State, its sole shareholder. The Bank
was re-privatised in 2012, with the shareholders of Banco BIC having acquired the entirety
of its share capital during the first half of 2012. In this context, in June 2012, the group of
shareholders which thus held and controlled BPN and BIC deliberated, for reasons of
economic rationale, the incorporation of the latter into the former, through a merger by
incorporation, with the consequent extinction of BIC.
42. Banif was split into a clean bank (“Clean Bank”) and a remaining bank (“Remaining
Bank”). The Clean Bank has been sold to another bank (Banco Santander Totta). In
addition: a separate asset bundle for sale to another third party had been carved out in
resolution into an Asset Management Company (“Carve-out”).
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Slovenia
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Abanka SA.37690 18 December
2013
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid in favour
of Abanka
Abanka SA.38228 13 August
2014
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Abanka
C
Abanka/
Banka Celje
SA.38522 16 December
2014
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
for Banka
Celje/Abanka
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Nova Kreditna
BankaMaribor
(NKBM)
SA.35709 20 December
2012
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
NKBM
NKBM SA.35709 18 December
2013
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
NKBM
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Nova
Ljubljanska
banka (NLB)
SA.32261 7 March 2011 Rescue
decision
Rescue recapitalisa-
tion in favour of
NLB
NLB SA.34937,
SA.33229
2 July 2012 Opening
decision
Second
recapitalisation
NLB SA.33229 18 December
2013
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
NLB
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Factor Banka SA.37315 6 September
2013
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid in favour
of Factor Banka
Factor Banka SA.37643 18 December
2013
Restructuring
decision
Orderly winding
down of Factor
Banka
W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Probanka SA.37314 6 September
2013
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid in favour
of Probanka
Probanka SA.37642 18 December
2013
Restructuring
decision
Orderly winding
down of Probanka
W
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Spain
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Catalunya
Banc
SA.33103 30 September
2011
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
Catalunya Banc
Catalunya
Banc
SA.33735 28 November
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Catalunya Banc
C
Catalunya
Banc
SA.39402 17 December
2014
Amendment
decision
Restructuring of
Catalunya Banc
through its acquisi-
tion by BBVA *43
T
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Novacaixaga-
licia (NCG)
Banco
SA.33096 30 September
2011
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
NCG Banco
NCG Banco SA.33734 28 November
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
NCG
C
NCG Banco SA.38143 20 June 2014 Amendment
decision
Restructuring of
NCG through its
acquisition by
Banesco Group *44
T
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
BFA Group SA.34820 27 June 2012 Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to BFA
(“Conversion
Decision”)
BFA Group SA.35369 7 September
2012
Rescue
decision
Urgent recapitalisa-
tion of BFA
BFA Group SA.35253 28 November
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring and
Recapitalisation of
the BFA Group
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco Mare
Nostrum
(BMN)
SA.35488 20 December
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Banco Mare
Nostrum
C
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Liberbank SA.35490 20 December
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Liberbank
C
43. NB: no new aid.
44. NB: no new aid.
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Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco de
Valencia
SA.33917 21 November
2011
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation and
Liquidity support
for Banco de
Valencia
Banco de
Valencia
SA.34053 28 November
2012
Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of Banco de
Valencia
T *45
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco CAM SA.33402 24 July 2011 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
the CAM Group
Banco CAM SA.34255 30 May 2012 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
CAM and Banco
CAM
T *46
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
UNNIM Banc SA.33095 30 September
2011
Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
UNNIM Banc
UNNIM
Banc
SA.33733 25 July 2012 Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
UNNIM Banc SAU
T *47
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco Grupo
Cajatres
SA.35489 20 December
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Banco Grupo
Cajatres
T *48
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco
Gallego
SA.36500 25 July 2013 Restructuring
decision
Recapitalisation
and Restructuring
of Banco Gallego
T *49
45. CaixaBank purchased all the shares of the FROB in BVA at a price of EUR 1.
46. On 1 June 2012 Banco Sabadell completed the acquisition of 100% of the shares of Banco
CAM. A few months later, on 5 December, the merger of Banco CAM by absorption into
Banco Sabadell was officially registered, although the effective date of the merger for
accounting purposes was 1 June 2012.
47. Through a share sale purchase agreement, BBVA purchased 100% of the shares of Unnim
for €1.
48. During 2014 a merger by absorption took place between Ibercaja Banco, S.A. (acquiring
company) and Banco Grupo Cajatres, S.A.U. (target company) after 100% of the shares in
Banco Grupo Cajatres, S.A.U. had been acquired by Ibercaja Banco, S.A.
49. Banco Sabadell purchased 100% of the shares in Banco Gallego, S.A. for a consideration
of one euro.
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Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
CajaSur N202/2010 23 May 2010 Rescue
decision
Recapitalisation of
CajaSur
CajaSur N392/2010 8 November
2010
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
CajaSur
T
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Caja Castilla
La Mancha
(CCM)
NN61/2009 29 June 2010 Restructuring
decision
Rescue and
restructuring of
Caja Castilla La
Mancha
S/T/W
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Banco CEISS SA.34536 20 December
2012
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring and
Recapitalisation of
Banco CEISS
C
Banco CEISS SA.36249 13 May 2013 Amendment/
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Banco CEISS
through integration
with Unicaja Banco
T
Banco CEISS SA.36249 25 July 2013 Amendment
decision
Amendment of the
Restructuring of
CEISS through
integration with
Unicaja Banco *50
Banco CEISS SA.36249 12 March
2014
Amendment/
Restructuring
decision
Amendment of the
Restructuring of
CEISS through
integration with
Unicaja Banco
T
Sweden
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Carnegie
Investment
Bank
NN64/2008 15 December
2008
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to Carne-
gie Bank
Carnegie
Investment
Bank *51
NN18/2010 12 May 2010 Restructuring
decision
Omstrukturerings-
stöd till Carnegie
Investment Bank
T
50. NB: no new aid.
51. Since this decision is available only in the Swedish language, this decision is not included
in my analysis.
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Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Lloyds Bank-
ing Group
(LBG)
N428/2009 18 November
2009
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
Lloyds Banking
Group
C
Lloyds Bank-
ing Group
SA.29834 13 May 2014 Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan of
Lloyds Banking
Group
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Royal Bank
of Scotland
(RBS)
N422/2009,
N621/2009
14 December
2009
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring of
RBS following its
recapitalisation by
the State and its
participation in the
Asset Protection
Scheme
C
Royal Bank of
Scotland
SA.38304 9 April 2014 Amendment
decision
Amendment to the
restructuring plan of
RBS
Royal Bank of
Scotland
SA.47702 4 April 2017 Amendment
decision
Alternative package
to replace the
commitment for the
Royal Bank of
Scotland to divest
the Rainbow
business
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Bradford &
Bingley
NN41/2008 1 October
2008
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to
Bradford&Bingley
S/T/W
Bradford &
Bingley
N194/2009 25 January
2010
Restructuring
decision
Liquidation aid to
Bradford&Bingley
S/T/W
Bradford &
Bingley
SA.29731,
SA.30326
22 September
2014*
Amendment
decision
Northern Rock and
Bradford&Bingley;
amendment of
commitments
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Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Northern
Rock
NN70/2007 5 December
2007
Rescue
decision
Rescue aid to
Northern Rock
Northern
Rock
C14/2008 2 April 2008 Opening
decision
Restructuring aid to
Northern Rock
Northern
Rock
C14/2008 7 May 2009 Prolongation
decision
Restructuring aid to
Northern Rock
Northern
Rock
C14/2008 28 October
2009
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to Northern Rock
S/C/W
Northern
Rock
SA.29731,
SA.30326
22 September
2014*
Amendment
decision
Northern Rock and
Bradford&Bingley;
amendment of
commitments
Bank Case number Date Type of
decision
Subject Context
Dunfermline
Building
Society
NN19/2009 25 January
2010
Restructuring
decision
Restructuring aid
to Dunfermline
Building Society
S/T/W
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Annex IV: Overview of the compatibility-assessment
The following tables provide two useful insights:
• In the first place, the tables indicate in which instances the compatibility-
assessment comprises two stages.
• In the second place, the tables indicate in which instances a restructuring
plan is required.
Two-stage compatibility-assessment
As set out in section 8.1.1, the two-stage compatibility-assessment entailed the
following. First, the Commission would assess whether the aid was appro-
priate, necessary and proportionate. Afterwards, when a restructuring plan for
the beneficiary bank had been submitted, the Commission assessed whether
the restructuring plan met the three objectives of restoring the long-term via-
bility of the bank, ensuring burden-sharing and minimising competition
distortions.
Restructuring plan required?
As set out in section 10.2, the question whether a restructuring plan is required
is influenced by three factors: i) the type of State aid measure, ii) the question
whether the aid is granted under a scheme or as ad hoc aid, iii) the Communica-
tions that are in force at the moment the aid was granted to the bank. These three
factors interact with each other. For that reason, a distinction should be made
on three levels.
In the first place, since there are essentially three types of State aid – i.e.
recapitalisation measures, asset relief measures and guarantees – there are three
different tables. Each table concerns one specific type of aid.
In the second place, a distinction is made between aid granted under a scheme
and ad hoc aid. NB: this distinction will only be made with respect to recap-
italisation measures and asset relief measures. The need to submit a restructur-
ing plan in case of an ad hoc guarantee will not be discussed, for the following
two reasons. First, guarantees are almost always granted in the context of
a guarantee scheme. And second, in the rare cases that a bank benefits from an
ad hoc guarantee, the bank also benefits from other State aid measures and a
restructuring plan is already required.
In the third place, there are three policy documents – i.e. the DG Competition
Staff Working Document of 30 April 2010, the First Prolongation Commu-
nication and the 2013 Banking Communication and – that changed the
requirements to submit a restructuring plan. For that reason, a distinction is
made between the situation before and the situation after the adoption of each
of these policy documents.
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Recapitalisation measures
The situation after the adoption of the 2008 Banking Communication and the
Recapitalisation Communication
Aid under a scheme Ad hoc aid
Fundamentally sound Distressed Fundamentally sound Distressed
A fundamentally
sound bank
receives a capital
injection under
a scheme.
A distressed bank
receives a capital
injection under a
scheme.
A fundamentally
sound bank receives
an ad hoc capital
injection.
A distressed bank
receives an ad hoc
capital injection.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission) whether
the scheme was appro-
priate, necessary
and proportionate.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission) whether
the scheme was appro-
priate, necessary and
proportionate.
First stage: The
Commission assesses
whether the aid is
appropriate, necessary
and proportionate.
First stage: The
Commission
assesses whether
the aid is appropriate,
necessary and
proportionate.
The Member State
has to submit a
report/review on
the use of
the scheme.52 This
review includes
details of all banks
that have benefited
from the scheme.
Aid under the scheme
is temporarily appro-
ved. Within 6 months
of the recapitalisation,
the Member State has
to submit a
restructuring plan
for the beneficiary
bank.53
If this is the case, the
aid is temporarily
approved, on the
condition that the
Member State
submits a viability
plan within 6 months
of the recapitalisation.
If this is the case, the
aid is temporarily
approved, on the
condition that the
Member State submits
a restructuring plan
within 6 months of
the recapitalisation.54
Second stage: there
is no second stage.
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the viability plan.
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
52. Pursuant to point 40 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
53. Pursuant to point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
54. Pursuant to point 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
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The situation after the adoption of the First Prolongation Communication
A fundamentally
sound bank receives
a capital injection
under a scheme.
A distressed bank
receives a capital
injection under
a scheme.
A fundamentally
sound bank receives
an ad hoc capital
injection.
A distressed bank
receives an ad
hoc capital injection.
First stage: The Commission assessed
(when the Member State notified the
scheme to the Commission) whether the
scheme was appropriate, necessary and
proportionate.
First stage: The Commission assesses
whether the aid is appropriate, necessary
and proportionate.
Within 6 months, the Member State has to
submit a restructuring plan for the
beneficiary bank – irrespective of whether
the bank is fundamentally sound or
distressed.55
If this is the case, the aid is temporarily
approved, on the condition that the
Member State submits a restructuring
plan – irrespective of whether the bank
is fundamentally sound or distressed.56
Second stage: the Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
Second stage: the Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
55. Pursuant to point 14 of the First Prolongation Communication.
56. Pursuant to point 14 of the First Prolongation Communication.
539
ANNEXES
The situation after the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication
A fundamentally
sound bank receives
a capital injection
under a scheme.
A distressed bank re
ceives a capital
injection under
a scheme.
A fundamentally
sound bank receives
an ad hoc capital
injection.
A distressed bank
receives an ad hoc
capital injection.
NB: a recapitalisation scheme is only
possible for small banks (i.e. banks
with a balance sheet of not more than
EUR 100 million).57
First stage: recapitalisation measures are
no longer approved on a temporary basis,
so there is no first stage.
Every six months, the Member State must
submit a report on the use of the scheme.
The Member State should submit a
capital raising plan58 and a restructuring
plan.59
Second stage: the recapitalisation is
authorised only after the Commission
has approved the restructuring plan.60
NB: the recapitalisation can exceptionally
be approved on a temporary basis as rescue
aid.61 This assessment corresponds to the
first stage.
The Member State has to submit a
restructuring plan within 2 months. In
the second stage, the Commission assesses
the restructuring
plan.
57. Pursuant to points 54-55 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
58. Pursuant to point 29 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
59. Pursuant to point 30 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
60. See point 34 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
61. Pursuant to points 50-53 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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Impaired asset measures
The situation after the adoption of the 2008 Banking Communication and the Impaired
Assets Communication (IAC)
Aid under a scheme Ad hoc aid
Fundamentally sound Distressed Fundamentally sound Distressed
A fundamentally
sound bank benefits
from an asset relief
measure under
a scheme.
A distressed bank
benefits from an asset
relief measure under a
scheme.
A fundamentally
sound bank benefits
from an ad hoc asset
relief measure.
A distressed bank
benefits from an ad
hoc asset
relief measure.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission)
whether
the scheme was line
with the IAC-criteria.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission) whether
the scheme was line
with the IAC-criteria.
First stage: The
Commission assesses
whether the aid is
in line with the
IAC-criteria.
First stage: The
Commission assesses
whether the aid is
in line with the
IAC-criteria.
The Member State
has to submit a
viability plan
within 3 months from
the bank’s
accession to the
asset relief scheme.62
The Member State
has to submit a
restructuring plan
within 3 months from
the bank’s accession
to the asset relief
scheme.63
If this is the case,
the aid is temporarily
approved, on the
condition that the
Member State
submits a viability
plan.
If this is the case,
the aid is temporarily
approved, on the
condition that the
Member State
submits a
restructuring plan.
Second stage: The
Commission assesses
the viability plan.
Second stage: The
Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the viability plan.
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
62. Pursuant to Annex V of the IAC.
63. Pursuant to Annex V of the IAC.
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The situation after the adoption of the First Prolongation Communication
A fundamentally
sound bank benefits
from an asset relief
measure under a
scheme.
A distressed bank
benefits from an asset
relief measure under a
scheme.
A fundamentally
sound bank benefits
from an ad hoc asset
relief measure.
A distressed bank
benefits from an ad
hoc asset relief
measure.
First stage: The Commission assessed
(when the Member State notified the
scheme to the Commission) whether
the scheme was line with the IAC-criteria.
First stage: The Commission assesses
whether the aid is in line with the
IAC-criteria.
The Member State has to submit a
restructuring plan – irrespective of
whether the bank is fundamentally sound
or distressed.64
If this is the case, the aid is temporarily
approved, on the condition that the Member
State submits a restructuring
plan– irrespective of whether the bank
is fundamentally sound or distressed.65
Second stage: the Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
Second stage: the Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
64. Pursuant to point 14 of the First Prolongation Communication.
65. Pursuant to point 14 of the First Prolongation Communication.
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The situation after the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication
A fundamentally
sound bank benefits
from an asset relief
measure under a
scheme.
A distressed bank
benefits from an asset
relief measure under a
scheme.
A fundamentally
sound bank benefits
from an ad hoc asset
relief measure.
A distressed bank
benefits from an ad
hoc asset relief
measure.
NB: a scheme is only possible for small
banks (i.e. banks with a balance sheet of
not more than EUR 100 million).66
First stage: impaired asset measures are
no longer approved on a temporary basis,
so there is no first stage.
Every six months, the Member State must
submit a report on the use of the scheme.
The Member State should submit a
capital raising plan67 and a restructuring
plan.68 The measure is authorised only
after the Commission has approved the
restructuring plan.69
Second stage: the Commission assesses
whether the measure is in line with the
IAC-criteria and whether the restructuring
plan meets the three restructuring objectives.
NB: the impaired asset measure can
exceptionally be approved on a temporary
basis as rescue aid.70 This assessment
corresponds to the first stage.
The Member State has to submit a
restructuring plan within 2 months. In the
econd stage, the Commission assesses the
restructuring plan.
66. Pursuant to points 54-55 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
67. Pursuant to point 29 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
68. Pursuant to point 30 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
69. See point 34 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
70. Pursuant to points 50-53 of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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Guarantee (scheme)
The situation after the adoption of the 2008 Banking Communication
Bank does not call upon the guarantee Bank calls upon the guarantee
First stage: The Commission assessed (when
the Member State notified the scheme to the
Commission) whether the guarantee scheme
was appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
First stage: The Commission assessed (when
the Member State notified the scheme to the
Commission) whether the guarantee scheme
was appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
There is no need to submit a viability plan
or restructuring plan for the beneficiary bank.
Within 6 months, the Member State has
to submit a restructuring plan for the
beneficiary bank.71
Second stage: there is no second stage. Second stage: The Commission assesses the
restructuring plan.
71. Pursuant to point 30 of the 2008 Banking Communication.
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The situation after the DG Competition Staff Working Document of 30 April 2010
Bank does not call upon the guarantee Bank calls upon the guarantee
The total amount
outstanding
guaranteed liabilities
exceeds both a ratio
of 5% of total
liabilities and the total
amount of EUR 500
million.
These thresholds are
not exceeded.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission) whether
the guarantee scheme
was appropriate,
necessary and
proportionate.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission) whether
the guarantee scheme
was appropriate,
necessary and
proportionate.
First stage: The Commission assessed
(when the Member State notified the scheme
to the Commission) whether the guarantee
scheme was appropriate, necessary and
proportionate.
The member State has
to submit a viability
plan for the bank
within 3 months from
the granting of the
guarantee.
There is no need
to submit a viability
plan or restructuring
plan for the
beneficiary bank.
Within 6 months, the Member State has
to submit a restructuring plan for the
beneficiary bank.
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the viability plan.
Second stage: there is
no second stage.
Second stage: the Commission assesses the
restructuring plan.
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The situation after the adoption of the 2013 Banking Communication
Bank does not call upon the guarantee Bank calls upon the guarantee
The total amount
outstanding
guaranteed liabilities
exceeds both a ratio
of 5% of total
liabilities and the total
amount of EUR 500
million.
These thresholds are
not exceeded.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission) whether
the guarantee scheme
was appropriate,
necessary and
proportionate.
First stage: The
Commission assessed
(when the Member
State notified the
scheme to the
Commission)
whether the guarantee
scheme was
appropriate, necessary
and proportionate.
First stage: The Commission assessed (when
the Member State notified the scheme to the
Commission) whether the guarantee scheme
was appropriate, necessary and proportionate.
Within 2 months from
the granting of the
guarantee, the member
State has to submit
a restructuring plan
for the bank.72
There is no need to
submit a viability plan
or restructuring plan
for the beneficiary
bank.
The Member State has to submit a restructur-
ing planwithin 2 months after the guarantee has
been activated.73
Second stage: the
Commission assesses
the restructuring plan.
Second stage: there is
no second stage.
Second stage: The Commission assesses the
restructuring plan.
72. Pursuant to point 59-d of the 2013 Banking Communication.
73. Pursuant to point 59-e of the 2013 Banking Communication.
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Annex V: behavioural commitments under bank support schemes
The following tables give an overview of the behavioural restrictions under bank
support schemes. The first table concerns recapitalisation schemes, the second
table concerns guarantee schemes, while the third table concerns other schemes.
The recitals mentioned in the tables refer to the recitals of the decisions in
which the original schemes74 were approved by the Commission. The sym-
bol “-” indicates that the behavioural restriction was not mentioned in the
decision.
Balance
sheet
growth
limitation
Ban on
advertising
Remunera-
tion
restrictions
Coupon/
dividend
ban
Acquisition
ban
Austrian recapitalisation
scheme (N557/2008,
9 December 2008)
- Para. 40 - Para. 98, 103 -
Danish recapitalisation
scheme (N31a/2009,
3 February 2009)
- - Para. 27 Para. 27 -
Finnish recapitalisation
scheme (N329/2009,
11 September 2009)
- Para. 43 Para. 13 - -
French recapitalisation
scheme (N613/2008,
8 December 2008)
- Para. 57 Para. 48 *75 -
German recapitalisation
scheme (N625/2008,
12 December 2008)
- Para. 19 Para. 18 - -
Greek recapitalisation
scheme (N560/2008,
19 November 2008)
Para. 19 Para. 19 Para. 19 Para. 19 -
Hungarian recapitalisa-
tion scheme (N664/2008,
12 February 2009)
- Para. 27 Para. 27 - -
Polish recapitalisation
scheme (N302/2009,
21 December 2009)
- Para. 20 Para. 23, 56 Para. 21-22 *76
74. Amendments to the schemes are thus not taken into account in the following tables.
75. The participating banks were prohibited from repurchasing their own shares. See para. 58
of the decision.
76. Interestingly, the decision on the sixth prolongation of the scheme mentions an acquisition
ban. See: Prolongation of the Polish bank recapitalisation scheme, SA.35943, 11 February
2013, para. 22.
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Balance
sheet
growth
limitation
Ban on
advertising
Remunera-
tion
restrictions
Coupon/
dividend
ban
Acquisition
ban
Portuguese
recapitalisation scheme
(N556/2008,
20 May 2009)
- - Para. 40 Para. 40 -
Portuguese new
recapitalisation scheme
(SA.34055,
30 May 2012)
- Para. 23, 39 - Para. 23, 39 Para. 23, 39
Spanish recapitalisation
scheme (FROB)
(N28/2010,
28 January 2010)
- Para. 25 Para. 25 *77 Para. 25 Para. 25
Spanish new
recapitalisation scheme
(SA.35069,
25 July 2012)
- Para. 35 - Para. 35 Para. 35
Swedish recapitalisation
scheme (N69/2009,
10 February 2009)
- Para. 16 Para. 16 - -
UK recapitalisation
scheme (N507/2008,
13 October 2008)
Para. 12 - Para. 12 - -
77. The participating banks committed to “accommodate the remuneration of senior management
to the applicable Union rules and to the criteria laid down in the Commission Recommenda-
tion of 30 April 2009, on the remuneration policies in the financial services sector”.
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Balance
sheet
growth
limitation
Ban on
advertising
Remunera-
tion
restrictions
Coupon/
dividend
ban
Acquisi-
tion ban
Cypriot guarantee scheme
(SA.35499, 6 November
2012)
Para. 42 Para. 42 Para. 42 *78 -
Danish guarantee scheme
(NN51/2008, 10 October
2008)
Para. 26 Para. 14 - Para. 53 -
Finnish guarantee scheme
(N567/2008, 13 November
2008)
Para. 14 Para. 16 Para. 16 *79 -
German guarantee scheme
(N625/2008, 12 December
2008)
- Para. 27 - - -
Greek guarantee scheme
(N560/2008, 19 November
2008)
Para. 19, 29 Para. 19, 29 - - -
Hungarian guarantee
scheme (N664/2008,
12 February 2009)
- Para. 24, 27 Para. 27 - -
Irish guarantee scheme
(CIFS) (NN48/2008,
13 October 2008)
- - Para. 27 - -
Irish guarantee scheme
(ELG) (N349/2009,
20 November 2009)
- - - - -
Italian guarantee scheme
(N520a/2008,
13 November 2008)
Para. 14 Para. 13 - - -
Latvian guarantee scheme
(N638/2008, 22 December
2008)
- Para. 18 Para. 18 Para. 18 -
Dutch guarantee scheme
(N524/2008,
30 October 2008)
Para. 14, 41 Para. 13, 43 Para. 12, 44 - -
78. The participating banks were prohibited from repurchasing their own shares. See para. 42
of the decision.
79. The participating banks were prohibited from repurchasing their own shares. See para. 16
of the decision.
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Balance
sheet
growth
limitation
Ban on
advertising
Remunera-
tion
restrictions
Coupon/
dividend
ban
Acquisi-
tion ban
Polish guarantee scheme
(N208/2009, 25 September
2009)
- Para. 19, 23,
48
Para. 19, 23 Para. 19, 23
Portuguese guarantee
scheme (NN60/2008,
17 December 2008)
Para. 18 - - - -
Slovenian guarantee
scheme (N531/2008,
12 December 2008)
- Para. 14 Para. 14 - Para. 14
Spanish guarantee scheme
NN54b/2008,
23 December 2008)
- Para. 43 - - -
Swedish guarantee scheme
(N533/2008, 29 October
2008)
Para. 14 Para. 17 Para. 17 - -
UK guarantee scheme
(N507/2008, 13 October
2008)
Para. 12, 21 - - - -
Balance
sheet
growth
limitation
Ban on
advertising
Remunera-
tion
restrictions
Coupon/
dividend
ban
Acquisi-
tion ban
Bulgarian liquidity scheme
(SA.38994, 29 June 2014)
- Para. 29 - - -
Cypriot bond loan scheme
(N511/2009, 22 October
2009)
Para. 20 Para. 20 - - -
French refinancing scheme
(N548/2008, 30 October
2008)
Para. 31 Para. 30 Para. 27 - -
Hungarian liquidity scheme
(NN68/2009, 14 January
2010)
- Para. 19 - - Para. 19
Slovak support scheme
(N392/2009, 8 December
2009)
- Para. 30 Para. 30 Para. 30 -
Slovenian liquidity scheme
(N637/2008, 20 March 2009)
- - Para. 20 Para. 20 Para. 19
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Annex VI: List of banks benefiting from asset relief measures
Member State Bank Impaired asset measure
Austria BAWAG Asset guarantee
(Austria) (KA) Split-up
NB: no impaired asset measure
(Austria) (OVAG) Asset guarantee was comparable to
recapitalisation
NB: no impaired asset measure
(Austria) (HGAA) Asset guarantee was comparable to
recapitalisation NB: no impaired asset
measure
Belgium KBC State Protection Measure
Belgium Dexia (2010) FSA measure
Belgium Fortis Royal Park Investments (RPI)
Denmark FIH
Germany Hypo Real Estate Transfer of assets to FMS WertManagement
Germany LBBW Asset relief (ABS portfolio and
Sealink portfolio)
Germany HSH Nordbank Risk shield
Germany BayernLB Risk shield
Germany NordLB Contingent asset relief measure
Germany WestLB Risk shield
Germany WestLB (2009, 2011) Spin-off of assets (bad bank)
Hungary MKB Asset separation tool: transfer of assets to the
RAMV
Ireland scheme NAMA
Ireland Quinn Insurance Split-up
Ireland Anglo/INBS Only in the context of NAMA
Latvia Parex banka Split-up
Lithuania scheme
Netherlands ING IABF
Netherlands ABN AMRO Measure A (NB: guaranteed portfolio was not
made of impaired assets. IAC applied by
analogy)
Netherlands SNS REAAL (2013) Bad bank measure (i.e. Property Finance)
Portugal BPN Transfer of assets to the SPV’s
Portugal Banif Asset separation tool: transfer of assets to the
AMC
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Member State Bank Impaired asset measure
Slovenia Abanka Transfer of impaired assets to the BAMC
Slovenia NKBM
Spain CajaSur APS
Spain CCM
Spain NCG Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC
Spain Banco CEISS Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC
Spain Liberbank Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC
Spain Banco Mare Nostrum Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC
Spain Banco Grupo Cajatres Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC
Spain Banco de Valencia 1) Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC 2)
APS
Spain Banco CAM APS
Spain BFA Transfer of impaired assets to the AMC
Spain UNNIM APS
United Kingdom Royal Bank of
Scotland
Participation in the APS
United Kingdom Dunfermline Split-up
United Kingdom Northern Rock Split-up
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Annex VII: Viability-measures
The following table gives an overview of the characteristics that are relevant
to the viability-assessment. This table lists six relevant characteristics (dis-
cussed in sections 11.2 to 11.7) and 90 bank State aid cases. For each bank
State aid case, it is indicated whether the Commission took into account that
the case was characterised by the relevant characteristic.
In the table, the following symbols are used:
▪ The number indicates in which recital of the Restructuring Decision80 the
relevant characteristic is mentioned.
▪ The letters indicate whether the relevant characteristic was mentioned in
the description-part (“D”) or in the assessment-part of the decision. A further
distinction is made between the assessment of the viability (“v-A”), burden-
sharing (“b-A”) and competition distortions (“c-A”).
▪ The dash (“-”) means that the relevant characteristic is not mentioned in the
decision.
▪ The asterisk (“*”) means that the relevant characteristic is not mentioned in
the Restructuring Decision, although there are indications that the case was
characterised by the relevant characteristic.
▪ When the decision explicitly mentions that the case is not characterised by a
relevant characteristic (for instance the decision mentions that the bank did
not have funding problems), this is indicated in italics.
▪ Since remuneration restrictions are sometimes mentioned in the context of
the corporate governance framework and sometimes in the context of cost-
cutting (see section 11.4.3.1), the table indicates whether this is the case.
80. More information on the Restructuring Decisions can be found in the table in annex III. In
that table, the Restructuring Decisions are highlighted (in bold).
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Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
OVAG
C
- Annex 8.6 71 D, annex 8.6
(corp. gov.)
- 46-48 D,
103 v-A
60 D, 112
b-A
BAWAG
C
24 D - - - 87 v-A
(no
funding
problem)
-
Hypo
Tirol
C
- 36 D,
59 v-A,
annex 17
- 59 - -
HGAA
S/C/W
- - - 60 D,
148 c-A
66 D,
113 v-A,
116 v-A,
119 v-A
-
KA
(2011)
S/C/W
89 b-A - - - 67 v-A 81 v-A
KA
(2013)
W
- - - - - -
Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
KBC
C
- - 69 D,
annex point vii
(corp. gov.)
- 49 D,
147 v-A
(no
funding
problem)
-
Ethias
C
- 119 v-A 120 v-A (corp.
gov.)
44 D,
annex 1.2
- 49 D, 131
b-A
Fortis
(2008)
S/C/T/C
80 v-A 95 c-A - 96 c-A
(no restriction
needed)
- 84 -
Dexia
(2010)
C
- - 219 c-A, annex
point 10
- 175 74 D
Dexia
(2012)
S/C/T/W
- 276, 284,
345
291 118, 621,
683
285 558 550 v-A
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Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
FIB
C
- 50 D, 98-102
v-A
- 36 D, 49 D,
94-97 v-A
39 D 45-46 D,
90 v-A,
121 b-A
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
CCB
(2014)
C
119 v-A 50-55 D,
118 v-A
147 b-A
(cost-cutting),
annex point 30
(“operational
efficiency”)
122 v-A - 129-131
v-A
CCB
(2015)
C
- 86 v-A 108 b-A
(cost-cutting)
86 v-A - 108 b-A
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Amager-
banken
S/T/W
58 D - - - - -
Eik
Banki
S/T/W
- - - - - -
Fionia
Bank
S/T/W
- - - - - -
Roskilde
Bank
S/T/W
- - - - - -
FIH
Holding
C
- Annex 5.7 - - 137 c-A -
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
CIF
W
- - Annex point
2-d
- - -
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Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Bayern-
LB
C
- 190-193 v-A,
annex
point 21
211 c-A
(behavioural
restraint),
annex
points 23-24
- 176 v-A 175 v-A
Com-
merz-
bank
C
- 101 v-A 37 D, 101 v-A
(corp. gov.)
63 D 100 v-A 60 D
(no
funding
problem)
37 D
HRE
C
63 D 85 A - 86 A, 97 v-A 62 D,
66 D,
91 v-A
108 v-A
HSH
Nord-
bank
C
- 180 A,
annex
point 11
Annex 12.1
(corp. gov.)
226 v-A 66 D,
70 D
56 D
IKB
C
113 c-A - - 98 v-A 50 D 99 v-A
LBBW
C
- 27-29 D,
84-87 v-A
*81 76, 90 v-A 37 D,
72 v-A
(no
funding
problem)
81 v-A
NordLB
C
- - Annex point 14 - 141 v-A
(no
funding
problem)
151 b-A
Sachsen
LB
T
126 c-A - - Footnote 15 - -
Spar-
kasse
Koln-
Bonn
C
- 37-41 D,
80 v-A
- - - 88 b-A
WestLB
(2009)
C
- 68-69
v-A *82
- 75 v-A - 32 D,
75 v-A,
86 c-A
WestLB
(2011)
W
- - - - - 65 D,
84 D
81. NB: remuneration restrictions are mentioned in para. 37 of the Opening Decision (of 30
June 2009).
82. Ownership structure.
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Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Alpha
Bank
C
- 121 D,
276 v-A,
annex
chapter III
121 D,
292 b-A, annex
chapter II
point 12
Annex
chapter III
271-273
v-A
292 b-A
Euro-
bank
C
- 130 D,
373 v-A,
annex
chapter III
130 D,
391 v-A,
402 b-A, annex
chapter II
point 13
Annex
chapter III
368-370
v-A
390 b-A
Pireaus
Bank
C
- 141 D,
333 v-A,
annex
chapter III
141 D, annex
chapter II
point 13
Annex
chapter III
328-330
v-A
346 b-A
National
Bank
of Greece
C
- 156 D,
383 v-A,
annex
chapter III
156 D,
397 b-A,
annex
chapter II
point 13
Annex
chapter III
378-380
v-A
397 b-A
TT
Hellenic
Postbank
S/T/W
- *83 *84 * * *
Nea
Proton
Bank
S/T/W
- *85 *86 220 * *
ATE
(2011) C
- 42 D,
annex 14
28 D
(cost-cutting)
28 D 63 v-A 28 D,
42 D,
75 v-A
ATE
(2013)
S/T/W
- - - - - 35 D
Panelli-
nia Bank
S/T/W
- - - - - *
83. It is indirectly mentioned, since TT Hellenic Postbank was integrated into Eurobank,
which committed to improve its risk management, corporate governance, etc.
84. NB: remuneration restrictions were included in the Greek support scheme, N560/2008,
para. 19a and 19b.
85. It is indirectly mentioned, since Nea Proton Bank was integrated into Eurobank, which
committed to improve its risk management, corporate governance, etc.
86. NB: remuneration restrictions were included in the Greek support scheme, N560/2008,
para. 19a and 19b.
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Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
FHB
C
- - 89 c-A - 44 D,
73-75
v-A
-
MKB
C
- - 73 D, 121 b-A 64 D,
113 v-A
- 43 D,
63 D,
113 v-A
Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Anglo/
INBS
W
*87 - *88 - - -
AIB/EBS
C
50 D - *89 - 108 v-A 50 D,
54 D,
67 D,
110 v-A
BOI
(2010)
C
- 86 D, 155 D 86 D
(“risk
management”)
86 D 207 -
BOI
(2011)
C
- 61 D, 211 61 D 61 D 51 D,
130 v-A
60 D
IL&P
(PTSB)
C
- - 21 D
(cost-cutting)
- 70 v-A 21 D,
73 v-A
Quinn
Insu-
rance
S/T/W
46 D - - - - -
87. NB: Management changes and remuneration restrictions are mentioned in para. 66 of the
decision of 26 June 2009 on Anglo Irish Bank.
88. NB: Management changes and remuneration restrictions are mentioned in para. 66 of the
decision of 26 June 2009 on Anglo Irish Bank.
89. AIB/EBS, 2011, para. 83; AIB 2010, para. 96; Irish guarantee scheme, para. 27.
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Bank Replacement
of
senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
MPS
C
- 72-73 D,
129-130 v-A
76 D
(“behavioural
safeguards”)
62 D 127 v-A 50-52 D,
118-119
v-A,
143 b-A
BRC
S/T/W
- - - - - -
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Parex
banka
S/C/W
136 v-A 38 D,
136 v-A
- 39 D, 136
v-A
41 D 42 D
MLB
S/T/W
- - - - - -
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
LCCU
C
- - 24 D, 58 b-A,
66 c-A
15 D, 22 D,
47 v-A
- -
AB Ukio
Bankas
S/T/W
11 D 75 v-A - 75 v-A - -
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Kaup-
thing
Bank
Luxem-
bourg
S/T/W
- - - - 70 v-A -
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Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
ABN
AMRO
C
- - - - 305 83 D
ING
C
- - 59 D
(corp. gov.),
90 D, 129 v-A
(corp. gov.)
- 75 D (no
funding
problem)
51 D,
128 v-A
SNS
REAAL
(2010)
C
- 48 D 48 D 47 D 49 D (no
funding
problem)
30 D
SNS
REAAL
(2013)
13 D, 84 v-A - 51 D, 84 - 79 v-A Annex I
Aegon
C
- - - - - 54 D
Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
CGD
C
- Annex 6.5 Annex 6.6 - - 28-29 D,
62 v-A
BPI
C
- - Annex 5.4 - 76 v-A 38-40 D
BCP
C
- 87 v-A Annex 4.5 87 v-A 37 37 D
BPN T 200 v-A,
238 b-A
- - 43, 77 208 201 v-A
BES
S/C/W
- Annex
section II.1
Annex
section II.2,
40 D, 93 A
Annex
section II.1
- -
Banif
S/T/W
- - - - - 151 v-A
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Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Abanka
C
- 15, 32,
48, 109-113
v-A Annex 8
48 D
(corp. gov.),
111 v-A (corp.
gov.), 142 b-A
(cost-cutting),
annex 8-vii
(corp. gov.)
32 D, 49,
114-119,
annex 9
107 v-A
(no
funding
problem)
132 v-A,
142 b-A
Abanka/
Banka
Celje
C
- 138-142 v-A 140 v-A
(corp. gov.)
170
(cost-cutting)
143-148 v-A - 160 v-A,
170 b-A
NKBM
C
101 v-A 104-108
v-A,
Annex 6
28 D
(corp. gov.),
41 D (burden
sharing),
106 v-A (corp.
gov.), annex
6.9 (corp. gov.)
109-112 v-A - 126 v-A,
NLB
C
- 128-131 v-A 39 D (corp.
gov.), 130 v-A
(corp. gov.),
annex 9.8
132-135 v-A 142 v-A 146 v-A,
157 b-A
Factor
Banka
W
- - - - - -
Pro-
banka
W
- - - - - -
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Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
Catalu-
nya Banc
C
166 v-A 17, 166 v-A Annex 7.3 166 171 166 v-A,
174 b-A
NCG
Banco
C
160 v-A 13, 160 v-A Annex 7.4 160 v-A 167 v-A 160 v-A,
173 b-A
BFA
C
190 v-A 18, 190 v-A 215(i) A
Annex 7.4
- 196-198 190 v-A,
201 b-A
Banco
Mare
Nostrum
C
- 14 Annex 7.4 - 50, 141 134 v-A,
149 b-A
Libe-
rbank
C
- Only in the
title of annex
8
Annex 8.4 122, 124 123 v-A 131 b-A
Banco de
Valencia
T
- - - - 165 v-A -
Banco
CAM
T
157 b-A - - - 138 v-A -
UNNIM
Banc
T
- - - - 154 v-A -
Cajatres
T
- 136, Annex
8.3
Annex 8.3 136 145 v-A
(no
funding
problem)
138 v-A,
154 b-A
Banco
Galleco
T
- 16 - - 113 v-A -
CajaSur
T
82 b-A 92 A*90 - - - -
CCM
T
17 D - - - 155 v-A 155 v-A
Banco
CEISS
C
- 13 Annex 8.4 142 147-148
v-A
142 v-A,
154 b-A
90. This was addressed in the section titled “8.1.1.3. Remuneration of the aid measures
granted”.
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Bank Replacement
of senior
management
Corporate
Governance
Remuneration
restrictions91
Risk
management
Funding
strategy
Cost-
cutting
LBG
C
75 D 39 D,
139 v-A
- 39 D, 139 v-A 147 68 D
RBS
C
65 D, 189 v-A - 64 D, 106 D,
208 v-A
191 v-A 188 57 D,
64 D,
191 v-A
B&B
S/T/W
- - - - - -
NR
S/C/W
- - - - 130 v-A -
Dun-
ferm-line
S/T/W
- - - - - 98 v-A
91. See: UK support scheme, para. 12a.
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Annex VIII: Burden-sharing by shareholders
The following table gives an overview of the burden-sharing by shareholders
in the bank State aid cases. As discussed in chapter 12, there are various forms
of burden-sharing by shareholders: nationalisation (see section 12.5.3.1),
dilution (see section 12.5.3.2), capital raising (see section 12.5.3.3), remaining
at the bad bank (see section 12.5.3.4), write-down (see section 12.5.3.5) and
the dividend ban (see section 12.5.3.6).
Bank Nationalisation Dilution Capital
raising
Remaining at
the bad bank
Write-down Dividend
ban
OVAG
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“The capital increase is to be conducted in two steps. First, the bank's capital is reduced by 70%
to offset the accumulated losses. That capital cut also reduces pro rata the PS which Austria
injected in 2009. In a second step, ÖVAG receives fresh capital totalling EUR 484 million.
EUR 250 million thereof is to be subscribed by Austria, the rest by the Volksbanken. Austria
and the Volksbanken will subscribe the shares at the price of EUR 2.181 per share. As a result,
the State will obtain a 43.4% stake in the bank and become the second-biggest shareholder after
the Volksbanken (50.2%). The stakes of the other shareholders, which do not participate in the
capital injection, will be diluted: DZ-Bank 3.8%, ERGO 1.5%, RZB 0.9%, free float 0.1%.”92
BAWAG
C
Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“In July 2009 the bank successfully placed EUR 80 million Tier 2 capital on the market, and in
August 2009 the bank received EUR 205 million of capital through a shareholder contribu-
tion.”93
Hypo Tirol
C
Dividend
ban
“Die Hypo Tirol hat zugesagt, im Falle von Verlusten im operativen Geschäft keine
Kuponzahlungen vorzunehmen. Auf diese Weise wird im Einklang mit Randnummer 26 der
Umstrukturierungsmitteilung sichergestellt, dass die Bank keine staatlichen Beihilfen zur
Zahlung einer Vergütung für Eigenmittel verwendet, wenn die entsprechenden Geschäfte keine
ausreichenden Gewinne abwerfen.”94
92. OVAG, 19 September 2012, para. 23. See also: para. 49,50 and 119.
93. BAWAG, 30 June 2010, para. 97.
94. Hypo Tirol, 4 October 2012, para. 75.
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HGAA
S/C/W
Nationalisation
“First, all previous shareholders of HGAA have sold their shares to the Republic of Austria for
a symbolic price of one euro which reduced the risk that the aid measures benefit the former
shareholders. The former owners have also provided HGAA with capital or liquidity, which
have been used to cover losses and to improve the liquidity situation.
The majority shareholder of HGAA at the time of that sale was BayernLB. In total, BayernLB
has contributed about EUR 1.5 billion in capital whilst renouncing further ownership rights, not
even any prospect of further remuneration. BayernLB also contributed about EUR 4.3 billion in
liquidity to HGAA. Furthermore, BayernLB faced a significant write-down loss when selling
its HGAA shares which contributes to addressing moral hazard in line with point 22 of the
Restructuring Communication.”95
KA (2011)
S/C/W
Nationalisation Dividend
ban
“As regards burden sharing related to the restructuring process, the Commission takes note of
several positive elements. First, previous shareholders have been almost entirely wiped out by
the nationalisation, and within the nationalisation were required to transform claims against KA
into hybrid capital (participation certificates). Moreover, hybrid issuances (including the
participation certificates from the previous owners) have been split between KA Neu and
KA Finanz […], thus ensuring additional burden sharing, since the potential profits of KA
Finanz will be skimmed off by the guarantee fees to be paid to the state.”96
KBC
C
Dividend
ban
This case is somewhat remarkable, because there is no clear indication of burden-sharing by
shareholders (apart from the dividend ban).
Ethias
C
Dilution Dividend
ban
“The Commission observes that the historic owners of Ethias have contributed to the costs of
restructuring. In particular, the historic owners, if considered as a whole, have lost control of
the company, as their stake was diluted from 100% to 25%.”97
Fortis
(2008)
S/C/T/C
Even though there was burden-sharing by shareholders (because Fortis was broken-up and
most activities were sold), the decision does not really mention the aspect of burden-sharing by
shareholders.
95. HGAA, 3 September 2013, para. 124-125.
96. KA, 31 March 2011, para. 87. Only the Österreichischer Gemeindebund retained its share.
97. Ethias, 20 May 2010, para. 129.
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Dexia
(2010)
C
Dilution
“Dexia, its shareholders and theMember States concerned have already made an own contribution
to the restructuring effort in particular through the dilution of the share of the capital stock held by
existing shareholders when the bank's capital was increased (the French and Belgian authorities
directly subscribed to EUR 3 billion of the EUR 6.4 billion capital increase announced in
September 2008).”98
Dexia
(2012)
S/C/T/W
Dilution
“The EUR 5,5 billion dilution of existing shareholdings planned by the recapitalisation by the
Belgian and French States will be considerable. Existing shareholders, other than the Belgian
and French States, will see their holdings drastically diluted from 88,54% before the capital
increase to 5,58% thereafter.”99
FIB
C
“When the State provides a capital injection, equity capital and subordinated debt holders must
contribute to reducing the capital shortfall to the maximum extent. Such contributions can take
the form of either a conversion into Common Equity Tier 1 or a write-down of the principal of
the instruments. In the absence of any capital need in the case of FIB the Commission will not
require such measures.”100
CCB
(2014)
C
Dilution
“Without aid, the capital of the Cooperative group would have become negative in 2014. As a
consequence of the State's capital injection in the CCB, the State will own 99% of the shares
and voting rights of the CCB. Its existing shareholders, the CCIs, will be completely diluted
and left with 1%.”101
CCB
(2015)
C
Dilution
“The 1% shareholders of the CCB, the CCB Holding Company, and the 1% shareholders of the
CCIs, the old members, who will exchange their shares in the CCIs for shares in the CCB, will
hold a combined share with the range of 0.77%-0.98% in the CCB. They will therefore be
further diluted by the new recapitalisation and represents only a negligible shareholding. Hence
the requirements of the 2011 Prolongation Communication and of the 2013 Banking Communica-
tion are complied with.”102
98. Dexia, 26 February 2010, para. 200.
99. Dexia, 28 December 2012, para. 615.
100. FIB, 25 November 2014, para. 108.
101. CCB, 24 February 2014, para. 139.
102. CCB, 2015, para. 105.
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Amager-
banken
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The features of the burden-sharing foreseen in the conditional transfer agreement ensure that
losses on the book of Amagerbanken will be borne in full by Amagerbanken's owners and unguar-
anteed creditors. Accordingly, the subordinated debt holders and shareholders have suffered 100%
losses. They could only benefit from proceeds of sale and windingdown of the New Bank in the
context of the earn-out mechanism, and would only receive a positive contribution after full
repayment of aid received (increased by an annual interest payment of 10%). Such a prospect for
shareholders and unguaranteed creditors is thus very unlikely in view of the assessment of the
value of the assets transferred to the New Bank.”103
Eik banki
Fionia
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The Commission considers burden-sharing to be sufficient as the old shareholders lost control
of the bank and all financial stakes therein without any compensation (except for the theoretical
Earn- Out facility, which is deemed justified as being necessary and proportionate to ensure the
quick and smooth implementation of the liquidation).”104
Roskilde
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The investors having invested in old RB's equity and subordinated capital may only get some
future compensation via a so-called earnout mechanism after the DNB and DPB are repaid at
subscription value plus interest.”105
FIH
Holding
C
Dividend
ban
“FIH has committed not to pay any dividends during the restructuring phase and to repay a
previous State recapitalisation of DKK 1,9 billion. Further, FIH will not make any coupon pay-
ments to investors in hybrid instruments or any instrument for which financial institutions have
discretion to pay coupons or to call, regardless of their regulatory classification, including
subordinated debt instruments, if no legal obligation to make payments exists.”106
CIF
W
The limited burden-sharing in this case was justified.
103. Amagerbanken, 25 January 2012, para. 125.
104. Fionia, 25 October 2010, para. 76.
105. Roskilde Bank, 5 November 2008, para. 62.
106. FIH, 11 March 2014, para. 133.
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BayernLB
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“Another aspect concerns the savings banks association, which did not participate in the 2008
rescue measures even though it was a shareholder in BayernLB. Because it did not participate
in the rescue, the savings banks association's stake has been significantly diluted, but it has in
the meantime agreed to various additional contributions. (…) As a result of all these measures the
shareholding that was initially diluted to 6% will rise significantly, potentially up to 25%.”107
Commerz-
bank
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“The Commission is satisfied that, in addition to the earlier capital increase, the planned capital
increase is necessary so that Commerzbank can meet both internal and external demands and
that it has adequate risk buffers at its disposal for the near future.”108
“Furthermore, the owners are to participate in the costs of restructuring the bank as much as
possible. The existing shareholders and holders of hybrid capital instruments have not taken
part in the capital increases, with the exception of Allianz, whose contribution must be
attributed mainly to its desire to complete the takeover of Dresdner Bank as quickly as possible.
Nevertheless they shoulder part of the burden through the ban on dividend payments and on
using reserves for coupon payments. The Commission is convinced that there is a limit to
imposing a heavier burden on the holders of hybrid capital instruments at Commerzbank.”109
HRE
C
Nationalisation
“It should also be borne in mind that the bank was taken into public ownership and that the
compensation received by its former shareholders was based on the value of the company without
state support. That outcome is a positive element from a state aid point of view and means that the
former shareholders have been wiped out and thus can be considered as having sufficiently
contributed to the costs of the restructuring of HRE.”110
HSH
Nordbank
C
Dilution Dividend
ban
“The Commission concludes that adequate own contribution and burden sharing of the
minority shareholders can be achieved, and consequently that the aid can be viewed as compatible
subject to the conditions described in recitals 262, 202 to 208 and 241 to 244.”111
107. BayernLB, 5 February 2013, para. 198-202.
108. Commerzbank, 7 May 2009, para. 105.
109. Commerzbank, 7 May 2009, para. 107. See also para. 4: “As a result of SoFFin’s planned
participation in Commerzbank of 25% + 1 share, these shareholdings will be reduced.”
NB: this points at dilution.
110. HRE, 18 July 2011, para. 121.
111. HSH Nordbank, 20 September 2011, para. 263.
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IKB
C
Capital
raising
“A significant part of the restructuring of the portfolios is borne by the company itself and the
previous and new private shareholders, comprising in particular the participation of the
banking associations, IKB’s own funds and Lone Star’s capital injection.”112
LBBW
C
Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“As the shareholders have injected capital into the bank pro rata to their respective sharehol-
ding, the burdens are at least equitably distributed among the groups of shareholders.”113
NordLB
C
Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“Another aspect concerns the Savings Banks' Association, the second group of shareholders of
NORD/LB. The Commission noted that they have also contributed to the restructuring of the
bank both in the conversion of capital as well as in the provision of new capital.”114
SachsenLB
T
“In addition, the Commission recognises that the old owners of the bank and the management
are not involved any more in the activities of Sachsen LB, which provides a valuable signal
against moral hazard.”115
Sparkasse
KolnBonn
C
No mention of burden-sharing by shareholders. This could be explained by the fact that there
were no private shareholders; the ultimate owners of Sparkasse KolnBonn were the city of
Koln (70%) and Bonn (30%).116
WestLB
(2009)
C
Dividend
ban
The owners of WestLB were required to sell their shares. However, this was not mentioned in
the context of burden-sharing, but in the context of the restoration of long-term viability.
112. IKB, 21 October 2008, para. 104.
113. Para. 97. See also para. 10: “All shareholders participated in the capital injection in
accordance with their respective levels of shares and indirectly in the impaired assets relief
measure.”
114. NordLB, 25 July 2012, para. 156.
115. Para. 126.
116. Sparkasse KolnBonn, 4 November 2009, para. 6.
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WestLB
(2011)
W
“In the cases of Northern Rock and HRE, burden sharing was achieved by nationalisation. As
in those cases, the shareholders herewill lose all their equity. Moreover, WestLB's shareholders, as
well as SoFFin as the principal provider of hybrid capital, will take individual responsibility for
the different parts into which WestLB is to be split and provide additional capital.”117
Alpha
Bank
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“The historical shareholders of the Bank were diluted by the rights issue completed in 2009 and
then again by the HFSF recapitalisation (measure B4) and private capital raising of 2013 and
March 2014. For instance, the stake held by the shareholders of the Bank, which at the time
included the investors that injected money in 2009, was reduced from 100% prior to the Spring
2013 recapitalisation to only 4,9% after that recapitalisation. In addition, the Bank has not paid
any dividend in cash since 2008. In addition to that burden-sharing by historical shareholders,
the Bank has raised a significant amount of private capital since the crisis started in 2008, that
is to say EUR 986 million in 2009, EUR 550 million in 2013 and EUR 1 200 million in
2014.”118
EFG
Eurobank
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“The existing shareholders of the Bank were heavily diluted by the Spring 2013 recapitalisation
(measure B4). Indeed, the stake held by existing shareholders had been reduced from 100%
prior to the Spring 2013 recapitalisation to only 1,44%. The Commission also notes that the
Bank has paid no cash dividend since 2008. Finally the Commission takes a favourable view of
the fact that the HFSF will inject additional capital only if the Bank fails to raise it from the market
at a price deemed reasonable and established on the basis of two independent valuators.”119
Pireaus
Bank
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“The historical shareholders of the Bank were diluted by the rights issue completed in 2009115
and then again by the HFSF recapitalisation (measure B4) and private capital raising of 2013
and March 2014. For instance, the stake held by the shareholders of the Bank, which at the time
included the investors that injected money in 2009, was reduced from 100% prior to the Spring
2013 recapitalisation to only 2,3% after that recapitalisation. In addition, the Bank has not paid
any dividend in cash since 2008. In addition to that burden-sharing by historical shareholders,
the Bank has raised a significant amount of private capital since the crisis started in 2008, that
is to say EUR 807 million in 2009, EUR 1 444 million in 2013 and EUR 1 750 million in
2014.”120
117. WestLB, 20 December 2011, para. 186.
118. Alpha Bank, 9 July 2014, para. 293.
119. Eurobank, 29 April 2014, para. 392.
120. Piraeus Bank, 23 July 2014, para. 347.
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National
Bank of
Greece
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“The existing shareholders of the Bank were successively diluted by the rights issues
completed in 2009 and 2010 and then by the HFSF recapitalisation. The stake held by the
shareholders of the Bank was reduced from 100% prior to the Spring 2013 recapitalisation to
only 5,1% afterwards. In addition, no dividend has been paid to ordinary shareholders since 2007
or to US preference shareholders since 2009. Besides that burden-sharing by historical sharehol-
ders, the Bank has raised a significant amount of capital since the crisis started in late 2008. That
capital raised has contributed to reducing the amount of capital needs which had to be filled by
State aid.”121
T Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The shareholders and subordinated debt holders are not transferred and remain in the entity in
liquidation. They will be entitled to proceeds from the liquidation only if the proceeds are
sufficient to repay first the Resolution Scheme, which has a priority claim over the other
creditors. Knowing that there are no more assets in T Bank, it is very likely that the shareholders
and subordinated debt holders will not get back their investments.”122
TT
Hellenic
Postbank
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“Concerning burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders, the Commission
has already established, in recital 100 of the New TT Opening Decision, that the shareholders
and subordinated debt holders were not transferred to New TT Bank but have remained in TT
Bank, that is to say, the entity in liquidation. Hence, the Commission considered that sufficient
burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders was achieved.”123
(Nea)
Proton
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“Concerning burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders, the Commission
notes that the shareholders and subordinated debt holders were not transferred to Nea Proton
Bank but have remained in the entity in liquidation. Therefore, there is a high probability that
they will lose their investments. That burden-sharing reduces the aid amount needed. Hence,
the Commission considers that sufficient burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt
holders is achieved.”124
121. NBG, 23 July 2014, para. 398.
122. T Bank, 16 May 2012, para. 51.
123. Eurobank, 29 April 2014, para. 257.
124. Nea Proton Bank, 26 July 2012, para. 77.
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ATE (2011)
C
Dilution
“The current shareholders will be diluted in the context of the upcoming capital increase of
EUR 1,259.5 million, as the State will possibly participate for a higher proportion than its current
shareholdership in ATE.”125
ATE
(2013)
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The Commission also takes positive note of the fact that the shareholders of ATE Bank were
completely wiped out. Moreover, the Greek authorities did not transfer shares or subordinated
debt to Piraeus Bank.”126
Panellinia
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The equity of the Bank, which consists only of ordinary shares and of preference shares
owned by the Hellenic Republic, will not be transferred, but will be left in the liquidated entity.
Therefore, the shareholders are fully wiped out and suffer 100% losses.”127
FHB
C
Dividend
ban
“The Hungarian authorities also note that FHB has not paid dividends for several years in
succession, and it has only purchased back a minor portion of its shares relative to the total
value of the shareholder’s equity. Accordingly, as the amount of funds returned to owners and
shareholders has been low over the past years, an appropriate burden-sharing has been
ensured.”128
MKB
C
Write-down Dividend
ban
“The sole shareholder of MKB Bank, the Hungarian State, will be fully written down, and the
resolution fund via the RAMV will become the sole shareholder of the core bank.”129
125. ATE, 23 May 2011, para. 81.
126. ATE, 3 May 2013, para. 74.
127. Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 113.
128. FHB, 22 February 2012, para. 61.
129. MKB, 16 December 2015, para. 117.
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Anglo/
INBS
W
Nationalisation Dilution
“In the particular case of Anglo, private shareholders have been fully 'wiped out' and the bank
was fully nationalised.
Concerning INBS, prior to the State recapitalisation INBS was owned by its members. In
particular "share members" (persons who have a deposit account in INBS) had a right to gains
on any surplus of assets realised in case of its demutualisation (transformation of INBS into an
ordinary bank), winding-down or dissolution. As a result of the first recapitalisation of INBS,
the State has taken full control of INBS via the issuance of Special Investment Shares,
following which the members have lost all rights to gains on surpluses of the assets realised to
the benefit of the State (for instance, in case of a sale of INBS). As a result, the economic rights of
the share members have been completely 'wiped out'.”130
AIB/EBS
C
Dilution
“Quasi full burden sharing has been achieved from the former owners of AIB. Shareholders
have been wiped out and the State currently owns 99,8% of the Bank.”131
BOI (2010)
C
Dilution
“As regards the existing shareholders, they have been significantly diluted by the participation
of the State and private investors in the capital raising exercise described in paragraphs (81)-
(85) and the following. In that way, they bore the consequence of the losses registered by
BOI.”132
“By the end of the capital-raising exercise, the stake of incumbent shareholdings in BOI will be
around 30% (compared with 100% just after the EUR 3.5 billion rescue recapitalisation in
March 2009 and 84% following the payment of coupons on the government's preference shares
in February 2010).”133
BOI (2011)
C
Dilution Capital
raising
“The Commission further notes that the need for additional State aid has been limited to a
significant extent by the liability management exercises carried out in July and December 2011,
while new capital has been raised on the market. Incumbent shareholders had to provide fresh
capital to finance the restructuring costs, or significantly diluted in the capital raise.”134
130. Anglo/INBS, 29 June 2011, para. 165-166.
131. AIB/EBS, 2014, para. 121.
132. Bank of Ireland, 15 July 2010, para. 216.
133. Bank of Ireland, 15 July 2010, para. 82.
134. Bank of Ireland, 20 December 2011, para. 160.
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IL&P
(PTSB)
C
Dilution
“Almost complete burden-sharing has been achieved from the former owners of PTSB.
Shareholders have been diluted and the State currently owns 99.2% of PTSB. Therefore, the
amount of burden-sharing from the former owners is significant and adequate.”135
Quinn
Insurance
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“The former shareholders of QIL will in any case not benefit from the measures taken by
Ireland to aid the administration of QIL. They are part of the rump of QIL that will be wound-
down. They rank last or second-last and will only be paid out after all the other creditors have
been compensated. The Commission notes that legally the rump of QIL is still owned by its
shareholder, the Quinn Group (which is itself under share receivership). However, the Quinn
Group will receive money only if the ICF is repaid in full. Given that the expected gap in the rump
of QIL is estimated at EUR 738 million, there is no prospect of future economic value in that
ownership of the rump.”136
MPS
C
Dilution
MPS was recapitalised in the form of ‘new instruments’. The restructuring plan of MPS
included an accelerated repayment schedule with respect to the ‘new instruments’. To that end,
MPS intended to increase its capital by at least EUR 2,5 billion.137 This capital increase would
significantly dilute the existing shareholders. If the capital increase would not be successful,
then the ‘new instruments’ would be converted into normal shares. This conversion would also
result in the dilution of existing shareholders.
BRC
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
Write-down
“Because BRC has currently negative equity, its shareholders will be fully written down.
Furthermore, subordinated debt is not transferred to ICCREA but remains in the entity in
liquidation.”138
Banca
Tercas
Write-down
“The Commission observes that a complete write-down of shareholders' equity was performed
in Tercas.”139
“On 27 July 2014, the Tercas’ shareholders’ meeting decided: 1) to partially cover the losses
inter alia by reducing capital to zero with cancellation of all the circulating ordinary shares;
and 2) to increase the capital up to EUR 230 million with issuance of new ordinary shares offered
exclusively to BPB.”140
135. IL&P, 9 April 2015, para. 85.
136. Quinn Insurance, 12 October 2011, para. 144.
137. MPS, 27 November 2013, para. 57.
138. BRC, 2 July 2015, para. 71.
139. Banca Tercas, 23 December 2015, para. 200.
140. Banca Tercas, 27 February 2015, para. 21.
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Parex
banka
S/C/W
Nationalisation Dilution
“As a result of nationalization, the former majority shareholders in Parex banka were wiped out
(see recital (13)). Due to the subsequent recapitalisation of Parex banka by the State and the
EBRD, the minority shareholders were diluted (from previous 15.2% to 3.7% as at 7 July
2010).”141
MLB
“It has already been concluded in the opening decision that the base case scenario contained in
the sales strategy ensures the limitation of the aid needed for the phasing-out of the commercial
activities of MLB to the minimum. The actual execution of that plan does not change that
assessment.”142
“The bank and its capital holders should contribute to the restructuring as much as possible with
their own resources. That requirement ensures that rescued banks bear adequate responsibility for
the consequences of their past behaviour and creates appropriate incentives for their future
behaviour. In the present case the Commission notes that all the capital of the bank was held by the
State. By means of a sale, the State discontinues the commercial activities of MLB.”143
LCCU
C
Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
“In that regard, the Commission observes that the member credit unions provided capital
covering 68% of the capital needs of the LCCU which was the maximum amount they could
contribute in 2011 without jeopardizing their own existence.”144
AB Ukio
Bankas
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“Although the shareholders of Ukio bank do not cease to be its owners they will participate in
the restructuring costs. First, they contributed to the costs of the restructuring by absorbing the
bank’s losses. Second, in view of the capital gap it is not expected that either the shareholders
or subordinated loans holders will receive any compensation as a result of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.”145
141. Parex banka, 15 September 2010, para. 53.
142. MLB, 17 July 2013, para. 91.
143. MLB, 26 January 2012, para. 211-212.
144. LCCU, 26 September 2012, para. 53
145. AB Ukio Bankas, 14 August 2013, para. 82.
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Kaupthing
Bank
Luxem-
bourg
S/T/W
Write-down
“First of all, it should be noted that the restructuring plan provides that the Bank’s shareholder
(that is to say the Icelandic parent company) must reduce its capital in the Bank to zero, with
the result that it ceases to be a shareholder without receiving any compensation. To that degree,
the Bank’s shareholder will have participated in the costs by absorbing the losses to the maximum
extent of its capital. […].”146
ABN
AMRO
C
Burden-sharing by shareholders not applicable in this case, since the Dutch State acquired
Fortis Bank Nederland (and thus ABN AMRO).
ING
C
Dilution
“Furthermore, the restructuring plan foresees that ING will raise EUR 5 billion of capital via a
share offering in 2009, which will result in a dilution of existing shareholder rights. This can be
considered as a significant own contribution of existing capital providers.”147
SNS
REAAL
(2010)
C
Dilution
“The shareholders of SNS have been diluted by the EUR 135 million capital increase in
September 2009 (equivalent to 10% of shares). This capital increase was used to partly repay
the State and the Foundation. The Foundation is entitled to be repaid pro rata with the State but
it decided to waive this right and to be repaid a smaller amount in 2009 (with the remainder to
be repaid in the coming years). It also accepted to be repaid at 100% (and not at 120%). The
Commission considers that the dilution of shareholders and the waiving of payments by the
Foundation, as the main strategic shareholder, provides for appropriate burden-sharing.”148
146. Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, 9 July 2009, para. 72.
147. ING, 18 November 2009, para. 136.
148. SNS REAAL, 28 January 2010, para. 77.
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SNS
REAAL
(2013)
C
Nationalisation
“As regards the increased burden-sharing requirements under the 2013 Banking Communication,
the Commission notes that the Dutch State has not bailed out the shareholders of SNS REAAL
and the hybrid debt-holders of SNS REAAL and SNS Bank. As described in recital (13), those
shareholders and hybrid debt-holders were expropriated and will only receive a fair compensation
in line with the relevant provisions of Dutch law.”149
Aegon
C
Dilution Dividend
ban
“Burden-sharing is ensured by the contribution of capital and hybrid instrument holders of
AEGON to the costs of the restructuring. In this respect it is noted first that the capital increase
of August 2009, which was used to repay one-third of the State capital, provided burden-sharing
through the dilution of existing shareholders. Second, the commitment by the Netherlands
whereby AEGON will not make dividend payments to its common stock holders and will not call
or repurchase any of the outstanding hybrid securities prior to the full repayment of the CCS
ensures that the owners and hybrid instrument holders of AEGON contribute to the restruc-
turing.”150
CGD
C
Dividend
ban
“Ban on dividend, coupon and interest payments: CGD will not (and shall procure that none of
its subsidiary undertakings shall) make any payments of dividends, coupons or interest to
holders of preference shares and subordinated debt, in so far as those payments are not owed on
the basis of contractual or legal obligations.”151
NB: this case was characterised by a breach of the dividend ban.
BPI
C
Dividend
ban
NB: this case was characterised by a breach of the dividend ban.
BCP
C
Dilution Capital
raising
Dividend
ban
In the decision on BCP, the Commission noted positively that 14% of the capital shortfall was
provided by private investors.152 In 2012, BCP not only issued CoCos subscribed by the
Portuguese State, BCP also issued ordinary shares. These shares were offered to the current
shareholders of BCP for subscription through the exercise of their pre-emptive subscription
rights.153 The issuance of ordinary shares diminished the State’s recapitalisation to 86% of the
identified total capital shortfall.
149. SNS REAAL, 19 December 2013, para. 92.
150. Aegon, 17 August 2010, para. 110.
151. CGD, 24 July 2013, annex point 6.7.
152. BCP, 30 August 2013, para. 110.
153. BCP, 30 August 2013, para. 25.
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BPN
T
Nationalisation
“In November 2008 Portugal nationalised BPN by force of law at a zero price.”154
“In the present case, the Commission welcomes the fact that the shareholders have lost all their
stake in the bank without any compensation.”155
BES
S/C/W
Remaining at
the bad
bank
“All shareholders and subordinated creditors will be left in the Bad Bank.”156
Banif
S/T/W
Write-down
“As resolution measure, Portugal will apply the Sale of Business resolution tool combined with
the Bail-in tool which under the Portuguese implementation law of Directive 2014/59/EU is
already applicable in 2015.”157
“Using its resolution powers, the resolution authority has generated EUR 431 million of capital
through applying bail-in to holders of subordinated debt as well as liabilities from other credit
institutions. This has to be added to the amount of shareholder capital still present in Banif of
EUR 650 million bringing the total up to EUR 1 081 million.”158
Abanka
C
Nationalisation
“To ensure adequate burden-sharing and participation of Abanka’s existing investors in the
restructuring, the equity holders and all subordinated debt holders were written down in full prior
to the first recapitalisation.”159
NKBM
C
Nationalisation
“In that respect, Slovenia committed that before any State aid is granted to NKBM (i.e. the
second recapitalisation and the transfer of impaired assets to the BAMC), the latter will write-
down in full its shareholders’ equity and outstanding subordinated debts so ensuring compliance
with the requirements of 2013 Banking Communication.”160
NLB
C
Nationalisation
“In that respect, Slovenia committed that before any State aid is granted to NLB (i.e. the third
recapitalisation and the transfer of impaired assets to the BAMC), the latter will write-down in
full its shareholders’ equity and outstanding subordinated debts so ensuring compliance with
the requirements of 2013 Banking Communication.”161
154. BPN, 27 March 2012, para. 18.
155. BPN, 24 October 2011, para. 112.
156. BES, 3 August 2014, para. 89.
157. Banif, 21 December 2015, para. 131.
158. Banif, 21 December 2015, para. 141.
159. Abanka, 13 August 2014, para. 140.
160. NKBM, 18 December 2013, para. 135.
161. NLB, 18 December 2013, para. 154.
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Factor
Banka
W
Nationalisation
“The State recapitalisation will only be implemented after the complete implementation of the
wipe-out of the shareholders’ equity and subordinated debts. All existing shareholders and
subordinated debt holders therefore fully contribute to the orderly winding down costs of the
Bank prior to the granting of the State support.”162
Probanka
W
Nationalisation
“The State recapitalisation will only be implemented after the complete implementation of the
wipe-out of the shareholders’ equity and subordinated debts. All existing shareholders and
subordinated debt holders therefore fully contribute to the orderly winding down costs of the
Bank prior to the granting of the State support.”163
Catalunya
Banc
C
Dilution
“With the implementation of the Restructuring Plan, all existing shareholders will be asked to
bear losses in proportion to their stakes prior to any new capital injection under the MoU. As a
result and given the significant capital needs of the Bank, all existing shareholders in the Bank
other than the FROB, the founding savings banks, will be fully diluted and will lose all economic
claims and all political/voting rights over the Bank.”164
NCG
Banco
C
Dilution
“As established in recital (78), the State will acquire a significant ownership of NCG and its
previous owners will be fully wiped out.”165
“The conversion of the convertible preference shares issued to the FROB in 2010 and the new
capital injection mean that the old owners of NCG shares will lose all economic claims and
other rights over NCG.”166
162. Factor Banka, 18 December 2013, para. 65.
163. Probanka, 18 December 2013, para. 66.
164. Catalunya Banc, 28 November 2012, para. 82.
165. NCG, 28 November 2012, para. 171.
166. NCG, 28 November 2012, para. 75.
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BFA
C
Dilution
“As a result of that conversion, as of June 2012 the FROB owned 100% of the ordinary shares
in BFA. Accordingly, the previous equity holders (the seven founding savings banks) lost all
economic and political rights over the BFA Group.”167
“Based on the assessment made by the Spanish authorities on the economic value of BFA, the
FROB will control 100% of BFA’s capital. As a result, the seven founding savings banks will lose
all control over BFA.”168
Banco
Mare
Nostrum
C
Dilution
“As established in recital (62), the State will acquire a significant ownership of BMN and the
stake of its previous owners will be significantly reduced. The State will consequently receive a
large part of future profits and/or the revenue from the envisaged listing of BMN in the future. The
Commission therefore considers the level of remuneration associated with the State’s stake in
BMN of at least 64% as appropriate.”169
“All existing shareholders will bear losses proportionate to their stake prior to the injection of new
capital and the SLE described below. Moreover, the mandatorily convertible contingent debt as
described in recital (18) will be converted into equity prior to these measures. The consecutive
absorption of accounting losses as of 31 December 2012 will lead to a remaining equity of approx-
imately EUR [200 – 300] million.”170
Liberbank
C
This decision is remarkable in the sense that there is no mention of burden-sharing by share-
holders.
167. BFA, 28 November 2012, para. 91. See also para. 148 and 149: with the conversion of
FROB’s convertible preference shares into equity in BFA in June 2012, any pre-existing
link between the seven founding savings Banks and the BFA Group was severed, in terms
of ownership, control and operational involvement.” “In terms of burden-sharing, they
have relinquished any ownership rights in the BFA Group, and will not recover them in the
future.”
168. BFA, 27 June 2012, para. 28.
169. BMN, 20 December 2012, para. 147.
170. BMN, 20 December 2012, para. 59.
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Banco de
Valencia
T
Dilution
“Furthermore, the offer is made under the following assumptions: (i) The share purchase will be
made only after the General Assembly of BVA adopts a capital reduction and, simultaneously, an
increase of capital corresponding to the capital injection of EUR 4.5 billion by the FROB.”171
“The unitary nominal value of EUR 0.2 per share of existing minority shareholders will be
reduced to the lowest possible unitary nominal value of EUR 0.01, as a result of the reduction and
simultaneous increase of capital that the FROB will execute with effect of 30 October 2012. The
capital reduction will result in a reduction of 95% of the nominal value of the shares.”172
“In this regard, the Commission observes that BVA’s previous owners will be fully wiped out as a
result of the measures granted in the context of its restructuring, except for the minor compensa-
tion as described in recital (73).”173
Banco
CAM
T
Dilution
“As regards the contribution of Banco CAM to the financing of the restructuring costs, the
Commission observes that the stakeholders of that credit institution have suffered significant
losses. More specifically, the cuotas participativas – equity instruments with non-voting rights
which allow investors to receive a percentage of the after-tax profits distributed by the issuing
company – have lost all value.”174
“Furthermore, since the FROB injected capital in the form of ordinary shares, it controls 100%
of the voting rights in Banco CAM’s General Assembly.”175
UNNIM
Banc
T
Dilution
“The Commission notes that the takeover of UNNIM Banc by BBVA results both in the total
wiping out of former UNNIM Banc shareholders and in the disappearance of UNNIM Banc as
a standalone entity.”176
Cajatres
T
Dilution
“Finally, the restructuring will take place through the merger of Cajatres into Ibercaja. Cajatres’
incumbent shareholders will hold a stake of around [0-20]% in the combined entity and will
therefore experience a very significant dilution of their shareholdings as part of the restructuring
effort.”177
171. Banco de Valencia, 28 November 2012, para. 34.
172. Banco de Valencia, 28 November 2012, para. 73.
173. Banco de Valencia, 28 November 2012, para. 178.
174. Banco CAM, 30 May 2012, para. 156.
175. Banco CAM, 30 May 2012, para. 157.
176. UNNIM Banc, 25 July 2012, para. 179.
177. Cajatres, 20 December 2012, para. 156.
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Banco
Galleco
T
Dilution
“On 29 January 2013, Banco Gallego’s shareholders decided to reduce the equity of the Bank to
zero by absorbing losses and, simultaneously, NCG increased the capital of Banco Gallego. As
a result of that operation, on 18 March 2013, the FROB, indirectly through NCG, held 99.95%
of Banco Gallego, the rest remaining in the hands of private shareholders.”178
“As described in recital (7) the existing private shareholders were nearly fully diluted as a result
of a capital increase conducted by NCG on 18 March 2013.”179
“In that regard, the Commission observes that Banco Gallego’s previous owners were fully wiped
out.”180
CajaSur
T
“The Commission observes that the stakeholders of the credit institution lost ownership.”181
Caja
Castilla-La
Mancha
T
“The Commission observes that the stakeholders of the credit institution lost ownership.”182
Banco
CEISS
C
“The absorption of accounting losses as of 31 December 2012, followed by the conversion of
the FROB Preference Shares and the required new capital injection to meet regulatory solvency
levels mean that all existing shareholder will be asked to bear losses in proportion to their
stakes prior to any new capital injection under the MoU.”183
LBG
C
Dilution Dividend
ban
“As regards the existing shareholders, they have been diluted by the State and private
recapitalisations described above. In that way, they bore the consequence of the losses registered
by LBG.”184
178. Banco Gallego, 25 July 2013, para. 7.
179. Banco Gallego, 25 July 2013, para. 59.
180. Banco Gallego, 25 July 2013, para. 126.
181. CajaSur, 8 November 2010, para. 81.
182. CCM, 29 June 2010, para. 172.
183. Banco CEISS, 20 December 2012, para. 59.
184. LBG, 18 November 2009, para. 163.
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RBS
C
Dilution Dividend
ban
“As regards the contribution of the existing shareholders, the Commission considers positively
the fact that in exchange for its £20 billion recapitalisation in the group, the State received
shares issued at a discount compared to the stock market price at the time of the announcement.
This allowed it to own around 70% of RBS. This means that the aid did not wholly protect
RBS’s shareholders against the consequences of the group’s past losses. On the contrary, they
have been strongly diluted by the State recapitalisations. In that way, they bore the consequence
of the losses registered by RBS. In addition, in case of conversion of the B shares in ordinary
shares, it will lead to a further dilution of the existing shareholders.”185
B&B
S/T/W
Nationalisation
“Moreover, the UK has taken measures to minimise moral hazard, notably by excluding
shareholders and possibly certain types of creditors from receiving the benefit of any aid in the
context of the controlled winding-up procedure. This was achieved through the nationalisation
of B&B by which its former shareholders were wiped-out under the Transfer Order.”186
Northern
Rock
S/C/W
Nationalisation
“With regard to NR, the bank was nationalised and its former shareholders will only be
compensated on the basis of the value of the company without any State support. As a conse-
quence, this compensation is likely to be close to zero. This means that the former shareholders
have been wiped-out and thus can be considered as having sufficiently supported the con-
sequences of the failure of NR.”187
Dunferm-
line
S/T/W
Remaining at
the bad bank
“As regards burden-sharing of the costs related to the impaired assets between the State,
shareholders and creditors, the Commission notes that both the former members and the
subordinated debt holders will contribute to the restructuring of the bank to the greatest extent
possible as they remain with the Rump Dunfermline. Depending on their degree of subordination,
they will bear the potential losses from assets held by Rump Dunfermline in accordance with
ordinary bankruptcy laws.”188
185. RBS, 14 December 2009, para. 216.
186. B&B, 25 January 2010, para. 55.
187. Northern Rock, 28 October 2009, para. 149.
188. Dunfermline, 25 January 2010, para. 74.
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Annex IX: Burden-sharing by hybrid and subordinated debt holders
The following table gives an overview of the burden-sharing by hybrid and
subordinated debt holders in the bank State aid cases. As discussed in chapter
12, there are various forms of burden-sharing by hybrid and subordinated debt
holders: Liability Management Exercise (LME) (see section 12.6.3.1), write-
down (see section 12.6.3.2), remaining at the bad bank (see section 12.6.3.3) and
the coupon ban (see section 12.6.3.4).
Bank LME Write-down Remaining at
the bad bank
Coupon ban
OVAG
C
LME Coupon ban
“The Commission further observes that ÖVAG offered to buy hybrid instruments back from
private investors at the price corresponding to around 40% of their nominal value. The offered
buy-back price was determined on the basis of the market value of the instruments and
contained a premium of not more than 10 percentage points, which was added to incentivise
investors to participate in the buy-back. The offer was accepted for almost 80% of the
instruments’ total nominal value, which after taking the costs of the transaction into considera-
tion left ÖVAG with a profit of EUR 130 million. The still outstanding instruments are subject
to the coupon ban explained in recital (117). Therefore, the Commission considers that an ade-
quate burden-sharing from ÖVAG’s private hybrid investors is ensured and the requirements of
the Restructuring Communication in that respect are met.”189
BAWAG
C
Coupon ban
This case is somewhat remarkable, because the dividend/coupon ban seemed to be sufficient
burden-sharing.
Hypo Tirol
C
Coupon ban
“Die Hypo Tirol hat zugesagt, im Falle von Verlusten im operativen Geschäft keine
Kuponzahlungen vorzunehmen. Auf diese Weise wird im Einklang mit Randnummer 26 der
Umstrukturierungsmitteilung sichergestellt, dass die Bank keine staatlichen Beihilfen zur
Zahlung einer Vergütung für Eigenmittel verwendet, wenn die entsprechenden Geschäfte
keine ausreichenden Gewinne abwerfen.”190
189. OVAG, 19 September 2012, para. 118
190. Hypo Tirol, 4 October 2012, para. 75.
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HGAA S/C/
W
LME Coupon ban
“As regards the hybrid capital holders, HGAA has taken a number of steps to ensure their burden-
sharing by buying back those instruments significantly below par or cancelling them altogether
which has generated a significant capital effect.191
Furthermore, the Commission notes that many of the hybrid capital instruments as well as the
Partizipationskapital instruments only yield dividends or coupon payments in case of profits.
Given the lack of profitability of the bank in recent years, the holders of those instruments have
not received such payments. In addition, there will be restrictions on dividend and coupon pay-
outs in the future. As a result, the Commission considers that there is sufficient burden-sharing
from the holders of those instruments.”192
KA (2011)
S/C/W
Remaining at the bad
bank
Coupon ban
“Moreover, hybrid issuances (including the participation certificates from the previous owners)
have been split between KA Neu and KA Finanz […], thus ensuring additional burden sharing,
since the potential profits of KA Finanz will be skimmed off by the guarantee fees to be paid to
the state.”193
KBC
C
LME Coupon ban
“Finally, the Commission notes that the Belgian authorities have committed that KBC will not
pay coupons or call subordinated debt instruments, except where there is a legal obligation to
do so. As a result, subordinated debt holders will receive limited remuneration and thus con-
tribute to the restructuring.”194
Ethias
C
Coupon ban
“The Commission notes that the holders of hybrid instruments should also bear to the extent
possible the losses incurred by Ethias. In this respect, the Commission notes that – as confirmed
by the CBFA – the hybrids issued by Ethias are not loss absorbing on a going concern basis. In
particular Ethias has no discretion to suspend coupon payment. The possibility of coupons
deferral is conditional on the inability of Ethias to meet solvency requirements in view of its
annual audited accounts. As this condition has not been fulfilled during the period since the aid
measure was announced, Ethias has not had discretion to defer coupon payments on its hybrids.
As a result, the criterion of burden sharing does not require Ethias to refrain from payments of
coupon payments on its hybrid instruments.”195
191. HGAA, 2013, para. 136.
192. HGAA, 3 September 2013, para. 136-137.
193. KA, 31 March 2011, para. 87
194. KBC, 18 November 2009, para. 166.
195. Ethias, 20 May 2010, para. 134.
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Fortis
(2008)
S/C/T/C
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
Dexia
(2010)
C
Coupon ban
See para. 201-205.
Dexia
(2012)
S/C/T/W
LME Coupon ban
“DBB/Belfius will not distribute any form of dividend in respect of its shares. DBB/Belfius
will not make any discretionary early repayment or payment of coupons on instruments (i)
issued by DBB/Belfius before 20 October 2011, (ii) held by persons or entities other than DBB/
Belfius and (iii) the payment or exercise of which is discretionary by virtue of the contractual
provisions covering these instruments.”196
“The Commission notes that in 2012 DBB/Belfius repurchased its own debt on several
occasions at substantial discounts ([50-100] % of the nominal value), which enabled it to
generate a profit after tax of EUR [250-750] million. This profit corresponds to the losses
sustained by bond holders and thus helps to share the burden.”197 “The Commission also notes
that the distribution of dividends, coupons and discretionary early repayments are suspended
until 31 December 2014, which are all favourable elements.”198
“Dexia’s shareholders and security-holders have already contributed to the cost of restructur-
ing. Since October 2008, the share price has fallen by over 95 %. Since the initial restructuring
plan, Dexia has waived the payment of dividends and the payment or early repayment of
discretionary coupons on its hybrid Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments.”199
“The Commission takes a favourable view of the fact that DMA, the NEC and the JV will not
distribute any form of dividend on their shares until 31 December 2015 (except for dividends
paid by DMA to the NEC) and that DMA, the NEC and the JV will not pay coupons, except if
contractually obliged to do so as a result of a commitment given before 14 December 2012.”200
FIB
C
Coupon ban
“In that context the Bank will suspend any coupon payments on outstanding instruments until
the State aid has been fully repaid. In particular the Bank will cancel coupon payments on its
hybrid and perpetual bands.”201
196. Dexia, 28 December 2012, para. 286-287.
197. Dexia, 28 December 2012, para. 574.
198. Dexia, 28 December 2012, para. 575.
199. Dexia, 28 December 2012, para. 614.
200. Dexia, 28 December 2012, para. 682.
201. FIB, 25 November 2014, para. 118.
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CCB (2014)
C
“There is no outstanding subordinated debt, junior debt or other hybrid/Tier 2 instruments
issued by any of the CCIs or the CCB.”202
CCB (2015)
C
“Moreover, there is no outstanding subordinated debt, junior debt or other hybrid/Tier 2
instruments issued by the group so that the options for burden-sharing by historical sharehol-
ders and subordinated debt holders are limited to a dilution of existing shareholders.”203
Amager-
banken
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“Furthermore, shareholders and subordinated debt holders of Amagerbanken were totally
wiped out, which constitutes their maximum possible own contribution in the restructuring of
the New Bank.”204
Eik banki
Fionia Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“Furthermore, the subordinated debt remains in Old Fionia. Subordinated debtholders will only
be eligible to receive payments out of the profit of the winding-up of the Rump Bank after
repayment of the State including a market-based annual interest of 10% and thus provide an
appropriate own contribution to the restructuring.”205
Roskilde
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“The investors having invested in old RB’s equity and subordinated capital may only get some
future compensation via a so-called earnout mechanism after the DNB and DPB are repaid at
subscription value plus interest.”206
FIH
Holding
C
Coupon ban
“Further, FIH will not make any coupon payments to investors in hybrid instruments or any
instrument for which financial institutions have discretion to pay coupons or to call, regardless
of their regulatory classification, including subordinated debt instruments, if no legal obligation
to make payments exists.”207
202. CCB, 24 February 2014, para. 138.
203. CCB, 18 December 2015, para. 102.
204. Amagerbanken, 25 January 2012, para. 108.
205. Fionia, 25 October 2010, para. 79.
206. Roskilde Bank, 5 November 2008, para. 62.
207. FIH, 11 March 2014, para. 133.
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CIF
W
The limited burden-sharing in this case was justified.
BayernLB
C
Coupon ban
“[No servicing of hybrid capital] BayernLB will adhere to a ban on the servicing of hybrid
capital. BayernLB will service hybrid capital (such as silent participations (stille Einlagen) and
profit participation certificates (Genussscheine)) only if it is obliged to do so even without a
release of reserves (Rücklagen) or of the special item referred to in Section 340 f and g of the
Commercial Code. […].”208
Commerz-
bank
C
Coupon ban
“Nevertheless they shoulder part of the burden through the ban on dividend payments and on
using reserves for coupon payments. The Commission is convinced that there is a limit to
imposing a heavier burden on the holders of hybrid capital instruments at Commerzbank.”209
HRE
C
Coupon ban
“Furthermore, as regards HRE’s subordinated debt holders, Germany has provided a commit-
ment that HRE will not make discretionary payments on profit-related financial instruments to
third parties, thereby ensuring that Tier 2 capital holders will get little or no compensation for
their investment and will thus participate in the burden sharing in the same way as Tier 1 capital
holders.”210
HSH
Nordbank
C
Coupon ban
“[Hybrids] Until 31 December 2014, HSH may not make any payments in respect of profit-
related equity instruments (such as hybrid financial instruments and profit participation
certificates (Genussscheine)), in so far as those payments are not owed on the basis of a
contract or the law. If HSH’s balance sheet, before adjustment of reserves and retained earnings,
shows a loss, those instruments will also participate in the loss. There will be no participation in
losses brought forward from previous years.”211
208. BayernLB, 5 February 2013, annex point 27.
209. Commerzbank, 7 May 2009, para. 107.
210. HRE, 18 July 2011, para. 122.
211. HSH Nordbank, 20 September 2011, Annex II point 2.
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IKB
C
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
LBBW
C
Coupon ban
“Due to the prohibition on appropriating reserves for the servicing of coupons for tier 1 and tier
2 instruments, the lower-ranking capital owners are also contributing to the restructuring of
LBBW.”212
NordLB
C
Coupon ban
“[Hybrids] NORD/LB will not service hybrid capital instruments unless it is under a legal
obligation to do so and does not need to release reserves and special items in accordance with
Section 340(f) and (g) of the German Commercial Code. In this context hybrid capital instruments
include all subordinate capital instruments that are serviced contractually or according to their
terms of issue only if for the given period there are sufficient earnings before taxes or consolidated
profit in accordance with the German Commercial Code.”213
SachsenLB
T
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
Sparkasse
KolnBonn
C
Coupon ban
“The bank has no discretion to suspend or to delay the payment of a coupon on the hybrid
instruments if it generates profit in a given year. However, the holders of hybrid instruments
also bear to the extent possible the losses incurred by Sparkasse KölnBonn, as both coupon
payment and principal of the hybrid capital were suspended or participated in the absorption of
Sparkasse KölnBonn’s losses. Therefore, the Commission considers that the maximal possible
burden-sharing from its private hybrid investors is ensured and therefore the requirements of
the Restructuring Communication for the contribution to the restructuring costs by the private
investors are met.”214
WestLB
(2011)
W
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
212. LBBW, 15 December 2009, para. 98.
213. NordLB, 25 July 2012, annex point 9.
214. Sparkasse KolnBonn, 29 September 2010, para. 90.
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Alpha Bank
C
LME Coupon ban
“The Bank’s subordinated debt holders have contributed to the restructuring costs of the Bank.
The Bank performed several liability management exercises in order to generate capital. The
total amount of liabilities exchanged reached EUR 828 million, with a capital gain of EUR 436
million, as described in recital (114).
The still outstanding instruments are subject to the coupon ban mentioned in recital (124).
Therefore, the Commission considers that an adequate burden-sharing from the bank’s private
hybrid investors is ensured and the requirements of the Restructuring Communication in that
respect are met.”215
EFG
Eurobank
C
LME Coupon ban
“The Bank’s subordinated debt holders have contributed to paying for the restructuring costs of
the Bank. The Bank performed several liability management exercises in order to generate
capital. The total amount of liabilities exchanged amounted to EUR 748 million, with a capital
gain of EUR 565 million, as described in recitals (122) and (123).
The still outstanding instruments are subject to the coupon ban described in recital (133).
Therefore, the Commission considers that an adequate burden-sharing from the bank’s private
hybrid investors is ensured and the requirements of the Restructuring Communication in that
respect are met.”216
Pireaus
Bank
C
LME Coupon ban
“The Bank’s hybrid and subordinated debt holders have contributed to the restructuring costs of
the Bank. The Bank has performed several liability management exercises in order to generate
capital, as described in recital (134). The still outstanding instruments are subject to the coupon
ban mentioned in recital (143). Therefore, the Commission considers that an adequate burden-
sharing from the Bank’s hybrid and subordinated debt holders is ensured and the requirements
of the Restructuring Communication in that respect are met.”217
National
Bank
of Greece
C
LME Coupon ban
The Bank’s subordinated debt holders have contributed to the restructuring costs of the Bank.
The Bank has performed several liability management exercises in order to generate capital, as
described in recitals (149) and (150).
The still outstanding instruments are subject to the coupon ban mentioned in recital (159).
Therefore, the Commission considers that an adequate burden-sharing from the bank’s private
hybrid investors is ensured and the requirements of the Restructuring Communication in that
respect are met.218
215. Alpha Bank, 9 July 2014, para. 294-295.
216. Eurobank, 29 April 2014, para. 393-394.
217. Piraeus Bank, 23 July 2014, para. 348-349.
218. NBG, 23 July 2014, para. 399-400.
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T Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“The shareholders and subordinated debt holders are not transferred and remain in the entity in
liquidation. They will be entitled to proceeds from the liquidation only if the proceeds are
sufficient to repay first the Resolution Scheme, which has a priority claim over the other creditors.
Knowing that there are no more assets in T Bank, it is very likely that the shareholders and
subordinated debt holders will not get back their investments.”219
TT Hellenic
Postbank
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“Concerning burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders, the Commission
has already established, in recital 100 of the New TT Opening Decision, that the shareholders
and subordinated debt holders were not transferred to New TT Bank but have remained in TT
Bank, that is to say, the entity in liquidation. Hence, the Commission considered that sufficient
burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders was achieved.”220
(Nea)
Proton
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“Concerning burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders, the Commission
notes that the shareholders and subordinated debt holders were not transferred to Nea Proton
Bank but have remained in the entity in liquidation. Therefore, there is a high probability that
they will lose their investments. That burden-sharing reduces the aid amount needed. Hence,
the Commission considers that sufficient burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt
holders is achieved.”221
ATE
(2011)
C
Coupon ban
“Dividend, Coupon and Call ban: The Hellenic Republic commits that ATE will not pay any
coupon or dividend on own funds instruments by using the capital or reserves of ATE for two
years except where there is a legal obligation to do so. Furthermore, ATE shall not exercise a call
option in respect of those own fund instruments.”222
ATE (2013)
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“The Greek authorities did not transfer shares or subordinated debt to Piraeus Bank.”223
219. T Bank, 16 May 2012, para. 51.
220. Eurobank, 29 April 2014, para. 257.
221. Nea Proton Bank, 26 July 2012, para. 77.
222. ATE, 23 May 2011, para. 42.
223. ATE, 3 May 2013, para. 74.
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Panellinia
Bank
S/T/W
Remaining at the bad
bank
“The equity and preference shares are not transferred to the Buyer but remain in the Bank, the
entity in liquidation. Moreover, the Bank does not have any subordinated debt holders.”224
FHB
C
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
MKB
C
MKB Bank had no outstanding subordinated debt.
Anglo/INBS
W
LME Coupon ban
Subordinated debt holders have also contributed to a significant extent to the restructuring by
means of two Liability Management Exercises (hereinafter referred to as ’LMEs’) in Anglo and
one in INBS.
In total, the merged entity will hold EUR 500 million of subordinated liabilities (as at
31 December 2010), significantly less than the subordinated debt held by Anglo and INBS at
31 December 2008 (respectively EUR 5 billion and EUR 300 million), illustrating the massive
losses taken by subordinated bond holders. Ireland has committed, in addition, that the merged
entity will not pay coupons or exercise calls on subordinated debt instruments and hybrid capital
instruments, unless it is legally obliged to do so.
AIB/EBS
C
LME
“With regard to subordinated debt holders, a series of Liability Management Exercises/Debt
Buy Backs were carried out between 2009 and 2011, which have contributed EUR 5,4 billion of
Core Tier 1 capital (buy back of Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments). Currently, only a marginal amount
of subordinated debt remains in the Bank (i.e. around EUR 34 million at 31 December 2012) […].
Therefore, subordinated creditors have adequately contributed to bearing the restructuring
costs.”225
224. Panellinia Bank, 16 April 2015, para. 84.
225. AIB/EBS, 7 May 2014, para. 122.
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BOI (2010)
C
Coupon ban
“Finally, as regards the subordinated debt holders, the Commission notes positively that BOI
complies with the Commission’s policy on Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments set out in point
26 of the Restructuring Communication. By virtue of its participation in the CIFS and ELG
scheme, BOI was already subject to a ban on the payment of discretionary hybrid coupons in
line with the Commission’s guidance.”226
BOI (2011)
C
LME
“The Commission further notes that the need for additional State aid has been limited to a
significant extent by the liability management exercises carried out in July and December 2011,
while new capital has been raised on the market.”227
IL&P
(PTSB)
C
LME
“PTSB also conducted several liability management exercises in 2011 and 2012, representing
significant burden-sharing on the part of PTSB’s creditors. Over the course of 2011, PTSB
bought back its own subordinated debt with a book value of EUR 1.2 billion for a cash
consideration of EUR 0.2 billion, leading to a EUR 1.0 billion loss for subordinated debt
holders. In 2012, PTSB bought back its own subordinated debt with a book value of EUR 1.2
billion, for a cash consideration of EUR 0.9 billion, leading to approximately EUR 0.2 billion
loss for subordinated debt holders. Therefore, subordinated creditors have adequately con-
tributed to bearing the restructuring costs.”228
Quinn
Insurance
S/T/W
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
MPS
C
Coupon ban
“Moreover MPS commits to a dividend ban until the capital increase has been completed as
well as a coupon ban, a ban on advertisement and aggressive pricing strategies and some
restrictions on liability managements; those commitments are detailed in the Annex.”229
226. Bank of Ireland, 15 July 2010, para. 217.
227. Bank of Ireland, 20 December 2011, para. 160.
228. IL&P, 9 April 2015, para. 87.
229. MPS, 27 November 2013, para. 74.
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BRC
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“Subordinated debt is not transferred to ICCREA but remains in the entity in liquidation. While
the subordinated debt holders are in principle entitled to proceeds from the liquidation the
FDGCC has first claim on repayment of the cost of the intervention before other creditors will
be served. Given that the FDGCC claim exceeds the book value of the residual assets (see
Table 1), subordinated debt holders will in all likelihood not benefit from the proceeds of the
liquidation.”230
Banca
Tercas
“However, EUR 189 million (as of 31 March 2014) of subordinated debt of Tercas on a
consolidated basis (including its subsidiary Caripe) should have been converted or written
down in line with the requirements envisaged in the 2013 Banking Commission in order to
reduce the capital shortfall and minimise the amount of aid. The Commission notes that no such
conversion or write-down was performed.”231
Parex
banka
S/C/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“Subordinated loans by legacy shareholders will be junior liabilities in Parex banka. The
liquidation of the assets of Parex banka in the base case scenario does not envisage that
sufficient proceeds will be received to cover more than senior liabilities in the bank.”232
LCCU
C
Coupon ban
“Further, the Lithuanian authorities confirmed that LCCU had no hybrid instruments with
discretionary coupons. In addition, Lithuania confirmed that it would seek prior approval from
the Commission before the LCCU repays any subordinated debt earlier than contractually
envisaged. That commitment will apply until the LCCU fully repays the State capital.”233
AB Ukio
Bankas
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“In view of the capital gap it is not expected that either the shareholders or subordinated loans
holders will receive any compensation as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings.”234
230. BRC, 2 July 2015, para. 71.
231. Banca Tercas, para. 201.
232. Parex banka, 15 September 2010, para. 148.
233. LCCU, 26 September 2012, para. 21.
234. AB Ukio Bankas, 14 August 2013, para. 82.
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Kaupthing
Bank
Luxem-
bourg
S/T/W
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
ABN
AMRO
C
Coupon ban
“Against that background, a hybrid coupon and hybrid call ban of 2 years seems to provide
appropriate burden-sharing from the company’s capital holders.”235
ING
C
Coupon ban
“The calling of Tier 2 capital and Tier 1 hybrids will in the future be proposed case by case to
the Commission for authorisation.”
SNS
REAAL
(2010)
C
“At the end of September 2009, SNS announced (after consultation with the Commission) that
it would repay subordinated debt below par and issue new subordinated debt at market conditions
(exchange of subordinated debt).”236
SNS
REAAL
(2013)
C
Write-down
“As regards the increased burden-sharing requirements under the 2013 Banking Communica-
tion, the Commission notes that the Dutch State has not bailed out the shareholders of SNS
REAAL and the hybrid debt-holders of SNS REAAL and SNS Bank. As described in recital
(13), those shareholders and hybrid debt-holders were expropriated and will only receive a fair
compensation in line with the relevant provisions of Dutch law.”237
235. ABN AMRO, 5 April 2011, para. 315.
236. SNS REAAL, 28 January 2010, para. 30.
237. SNS REAAL, 19 December 2013, para. 92.
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Aegon
C
Coupon ban
“The commitment by the Netherlands whereby AEGON will not make dividend payments to
its common stock holders and will not call or repurchase any of the outstanding hybrid
securities prior to the full repayment of the CCS ensures that the owners and hybrid instrument
holders of AEGON contribute to the restructuring.”238
CGD
C
Coupon ban
“Ban on dividend, coupon and interest payments: CGD will not (and shall procure that none of
its subsidiary undertakings shall) make any payments of dividends, coupons or interest to
holders of preference shares and subordinated debt, in so far as those payments are not owed on
the basis of contractual or legal obligations.”239
NB: this case was characterised by a breach of the dividend ban.
BPI
C
Coupon ban
NB: this case was characterised by a breach of the dividend ban.
BCP
C
Coupon ban
“Ban on coupon payments: BCP will not make any coupon and interest payments to third
parties on hybrid instruments and subordinated debt which are not held by Portugal, where
there is no legal obligation to proceed with such payment.”240
BPN
T
Coupon ban
“However, the Commission notes that subordinated bond holders, holding an amount of EUR
245 million, will be maintained in the bank that is being privatised and may continue to receive
coupons.”241
“However, since the bank is now being sold, a ban on calls until 31 December 2016 is necessary to
provide a minimum level of burden-sharing from the bank’s capital holders.
In this respect, the Commission takes stock of the commitment by Portugal that, in order to
contribute to the restructuring process of BPN, Banco BIC, the combined entity and Portugal will
not exercise until 31 December 2016 any call option rights in relation to subordinated debt issued
by BPN prior to the date of the sale.”242
238. Aegon, 17 August 2010, para. 110.
239. CGD, 24 July 2013, annex point 6.7.
240. BCP, 30 August 2013, annex point 4.8.
241. BPN, 27 March 2012, para. 239.
242. BPN, 27 March 2012, para. 243-244.
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BES
S/C/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“All shareholders and subordinated creditors will be left in the Bad Bank.”243
Banif
S/T/W
Write-down
“As resolution measure, Portugal will apply the Sale of Business resolution tool combined with
the Bail-in tool which under the Portuguese implementation law of Directive 2014/59/EU is
already applicable in 2015.”244
Abanka
C
Write-down
“To ensure adequate burden-sharing and participation of Abanka’s existing investors in the
restructuring, the equity holders and all subordinated debt holders were written down in full prior
to the first recapitalisation.”245
Abanka/
Banka Celje
Write-down Coupon ban
“To ensure adequate burden-sharing and participation of the existing investors in the
restructuring, the equity holders and all subordinated debt holders were written down in full
prior to the recapitalisation. To that end, Bank of Slovenia has, through a specific order, frozen
all the subordinated-debt issued by the bank, of which instruments that were to mature before
the adoption of the decision. Those subordinated debt instruments maturing before the date of
adoption of the decision are also subject to the bail in. After the recapitalisation the State will
become the sole shareholder.”246
NKBM
C
Write-down
“The Commission positively notes that the contribution of subordinated debt holders is
achieved to the maximum extent possible, thus ensuring adequate burden-sharing. The State
capital recapitalisation will only be implemented after the complete implementation of the
wipe-out of the subordinated debt holders.”247
NLB
C
Write-down
“The Commission positively notes that the contribution of subordinated debt holders is
achieved to the maximum extent possible, thus ensuring adequate burden-sharing. The State
capital injections will only be implemented after the complete implementation of the wipe-out
of the subordinated debt holders.”248
243. BES, 3 August 2014, para. 89.
244. Banif, 21 December 2015, para. 131.
245. Abanka, 13 August 2014, para. 140.
246. Abanka / Banka Celje, 16 December 2014, para. 168.
247. NKBM, 18 December 2013, para. 135.
248. NLB, 18 December 2013, para. 154.
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Factor
Banka
W
Write-down Coupon ban
“The State recapitalisation will only be implemented after the complete implementation of
the wipe-out of the shareholders’ equity and subordinated debts. All existing shareholders and
subordinated debt holders therefore fully contribute to the orderly winding down costs of the
Bank prior to the granting of the State support.”249
Probanka
W
Write-down Coupon ban
“The State recapitalisation will only be implemented after the complete implementation of the
wipe-out of the shareholders’ equity and subordinated debts. All existing shareholders and
subordinated debt holders therefore fully contribute to the orderly winding down costs of the
Bank prior to the granting of the State support.”250
Catalunya
Banc
C
LME Coupon ban
“As described in section 3.2.1, all hybrids and subordinated debt instruments will be converted
into equity following a material haircut on their nominal prices, leading to a decrease in the
capital shortfall.”251
NCG Banco
C
LME Coupon ban
“First, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden-sharing of
hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication. As
described in recitals (76) to (78), all hybrids except dated subordinated debt will be converted
into equity.”252
BFA
C
LME Coupon ban
“As described above in recital (39), all hybrids and subordinated debt instruments will be
converted into equity following a haircut on their nominal prices, further decreasing the BFA
Group’s capital shortfall. As the Commission would consider a cash buyback of hybrids securities
at market price plus a 10% premium to fulfil the requirements of the Restructuring Communica-
tion, it welcomes the commitment by Spain, which results in greater burden-sharing and
consequently a decrease in the public funds that are needed to restore viability.”253
249. Factor Banka, 18 December 2013, para. 65.
250. Probanka, 18 December 2013, para. 66.
251. Catalunya Banc, 28 November 2012, para. 174.
252. NCG, 28 November 2012, para. 170.
253. BFA, 28 November 2012, para. 201.
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Banco Mare
Nostrum
C
LME Coupon ban
“First, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden-sharing of
hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication. As
described in recitals (60) to (62), all hybrids except dated subordinated debt will be converted
into equity.”254
Liberbank
C
“First, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden-sharing of
hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication. As
described in recitals (47) to (49), all hybrids will be converted into equity and CoCos eligible as
Core Tier 1.”255
Banco de
Valencia
T
LME
“Moreover, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden-
sharing of hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication.
As described in recitals (74)-(75), all hybrid capital instruments will also be subject to significant
burden-sharing.”256
Banco
CAM
T
LME Coupon ban
“As a result, on 24 February 2012, the Commission agreed to a buy-back of a total amount of
EUR 167.25 million of subordinated debt held by institutional investors for a price over
nominal of 75%. Banco CAM announced on 23 September 2011 through the CNMV that the
coupon payment on the Hybrid Securities due on 25 September 2011 would be suspended.
Spain has agreed to suspend any payment of coupons until the Commission has decided on the
restructuring aid. Finally, as a consequence of the rescue of Banco CAM by BOS, CAM’s
Preference Shares have a market value of 0. Therefore, burden sharing has also been applied to the
holders of the Hybrid Securities.”257
UNNIM
Banc
T
No mention of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders
254. BMN, 20 December 2012, para. 146.
255. Liberbank, 20 December 2012, para. 127.
256. Banco de Valencia, 28 November 2012, para. 178.
257. Banco CAM, 30 May 2012, para. 159.
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Cajatres
T
LME Coupon ban
“First, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden-sharing of
hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication. As
described in recitals (64) to (66), all institutional holders of dated subordinated debt instrument
will be offered the option to convert their debt instruments, – subject to a [0-5]% monthly
haircut – into new senior debt securities with the same maturity as the original instrument with
a zero coupon, and thereby lead to significant haircuts of [20-30]% for the hybrids instruments
maturing in 2014 and [60-70]% for the hybrids instruments maturing in 2016.”258
Banco
Galleco
T
LME
“Moreover, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden-
sharing of hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication.
As described in recitals (59) and (60), all hybrid capital instruments will also be subject to
significant burden-sharing. As the Commission would normally consider an exchange of
hybrid capital instruments at market price plus a premium into cash to fulfil the requirements of
the Restructuring Communication. In that respect, it welcomes that commitment by Spain
which results in the maximum legally possible burden-sharing by hybrid instrument holders.”259
CajaSur
T
Coupon ban
“As regards the holders of the Hybrid Securities, since the date on which CajaSur was
intervened by the BOS, quarterly payments of coupons on the Hybrid Securities have been
suspended and no Hybrid Securities have been called by CajaSur. Therefore, burden sharing
has also been applied to the holders of the Hybrid Securities.”260
Caja
Castilla-La
Mancha
T
Coupon ban
“Due to legal constrains, subordinated debt holders are to be transferred to Banco Liberta.
Notwithstanding this, in order for them to contribute to the restructuring process of CCM, the
Spanish authorities provided the commitment that Banco Liberta’s will not exercise any call
options during the period it enjoys financial support from the FGD.”261
Banco
CEISS
(2012)
LME Coupon ban
“First, the Commission notes positively that the commitments regarding the burden sharing of
hybrid instruments go beyond the prerequisites of the Restructuring Communication. As
described in recitals (60) to (62), all hybrids except dated subordinated debt will be converted
into equity.”262
258. Cajatres, 20 December 2012, para. 151.
259. Banco Gallego, 25 July 2013, para. 126.
260. CajaSur, 8 November 2010, para. 83.
261. CCM, 29 June 2010, para. 71.
262. Banco CEISS, 20 December 2012, para. 151.
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LBG
C
Coupon ban
“Finally, as regards the subordinated debt holders, the Commission notes positively that LBG
will comply with the Commission’s policy on Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments set out in
point 26 of the Restructuring Communication. As described in recital 112 above, LBG will
shall not pay investors any coupon on capital instruments or exercise any call option rights in
relation those instruments between 31 January 2010 and 31 January 2012 unless there is a legal
obligation to do so.”263
RBS
C
Coupon ban
“Finally, as regards the contribution of the subordinated debt holders, the Commission notes
positively that RBS will comply with the Commission’s policy on Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital
instruments set out in point 26 of the Restructuring Communication. As described in recital
(104) above, RBS will not pay investors any coupon on capital instruments or exercise any call
option rights in relation to those instruments for a two year period unless there is a legal obligation
to do so.”264
B&B
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
Coupon ban
“As regards B&B’s hybrid debt holders who remained with Rumpco, the Commission notes
positively that the UK undertook to conduct a restrictive policy on coupon payments and call
options on hybrid capital. In particular, Rumpco will not make payments of interest and
principal on the hybrids before the statutory debt will have been repaid with the exception of
payments under the Capital Funding Notes. In addition, the Commission notes that Rumpco
shall not be recapitalised in order to prevent a breach of minimum regulatory capital requirements
upon such payments.”265
263. LBG, 18 November 2009, para. 164.
264. RBS, 14 December 2009, para. 217.
265. B&B, 25 January 2010, para. 55.
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Northern
Rock
S/C/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
Coupon ban
“Furthermore, NR’s subordinated debt holders will remain with AssetCo. This means that they
will be compensated through the amounts that are recovered from AssetCo’s assets. As
subordinated debt holders, […]. The State, on the other hand, will be a senior creditor by virtue
of the loans (BoE/HMT liquidity facility and the working capital facility) it has provided to
AssetCo. Therefore, […]. In addition, NR has recently decided to defer coupon payments and
payments on the principal on cumulative Tier-2 and related Tier-1 instruments where it has
discretion to do so. The United Kingdom has furthermore provided a commitment that AssetCo
will continue to defer those payments after the split-up. […].” 266
Dunferm-
line
S/T/W
Remaining at the
bad bank
“The subordinated debt holders will in any case not benefit from the measures taken by the UK
authorities to prevent Dunfermline’s failure. They are part of the Rump Dunfermline which is
in the process of being liquidated. They rank last or second last and will only be paid out after
all the other creditors have been compensated. In this regard, the Commission also notes that
the depositors, which in building societies such as Dunfermline are also the owners, have lost
all ownership rights in the Rump Dunfermline.”267
266. Northern Rock, 28 October 2009, para. 150.
267. Dunfermline, 25 January 2010, para. 120.
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Annex X: Acquisition ban
The following table lists the cases that are characterised by an acquisition ban.
In particular, the table gives an overview of two modalities of the acquisition
ban: i.e. the scope and the exemptions.
Scope
As discussed in section 13.9.3.2, many acquisition bans entail that the ben-
eficiary bank shall not acquire any stake in any undertaking. The following table
indicates whether the scope of the acquisition comprises any stake in any
undertaking (indicated by “yes”) or whether the scope of the acquisition ban is
formulated in a different manner (indicated by “no”).
Exemptions
As discussed in section 13.9.3.3, there are three main exemptions to the
acquisition ban. In the following table, these three exemptions are mentioned
under the headings “Commission approval”, “Purchase price is less than
[…]”, and “Ordinary course of business”. An “x” indicates that the exemption
is present, whilst a “0” indicates that the exemption is not present.
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
OVAG yes x 0 x 0
BAWAG no268 x 0 0 x
Hypo Tirol yes x x x 0
HGAA yes x x x 0
KA (2011) yes x 0 0 x
268. The acquisition ban applied to “any financial institutions or other businesses in actual or
potential competition with BAWAG”.
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Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
KBC no269 x 0 0 0
Ethias no270 0 0 0 x
Fortis no271 0 0 0 x
Dexia
(2010)
no272 x* 0 0 x
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
FIB yes x x x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
CCB yes x x x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
CIF yes 0 0 0 x273
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
FIH yes x x x 0
269. “The Belgian authorities commit that KBC will refrain from acquiring control of financial
institutions. KBC will moreover refrain from acquiring control of businesses other than
financial institutions if such an acquisition would slow down the repayment of state aid.”
270. “Ethias commits not to acquire more than 5% of the capital of other credit institutions or
investment firms.”
271. “BNP Paribas is firmly committed, for a period of four years, not to acquire control of
other credit institutions or investment companies (within the meaning of Directive 2004/
39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments) that have their registered
office, a subsidiary or a branch in Belgium or Luxembourg and have substantial operations
there.”
272. The acquisition ban applied to “any acquisition of more than 5% of the share capital of
other credit institutions or investment firms or insurance companies”.
273. “Il ne prendra aucune participation dans une entreprise, que ce soit par cession d’actifs ou
par transfert d’actions, sauf dans le cadre des opérations de simplification juridique et de
centralisation de la gouvernance strictement prévues dans le plan de résolution ordonnée”.
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Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
Commerz-
bank
no274 x 0 0 x
HSH
Nordbank
yes x* 0 x 0
HRE yes x 0 x x
LBBW no275 0 0 x 0
BayernLB no276 0 x x 0
Sparkasse
KolnBonn
no277 x* 0 0 0
NordLB yes 0 x x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
Alpha Bank yes x x x 0
Eurobank yes x x x 0
Piraeus
Bank
yes x x x 0
NBG yes x x x 0
ATE (2011) no278 x 0 0 x
274. The acquisition ban applied to “any finance institutions or other businesses in potential
competition with Commerzbank”.
275. The acquisition ban applied to “any purchases of financial institutions in competition with
LBBW”.
276. There will be no expansion of business activities through the acquisition of control over
other firms with a sales price of more than EUR [0-2 million] without the Commission’s
approval (‘no external growth’).
277. “Sparkasse KölnBonn is not to acquire more than 20% of the shares in other financial
institutions during a period of three years. Other participation transactions that are not
related to Sparkasse KölnBonn’s original customer business in its business model may still
be carried out, provided they do not jeopardise the Sparkasse’s viability and have been
approved by the European Commission. In addition, Sparkasse KölnBonn is to refrain
from acquiring participations that are not necessary for its core business, or that entail
excessive risks.”
278. The acquisition ban applied to stakes of more than 5%.
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Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
Anglo /
INBS
yes x* 0 x 0
AIB / EBS yes x x x 0
BOI (2010) no279 0 x 0 0
BOI (2011) no280 0 x 0 0
IL&P
(PTSB)
yes x x x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
MPS yes x x x x
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
Parex
Banka
yes 0 0 0 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
LCCU yes x x x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
ABN
AMRO
yes 0 x 0 x
ING no281 x 0 0 0
SNS
REAAL
yes x x x 0
AEGON no282 0 0 0 x
279. The acquisition ban applied to “i) any financial institution; ii) any acquisition that would
alter the bank’s business model”.
280. The acquisition ban applied to “i) any financial institution; ii) any acquisition that would
alter the bank’s business model”.
281. The acquisition ban applied to acquisitions of financial institutions and any other
acquisitions of businesses that would slow down the repayment of the state aid.
282. The ban applied to acquisitions of stakes of 20% or more.
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Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
CGD yes 0283 x x x
BPI yes x x x 0
BCP yes x x x 0
BPN yes 0 x 0 0
BES yes x x x 0
Banif yes 0 0 0 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
Abanka yes x x x x
NKBM yes x x x x
NLB yes x x x x
Factor
Banka
yes 0 0 x 0
Probanka yes 0 0 x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
Catalunya
Banc
yes 0 x x 0
NCG Banco yes x x x 0
BFA/
Bankia
yes 0 x x 0
Banco Mare
Nostrum
yes 0 x x 0
Liberbank yes 0 x x x
Banco
CEISS
yes x x x 0
Bank Scope: Any
stake in any
undertaking?
Commission
approval
Purchase
price is less
than […]
Ordinary
course of
business
Other
exemptions
LBG no284 0 x 0 0
RBS no285 0 x 0 0
Northern
Rock
yes 0 0 0 0
283. Acquisitions that must be made in order to maintain financial and/or association related
stability, or in the interests of effective competition, had to be approved beforehand by the
Monitoring Trustee.
284. The acquisition ban applied to “i) any financial institution, ii) any other acquisition whose
purpose is to expand the bank’s activities outside of its business model”.
285. The acquisition ban applied to “i) any financial institution, ii) any other acquisition whose
purpose is to expand the bank’s activities outside of its business model”.
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Annex XI: Price leadership ban and other pricing restrictions
The following table gives an overview of the bank State aid cases that are
characterised by a price leadership ban or other pricing restrictions (see section
13.10) and/or a ban on aggressive commercial practices (see section 13.11). In
particular, the table indicates where these behavioural restrictions are mentioned
in the Restructuring Decisions.286 The symbol “-” indicates that the behavioural
restriction was not mentioned in the Restructuring Decision.
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
OVAG
C
Annex point 8.4 - -
BAWAG
C
- - -
Hypo Tirol
C
Para. 81, annex
point 16
- -
HGAA
S/C/W
- Para. 147 Para. 153
KA (2011)
S/C/W
- Para. 34, 82 -
KA (2013)
W
Para. 76, annex point 6 - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
KBC
C
Para. 67 - -
Ethias
C
*287 Para. 144 -
Fortis
S/C/T/C
Para. 94 - -
Dexia (2010)
C
- Para. 70, 174, 212 -
Dexia (2012)
S/C/T/W
Para. 224, 661 and 687 - -
286. More information on the Restructuring Decisions can be found in the table in annex III. In
that table, the Restructuring Decisions are highlighted (in bold).
287. A price leadership ban was contemplated. See para. 144.
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Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
FIB
C
- - Para. 124
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
CCB (2014)
C
- Para. 166 Para. 165
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Amagerbanken
S/T/W
- Para. 59 -
Eik banki
S/T/W
- *288 -
Fionia bank
S/T/W
- Para. 31-34 -
Roskilde bank
S/T/W
- *289 -
FIH
C
Para. 61, 137, annex
point 5.3
- Para. 61, 137
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
CIF
W
288. Pricing restrictions are not mentioned in the decision, but may follow from the commit-
ments of the general scheme.
289. Para. 44 of the amendment decision.
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Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
BayernLB
C
- - -
Commerzbank
C
Para. 71 - -
HRE
C
- Para. 70, 93,
106, 129
-
HSH Nordbank
C
- - -
IKB
C
- - -
LBBW
C
Para. 38 - -
NordLB
C
- - -
SachsenLB
T
- - -
Sparkasse
KolnBonn
C
Annex point 5 - -
WestLB - - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Alpha Bank
C
- Para. 303 Annex point 29
EFG Eurobank
C
- Para. 418 Annex point 29
Piraeus bank
C
- Para. 357 Annex point 29
National Bank of
Greece
C
- Para. 408 Annex point 29
T Bank - - Para. 47
TT Hellenic
Postbank
*290 - -
Nea Proton Bank *291 - -
ATE (2011)
C
- Para. 42 -
ATE (2013)
S/T/W
- - -
290. A price leadership ban was contemplated.
291. A price leadership ban was contemplated.
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Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
FHB
C
- - Para. 92
MKB
C
- Para. 64 Para. 75, 126
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Anglo/INBS
W
- - -
AIB/EBS
C
- - Annex point 5.2
BOI (2010)
C
- - -
BOI (2011)
C
- - -
IL&P (PTSB)
C
- - Para. 96
Quinn Insurance
S/T/W
- - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
MPS
C
- - Para. 74, 156
BRC
C
- - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Parex banka
S/T/W
- - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
LCCU
C
- - -
AB Ukio Bankas
S/T/W
- - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Kaupthing Bank
Luxembourg
S/T/W
- - -
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Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
ABN AMRO
C
Article 3 of the
decision
- -
ING
C
Para. 54, 150 - -
SNS REAAL
(2010)
C
- - -
SNS REAAL
(2013)
- - Para. 51, 99
Aegon
C
Para. 69-72 - -
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
CGD
C
- - Para. 91
BPI
C
- - Para. 94
BCP
C
- - Para. 117
BPN
T
- - -
BES
S/C/W
- Para. 81, 86 Para. 86
Banif
S/T/W
- - Annex point 14
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Abanka
C
- Para. 109, 114-115,
130
Para. 143
NKBM
C
- Para. 29, 104, 110,
124
Para. 139
NLB
C
- Para. 40, 128, 133,
144
Para. 158
Factor Banka
W
- Para. 62 Para. 34
Probanka
W
- Para. 63 Para. 35
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Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
Catalunya Banc
C
* - Para. 188
NCG Banco
C
* - Para. 187
BFA
C
* - Para. 215
Banco Mare
Nostrum
C
* - Para. 158
Liberbank
C
- - Para. 140
Banco de Valencia
T
- - -
Banco CAM
T
- - Para. 67
UNNIM Banc
T
- - -
Cajatres
T
- - -
Banco Galleco
T
- - -
CajaSur
T
- - Para. 105
Caja Castilla-La
Mancha
T
- - Para. 82, 205
Banco CEISS
C
Bank Price leadership ban Pricing restrictions Ban on aggressive
commercial practices
LBG
C
- - -
RBS
C
- - -
B&B
S/T/W
- - -
Northern Rock
S/C/W
Para. 29, 161 - -
Dunfermline
S/T/W
- - -
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Annex XII: Divestments
The following table indicates – for every bank State aid case – whether the
Restructuring Decision292 mentions that the case is characterised by i) a focus
on core activities, ii) a sale of activities and iii) a balance sheet reduction.
Since a balance sheet reduction is often related to the aid amount, the
following table also indicates the aid amount (as a percentage of the bank’s
RWA).
The overarching theme is ‘divestments’. Firstly, a focus on the core
activities usually entails the divestment of non-core activities. Secondly, the
sale of activities entails by definition a divestment. Thirdly, the balance sheet
reduction can be achieved by a divestment of activities.
Bank Divestment of
non-core
activities
(Pillar I)
Divestment as an
own contribution
(Pillar II)
Divestment as a compensatory
measure (Pillar III)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
OVAG
C
Para. 107 Para. 113 3,8% (para. 79,
122)
67% (balance
sheet) 71%
(in terms of RWA)
(para. 123)
BAWAG
C
Para. 84 Not
mentioned *293
Capital
injection
amounts to
2,4% of RWA
(para. 77)
Not mentioned
(although
divestments are
mentioned in
para. 104)
Hypo Tirol
Bank
C
Para. 55 Para. 73 1,6%+4,25%
(para. 12-15)
30%/39%
(para. 78)
HGAA
S/C/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned 26%
(para. 143)
85% (para. 152
and 58)
KA (2011)
S/C/W
Not
mentioned *294
Not mentioned 18,4%
(para. 50, 94)
More than 60%
(para. 96) *295
KA (2013)
W
Not mentioned Para. 82 Not mentioned Not mentioned
292. The recitals mentioned in the table thus refer to recitals of the Restructuring Decisions.
More information on the Restructuring Decisions can be found in the table in annex III. In
that table, the Restructuring Decisions are highlighted (in bold).
293. See however: para. 104.
294. The strategic assets were transferred to KA Neu, while the non-strategic assets remained at
KA Finanz.
295. Downsizing was also aimed at viability.
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
KBC
C
Para. 147-148 Para. 163-164 4,1%/5,1%
(para. 114, 115)
20%/17%
(para. 172) *296
Ethias
C
Para. 122 Para. 132 [11-15]%
(para. 104)
38% (annex
point 48) *297
Fortis
S/C/T/C
Not mentioned Para. 90 No percentage
mentioned
Not mentioned
(although para. 93
mentions the sale
of Fortis
Bank Nederland)
Dexia (2010)
C
Para. 173 Para. 206 Para. 150, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
35% (para. 62,
88, 173, 216)
Dexia (2012)
S/C/T/W
Not mentioned Para. 616 Para. 526-537,
but only
absolute
amount, no
percentage
[70-80]% (para. 76,
605) DBB/Belfius:
20% (para. 565,
585)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
FIB
C
Not
mentioned *298
Not
mentioned
*299 *300
Liquidity
support; no
percentage
No balance sheet
reduction.
Justification in
para. 80, 81
and 83.
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
CCB/CCI
(2014)
C
Para. 59 Para. 149-150 13% (para. 150,
153)
10-12% *301
(para. 156)
CCB/CCI
(2015)
C
Para. 50 Para. 109 2% (para. 113) Not mentioned
296. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
297. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
298. Justification in para. 80, 81 and 83.
299. See previous footnote.
300. Justification in para. 80, 81 and 83.
301. The Commission accepted a relatively low level of downsizing. See para. 150 and 160-
163.
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
Amager-
banken
S/T/W
Not mentioned Para. 127 Not mentioned Not mentioned
Eik banki S/T/
W
Not mentioned Para. 57 Para. 21, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
Not mentioned
Fionia Bank
/T/W
Not mentioned Para. 103-104 Not mentioned “reduction of the
economic activity
to less than 40% of
its former size”
(para. 85)
Roskilde Bank
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned
FIH Holding
C
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 103, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
44% (para. 140)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
CIF
W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
BayernLB
C
Para. 51 Para. 196 Capital
assistance equi-
valent to 8%
(para. 205)
51% (para. 206)
Commerzbank
C
Para. 94-95 Para. 106 Not mentioned 45%
(para. 46, 69, 112)
HRE
C
Para. 95 Para. 118 and 120 20% (para. 88) 85% (para. 63, 127)
HSH
Nordbank
C
Para. 224 Para. 239 [2-10]% 61% (para. 58, 266)
IKB
C
Para. 44, 62, 98 Para. 104-107 Para. 92, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
47,2%
para. 49, 111)
LBBW
C
Para. 74 Para. 96 Para. 100, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
41% (para. 102)
NordLB
C
Para. 138 Para. 152 3,9% (para.
110)
15% (para. 165)
SachsenLB
T
Para. 107-108 Para. 119 Not mentioned 51% (para. 119)
Sparkasse
KolnBonn
C
Para. 76 Para. 89 3,3% (para. 98) [15-20]%
(in terms of RWA)
(para. 30, 97)
WestLB (2009)
C
Para. 74 Para. 76-79 Para. 60, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
50% (para. 84)
WestLB (2011)
W
Not mentioned Not mentioned [24,4-27,6]%
(para. 140-h)
“will disappear
from the market”
(para. 188)
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
Alpha Bank
C
Para. 277-281 Para. 288-290 12%
(para. 298)
No percentage
mentioned
(para. 299, 301)
Eurobank
C
Para. 375-378 Para. 385-386 23,7%
(para. 413)
No percentage
mentioned
(para. 414, 416)
Pireaus Bank
C
Para. 334-337 Para. 344 23,7% / 19,4%
(para. 352,
ootnote 118)
No percentage
mentioned
(para. 353, 355)
National Bank
of Greece
C
Para. 384-388 Para. 394-395 17,3% / 15,6%
(para. 403)
No percentage
mentioned
(para. 404, 406)
TT Hellenic
Postbank
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 260 “New TT Bank
ceases to exist as
an autonomous
competitor that
determines its
policy on a
stand-alone
basis” (para. 262)
Nea Proton
Bank
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 223302 “Nea Proton Bank
will not continue
to exist as a
stand-alone
competitor”
(para. 226)
ATE (2011)
C
Not mentioned Para. 80 8,3%
(para. 55, 85)
25,7% (para. 86)
ATE (2013)
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned “ATE Bank will
disappear in its
prevailing form
from the market”
(para. 75)
Panellinia
Bank
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 36, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
“will cease to exist
as a stand-alone
competitor”
(para. 88)
302. Measures NP1 and NP2 represented more than 50% of Proton Bank’s RWA or more than
130% of Nea Proton Bank’s RWA. Measure NP3, corresponded to around 48.7% of the
RWA of Nea Proton Bank.
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
FHB
C
Para. 76 *303 *304 Not mentioned No structural
measures
(para. 91).
Justification in
para. 94.
MKB
C
Para. 61, 67 Para. 119 2,8%
(para. 123)
Absolute amount,
no percentage
(para. 69, 124)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
Anglo/INBS
W
Not mentioned Para. 162 Anglo : 43,9%
INBS : 59%
(para. 118) See
also para. 173
“the institutions
will almost
completely exit all
the markets where
they were present”
(para. 174)
AIB/EBS
C
Para. 107 Para. 123 Para. 98, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
14% (para. 59 in
the context of
viability; see
also para. 50305 )
Bank of
Ireland
(2010)
C
Para. 184 Para. 214 [4-5]%
(para. 176)
[20-30]%
(para. 248) *306
Bank of
Ireland
(2011)
C
Para. 130 Para. 166 4-5% RWA
(para. 100)
[…]% (para. 178)
IL&P
(PTSB)
C
Para. 69 Para. 86 18% (para. 60) Not mentioned
Quinn
Insurance
S/T/W
Not mentioned Para. 145 Not mentioned Not mentioned
303. “FHB has taken the necessary steps to significantly reduce its involvement in the mortgage
bond market.”
304. Justification in para. 94.
305. “The Bank has already implemented a wide range of restructuring measures before
submitting the final version of the restructuring plan, with a view to achieving the aims
of long-term viability, own contribution and burden sharing. Those measures comprise
business divestments, asset deleveraging” (para. 50)
306. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
MPS
C
Not mentioned Para. 144 3,7%
(para. 152)
20% (para. 155)
BRC
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned 29% of total
assets
(para. 65)
“BRC will cease to
exist entirely as
a stand-alone
competitor”
(para. 68)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
Parex banka
S/C/W
Para. 134 Para. 145 Para. 111, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
60%
(para. 152) *307
MLB
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
LCCU
C
* *308 Para. 61, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
No restructuring,
but there is a
justification in
para. 69
AB Ukio
Bankas
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned 71% of RWA
of legacy
business
(para. 89)
80% (para. 93)
307. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
308. See para. 57: “the Commission finds that the restructuring process is adequate”.
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
ING
C
Not mentioned Para. 135 5% (para. 141) 45% (para. 54,
82, 143) *309
ABN AMRO
C
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 280 Not mentioned
(although para. 323
mentions the
divestment of
new HBU)
SNS REAAL
(2010)
C
Para. 70 Not mentioned Less than 2%
(para. 67, 79)
20-25% of RWA
(para. 80)
SNS REAAL
(2013)
C
Para. 79-80 Para. 94 7,8%/9,4%
(para. 62)
Not explicitly
mentioned in
the
compatibility-
assessment
Aegon
C
Not mentioned Not mentioned 3,8% (para. 94) 6% (para. 121)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
CGD
C
Para. 22, 65 Para. 79 2,3% (para. 89) [10-20]%
(para. 22, 65)
BPI
C
Para. 29-36 Not mentioned 6% (para. 92) [20-30]%
(para. 70)
BCP
C
Para. 38-46 Para. 109 5,4%
(para. 113)
[15-30]% (para. 45)
[20-40]% including
sale BCP Poland
(para. 57)
BPN
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 182, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
Not really
mentioned310
BES
S/C/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not really
mentioned311
Banif
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Para. 115, but
only absolute
amount, no
percentage
Not mentioned
309. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
310. “The retail banking business that will be taken over by BIC has a balance sheet of less than
35% of the balance sheet of BPN before its nationalisation.” (para. 250; see also para. 195-
198 and para. 226)
311. “The Bad Bank will gradually reduce its balance sheet and off- balance sheet exposure
total by at least [20-30]% by […] and by additional [30-40]% by […].” (para. 79)
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
Abanka
C
Para. 120-126 Not mentioned [30-40]% (para.
150)
[…] (para. 150)
Abanka/
Banka Celje
C
Para. 149-154 Not mentioned 18,3%
(para. 177)
[20-30]% balance
sheet [10-20]%
RWA (para. 179)
NKBM
C
Para. 113-119 Para. 138 [30-40]%
(para. 144)
[…] (para. 119)
NLB
C
Para. 136-138 Para. 157 20%
(para. 92, 163)
[…] (para. 55)
Probanka
W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Gradual reduction
of balance sheet
(para. 24, 60)
Factor Banka
W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Gradual reduction
of balance sheet
(para. 23, 59)
Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
Catalunya
Banc
C
Para. 167-168 Para. 174e 32,3%
(para. 123, 178)
[60-70]% in terms
of RWA
(para. 63, 180)
NCG Banco
C
Para. 161-162 Para. 173 22,27%
(para. 177)
[30-40]%
(para. 181)
BFA C Para. 191-192 Para. 201v [20-30]%, para.
205 22%, para.
140
[40-50]%
(para. 210)
BMN C Para. 135-136 Para. 149 9,4% (para. 93,
153)
[40-50]%
(para. 51, 155)
Liberbank
C
Para. 123 Para. 131 4,06%
(para. 82, 135)
[20-30]%
(para. 137)
Banco de
Valencia
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned 64,4%
(para. 116, 189)
“disappearance of
BVA as a
standalone entity”
(para. 190)
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Banco CAM
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned 30-33%
(para. 162)
“disappearance
of CAM as a
standalone entity”
(para. 163)
UNNIM Banc
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned 24,8% (para.
120)
“disappearance of
UNNIM Banc as
a standalone entity”
(para. 179)
Cajatres
T
Not mentioned Para. 154 8,6%
(para. 94, 160)
Para. 164
Banco Galleco
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned 43,4%
(para. 136)
“disappearance of
Banco Gallego as
a standalone entity”
(para. 137)
CajaSur
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned […]% of
CajaSur’s
RWA.
(para. 99)
“exit of a failed
entity” (para. 100)
Caja
Castilla-
La Mancha
(CCM)
T
Not mentioned Not mentioned 51,7%
(para. 197 and
136)
“exit of a failed
entity” (para. 199)
“significant
downsizing of
the banking
activities
transferred to
Banco Liberta”
(para. 203)
Banco CEISS
(2012)
C
Para. 143 Para. 154 7,8%
(para. 101, 159)
[20-30]%
(para. 163)
Banco CEISS
(2013)
T
Para. 101 Para. 112 7,8%/8,65%n
(para. 118)
more than
[20 – 30]%
(para. 122)
Banco CEISS
(2014)
T
Para. 93 Para. 109 0,75%
(para. 103, 115)
additional
[10 – 20]%
reduction in the
balance sheet
(para. 117)
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Focus on core
activities
Sale of activities Aid amount (%) Balance sheet
reduction (%)
LBG
C
Para. 70-71 Para. 161 3%/4,1%
(para. 178)
25%
(para. 191) *312
RBS
C
Para. 58 Para. 215 Between 11,3
and 19,6%
(para. 234)
[above 20]% of
total balance sheet
and [above 40]%
of funded balance
sheet
(para. 59, 250; see
also footnote
37) *313
Northern
Rock
S/C/W
Not mentioned Para. 144-145 Para. 40,
99-101
“The balance sheet
will be less than
[30-35]% of the
original size of
NR in 2007”
(para. 156)
B&B
S/T/W
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned
Dunfermline
S/T/W
Not mentioned Para. 121 Not mentioned “break-up of the
former
Dunfermline and
the
subsequent
wind-down of 50%
of its business”
(para. 124-125)
312. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
313. NB: one divestment was specifically aimed at creating a new competitor.
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dank daarvoor.
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promovendi buiten mijn eigen sectie. Mijn collega’s van Boat BVwil ik hier ook
niet onvermeld laten.
Eva en Bart zijn twee mensen die ik in het bijzonder zou willen bedanken. Het
is niet voor niets dat ik jullie als paranimf heb gevraagd. Wat jullie voor mij
betekend hebben, heb ik al op een andere plaats toegelicht.
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Sebastiaan, ook jou zou ik willen bedanken. Afgelopen jaren hebben we elkaar
vaak gesproken tijdens een goede lunch. Bij die gesprekken heb ik veel met je
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Tot slot zou ik mijn ouders en zusje willen bedanken. Jullie spelen een belang-
rijke rol in mijn leven en daar ben ik jullie dankbaar voor.
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